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Preface
 The Terrifying Convergence of the Three Worlds 
of the “Social  Question”
Göran Therborn
Reading this great collection of planet-embracing, penetrating analyses by emi-
nent area specialists, you can almost hear Minerva’s owl flapping her wings in the 
social dusk of the world. We get a picture of how the social issues of the world hang 
together, with all their differences; we can see how global patterns become discern-
ible, rolled out over time, as well as in space.
Poverty, inequality, and social injustice are ancient plagues of humankind. But 
they emerged as a “social question” rather late, in a context of the Enlightenment 
and the Industrial Revolution—the former by putting inequality and human rights 
on the agenda, though mainly existential inequality before the law, and the latter 
by producing poverty and misery by wage labor. The editors and authors of this 
book have put the social question into a broad socioeconomic dynamics of accu-
mulation and dispossession and of class and labor.
The awareness and the notion of a social question derived from the emergence of 
wage labor—that is, of formally free and substantially unprotected labor, disembed-
ded from family subsistence and constantly at risk from polluting working conditions, 
from accidents, sickness, unemployment, and from old age frailty. Wage labor emerged 
and developed on different scales and with different temporalities worldwide, spawn-
ing different responses to the question. Industrial wage labor originated in Western 
Europe, spreading unevenly across the world, most early and successfully to North 
America, giving rise to what we now call the Global North. Wage labor became the 
work of the majority of the world’s population only recently, in the second decade 
of the twenty-first century, now estimated by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) at 54 percent, up from about 40 percent in the early 1990s. In sub-Saharan Africa 
and in South Asia, wage labor is still only a fourth of people’s work status.
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From a perspective of wage labor in general and of industrial wage labor in 
particular, there was, as this book shows, a very different trajectory of social devel-
opment in the Global South, reigning in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, with 
both intra- and intercontinental variations, just as the northern route comprises 
the three well-known mini-worlds of welfare capitalism. There are good reasons 
to distinguish as a third route—also treated in this book—the eastern route of 
twentieth-century communist socialism, opened by the Russian and the Chinese 
Revolutions, which provided another approach to the social question. The differ-
ent areas of wage labor were always connected by the imperialism of European and 
(later) U.S. capitalism, and area developments were increasingly synchronized by 
a world time of crucial events, above all, the two World Wars and, decisively, the 
neoliberal offensive of the 1980s and onward.
THE GLOBAL ONSL AUGHT OF POSTINDUSTRIAL 
 FINANCE CAPITALISM
Perhaps the most surprising finding of this rich worldwide overview is the synchro-
nized turn, since the 1980s, of all the three trajectories of the social question into a 
neoliberal plunge. With some time lags, there is occurring a dramatic convergence 
of the three historical paths, toward one of social precarity, of more human exploi-
tation and exclusion—although the legacies of their different employment devel-
opments and different social institutions are likely to lead to different responses in 
the medium term.
In the North, where it all started, there are de-industrialization of employment, 
beginning in 1965, accelerating from 1975, and the financialization of capitalism, 
from currency trading, credit deregulation, and the opening up to unhampered 
international capital movements. These tendencies provided the structural eco-
nomic underpinnings of aggressive neoliberal ideology and politics.
In the South, weakened by the lure of debt, the neoliberal message spread 
through the International Monetary Fund–World Bank (IMF-WB) Washington 
Consensus and its imposition of “structural adjustment policies.” A significant role 
was also played by the military-capitalist economics of Pinochetista Chile, namely, 
inspiring a worldwide World Bank campaign for privatization of pensions— which 
ultimately largely failed. In the Arab world, the military-corporatist compact was 
unraveled, leading up to the Arab Spring, in the end crushed by post-corporatist 
repression. India experienced how the previous, badly implemented social con-
tract was broken by Hinduist neoliberalism.
In the East, there were the collapse of the Soviet Union and the post-Mao capi-
talist turn of China. The latter was managed by the Chinese themselves, in many 
ways very successfully, including a spurt of updated industrialization and a mas-
sive lift out of extreme poverty, although with initially brutal social effects—for 
example, on health care and rural education. The Russian turn was under Western 
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tutelage, whose electoral-manipulation experts meddled forcefully in the 1996 
Russian election to ensure the victory of the Western candidate. This was the most 
brutal economic aggression since the heyday of colonial plundering. Between 1990 
and 1995, the income share of the bottom half of the Russian population plum-
meted from 30 percent to 10 percent, and by 2016, the latter had an income 20 
percent below their income in 1989, under communist “stagnation.”1
The worldwide commonality of postindustrial neoliberal ideology and ruling 
practices is highlighted by the current Chinese promotion of “entrepreneurship” 
and the practice of the gig economy, as Ching Kwan Lee shows in this book.2 The 
worldwide structural changes that made the synchronized global political turn of 
the 1980s possible still awaits a full-scale analysis.
The chapters of this book provide a somber picture of what the neoliberal 
onslaught means to the world, and they give us, all of us outside the ever- narrowing 
circle of the privileged, reasons to fear for our future—but also reasons to fight 
against our prescribed fate.
The numbers and the proportion of wage workers in the world will continue 
to grow—as service workers, dispersed among decentralized or small workplaces, 
never reaching the concentrated mass of big industry workers. The industrial 
trajectory of the North will not be repeated. Industrial employment seems to 
have reached its world peak, at barely a fourth of the economically active world 
population. Deindustrialization has already started in Latin America, and indus-
trial employment has stalled or begun to decline elsewhere.3 Even in China, the 
number of industrial workers seems to have started to decrease in this century.4 
The northern trajectory of the social question, propelled by industrialization and 
industrial labor to workers’ rights and to social citizenship, is now closed in the 
South and the East as well as in the North.
FROM THE WORKERS QUESTION TO “INCLUSION”
The social question of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was the workers 
question. The latter is now gone, or discarded, all over the world. Does it have any 
successor? Perhaps none with any equally broad legitimacy, but in terms of a social 
issue talked about by a concerned establishment—which was the semantic field of 
the original social question—there is a plausible candidate. “Inclusion” was put 
onto the EU agenda of the 2000 Lisbon Strategy, and later adopted by the Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), inserted into the 
UN Development Goals, and sponsored by the World Bank and the Asian Devel-
opment Bank in the form of “inclusive growth.” The concept does point to some-
thing central in postindustrial twenty-first-century societies—the ongoing process 
of social exclusion and inequality, as evidenced in all of the following chapters.
However, the problem is that the workers question was not really tackled by 
enlightened ruling-class concern, but by the force of the workers themselves, their 
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mutualités, their trade unions, their votes, their strikes and demonstrations, and 
their political parties, moved forward by the strong tailwind of expansive indus-
trialization. How much force will the excluded and the marginalized of today be 
able to gather—the shrinking industrial working class, the “informal” workers 
on sub-industrial-standard employment, the precariat, the subsistence farmers 
under mounting pressure, the roving day laborers, the street vendors, the never-
employed youth, all facing a strong headwind of global finance capitalism? To 
what extent will they be able to find allies among the middle-class salariat, also 
threatened by the ruthlessness of capital accumulation?
And into what kind of society can they be possibly included? Hardly into con-
temporary capitalism. The industrial response to the workers question was an 
extensive class compromise, a changed capitalism, of workers’ rights and civic 
rights. Without strong forces of resistance and rebellion, what is awaiting us—
all rhetoric of “inclusion” notwithstanding—would be galloping inequality and 
exclusion.
These are questions for a sequel to this great book.
NOTES
1. F. Alvaredo, L. Chancel, T. Piketty, E. Saez, and G. Zucman, World Inequality Report 2018, 118–19.
2. China cannot be comprehended in one formula, however. The official bicentenary promotion of 
Marx and the current mandated politburo reading of the Communist Manifesto indicate that.
3. International Labour Organization, World Employment Social Outlook 2018, 30–31.
4. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Employment Outlook 2017, 122.
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The Social Question All Over Again
Jan Breman, Kevan Harris, Ching Kwan Lee, and Marcel van der Linden
Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor, and Idleness. These were, according to the Brit-
ish liberal reformer William Beveridge, the enemies of social progress. Together, 
the five “giant evils” express the so-called social question: that is, the problem of 
indigence and destitution on a mass scale. Originally a French notion, created 
more than two centuries ago (la question sociale), the social question became the 
leitmotiv for the many laws and policy measures in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries that resulted, in a relatively small part of the world—in capitalist wel-
fare states and some “state-socialist” societies—in extensive protective arrange-
ments for the disabled, the old, and the unemployed, as well as in health care, 
housing, and education accessible to (almost) all. Due to uneven development of 
capitalism on a world scale, however, working people in colonized and dominated 
Africa, Latin America, and Asia were excluded—indeed, necessarily—from the 
benefits and progress of the Global North. Between the 1970s and 2010s, global 
development has slowly led to the return of the social question with a vengeance, 
but without the assertive engagement that had made it publicly visible and politi-
cally urgent in earlier times. The decline of average profit rates in “old” capitalist 
countries, the collapse of state-socialist competitors to capitalism, and the con-
comitant rise of neoliberal ideologies have brought turmoil to the vast majority 
of the world’s working population. The pernicious effects of mass immiseration 
have found poignant political expressions in, on the one hand, the surge in ultra- 
conservative, nationalistic, and populist politics and trends (such as the election of 
Donald Trump, Britain’s exit from the European Union, and xenophobic rejections 
of refugees arriving in Europe), and on the other, the mass protests and occupy 
movements against austerity and crony capitalism. And yet, the worldwide erasure 
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of the “social” in favor of self-employment and self-reliance emphasized by neolib-
eral ideology has repressed the social question from public discussion.
This introduction offers a stylized global overview of the evolution of the social 
question since it was first articulated in nineteenth-century Europe. We attend 
to both its discursive constructions and its material and political manifestations. 
But first, it is important to differentiate the frame of the social question from the 
dominant paradigm of “poverty alleviation.” The disappointing outcome of the 
postwar decades of developmentalism led to the declaration of the Millennium 
Development Goals at the end of the twentieth century, making the worldwide 
reduction of poverty the prime objective. Fifteen years later, equating the march 
to human progress with poverty alleviation and the diminution of development 
policy to this shallow ambit has been hailed as a remarkable success story. The 
country and regional case studies collected in this volume mount a major rebuttal 
to this assessment. The empirical findings in this book show that the persistent 
belief in a trickle-down spread of the benefits of economic growth to the subaltern 
classes is an illusion that ignores an accelerating immiseration resulting from dis-
possession, dislocation, and disenfranchisement.
It is not just the failure of poverty alleviation as development policy that gives 
us pause. There is an important conceptual difference between poverty and the 
social question. Poverty exists when people find it difficult to make ends meet. 
The deficit forces them to make painful choices, some of which are temporary in 
nature or restricted in magnitude and are made manageable by deferring gratifica-
tion, occasionally or forever, of needs given a lower priority. Destitution, a more 
severe and chronic grade of misery, requires not incidental but institutionalized 
support to safeguard even sheer survival. Whereas the notions of poverty and 
destitution allude to the personal, immediate, and often irreversible deprivation 
afflicting people in that predicament, the social question points to the relational, 
institutional, and political economic forces constitutive of destitution as a histori-
cally specific phenomenon. As Marcel van der Linden elaborates in his contribu-
tion to this volume, the understanding and assessment of destitution as a social 
issue demanding public awareness, legal mediation, and state intervention did not 
come about until the great transformation in nineteenth-century Europe. It was 
linked, on the one hand, to the increasing commodification of social relations and 
the concomitant transition from an agrarian-rural to an industrial-urban econ-
omy and, on the other hand, to a social consciousness expressing solidarity spear-
headed by an emancipatory working-class movement in Europe.
HISTORICAL TR AJECTORY OF THE SO CIAL QUESTION
Pre-Capitalist Responses to Indigence
Indigence did exist in the pre-capitalist era, before commodified labor relations 
became widespread, perhaps as far back as European antiquity, but historical 
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research on this issue is underdeveloped.1 In many pre-capitalist agrarian soci-
eties, huge differentials in wealth and income could exist, but often the poorest 
layers of society were at least minimally protected by forms of communal relief. 
Frequently, better-off agrarian or artisanal households were obliged to chip in to 
extend support to deprived neighbors in their small-scale midst. In Europe’s late 
Middle Ages, for example, communal relief was institutionalized at the local level 
in the Poor Laws, which lightened the burden of improvidence. Redistributive 
mechanisms were usually endorsed by a religious code prescribing charity, as, for 
instance, provided by the collection of zakat, a payment in kind or cash made 
under Islamic law. To prevent or at least slow down an unwelcome trend toward 
increasing dispossession, many peasant societies utilized the custom of the com-
mons, which implied open access to resources jointly held nearby, such as waste 
land or water, to members of the same rural community. A periodic redistribution 
of cultivated land, as, for instance, in the traditional Russian mir or among indig-
enous tribes in South America, was a more rigorous way to preempt progressive 
differentiation in property and power. Were such customary arrangements, which 
pressed for some modicum of redistribution, a feature of all peasant societies? It 
seems likely that a large part of humanity used to live and work in societies marked 
by inequality in all walks of life.
Capital accumulation, commodification of land and labor, and dispossession of 
peasants and artisans went hand in hand. This trend first became visible in Europe 
when the medieval communitarian economy that still leaned toward autarky was 
finally destroyed. Varieties of feudalism had eroded peasant property while silenc-
ing the voice of the victimized peasantry. In his early Memoir on Pauperism, pub-
lished in 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, “from the moment that landed property 
was recognized and men had converted the vast forests into fertile cropland and 
rich pasture, . . . individuals arose who accumulated more land than they required 
to feed themselves and so perpetuated property in the hands of their progeny.”2 As 
a consequence of the enclosure movement, the large estates in England became 
even larger and were operated more commercially. Max Weber’s treatise on the 
agrarian question is equally relevant for understanding how the social question 
was handled in the rural past. Elaborating on the concept of patrimonial rule prac-
ticed in the eastern German provinces, he characterized the relationship between 
the landlord (Junker), who maximized power and status instead of production, 
and the farm servant, who was tied to his employer’s household on an annual 
contract in which he received discretionary benevolence for the permanent use 
made of his labor power. It was a form of attachment marked by exploitation as 
well as patronage.3
The Great Transformation in Europe
Taking stock of a large amount of data collected in a survey toward the end of 
the nineteenth century, Max Weber, who was commissioned by the Verein für 
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Sozialpolitik (Association of Social Policy) for this analysis, focused his  attention 
on the inroads capitalism had made in the rural economy. A drastic change in the 
crop patterns, caused by a higher volume of international trade, led to a pronounced 
seasonality in the cultivation cycle. In reaction to increased commercialization, 
estate owners had started to replace their attached workforce with casual labor 
hired only when their presence was required in peak periods. Swarms of seasonal 
hands from Poland and Russia—“barbarian hordes,” in Weber’s  vocabulary—with 
less physical ability but willing to work on very low wages, flooded the coun-
tryside of eastern Germany in the busy months, only to disappear again when 
employment fell. Landlords were no longer willing to guarantee the livelihood of 
agricultural laborers in the relentless drive to proletarianization. While seasonal 
migrants were hired when needed, the local landless could not survive on tempo-
rary, off-and-on work. They had become superfluous to demand and took off to 
the city to find employment in industry, construction, or other sectors of the now 
rapidly expanding urban economy.
A similar turn had taken place in Great Britain somewhat earlier on. A drastic 
revision of the Poor Laws in 1834, two years after the middle classes had gained 
suffrage under the 1832 Reform Act, took away the public relief that, since the 
medieval era, had been provided locally to unemployed labor in times of need. 
Forthwith, it was provided exclusively to the non-laboring poor—the elderly, wid-
ows, the handicapped, and the chronically ill. Their dole was granted only when 
they were fortunate enough to pass the “means test,” confirming that they did not 
get support from relatives or other donors. Parliament, which still mainly con-
sisted of members hailing from the landed aristocracy, debated why and how to 
amend the Poor Laws. The immediate ground for the amendments seemed to be 
the growing resistance of the non-poor to contribute to a public fund spent on 
labor labeled as unwilling to search around for waged work and thus take care of 
their own sustenance. Hidden sentiments behind expressing annoyance against 
what was portrayed as a “free rider” mentality were inspired by a steadfast refusal 
to accept maintenance of the idle poor as a burden to the commonweal in which 
the non-poor must share. Summing up the essence of the amendment, Karl Polányi 
wrote, “No relief any longer for the able-bodied unemployed, no minimum wages 
either, not a safeguarding of the right to live. Labor should be dealt with as that 
which it was, a commodity which must find its price in the market.”4 A covertly 
held consideration was the impelling need to drive the land-poor and landless 
away from their rural habitats, in which they found minimal security in times of 
distress, and to urban growth poles to feed the local stock of labor required for the 
new industrial economy.
Disqualified from Relief
The revision of the Poor Laws formed the main push for the falling from grace 
for many throughout Europe. This turned agrarian workers, who had always been 
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stakeholders, into outsiders from the commonweal, once they lost their regular 
jobs and were hired off and on as casual hands. They were no longer eligible for 
public relief when unemployed. Over time, and as a consequence of the lengthen-
ing chain of dependency far beyond local reach and control, the segment cut loose 
from wherever it belonged in terms of work and life rapidly increased. Their rise 
to an abundant number with the worldwide advance of capitalism, multi-class in 
origin and joining the ranks of the stigmatized lot, is captured well in Karl Marx’s 
description of what he rather disparagingly called the Lumpenproletariat.5 Due to 
ongoing dispossession, the land-poor and landless classes in European countries 
had rapidly increased in size and were forced to vie for sources of livelihood other 
than what had been the prime sector of the economy in previous generations. 
The transformation went together with a major restructuring or destruction of 
artisanal forms of production. An accelerated footlooseness of adults, as well as 
minors, occurred within the countryside, but mobility from village to town or city 
increased even more. Sprawling urban locations required the presence of mas-
sive armies of labor for the transport and storage of a steadily growing volume 
of goods, not only at expanding industrial work sites but also for building up an 
infrastructure consisting of railway lines, stations, canals, dockyards, roads, and 
warehouses. The exploitation of men, women, and children ruthlessly put to work 
in the intensified process of economic activity—and their total lack of wherewithal 
to cope with the commodification to which they were subjected—led to stark pov-
erty and pauperization. It was a consequence of capital becoming dominant in the 
new landscape of economic production.
The Struggle against Adversity and the Northern Class Compromise
The deterioration in livelihood caused by loss of employment as well as habitat 
instigated new forms of social security. As a first step, many from the ranks of 
the somewhat better-off and more regularly employed wage earners organized 
mutual-aid societies, usually beginning as small-scale, local operations, but grad-
ually becoming interregional and even national. These forms of social security 
excluded, however, significant segments of the working population. Women were 
usually not admitted, and the poorest workers were not eligible because of their 
fluctuating and insufficient incomes.6 Ongoing pauperization of the “dangerous 
classes” on a mass scale, their sporadic violent and rebellious behavior, and their 
deteriorating health combined with new forms of trade-union actions, leading to 
more encompassing forms of association in which claims for improvement were 
articulated. From the late eighteenth-century, trade unions began to organize the 
workforce; after 1848, their strength increased and, backed up by industrial action, 
they gradually succeeded in institutionalizing forms of collective bargaining. The 
threat of straightforward confrontations between capital and labor was avoided—
or at least mitigated—when the state, through a variety of regulations, started 
to defuse the risk of havoc, which, in all likelihood, would have resulted from a 
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head-on clash between them. Mediation was operationalized through extensive 
labor legislation that made basic rights of the workforce mandatory, such as fixing 
minimum wages (and a hike, in case of price rise), steadily lowering the ceiling for 
hours at work, and, in case of dispute, requiring obligatory arbitration.
The transformation that occurred until and beyond the middle of the  twentieth 
century has resulted in a relative rise in working-class power in what were, of 
course, still capitalist societies. The social struggle that came about in industrial-
izing and urbanizing Europe had two major components. In the first place, better 
conditions of employment ensued, such as higher wages; a change from piece rate 
to time rate; a shorter working day, week, and life; safety at work; paid leave; and a 
premium on schooling and skilling. All this culminated in a standard contract that 
conceded the right to collective action and representation.7 In the second place, 
the provision of social security and protection took shape, which included health 
insurance, a pension fund for the aged, allowances in case of injuries and handi-
caps while at work, gratuities or bonuses, and, to cap it all, compensation for loss 
of employment. 
Growth of the Welfare State and the Public Economy
What initially had been posed as a labor question, pure and simple, metamor-
phosed into a wider question expressing aspirations for a decent and dignified 
mode of existence. The deepening of public authority climaxed in the emergence 
of the welfare state that slowly came about in this part of the world during the 
first half of the twentieth century. An important element of the social progress 
made in Europe was the extension of suffrage, first for adult men and, belatedly, 
for women as well. The social question transfigured from the realm of labor to the 
realm of citizenship at large. The universalization of social security provisions—
including medical insurance, compulsory education at young age, pension rights, 
unemployment and disability benefits, widows’ and orphans’ support, and supple-
mented, after World War II, by child benefits and an old-age allowance—often 
extended to a large segment of the population and made an important contribu-
tion to their well-being. In the righteous jargon of politicians and policy makers, 
this was known as care “from the cradle to the grave.” Memories of the trente glo-
rieuses, roughly from 1945 to 1975, evoke feelings of nostalgia. The working classes 
of the erstwhile Second World would have ample reason to share those sentiments.
Conditional to the realization of the ambition to raise people’s standard of life 
was the intervention of the state machinery in building up a much larger and 
strengthened public economy than had existed before. The first steps toward this 
attempt to bring the former notion of the commons to the national level were 
taken in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with the establishment 
of municipal utility corporations for gas, water, and electricity and for garbage and 
sewage disposal, as well as sanitation. Cooperative housing societies, the postal 
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and telephone services, public transport and insurance authorities were set up to 
cater to the commonweal and public works to upgrade the physical infrastructure. 
And, to top it all, public health and education became schemes of welfarism. The 
creation of the welfare state was inextricably linked to the emergence of public 
institutions, space, and agency. The flipside of a steadily expanding public domain 
was, of course, higher (albeit income-differentiated) taxation and increasing 
bureaucratization.8
The so-called Second World of the Soviet Union and its allies in Europe, as well as 
in the world at large, claimed to have put the social question at the top of the national 
agenda. After all, in its revolutionary origin was the promise to end the exploitation 
and suppression of the working classes by capitalism. In China, the urban laboring 
class employed in state-owned enterprises was a minority in a system that excluded 
the vast majority of rural producers and urban temporary workers from its iconic 
state paternalism. As Ching Kwan Lee documents in her contribution to this vol-
ume, even this exclusionary socialist welfare system gave way to a secular process of 
precarization and political exclusion for labor. The disappearance of the only alter-
native to capitalism lifted the pressure on Western democracies to demonstrate the 
superiority of their system through welfare provision.
Falling behind and the “Southern” Class Compromise
Vast tracts of the planet had remained exempt from the march of progress, result-
ing in what turned out to be a time-bound social compact. The Global South, 
made up of societies and economies subjected to (semi-)colonial rule imposed 
from the metropoles in the Global North, fell behind in stagnation. The split in 
the global working class, having its origin in the uneven path of development, 
with colonialism as a major cause, eventuated in a growing segregation between 
frontrunners in the Global North and latecomers in the Global South. After the 
abolition of slavery, new forms of unfree labor were introduced, on the pretext 
that the limited needs to which the “natives” were habituated made them work 
shy. It led to the recruitment, in the backward economies, of armies of indentured 
coolies deployed worldwide to enclaves of capitalist production, such as mines and 
plantations in the southern hemisphere. The work contracts in which they were 
entrapped could not be reneged, and protest or resistance against the harsh labor 
regime was brutally punished. The major part of humankind remained embedded 
in village-based economies, producing food mainly for their own livelihood. The 
low-level technology explained why these small-scale peasant communities went 
on to live and work from generation to generation without much change and were, 
in years of scarcity, supposed to help each other out in a pattern of shared poverty.
Sustained and intensified colonial rule was now portrayed as a civilizing mis-
sion with the pledge to “add value” where it was considered to be absent. In the 
early twentieth century, the international alliance of social-democratic parties 
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endorsed the French proclamation of this mise-en-valeur thesis.9 It meant the 
endorsement and propagation of a racist doctrine that justified the ongoing subor-
dination of the “lower” segments of humanity held back in an imperialist setting. 
On the eve of independence from colonial rule, only a tiny fraction of the total 
workforce—a privileged contingent of modern factory hands and office work-
ers mainly—had come to enjoy formalized conditions of employment. The large 
majority of men and women engaged in waged work were firmly stuck in labor 
relations that remained thoroughly informalized. The formal-informal divide that 
became so prominent in the late twentieth century has its origin in labor policies 
of the colonial period.
In the wake of decolonization of the Global South around the mid-twentieth 
century—though Latin America had gotten rid of formal colonialism earlier on—
internal developments in the Global South led to a “southern class compromise.” 
Rapid urbanization in the developing countries from 1950 to 1970 compelled 
governments in Latin America, the Middle East, and North Africa to pacify the 
urban popular groups consisting of both poor and middle classes with price sub-
sidies, public services, and other forms of social wage guarantees. As Kevan Harris 
shows for the Middle East and North Africa, nationalization of major industries 
and expansion of state bureaucracy made the public economy a major provider of 
formal employment. This pact of developmentalist populism was orchestrated by 
a class coalition of state bureaucracy and industrial and export interests that paid 
the price of social peace with concessions to urban dwellers.10 National sociopo-
litical formations shaped the particular mode of compromise. In South Africa, 
as Ben Scully discusses in his chapter, the settler colonial response to the social 
question was in the form of a whites-only welfare state, a racialized social com-
pact that excluded the majority black population. Overall, whereas in advanced 
industrial societies the compromise was essentially an exchange between orga-
nized capital and organized labor, the southern class compromise was driven by 
the state, which incorporated and subordinated urban labor.11 As Ronaldo Munck 
and Mao Mollona examine in Latin American cases, since the mid-1970s, this class 
compromise has begun to unravel, as southern states plunged into a sustained debt 
crisis and International Monetary Fund–inspired adjustment programs triggered 
widespread austerity protests by the urban classes.
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the two transnational 
corporations set up by the Bretton Woods system of financial management, 
expanded their original mandate, which had mainly focused on the advanced 
economies. Increasingly, both agencies started to extend their operations to the 
provision of loans to developing countries with conditionality clauses meant to 
prevent or undo fiscal imbalances. Announced as structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs), policies were advocated that privatized and deregulated what had been 
the prerogative of state-directed welfare management exercised by the national 
treasury. Andreas Eckert has commented on the impact of this policy in Africa. 
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No transnational agency was set up to handle the social mandate. Instead, Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) were announced to suggest that higher rates 
of economic growth in the catching-up countries were both a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for welfare to trickle down. The fading away of the state as a broker 
between capital and labor was the outcome of the neoliberal strategy that first 
became mandatory in the Global South. After the turn of the century, it was also 
imposed on the Global North and became increasingly dominant the world over. 
In the former Soviet bloc countries, the shift that endeavored to boost the “free 
market” led to much reduced funding on social-sector expenditure and a major 
contraction of the sizable public economy. Carine Clément shows in her chapter 
how shock therapy in Russia in the 1990s took a heavy toll on Russian workers 
and their families and led to a rampant normalization and individualization of 
precarity. Don Kalb similarly highlights how liberalization and market reforms in 
post-socialist Eastern Europe undermined the strong and militant solidarities of 
the 1980s labor movements in the region.
THE RETURN OF THE SO CIAL QUESTION UNDER 
GLOBAL CAPITALISM
In drawing the final balance of the Millennium Development Goals, bringing a 
growing number of people above the threshold of deprivation is highlighted as the 
successful outcome of neoliberal policies. The World Bank’s felicitous observation 
of gradually diminishing indigence all over the world—from 14.5 percent in 2011 to 
12.8 percent in 2012 and, hopefully, to below 10 percent in 2015—stems from fixing 
the takeoff point at a budget considered to be adequate for the poorest countries 
in the world. In 1990, when the global poverty line became set for the first time, 
the yardstick was the ability to spend not less than one dollar a day per capita, 
the international poverty line based on the purchasing power parity (PPP) index. 
After a hike of this amount to $1.25 in 2005, it was further raised to $1.90 in 2011 in 
order to account for rising prices. In this statistical exercise, the growing part of the 
population sliding downward in the advanced economies is totally disregarded. It 
is an oversight compounded by the assumption that indigence is a condition that 
is absolute. It defies the point of view that poverty should be perceived as a lack of 
means defined both in relative as well as relational terms. The global downfall is not 
one of capitalism, as Immanuel Wallerstein has already been arguing for a number 
of years.12 It should rather be understood and tackled as an increasing shortage 
of gainful employment and too low a price for rewarding an incessantly growing 
workforce in the world. One result of the globalizing economy is that the dominat-
ing trend of increasing inequity appears to indicate a growing divergence between 
social classes. While inequality between countries is slowly decreasing, inequal-
ity within countries is rapidly growing. For the Global North, Thomas Piketty has 
amply documented the enrichment of owners and managers of capital.13
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Divergent Trajectories between the Global North and Global South
The notion that postcolonial countries, in the aftermath of the successful fight 
for national sovereignty, would be put on the track to progress by their erstwhile 
rulers pretending to be inclined to more altruistic policies than before was met 
with skeptical appraisals. To start with, it is an evolutionary imagery that does not 
acknowledge a substantial drain from the Global South during the era of colonial-
ism in building up the lead position of the Global North. The early growth trajec-
tory in the Atlantic basin had partly been achieved by extracting surplus from 
countries in the Global South caught up in a stultified, backward rural economy. 
These transfers—written up as a drain in the dissenting literature—contributed 
to the in-country process of accumulation going on in the Global North. To this 
critical assessment, other major diversions in the differential growth and devel-
opment trajectories in the world, separated from each other in a prolonged time 
span, should be added. The most significant of these other distinctive features 
were limits to demands for labor and a drastically changed appraisal on the role 
of migration.
Of major importance is the much lower land-labor ratio in mid-nineteenth-
century Europe as compared to the much higher pressure in the mid-twentieth 
century on agrarian resources elsewhere, particularly in Asia. While the push away 
from agriculture and the countryside amounted to a ballpark figure of 120–150 
million people in Europe between 1850 and 1914, the exodus going on one cen-
tury later out of the major countries of Asia easily adds up to a staggering above 
700 million mostly land poor and landless peasants. Driven out by a stark lack of 
employment and income opportunities in and outside the primary sector of pro-
duction in the countryside, a major segment of these uprooted masses of migrants 
try to establish a foothold in the expanding urban economy. However, while work 
in industry became an alternative after the loss of agrarian-rural livelihoods in 
erstwhile Europe, it has remained modest in size in the postcolonial societies. This 
means that the newcomers to the towns and cities of the Global South are depen-
dent for employment on earnings made in construction, transport, petty trade, 
and services. Even in China, reputed to be today’s workshop of the world, indus-
trial jobs employ less than half of an estimated 300–350 million migrants who 
have left the countryside during the last quarter of a century. In India, as well as in 
other Asian countries, the size of the industrial workforce is still much lower, even 
if we include self-employed and mainly home-based manufacturers along with 
factory labor. Prospects of acceleration in industrial activity, providing jobs to a 
much larger percentage of the total workforce, are slight. While the first stage of 
the industrial revolution in the Global North continued was highly labor intensive, 
the transition to more advanced technology—first mechanization and automa-
tion, followed by computerization and robotization—has steadily given rise to a 
more capital-intensive mode of production and jobless forms of economic growth.
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Centuries earlier, when the European countryside started to depopulate, part of 
the redundant labor in agriculture did not migrate to towns and cities within the 
same country but left for destinations overseas. This transfer mitigated the pres-
sure on the swollen labor market at home. These earlier waves of emigrants settled 
down in the underpopulated zones of the planet—North and South America, 
southern Africa, Siberia, Australia, and New Zealand—to find better livelihoods 
than they had enjoyed before. The underpopulated territories on the global fron-
tiers happened to be inhabited by tribal communities driven off or wiped out in 
the march toward what was claimed to be a higher level of civilization. There are 
no more “empty” regions in today’s world.14 People nowadays, driven by distress 
and trying to get out of the Global South in desperate search of work and life, are 
no longer classified as brave colonists who are bid welcome to settle down in their 
country of arrival but have become labeled economic refugees. If escape from pov-
erty is their aim, they are even less welcome than newcomers better equipped with 
skills and physical as well as social capital to provide for their livelihood.
Informalization of Labor and Capital
By the turn of the new millennium, through different trajectories, the standard 
labor contract as part of the post-WWII class compromises in the Global North 
and the Global South has substantially unraveled. Informalization of labor has 
by leaps and bounds become a global trend. Its major features are as follows: no 
regulated jobs backed up by a labor contract, but hire-and-fire, according to the 
need of the moment; a variable length of the working day, fluctuating between 
too short or too long; extensive participation in the paid labor process at both 
underage and overage; no standardized wages with a fixed minimum, but piece-
rated remuneration imposed unilaterally and individually by the employer or his 
agent; erratic payment, either given by way of advance or settled afterward, but in 
both cases, a modality meant to reduce the labor price; injurious working condi-
tions at sites that are unclean, unhealthy, and hazardous or dangerous, leading to 
occupational diseases and accidents; no safeguard against dismissal, loss of labor 
power, and unemployment; and self-representation instead of collective bargain-
ing and forced self-employment coupled with self-provisioning. The case studies 
presented in this volume bear witness to the practices of informality and informal-
ization throughout the world. We cannot deny, of course, that huge differences in 
per capita income continue to exist between North and South. In the Global North 
there are still some vestiges left of the deal closed with labor when the economy 
was predominantly run along formalized lines of employment. Indigence in size, 
shape, and degree is much starker in the Global South than it has become once 
more in the Global North.
Not just labor, capital is also increasingly informalized. Labeled as a black cir-
cuit, massive financial transactions move around the globe, unregistered in gov-
ernmental bookkeeping and beyond the reach of the national exchequer. Gabriel 
12    The Social Question All Over Again
Zucman estimates that $7.6 trillion, or 8 percent of the world’s financial wealth, 
is held in tax havens. In Africa, the proportion is as high as 30 percent; in Russia 
and the Middle East, above 50 percent.15 The black money in circulation is difficult 
to estimate but might be close to or even larger than the amount of cash legally 
changing hands. Free market enterprise happens to be backed up by a political 
order at the level of the nation-state willing to go along with the directives of 
predatory capitalism. Handicapped by the absence of forceful and effective public 
governance in the global realm, it seems rather farfetched to presume that finan-
cialized freebooting, which has a strong lobby in privatized banking, will eventu-
ally be brought under public control.16
All over the world, rich and poor have disappeared from each other’s pres-
ence and even sight. They live in different circuits, and that lack of interaction 
means that the moral bearings of the social question got lost. Does the thoroughly 
informalized workforce in the global economy constitute a dangerous class? In our 
view, it might be more appropriate to label the down-and-out masses as an endan-
gered species, no longer embedded within the rights of citizenship in mainstream 
society.17 Take the case of the street vendor in a small Tunisian town who ended 
his life in self-immolation. Having failed to find a regular job, his efforts to scratch 
around at the bottom of the urban economy were met with police harassment, 
and in agony, he ended his life when his livelihood of the last resort was taken 
away from him. Such acts of defiance, though not rare, usually remain unseen and 
unheard in public space, but not in this instance. His refusal to bow down under 
lack of work and freedom fueled an outburst of popular anger. Demonstrations 
spread like wildfire and swept throughout North Africa and the Middle East in 
opposition to political, economic, and social tyranny.
Strains on Family and Reciprocity
In his contribution, Dennis Arnold highlights how, under the development regime 
the Asian Development Bank has imposed in Mekong South East Asia, “pro-poor” 
growth enclaves are set up that reproduce poverty rather than ameliorate it. The 
workforce is employed on an informal footing, and the migrants engaged, not 
earning enough to make a living, have to remain encapsulated in a fragile agrarian 
economy to do so. People steeped in progressive adversity have no other where-
withal than to fall back on makeshift solutions of long standing, such as support 
from family, neighbors, and others close to or far away from where they work and 
live. It is the low-profile way of mutual assistance, small-scale attempts to ward 
off setbacks by sharing expenses on life-cycle events or seasonal ups and downs 
among people in the same setting. But out of necessity, households have often 
become multi-locational, with members—both adults and children—pushed off 
to go wherever and for as long as waged work can be found. To bring dependents 
along would be an unbearable burden. As they drift away from home, the imposed 
mobility means that life for such labor migrants tends to become individualized, 
The Social Question All Over Again    13
deprived from the nearby comfort of parents or offspring. Claims on reciprocity 
put enormous strains on family relations. It explains why destitution is often an 
ordeal that coincides with a break-up of the household and ends in alienation 
and loneliness. Ben Scully’s chapter spotlights in particular the strain on the fam-
ily, especially the women, as central organizers of informal welfare and survival 
among South Africa’s poor.
Land Flight
Another coping mechanism for the surplus population is emigration, an option 
that has increasingly become perilous. In the receiving countries, migrant workers 
form a marginalized underclass depleted of minimal protection against exploita-
tion and oppression, as has become standing practice over the last half century, 
for example, in the Arab Gulf region. A doctrine of naked racism has emerged in 
many parts of the world, made manifest in autochthonous domination versus alien 
subordination. Labor in the globalized economy is prevented from uniting and 
fighting for their common interest—decent work and dignified life—by promot-
ing fault lines of segregation along what are considered to be primordial loyalties, 
such as gender, race, ethnicity, creed, caste, and nationality. It means that no com-
mon claims can be derived from the laboring status, since they clash with what are 
perceived as first-order sentiments.
The contingents of refugees from the Global South desperately trying to reach 
a safe haven in Europe, Russia, North America, or Australia tend to be equipped 
with an identity somewhat higher up in the class ranking, have enjoyed some 
degree of skilling or schooling, and, with familial support, are able to buy their 
way outside. They cross frontiers sans papiers and travel in the hope of good luck, 
often without knowing in advance where they will end up or wash ashore. Depots 
have been established either halfway or on the receiving end in which these flot-
sam and jetsam castaways are held in isolation, locked up because they have been 
found guilty of unauthorized trespassing at some point during their often ill-fated 
journey. In the middle of the twentieth century, the term displaced person (DP) 
was coined for the registration of people who had lost hearth and home. Half 
a century later, the abbreviation seems to express the fate of dumped people, 
arrested and detained out of sight for being a nuisance to citizens with a legal 
status of residence. When politicians insist that refugees have to be dealt with in 
or close to their country of origin, it is in euphemistic reference to detainment 
in permanent exile, end-stations for people considered to be surplus to demand. 
How to handle their presence? The simple pretense is that they are not there, have 
no right to existence, and building walls is not really necessary to keep them in a 
state of invisibility. Sheer lack of connectivity with faraway destinations, together 
with lack of money to pay the high price of the often illegal and tortuous pas-
sage, leaves them entrapped at home. The reserve armies of labor amassed in the 
Global South are stuck in a prolonged state of un- and underemployment, cut 
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off from regular and decently paid jobs that, in their dreams, are available else-
where. Together with the non-laboring poor, they are in rapidly growing numbers 
exposed to pauperism.
Earlier solutions for how to close or at least reduce the gap between prosperity 
and poverty were based on the logic of proportional representation and distribu-
tional justice, pertinent to an ethos of equity that aimed at structuring economic, 
political, and social life. The progressive disequilibrium has not prompted pol-
iticians to reconsider their policies of leaving the staggering bonanza of riches 
untaxed. Instead, they have opted to further reduce taxation and thus add to the 
sharply skewed splits of the spoils by rewarding capital with more subsidies and 
exemption from regulations prohibiting environmental degradation, pretending 
that this will stimulate employment. The strategy has allowed capital to escape 
again from societal control, but now in a context that is different from the one 
Polányi described and analyzed for the Western economies in the mid-nineteenth 
century.18 In contrast to what happened then in this part of the world, re-embed-
ding capitalism again within the perimeters of the nation-state is a moot possibil-
ity. While the drive to play along with the free operation of casino capitalism goes 
on as before, and a much required levy on financial transactions is not enacted, at 
the other end of the scale, the laboring and non-laboring poor are wont to bear the 
brunt of a fiscal policy that has led to a drastic underfunding of the budget spent 
on the social safety net. The punitive welfare reform, as designed and executed 
in the United States since the late twentieth century, as Fred Block details in his 
chapter, might become standard for dealing with the chronically unemployed in 
the front-running as well as the “catching-up” economies.19
Across the Global South, the social question on national agendas has taken 
the form of recently proposed or implemented social policies, such as small-cash 
transfers, old-age pensions, meager-workfare schemes, or basic-income grants. 
Poorer segments of the population that have gained newly available access to 
state-provided transfers, as in Brazil or South Africa, never had previous access 
to formal sector or employment-based welfare provisions. It remains to be seen if 
these low-quality and much restricted safety nets will have significant and lasting 
impacts in benefiting the poor. One objection, of course, is that a dole solely in 
the form of a state-provided cash transfer to the impoverished underclass does 
not even ameliorate the real situation of human immiseration. Evidence on the 
positive effects of the wide variety of new social policies across the Global South 
has to be matched with cases that demonstrate sustained or even hardening 
exclusion, as Jan Breman shows in his chapter on Indian social policies. Of even 
more significance than putting on record this diversity in graded practices of 
inclusion versus exclusion would be to point out that the strained public budget 
in the prolonged setting of neoliberalism does not allow governments to spend 
much on what is minimally required to keep the poor masses free from want, 
let alone provide them with income enabling a somewhat dignified livelihood 
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beyond sheer reproduction. In much of the Global South, such down-and-out 
people seem to have wasted their value as a commodity, let alone their human 
quality.
C OUNTERMOVEMENT S AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL?
Trade Unionism
Why and how has the social question failed to become raised and solved, when 
capital transcends beyond the nation-state and operates in predatory fashion at 
the globalized level? The main agencies charged with promoting the interests of 
the working classes in the world at large are a conglomerate of country-based trade 
unions and the International Labour Organization (ILO). Large-scale working-
class movements had their origin in the nineteenth century in the North Atlantic 
basin. When, in the interwar years, interest in trade-unionism increased in the 
peripheral and semi-peripheral countries, it was the Communist Red Interna-
tional of Labor Unions (RILU or Profintern), which, after its founding in 1921, 
sought to put down roots in the Global South. The International Federation of 
Trade Unions (IFTU) followed a few years later, from about 1928, partly to counter 
the rival Communist organization, which was intent on gaining greater influence 
in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. The IFTU and its successor, the Inter-
national Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), were both dominated by 
the British TUC and the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO), and had the reputation of being allies of colonialism 
and neocolonialism. Such suspicions were not entirely unfounded. The ICFTU 
tried for years to propagate a certain “model” of “proper unionism.” One of the 
aims formulated at the time of its founding in 1949 was “to provide assistance in 
the establishment, maintenance and development of trade union organizations, 
particularly in economically and socially under-developed countries.”20 It was 
assumed that “proper” trade unions would remain fully independent of political 
parties and states; concentrate on collective bargaining and lobbying for social 
security legislation; and defend and promote parliamentary democracy. These 
principles often proved difficult to apply.21 For a genuine collective-bargaining 
system to work, there are preconditions not found in many countries, including 
“a legal and political system permitting the existence and functioning of reason-
ably free labor organizations” (a condition that was fully compatible with the early 
ICFTU views) and the requirement that “unions be more or less stable, reason-
ably well organized, and fairly evenly matched with the employers in bargaining 
strength.”22 “Effective unions have rarely if ever been organized by ‘non-commit-
ted’ workers, i.e., casual workers who change jobs frequently, return periodically to 
their native village, and have no specific industrial skill, even of a very simple kind. 
In most (though by no means all) newly industrializing countries, large excess 
supplies of common labor are available for nonagricultural work. Not only are 
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unskilled workers rarely capable of forming unions of their own under such condi-
tions; if they succeed in doing so, their unions have little or no bargaining power.”23
Given these long-lasting limitations, it should not come as a surprise that there 
are major regions in the world where trade unions have almost no influence. In 
countries with independent workers’ organizations, union density (union mem-
bers as percentage of the total labor force) generally has been declining. Table 1.1 
reconstructs the trends in a number of countries with more than fifty million 
inhabitants in 2010, for the period 1960–2013.
Organized labor solidarity on a global scale is almost insignificant. Indepen-
dent trade unions organize only a small percentage of their target group world-
wide, and the majority of them are in the relatively wealthy North Atlantic region. 
By far the most important global umbrella organization is the International Trade 
Union Confederation (ITUC), founded in 2006 as a merger of the ICFTU and the 
Christian World Confederation of Labor (WCL). In 2014, the ITUC estimated that 
about 200 million workers worldwide belong to trade unions and that 176 million 
Table 1.1 Union densities in selected countries with more than fifty million inhabitants in 2010. 
  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2013
Brazil n.a. n.a. 20.8 
(1976)
26.7 28.3 26.5 16.6
China (People’s Republic) n.a. n.a. (58.6) (76.6) (62.3) 
(1997)
(34.7) (42.6)
France 19.6 21.7 18.3 10.0 8.0 7.9 7.7
Germany 34.7* 32.0* 34.9* 31.2 24.6 18.6 17.7†






Italy 24.7 37.0 49.6 38.8 34.8 36.0 36.9†
Japan 32.9 35.1 31.1 25.4 21.5 18.4 17.8
Malaysia n.a. n.a. n.a. 16.5 10.7 9.1 9.4
Mexico         15.6† 14.4† 13.6†
Philippines n.a. n.a. 27.0 29.7 27.1 8.7 8.5







South Africa n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 39.1‡ 29.7‡ n.a.
South Korea n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 11.4† 9.7† n.a.
Turkey 10.8 25.9 42.1 24.0 12.4 7.0 6.5
United Kingdom 40.4 44.8 51.7 39.7 30.1 27.1 25.4†
United States of America n.a. 23.5◊ 19.5◊ 15.5◊ 12.9† 11.4† 10.8†
* Germany for 1960–1990: West Germany. 
† OECD figures. 
‡ ILOSTAT. 
◊ Jelle Visser, “Union Membership Statistics in Twenty-Four Countries,” Monthly Labor Review, January 2006, 38–49. 
For lack of data, the following countries have not been included: Argentina, Bangladesh, Colombia, Democratic Re-
public of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tanzania, and Vietnam.
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of these are organized in the ITUC.24 The ITUC also estimates that the total num-
ber of workers is roughly 2.9 billion. Therefore, global union density currently 
amounts to no more than a meagre 7 percent.25
Apart from the “collective-bargaining bias,” several other factors have contrib-
uted to unionism’s demise. First, the composition of the working class is changing. 
Unions find it difficult to organize employees in the service or financial sector. The 
rapidly growing informal economy is complicating things further, since workers 
change jobs frequently and often have to earn their income under very precari-
ous conditions. A second important factor is what labor economist Richard Free-
man has called the “labor supply shock” that has manifested since the early 1990s. 
Through the entry of Chinese, Indian, Russian, and other workers into the global 
economy, there has been an effective doubling of the number of workers produc-
ing for international markets over the past two decades. And, third, in many coun-
tries, there has been a strong neoliberal offensive against old-style unions and their 
modus operandi: the dominant practice of collective bargaining has increasingly 
become decentralized, and individualized labor contracts have become much 
more widespread than before. Weakened trade unions have to face more and more 
competition from alternative associations that are better adapted to the new-style 
labor relations. In Brazil, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, South Africa, the Philip-
pines, or South Korea, militant workers’ movements (social movement unions) 
have emerged. New forms of rank-and-file trade unionism outside the estab-
lished channels appeared since the 1970s, with international connections at the 
shop-floor level “bypassing altogether the secretariats, which they see as too often 
beholden to the bureaucracies of their various national affiliates.”26 A well-known 
example is the Transnationals Information Exchange (TIE), an outfit in which a 
substantial number of research and activist labor groups exchange information 
on transnational corporations (TNCs). The ineffectiveness of old-style unions is 
underlined by the growing tendency on the part of international trade secretariats 
(now called Global Unions) to engage in the direct recruitment of members in 
the periphery. We may think, for example, of the activities of the Union Network 
International (the global union for the service sector) recruiting information tech-
nology (IT) specialists directly (without mediation of local unions) in India.
As before, the fight for labor rights has remained secluded within the frame 
of the nation-state, resulting in lukewarm interest for improving the lot of the 
laboring poor outside the Global North. The import of cheap durable and not-so-
durable consumer goods—garments, shoes, crockery, toys, electronics, household 
gadgets, and a wide range of other products manufactured in homes or sweatshops 
in the Global South—contribute to creating the impression of ongoing welfare 
in the advanced economies. It is an illusion that can only be maintained in total 
denial of what the excessively low cost of production means for the workforce 
in the catch-up economies: ongoing exploitation and repression. Exemplary of 
the neglect and indifference are the lukewarm trade-union protests in the Global 
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North not only to the recent factory fires in Bangladesh and Pakistan but also to 
the police brutality meted out to these factory workers when they made a faint 
attempt in early 2017 to back up their demand for a higher wage by going on strike.
Architects of a Global Social Compact: ILO and The World Bank?
The “globalization process” weakens labor rights across the globe. Rights are only 
rights if a public (national or transnational) authority is capable of enforcing them. 
Unenforceable claims or claims that are privately enforced should not be consid-
ered rights in a strict sense. In the field of labor rights, the International Labour 
Organization is a crucial institution. The ILO was set up in the wake of the social 
revolution that gave rise to the birth of the Soviet Union. Established under the 
auspices of the League of Nations, it sought to defuse an escalation of the conflict 
between capital and labor by calling for regulated consultations between employers 
and employees at the transnational level. An additional objective was the promo-
tion of a standard model of industrial relations that would prevent unfair competi-
tion between countries marked by strikingly different modalities of waged work. 
These preliminary considerations were the points of departure for the tripartite 
formula mandated in ILO’s directive: equal representation of government, employ-
ers, and employees. It was a canon that certified right from the beginning that the 
interests of labor would be superseded by those of the two other stakeholders.
The ILO’s conventions, if ratified by member states, are guidelines for good 
practices at shop-floor level. Three weak spots of the ILO have to be stressed. The 
ILO is not only a relatively powerless organization but also reacts rather slowly to 
new developments. During the evolving transition to neoliberalism, the agents of 
government were co-opted to cater one-sidely to the demands of capital, while 
the trade unions that cared for the interests only of the shrinking workforce still 
employed in the formal economy persisted for long in looking at informal-sector 
workers as blacklegs. With the passing of years, the international standing of ILO 
has gone down. No doubt, the flexibilization of waged work is the most important 
reason for the erosion of ILO’s mandate and agenda. All parties in the policymak-
ing process, including the trade-union movement, have in the past decades vigor-
ously refused to give voice to, as well as allow representation of, informalized labor 
in the Global South. Their vested interest in speaking up on behalf of the shrinking 
portion of the workforce still in the formal economy played a major role in the 
sustained resistance to giving a better deal to workers bereft of collective action. 
The wisdom of hindsight was reflected in the manifesto calling for “decent work” 
in 1999, but this change of hearts is nothing more than a faint effort to regain the 
terrain lost. The lesson learnt is that the struggle for formalization of all waged 
work is on the ILO’s agenda. It is, indeed, a necessary although not sufficient pre-
condition for the emancipation of the laboring classes in the world.27
The World Bank is another major global-development actor, with enormous 
financial, political, and knowledge-making power. Its strategic response to what 
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we call the social question at the global level is “poverty alleviation,” a top priority 
in its renewed Millennium Development Goals. But instead of tackling the struc-
tural, political, and economic sources of poverty, the bank’s approach has been to 
reduce the problem of mass immiseration and precarity to deficient individual 
decision making on the part of the remaining poor, identified as a residual class 
to be found only in the catch-up economies. What should have been addressed 
as a budgetary deficit at the household level is conceived to be the lack of a pre-
disposition to economize, self-discipline, and financial literacy of the poor, who 
should simply work harder to lift themselves out of poverty.28 Applying behavioral 
economics to development and poverty, the policy recommendations prioritized 
focus on “nudging” the poor to change their cognitive and psychological predis-
positions and the social constraints that influence economic decision making.29 
This was essentially the logic of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2015, 
even as the bank belatedly and reluctantly acknowledged that the trickle-down 
mechanism does not operate as earlier proclaimed. The report reads like a tour de 
force, a major reappraisal of policies not so long ago vigorously prescribed, but the 
recommendations are not followed up by any concrete steps to change the way the 
thoroughly deregulated labor market operates. Moreover, while targeting income 
inequality, the bank glosses over the even more striking issue of wealth disparity.
An indictment of the shortcomings of the poor harks back to the doctrine of 
economic dualism that in the colonial era portrayed the homo economicus as a 
creature sprouting from Western civilization, while the human gestalt in the ori-
ental part of the world was supposed to be sadly deprived of righteous economic 
propensity.30 The construction of this contrast found a sequel in the dualistic dis-
tinction made between more-advanced versus less-advanced economies in the 
early postcolonial era, while a new and updated version of this dichotomy does not 
refer any longer to civilizations or countries but is conceptualized to exist between 
social classes. The World Bank, in its World Development Report 2015 referred to 
above, sets out to comprehend penury by laying stress on the misbehavior attrib-
uted to the people entrapped in this dire predicament. Only their doings and mis-
doings are highlighted. Apart from the biased manner in which their inadequacy 
is portrayed, our objection to this simplified assessment of the problem is that the 
societal context of poverty remains totally disregarded.
Announcing its flagship publication, “Poverty and Sharing Prosperity” (2016), 
the World Bank reluctantly agrees that tackling inequality is vital to ending exces-
sive poverty by 2030, the new signpost for what is called sustainable development. 
How to achieve this feel-good ambition? It would require a more equal income 
distribution, and that means a hike in the floor price at which labor is made to sell 
itself, backed up, in some undefined way, by employment formalization, the bank 
now concedes. Our contention is that the fight against income inequality will turn 
out to be meaningless if the divide between wealth and poverty remains unad-
dressed. On further reading what sharing prosperity actually implies, it seems that 
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the policies practiced so far may not have to be reformulated at all. This far-from-
surprising conclusion is reached with the argument that from 2008 to 2013, the 
share in income of the bottom 40 percent of the world’s population has consider-
ably gone up, and we are asked to believe that their gain in income exceeded that 
of the top 60 percent. It would, of course, have been setting a hopeful trend and 
more so, on being told that the leveling down of excessive inequality also took 
place at the high tide of another Great Depression of the 1930s. As usual, however, 
the bank’s arithmetic is founded on biased and otherwise disputable statistics.
In this book, we offer an alternative analytical lens, one that shows that poverty 
and precarity result from loss of property—of land and other assets as well as tools 
and skills from the nearby or remote past—and are often compounded by dissolu-
tion or even collapse of the social fabric, state support, and the public economy. It is 
an argument that leads us to perceive the accumulation versus dispossession binary 
as processes that are not disconnected but interact in tandem. In the accelerated 
process of globalization, pauperism and pauperization has risen to an alarming 
height under the banner of predatory capitalism and has found expression in the 
creation of surplus people, a contingent of humankind classified as redundant to 
demand.31 Emphasizing the interdependency between growing wealth and impov-
erishment implies that a life of human quality for all requires a fundamental redis-
tribution of the sources of existence. It is a conclusion that stands to be rejected by 
the stakeholders of global capitalism. The failure of half-hearted attempts at pov-
erty alleviation, which continue to rely on the trickle-down magic and its dismal 
outcome, flies in the face of the good news that the marginally reformulated Mil-
lennium Development Goals will ultimately be successfully achieved.
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The social question was a European “discovery.” It was first perceived in France, 
after the Industrial Revolution had gone through its early boisterous phase, and 
after the Revolution of 1789 had run aground in the Bourbon restoration. At that 
time, during the 1830s, a “divorce” became visible “between a juridico- political 
order founded on the recognition of the rights of citizens and an economic order 
that carried with it widespread misery and demoralization.” Pauperism expressed 
the social question at its clearest. It challenged “the capacity of a  society (known in 
political terms as a nation) to exist as a collectivity linked by relations of interde-
pendency.”1 The social question was located in the vacuum that had developed once 
the economic and the political spheres had gone separate ways and the economy 
was increasingly disembedded in the Polányian sense. Paupers were no longer 
integrated into society through economic ties or through political authority. They 
revealed the existence of a “perilous” environment, of “ dangerous classes”  escaping 
elite control.2 After France, the dominant circles in other Western  European 
 countries would soon conceptualize the new menace in similar ways.
ORIGINS OF UNPROTECTED L AB OR
Though the social question was discovered only in the nineteenth century, its ante-
cedents were, of course, much older. Casual wage labor has existed for millennia 
in Europe and elsewhere. In ancient Athens, a space existed known as kolonos 
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Day laborer: manual worker paid by the day. People like this make up the 
majority of the nation and their fate is what a good government should 
mainly have in mind. If the day laborer is poor, then the nation itself is poor.
—Denis Diderot, “Journalier”
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agoraios (or ergatikos or misthios), probably on the west end of the agora, where 
those who wanted to hire themselves out as land laborers offered their services 
daily.3 If casual laborers were “free” in the Marxian ironic sense, that is, if they had 
no other means of existence than their bodies, then they usually enjoyed no social 
protection in case of unemployment, sickness, invalidity, or old age.
Casual wage labor in precapitalist societies generally remained a “spasmodic, 
casual, marginal” phenomenon.4 Free wage labor often (but not always) was “an 
adjunct to other forms of labor and surplus appropriation, often as a means of 
supplementing the incomes of smallholders whose land—whether owned or held 
conditionally—has been insufficient for subsistence.”5 But in Western Europe, it 
became already important before the rise of capitalism. Michael Postan thought 
that in thirteenth-century England, “perhaps as much as a third of the total rural 
population was available for whole or part-time employment as wage labour.”6 
Charles Tilly estimated that in 1500, about 94 percent of all European proletarians 
were “rural”; even in 1800, it still amounted to 90 percent.7 The great majority of 
the group of “early modern” wage earners probably consisted initially of unfree 
wage laborers, and not of more-or-less “modern” workers.8 Their existence signals 
the rapid increase of the cash economy in Europe since the High Middle Ages9—a 
process that first became clearly visible in England and the Netherlands.10 Many 
were probably manorial workers, who were essentially nothing but “serf[s] to 
whom law denied that freedom of contract and movement which it allows to the 
twentieth-century labourer[s].”11
Alongside these unfree wage laborers, there existed an increasing number of 
urban and rural poor who could not find sufficient employment and became “wage 
hunters and gatherers” (in Jan Breman’s words). We have no clue how numerous 
the poor were: “counts of the poor all across early modern Europe varied widely.”12 
Already in the late feudal period, the authorities tried to discipline these “floaters.” 
In Sweden, for instance,
Liability for employment was introduced as early as in the Urban Law of King Mag-
nus Erik’s son (about 1350). Everybody who did not possess movables worth three 
marks was subjected to the special provisions. Since three marks was the amount 
of property which enabled a person to earn his living for one year, the connection 
of poor relief with employment-policy is here very evident. If a poor man did not 
accept the work offered to him, a fine was imposed upon him and he was expelled 
from the town. If he returned and was still unwilling to work, he was whipped and 
expelled again.13
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, most wage earners in Europe were 
therefore not “doubly free” in the Marxian sense. Research of recent years has 
revealed that many so-called free workers were really bonded laborers, far into 
the nineteenth century. Master-and-servant laws, apprenticeship arrangements, 
and similar policies ensured that workers were tied to their employers and had 
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significantly fewer legal rights than the literature previously suggested. In this 
context, there has indeed been mention of “industrial serfdom.”14 Legal historian 
Thorsten Keiser has even argued that in nineteenth-century Germany “multiple 
bonds existed, for factory workers and craftsmen as well. For grown-up industrial 
workers, these bonds were completely removed only around 1900, for domestics 
[Gesinde] and agricultural labourers not until 1918.”15
Proletarianization in Western Europe went through two stages. During the 
first stage (roughly until 1800), the large majority of the proletariat was rural. 
Decentralized capital formation, with its cottage industries in rural areas plus 
the impoverishment of parts of the agricultural population, had the effect that 
even in Britain—the heartland of the so-called Industrial Revolution—for a long 
time only a minority of the proletarians lived in cities. When afterward, in the 
 nineteenth and twentieth centuries, capital concentrated in cities, and rural areas 
deindustrialized, the proportion of rural proletarians decreased, and urban workers 
became concentrated in larger units of production.16
THE BEGINNINGS OF STATE PROTECTION
The more general proletarianization became, the larger the number of households 
without forms of social security. Families that depended exclusively or almost 
exclusively on wage incomes were extremely vulnerable; they often could not rely 
on a second line of defense, such as subsistence agriculture on a small piece of land 
or additional income through petty commodity production and trade. The larger 
the number of unprotected proletarians, the less effective traditional methods of 
charitable social assistance proved to be. Two kinds of responses emerged. First, 
self-organization of workers in mutual-aid societies, called Friendly Societies in 
Britain, mutualités in France, and Hilfskassen auf Gegenseitigkeit in Germany.17 
Second, responses from the elites, who became aware of the so-called social ques-
tion. Three motives were of crucial importance.
First, the fear for the classes dangereuses, who were uncontrollable and brought 
dirt, disease, and rebellion.18 After the July Revolution in France, in 1830, European 
states began to establish statistical offices, collecting demographic and economic 
data, and thus giving some insight into the size and distribution of social prob-
lems amongst the national population.19 And the wave of protest that swept over 
continental Europe a few years later and that culminated in the revolutions of 1848 
prompted the first large-scale budget surveys. In the words of George Stigler: “The 
agitation and violence of the working classes led to an increasing concern for their 
economic condition and thus to the collection of economic data, including bud-
getary data.”20 Studies of budgets were made in Saxony and Prussia in 1848, and in 
1855 a Belgian study, by Edouard Ducpetiaux, was published with full details on 
almost two hundred budgets. The motive for these studies was generally a simple 
view of the relationship between household budgets and collective action: if the 
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first were inadequate, the second would surely follow. But in France, the Revolu-
tion of 1848 had yet another result. Jacques Donzelot and others have shown how 
the defeat of that year’s rebellion resulted in the beginnings of institutionalized 
social assistance.21 Robert Castel has summarized the sequence of events as follows:
[In] February, under pressure from the streets, the provisional government pro-
claimed at the same time the Republic, universal suffrage, and the right to work. . . . 
It opened the National Ateliers, which resembled more the charity workshops of 
the ancien régime than a genuine public system for the management of labor. The 
closing of these Ateliers, in June, launched the workers’ insurrection and its bloody 
repression. The consequences of this defeat of the right to work, correlated with the 
awareness of the fragility of the tutelary controls exercised by the elites, opened a 
whole range of uncertainties that would require the development of a new concep-
tion of the social and of social policy.22
A second crucial factor was the concern that in the somewhat longer run, the 
working class might become incapable of working properly, because it would be ill 
nourished, physically weak, careless, and indifferent. Many of the social-security 
arrangements that have been realized in Western Europe since the nineteenth cen-
tury were the product of these fears: reactive responses to unforeseen and threat-
ening developments. The first Dutch law prohibiting some forms of child labor in 
1863 is a good example. The liberal economist and former minister Nicolaas G. 
Pierson has later explained the considerations behind this initiative:
Very often the factory-owner, who treats his workers badly, understands his own 
benefit all too well. Because there is sometimes a difference between what is advan-
tageous to the entrepreneurs as a class, and what is advantageous to the individual 
entrepreneur. The individual entrepreneur derives benefit from everything that im-
mediately increases his income. If he can cut down what he calls production costs by 
employing young children, then it is in his interest to do so, and if the consequence 
is that these children will later become very defective workers, then this may harm 
his successors, but it will be nothing to him. . . . The interests of the entrepreneurial 
class are durable interests, those of the individual entrepreneurs are . . . immediate 
interests. . . . Self-interest therefore does not only need guidance, but also curbing. . . . 
The state cannot quietly look on, while production is organized in a way that . . . un-
dermines the people’s productive forces. If only for purely economic reasons, which 
in this case are not the very best of reasons, it has to intervene.23
In this case, as in quite a few others, state intervention resulted from the con-
tradiction between individual and total capital—a contradiction that creates the 
necessity for the state to act as an ideelle Gesamtkapitalist, the ideal or imaginary 
total-capitalist.
Capitalist competition was a third important factor. In Germany, for example, 
a number of big enterprisers, such as the steel- and coal-magnate Carl Friedrich 
Stumm, began, from the 1870s on, to ardently advocate social-insurance legislation. 
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Their companies used extensive and technically refined machinery and employed 
highly skilled workers. But these workers were increasingly attracted by the higher 
wages in northern France and elsewhere, resulting in huge fluctuations of per-
sonnel. The challenge for German big employers was to develop a social-security 
system that would be so attractive for workers that it could compensate for lower 
wages and would allow for mobility between German industries. Municipal or 
company-based social-security arrangements tied workers to specific localities 
and could not achieve this. Therefore, state intervention was unavoidable. The 
campaign in favor of such intervention was legitimated propagandistically with 
reference to the supposed social-democratic “red danger.”24
Naturally, all these trends are situated in the context of the rise of capitalism, 
which on the one hand reduced restrictions on trade and commerce, but on the 
other hand—often after stubborn resistance—resulted in the freedom of associa-
tion, thus enabling the founding of local and regional and, later, of national trade 
unions and trade-union confederations (table 2.1).
Table 2.1. Introduction of freedom of trade and freedom of association; and founding 
of national trade-union confederations. 
























1898 Belgium Belgium, Denmark, Sweden
1906 Finland Italy
1907 Finland
source: Jens Alber, Vom Armenhaus zum Wohlfahrtsstaat. Analysen zur Entwicklung der Sozialversicherung in Westeuropa 
[Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1982], 39.
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The growth of labor movements is of great importance here, because it increased 
the social pressure in favor of social-security provisions. A precondition of this 
growth and the concurrent bargaining power of sections of the working classes 
was the falling off of over-unemployment (that is, the number of people that are 
not unemployed only temporarily, but permanently). The reduction of over-unem-
ployment (the term was introduced by Paul Bairoch) was aided by massive emi-
gration, especially to the Americas (table 2.2).
The historical demographer Peter Marschalck summarized the German 
development:
One could describe the effect of emigration as follows: it liberated the German 
 economy for the time being from precisely that number of people that it could no 
longer offer jobs without depriving an equal number of employees of their resource 
base. German industry therefore always had an “industrial reserve army” at its 
 disposal of which the size did not create [long-term] unemployment; social upheaval 
was thus avoided and industrial development was not impeded. . . . As the surplus 
population, i.e., the “unemployed,” found possibilities to work and live across he 
 Atlantic, emigration was an important factor in Germany’s development into Europe’s 
largest industrial nation.25
In Norway, “emigration absorbed about half the natural population increase, 
and in Norway, Sweden and Finland the population increase was a good deal 








Emigration as percentage 
of population growth 
(Estimate: A/B)
Austria-Hungary 0.8 18.8  4.3
Belgium 0.07  3.1  0.2
Denmark 0.25  1.4 17.9
Finland 0.24  1.3 18.5
France 0.35  3.8  9.2
Germany 4.22 24.9 16.9
Italy 6.39 10.3 62.0
Netherlands 0.16  2.8  0.6
Norway 0.69  1.0 69.0
Portugal 1.03  2.0 51.5
Spain 2.48 - -
Sweden 0.99  2.0 49.5
Switzerland 0.21  1.4 15.0
United Kingdom 13.29* 20.0 66.5
* Excluding 1851–52. 
source: Author’s calculation based on B.  R. Mitchell, “Statistical Appendix,” in The Fontana  Economic History of 
Europe, ed. Carlo M. Cipolla, vol. 2, The Emergence of Industrial Societies, 747–51 [London:  Collins/Fontana, 1972].
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smaller than the relation between their birth- and death-rates might lead one to 
 suppose.”26 Trade unions sometimes encouraged emigration enthusiastically, as it 
would strengthen their power.27
This mass emigration probably acted as a safety valve. Albert Hirschman 
 suspected that “the history of Europe in the 19th century would probably have 
been either far more turbulent or far more repressive and the trend toward repre-
sentative government much more halting, had it not been possible for millions of 
people to emigrate toward the United States and elsewhere.”28
During the whole “long” nineteenth century, European labor movements 
remained rather weak. Historian Richard Price writes about the United Kingdom in 
the 1870s that there was “no working-class movement in the sense of an  organised 
presence that exercised a continuing national influence. Trade-union membership 
included perhaps 5%–10% of the occupied male labour force, but, as in the past, 
it was highly unstable and fluctuated with the local labour market.”29 On the eve 
of World War I, approximate trade-union density rates in Western Europe were 
between 7 percent in Austria and 23 percent in Britain and  Denmark.30 Apparently, 
the big growth of union density happened only after the first stage of industrializa-
tion had been concluded.31
From a global perspective, this reduction of over-unemployment marks a cru-
cial difference with the contemporary Global South: in present-day Africa, Asia, 
or Latin America, the possibility of mass migration does not exist, and this, at least 
partly, may explain why informal labor has remained dominant and labor move-
ments have mostly remained weak.
TOWARD THE “GOLDEN AGE”
From the final decades of the nineteenth century until the 1950s or 1960s, an often 
cumulative but planless process of reforms and changes resulted in a relatively 
wide spreading of the so-called standard employment relationship. These reforms 
and changes pertain to seven policy areas: (1) protective labor legislation, includ-
ing the prohibition of child labor, safety rules at work, the prohibition of night 
work for women, and similar rules; (2) legalization of workers’ coalitions, with the 
founding of employers’ associations as a (delayed) response; (3) regulation of labor 
time through the shortening of the working day, shortening of the working week, 
and introduction of paid holidays; (4) introduction of obligatory insurances, such 
as sickness insurance, old-age pensions, invalidity insurance, and unemployment 
insurance (which implies the “discovery” of unemployment as a social phenom-
enon); (5) institutionalization of collective bargaining; (6) spread of labor con-
tracts with unlimited duration; and (7) arrival of full employment and a high-wage 
economy.32
This is not the right place for a detailed comparative reconstruction of this 
planless, cumulative process in various Western European countries, but I will 
30    The Social Question in Western Europe
briefly highlight some trends. Table 2.1 already gave a quick chronology of the 
legalization of workers’ coalitions. Protective labor legislation dates from the first 
half of the nineteenth century at the latest. It usually focused on female and child 
labor.33 From the 1880s and 1890s, the debate on more extensive protective legisla-
tion intensified and resulted in international conferences, partly motivated by the 
consideration that “restrictions on industrial methods intended for the benefit of 
the workers employed should be adopted in competing countries at the same time 
and in equal degree.”34
Labor time was increasingly regulated everywhere, but the average number of 
hours worked declined significantly after World War II (table 2.3).
Forms of obligatory insurance were introduced after voluntary forms of insur-
ance had become institutionalized. This happened mostly during the first three 
decades of the twentieth century.35 At the beginning of the long boom of the 1950s, 
social-security schemes were therefore mostly in place.36
The next step was the tendential generalization to all citizens, or to a substantial 
part of all citizens—in many cases, social security became a right for all citizens, 
not just for wage earners.37 Although the social question had largely been per-
ceived as a labor question, its partial solution brought in its wake the tackling of 
other social problems, such as old-age pensions for farmers and health care for 
self-employed. Naturally, this process took more time and took off somewhat later, 
as is illustrated by tables 2.4 and 2.5.
Institutionalized collective bargaining is usually only possible if two conditions 
are met. First, incomes have to be relatively high and should be rising, “so that 
labor-management conflicts are mainly concerned with the distribution of the 
Table 2.3. Average number of hours worked annually per person in selected 
Western European countries, 1950–1986. 
1950 1973 1986 1986 as percentage of 1950
Austria 1,976 1,778 1,620 0.82
Belgium 2,283 1,872 1,411 0.62
Denmark 2,283 1,742 1,706 0.75
Finland 2,035 1,707 1,596 0.78
France 1,926 1,788 1,533 0.80
Germany 2,216 1,804 1,630 0.74
Italy 1,997 1,612 1,515 0.76
Netherlands 2,208 1,825 1,645 0.75
Norway 2,101 1,721 1,531 0.73
Sweden 1,951 1,571 1,457 0.75
Switzerland 2,144 1,930 1,807 0.84
United Kingdom 1,958 1,688 1,511 0.77
source: Angus Maddison, The World Economy in the Twentieth Century [Paris: OECD, 1989], 132, plus calculation 
by the author.
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yearly increment of the national product rather than with shifts in the shares of 
different social groups in a given national income.” And second, the great majority 
of the workers should accept “the social and political fundamentals of the  society 
in which they live.”38 Everett Kassalow was justified when he stated that “this 
Table 2.5. Coverage of pension insurance in selected European countries, 1900–1990 
(members as a percentage of economically active population). Figures with an asterisk (*) 
are estimates based on legal regulations. 
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Austria 2 *5 43 51 75 78 82 85
Belgium 9 29 *29 51 *44 57 89 100
Denmark 95 *100 *100 *100 *100 *100 *100
Finland *100 *100 *100 *100 *100
France *8 13 14 *36 48 69 92 93
Germany/ West 
Germany
53 53 57 69 72 70 82 81 91 *100
Ireland 44 55 64 71 86 *100
Italy 0 *2 *38 38 38 *39 89 99
Netherlands 52 58 65 64 *100 *100 *100 *100
Norway *100 *100 *100 *100 *100
Sweden *100 *100 *100 *100 *100 *100 *100 *100
Switzerland *100 *100 *100 *100 99
United Kingdom 82 90 94 86 83
source: Béla Tomka, A Social History of Twentieth-Century Europe [London: Routledge, 2013], 168.
Table 2.4. Coverage of health insurance in selected European countries, 1900–1990 
(members as a percentage of economically active population). Figures with an asterisk (*) 
are estimates based on legal regulations. 
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Austria 18 24 39 59 56 71 85 87 86
Belgium 6 12 21 33 31 57 57 92
Denmark 27 54 97 *100 *100 *100 *100 *100 *100 *100
Finland *100 *100 *100
France 9 18 17 32 48 60 69 96
Germany/West 
Germany
39 44 53 57 56 57 67 67 84 *100
Ireland 34 44 53 58 67 78 89
Italy *6 *6 *6 7 47 44 76 92
Netherlands *42 *42 54 60 74 85 *100
Norway 55 56 86 *100 *100 *100 *100 *100
Sweden 13 27 28 35 49 97 *100 *100 *100 *100
Switzerland 43 69 86 89 *100 *100 *100 99
United Kingdom 73 82 90 *100 *100 *100 *100 *100
source: Béla Tomka, A Social History of Twentieth-Century Europe [London: Routledge, 2013], 167.
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coming to terms .  .  . did not fully occur in several countries of Western Europe 
until the end of World War I.”39 In most Western European countries collective 
bargaining really took off during the interwar years, and very soon the results 
of this bargaining between unions and employers were extended to nonunion 
sectors. This method of extension had first been tried out in New Zealand and 
Australia around 1900 and was, after World War I, introduced in Germany (1918) 
and Austria (1919)—soon to be abolished by National Socialism (1934 and 1938, 
respectively). During the years of the Depression Britain (1934), Czechoslovakia 
(1935), Greece (1935), France (1936), The Netherlands (1937), Yugoslavia (1937), 
Luxemburg (1938), and Belgium followed.40 The Scandinavian countries did not 
participate in this development.41
Combined with these trends, labor contracts with unlimited duration spread. 
“In the 1950s and 1960s, the labor contract for an undetermined length of time 
became the norm, and then served as a virtual guarantee of employment. But this 
stemmed only from the fact that in times of full employment, one often hires, and 
only rarely lays off employees.”42 At least two additional factors may have contrib-
uted to this process. First, when corporations embody large amounts of fixed capi-
tal and dominate stable markets through monopolistic competition, “a company 
[can] hold long term prospects, to which is linked the capability, when required, of 
employing workers for a long period.” And, second, the more specialized employ-
ees’ tasks become for the operation of these large amounts of fixed capital, the 
more “the worker moves from simple to more difficult jobs,” through on-the-job 
training, and becomes indispensable.43
Finally, capital accumulation became, from the early 1950s on, fast and 
 prosperous, so that unemployment rates reached “extraordinary low levels” in 
the early 1960s—thus stimulating the often government-driven international 
recruitment of migrant workers from other parts of Europe, North Africa, and 
Turkey.44  Parallel to this, Western Europe came fully into the stage of “high mass- 
consumption.”45 These developments had also major consequences for working-
class culture. The traditional labor movements—with their socialist and communist 
newspapers, youth organizations, theater groups, and so on— disintegrated. And 
more and more members of the working classes no longer defined themselves 
as such.46
The rise of the standard employment relationship by fits and starts can perhaps 
be interpreted as a Gramscian “passive revolution,” that is, as a result of attempts 
of the established order to disarm antagonistic forces by partly incorporating their 
methods and goals, up to the point where even representatives of the antagonist 
are absorbed.47 The temporary victory of standard employment was, of course, 
only relevant for segments of the working classes. Significant groups, such as 
migrant workers from Morocco or Turkey often did not share the same rights, and 
neither did many women entering the labor markets.
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DECREASING PROTECTION
From the late 1960s, the trente glorieuses came to an end. The average profit rate 
began to fall again, and economic growth declined. As predicted by Michal Kal-
ecki during World War II, full-employment capitalism did indeed reflect increased 
power of the working classes,48 and capital had to answer this challenge. From the 
late 1970s, the postwar compromise between capital and labor started to break 
down. The case of the most important Western European economy, that of West 
Germany, illustrates how the turn occurred. Already during the 1950s, a shortage of 
skilled laborers had become visible, and this shortage had been further reinforced 
by the building of the Berlin Wall, which blocked the import of workers from East 
Germany. Working hours had, moreover, been reduced since 1956. An upward 
pressure on wages was the outcome. This had two consequences. Firstly, extensive 
growth, based on the expansion of productive capacity at the old technical level, 
made way for intensive growth, based on further mechanization and increasing 
labor productivity. And second, the labor-power supply was enlarged through the 
recruitment of German housewives and Turkish (and other) immigrants.49 The 
first change had a stronger effect than the second and resulted, from about 1970, in 
a declining average profit rate, growing unemployment, and decreasing bargain-
ing power for the unions.50 Besides, the European economic integration since the 
1960s led to a partial synchronization of business cycles, thus reducing the steering 
capacity of national governments.51
These trends, intensified by the oil crisis of 1974, led to major policy shifts. Inter-
national labor migration began to fade away, while many settled immigrants initiated 
family reunions—a process accompanied by growing xenophobia and increasing 
racial harassment. An offensive of state and capital against the attainments and 
securities of the working population began. Four legitimations were usually given: 
the flexibilization of business organizations in consequence of the introduction of 
computerized work processes; the aging of the population, leading to higher expen-
ditures for pensions and health care; the spreading of new family structures and new 
patterns of labor-market participation; and the enforced “harmonization” of social 
provisions in view of economic globalization and EU integration.52
The passive revolution more and more turned into an active counterrevolution. 
When the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
ministers decided “to move away from Keynesian demand management to a 
 pronounced supply-side strategy, aimed at sound public finances and market flex-
ibility,”53 this was a crucial turning point. Wolfgang Streeck has shown how capital, 
with the support of national governments and supranational institutions (Inter-
national Monetary Fund, World Bank) pressed its offensive through in several 
steps, until today.54 This offensive implied the gradual forcing back of the working-
class achievements of the 1950s and 1960s. A weakening of trade unions in most 
 Western European countries was forced through (table 2.6).
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Table 2.6. Union densities in selected European countries, 1920–2010. 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Belgium 39.3 39.9 51.3 51.1 56.2 53.8
Denmark 56.9 60.3 78.6 74.6 73.9 67.0
France 19.6 21.7 18.3 10.0  8.0  7.9
Germany/ West Germany 34.7 32.0 34.9 31.2 24.6 18.6
Italy 24.7 37.0 49.6 38.8 34.8 36.0
Netherlands 40.0 36.5 34.8 24.3 22.6 19.3
Norway 60.0 56.8 58.3 58.5 54.4 54.8
Switzerland 31.0 24.9 27.5 22.5 20.2 17.1
United Kingdom 40.4 44.8 51.7 39.7 30.1 27.1
source: ICTWSS  Database, Amsterdams Instituut voor Arbeidsstudies [www.uva-aias.net/208], version 5.0,  October 
2015. All percentages indicate net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners in employment, 
 unless these figures are not available. If data were missing, I used net union membership as a proportion of wage and 
salary earners in employment, as in national household or labor-force surveys.
Only in Belgium and the Scandinavian countries (countries where unions are 
involved in the payment of unemployment benefits) is the situation relatively stable. 
In parallel with the weakening of trade unions a shift from central to decentralized 
collective bargaining, and to individualized labor contracts occurred.
Weakened trade unions facilitated further steps, such as:55
•	 A	declining	wage	share.	In	OECD	countries,	one	can	observe	that	“overall,	
real wage growth has clearly lagged behind productivity growth since around 
1980. This constitutes a major historical change as wage shares had been stable 
or  increasing in the post-war era.”56 This trend seems to have been particularly 
strong in continental European countries.
•	 The	tendential	replacement	of	permanent	and	full-time employment by 
 casualized and part-time jobs. In Germany, for instance, part-time work 
 increased from 14 percent in 1991 to almost 27 percent twenty years later.57 This 
“ flexibilization” is a major component of the labor contract, leading to hire-
and-fire at short or no notice, withdrawal of protection against dismissal, and 
a  progressive scaling down of out-of-work benefits. In parallel, we also see an 
increased role for labor mediators, for example, temporary-employment agencies.
•	 The	increase	of	outsourcing	and	subcontracting,	which	is	routinely	resorted	to	
in order to bring down the cost of labor, and gradually increasing multiple job 
holding.58
•	 Waged	work	is	increasingly	substituted	by	self-employment, mainly in the 
 tertiary sector of the economy, but that trend has been much strengthened by 
the growing lack of waged employment. In the EU25, already one out of six 
workers falls into this category.
•	 Drastic	cutbacks	on	secondary	benefits	affect	social	protection	and	social	security	
negatively. A wide range of allowances and provisions are curtailed or withdrawn.
•	 The	introduction	of	so-called activation measures, inducing the  unemployed to look 
harder for jobs, thus implicitly reintroducing the notion of the “ undeserving poor.”59
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To sum up, the Western economies demonstrate a clear trend toward informalization 
or precarianization of working class life.60 A recent ILO report says:
The past 40 years have witnessed changes to work arrangements globally. . . . Over-
all, the changes have been characterised by less contract duration and job security, 
more irregular working hours (both in terms of duration and consistency), increased 
use of third parties (temporary employment agencies), growth of various forms of 
dependent self-employment (like subcontracting and franchising) and also bogus/
informal work arrangements (i.e., arrangements deliberately outside the regulatory 
framework of labour, social protection and other laws). The factors underpinning 
these changes are complex but include shifts in business/employment practices, 
weakening union influence and government policies/regulatory regimes to promote 
labour market “flexibility” and weaken collectivist regimes (where they existed). The 
growth of international supply chains means that work has often been relocated to 
countries where union presence and regulatory protection is weak or non-existent.61
This tendency was strengthened and accelerated by the global economic crisis 
since 2007–2008. In 2015, around 119 million people (23.7 percent of the popula-
tion) in the European Union were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. This means 
that they (many of them women and first- and second-generation immigrants) 
were in at least one of the following three conditions: “at-risk-of-poverty after 
social transfers (income poverty), severely materially deprived or living in house-
holds with very low work intensity.”62 The social question seems on its way back.
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The End of American Exceptionalism
The Social Question in the United States
Fred Block
Exceptionalism has been the dominant theme in United States history from 
its founding. At the time that the United States won its independence, the old 
nations against which the United States formed its identity were, in fact, the great 
 European imperial powers—England, France, the Netherlands, and Spain, and the 
United States differed from these nations in critical ways. First, to expand and 
grow, the United States had no need to establish overseas colonies; it could draw 
immigrants from Europe and extend its territorial empire westward. It was able 
to create an internal colony in the American South where chattel slavery was the 
central economic institution. Second, it led the world in developing a democratic 
political system in which the right to vote was given to most adult white males. 
However, the tensions between slave states and free states resulted in the creation 
of a uniquely constrained central government.1 Third, the combination of early 
democracy, the continuing inflows of both coerced and free laborers, and the rich-
ness of the American continent created a uniquely productive economy that sus-
tained unprecedented levels of prosperity for two full centuries. Together, these 
elements made the trajectory of the United States exceptional.2
But over the last forty-five years, American exceptionalism seems to have 
come to an end. Werner Sombart insisted that there was no socialism in America 
because “all socialist utopias came to nothing on roast beef and apple pie,”3 mean-
ing that the material prosperity and upward mobility available to white workers in 
the United States precluded the kind of mass socialist movements that emerged 
in Europe. But for the last forty years, both prosperity and upward mobility 
have receded. Real wages in the United States have stagnated, and the number 
of well-paid manufacturing jobs has dropped precipitously. Moreover, rates of 
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intergenerational mobility in the United States are now well below that of many 
countries in Europe.4
One of the key elements in this transformation has been the informalization 
of labor market arrangements in the United States. Through systematic efforts by 
employers, private-sector unionization rates have been falling for decades and now 
hover around 10 percent. When not represented by unions or protected by con-
tract, employment in the United States is “at will,” so that employees can be fired 
for any reason, no matter how arbitrary. Nevertheless, employers have sought even 
greater control over wage costs by increasing their use of contingent workers to fill 
job openings. This includes temporary workers, part-time workers, day laborers, 
and individuals who are defined as independent contractors, such as drivers for 
ridesharing services such as Uber and Lyft. By one estimate, contingent employ-
ment had risen to 40 percent of the labor force by 2010.5
Stagnating wages and rising economic insecurity played a role in the election 
of Donald Trump as president in November 2016. The U.S. political system has 
multiple barriers to block the ascendance of populist demagogues, but Trump 
overcame those obstacles. His slogan “Make America Great Again” tacitly recog-
nizes the disappearance of American exceptionalism. Yet another marker of this 
disappearance was the strength of support for Bernie Sanders, an avowed socialist, 
in the Democratic primaries in 2016.
There is, of course, a global dimension to this shift. From the end of World War II 
to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, the United States used its military and 
economic strength to create a coherent structure of global order built around free 
trade and free capital movements.6 But the ability of the United States to shape 
the globe has declined sharply. The failed U.S. military interventions in Afghani-
stan and Iraq demonstrate the limits of U.S. military power. The U.S. pressure for 
free capital movements and “free trade” culminated in the disastrous global finan-
cial crisis that revealed the fragility of the U.S. economic model. Moreover, global 
hegemony ceased to provide benefits for much of the U.S. population, as the costs 
of empire rose while the economic rewards were concentrated in the hands of a 
small oligarchic elite.7
This essay will, however, focus almost exclusively on the factors internal to the 
United States that have brought American exceptionalism to an end. The argu-
ment is that the overly ambitious extension of U.S. power globally has simply mag-
nified these internal dynamics. The argument is organized in three parts. The first 
traces the arc of American exceptionalism from the nineteenth  century through 
to the middle of the twentieth century. The second part focuses on the causes and 
the consequences of the right turn in U.S. politics that began in the 1970s and 
1980s. The policy choices in that period created severe economic inequality and 
the deep social and political polarization that is currently reflected in the electoral 
arena. The final part examines the lived experience of polarization and shows how 
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different social groups have responded to the crisis of American exceptionalism 
in sharply divergent ways.
PART 1 :  THE REALIT Y OF EXCEPTIONALISM
My argument relies on Monica Prasad’s important book The Land of Too Much.8 
She argues that the U.S. economy was inserted into the global economy in a way 
very different from Europe in the nineteenth century and that that divergence 
channeled state building in the United States in a unique direction. Specifically, 
Prasad places farmers at the center of U.S. state building, in contrast to Europe, 
where that role was played by the industrial working class.
Prasad begins her story in the 1870s, but there are elements that started substan-
tially earlier. Agriculture in the United States was far more productive than farm-
ing in Europe, and the industrial working class in the United States was weaker 
than comparable European working-class movements. Both of these elements 
connect back to key elements of American exceptionalism—the reality of slavery 
and its legacy, the early adoption of universal suffrage for white men, and the west-
ward expansion of the United States, driven by the inflow of European immigrants. 
Strong demand for raw cotton from the slave plantations of the American South 
pushed the slave economy’s westward expansion. The cotton trade generated great 
fortunes for Northern merchants, and the reinvestment of these profits fueled the 
economic development of the new nation.9 But the economic dynamism of the 
new nation was also fueled by the democratic ethos in the Northern states.
Tocqueville identified several distinct ways in which democratic and egalitarian 
values contributed significantly to economic vitality.10 There was a widely shared 
emphasis on self-improvement that led to the world’s first public school system 
and institutions that allowed working people to improve their skills. Employees 
were often deeply engaged and productive at the workplace because they envi-
sioned later setting out on their own to start a business. The importance of inno-
vation was symbolized by the patent museum in Washington, DC, where visitors 
could inspect the physical models required for each patent application. This spirit 
was also embraced by farmers, who were eager to embrace new techniques that 
would improve yields and who would ultimately press for assistance from govern-
ment agencies. The pattern in which the United States invested earlier than other 
nations in needed infrastructure, such as canals, was already well established in 
the early years of the Republic. This pattern was continued with Lincoln’s decision 
to build the intercontinental rail system.
This economic dynamism allowed the United States to contest for global lead-
ership in industrial technologies in the last part of the nineteenth century, but 
these legacies also shaped the peculiar development of the industrial working class 
in the United States. Early suffrage meant that white workers were largely incor-
porated into the “two-party” political system, so they were less likely to develop 
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the consciousness of themselves as a separate class that was both economically 
exploited and politically excluded.11 Moreover, the racial privilege enjoyed by white 
workers relative to blacks and to multiple waves of new immigrants made the con-
struction of working-class solidarity a more difficult task than in most European 
nations. Finally, the vast distances in the new nation made it far more difficult to 
coordinate social movements than in European nations, where populations were 
heavily concentrated in a few major cities.
This dynamic market economy with a politically weaker industrial working 
class sets the stage for Prasad’s argument. The U.S. comparative advantage began in 
agriculture, because of rich farmland and the rapid adoption of more productive 
technologies, but by the 1890s, a similar advantage existed in many sectors of man-
ufacturing. To protect themselves from being inundated with imports from the 
United States, Europeans turned to tariffs and to economic policies that restricted 
wage increases to help them compete with the United States. In the second half of 
the twentieth century, Europeans would compensate for these limits on individual 
consumption by expanding public outlays for collective consumption, including 
old-age pensions and public services.
In the United States, in contrast, there was no advantage in protectionism or in 
restricting individual consumption. On the contrary, the model that was ultimately 
consolidated with the New Deal expanded the availability of credit, so that con-
sumers would be able to purchase a growing share of the “too much” production. 
This direction began with radical agrarian pressures for greater availability of credit 
at reasonable rates that culminated in the Federal Reserve System and the Federal 
Farm Loan Act of 1916. The New Deal further expanded farm credit and created a 
national system of subsidized mortgage loans to facilitate mass home ownership.12
The last important step in Prasad’s argument is that during the New Deal, agrar-
ian interests succeeded in defeating a national sales tax. Farmers insisted that the 
government should rely on payroll taxes and the progressive income tax to raise 
revenues. New Deal social-welfare measures were created later than in Europe 
and were weaker because they were less universal. However, the mechanism of 
financing made it substantially harder to extend welfare programs in later decades 
because of the absence in the United States of the kind of broad-based consump-
tion taxes that have financed welfare-state expansion in Europe.13
DIVERGENCES AFTER THE NEW DEAL
Prasad’s framework helps us to understand the divergent trajectories of the United 
States and Europe in the years after World War II. Starting during postwar recon-
struction, European countries continued to restrain the growth of wages to restore 
their competitiveness, but under pressure from a still powerful organized working 
class, they engaged in the progressive expansion of forms of collective consump-
tion, including systems of national health insurance. This was financed through 
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the expansion of consumption taxes, as big businesses saw benefits from a more 
educated and healthier work force.14
In the United States, in contrast, the achievement of the New Deal system of 
agricultural price supports was the death knell of agrarian radicalism. Without 
its earlier agrarian allies, organized labor’s political influence and power also 
declined. Labor-union density reached its peak level in the mid 1950s, before a 
relentless decline.15 Initiatives to expand the scope of the welfare state were both 
more modest and more fiercely resisted than in Europe. By the 1970s, the heavy 
reliance of the federal government on the income tax and the payroll tax had gen-
erated a powerful opposition to increased taxation.16
Prasad also rejects the argument that the stinginess of the U.S. welfare state is 
a symptom of a lack of state capacity. Her view is that because of the importance 
of agrarian radicalism, U.S. state capacity developed on a different trajectory from 
Europe, with much more emphasis on building strong and independent regulatory 
agencies.17
U.S. government agencies were also able to nurture new industries and new 
technologies in much the same way that the Department of Agriculture had dif-
fused new and more productive agricultural technologies. To be sure, this devel-
opmental side of the U.S. state was enormously enhanced by the growth of military 
and science spending in the Cold War era. However, starting in the 1980s, there 
were systematic initiatives to extend this developmental capacity beyond the 
Department of Defense, and these initiatives have been highly effective in main-
taining the United States’ superiority in technological innovation.18
PART 2 :  WEAKENING THE U.S .  MODEL
Despite the historic weakness of the labor movement in the United States, the 
United States was still able to create a particularly dynamic version of a market 
economy, largely because of its strong democratic traditions and the opportunity 
to expand across a vast continent rich in natural resources. This was facilitated 
by continuing investments in public education and a responsive government that 
developed capacities to invest in infrastructure, regulatory, and developmental 
policies that gave the United States global technological leadership.
Finally, the democratic legacy opened the way for powerful social movements 
that have periodically been able to overcome the entrenched power of reactionary 
interests whose reign threatened further economic advances. Abolitionism and 
the Civil Right Movement of the 1950s and 1960s fit here, as does the agrarian 
radicalism that Prasad emphasizes.19
But politics in the United States took a right turn in the mid-1970s that has 
weakened the democratic character of the society and has fundamentally jeop-
ardized the country’s economic dynamism.20 Piketty has highlighted the most 
important consequence of this right turn: the dramatic increase in income and 
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wealth inequality that began in the early 1980s and has continued ever since.21 
From 1981, the first year of the Reagan Administration, to 2014, the share of house-
hold income going to the top 1 percent of households is estimated to have increased 
from 8 percent to 18 percent.
The explanation for this right turn is closely linked to the turbulent Vietnam 
decade, from escalation of the war in August of 1964 to Nixon’s presidential resig-
nation in August of 1974.
Faced by a powerful communist insurgency in South Vietnam, U.S. policy 
makers were unable to recognize the limits of U.S. military power. The obvious 
futility of the U.S. effort produced a sustained crisis in the United States, with the 
emergence of powerful left-wing social movements. There was an unprecedented 
public debate about the United States’ global role, and there was a dramatic decline 
in public confidence in the political elites of both major parties.
Big business firms in the United States responded to the domestic turmoil of 
the Vietnam era and the failure of two presidents by reconsidering their political 
stance. Many previously centrist business leaders began to build an alliance with 
the right wing of the Republican Party, based on free-market economics and the 
call to roll back taxation, regulation, and labor-union gains.
At the grassroots, the turmoil of the Vietnam decade also produced significant 
popular backlash against the movements of the 1960s. Both in the South and in the 
North, many white voters were pushed to the right by escalating militancy among 
African Americans. Similarly, there was a strong backlash against the emergence 
of second-wave feminism, particularly after the Supreme Court legalized abortion 
in 1973. Moreover, the antiauthoritarian politics of the student movement fueled a 
revival of traditional values and increased mobilization among evangelical Chris-
tians. Finally, resistance to higher levels of taxation allowed all of these currents to 
fuse together into the strongest right-wing coalition that the nation had seen since 
the 1920s.
This convergence between grassroots conservatism and a turn to the right by 
big business led to Ronald Reagan’s election as president in 1980. Reagan then set 
in motion a series of policies that helped generate the shifts in income and wealth 
inequality that Piketty has documented. The massive “supply-side” tax cuts car-
ried out in 1981 significantly reduced the tax burden on high-income households 
and increased the returns to speculation in financial markets. Reagan also imple-
mented a shift in antitrust policy that conformed to the anti-regulatory ideology 
of Milton Friedman’s Chicago school of economics.22 A huge increase in executive 
compensation followed, generally implemented through stock options and stock 
grants, which was justified by the ideology of shareholder value. In the same vein, 
the Reagan administration encouraged the consolidation of the banking sector 
and accelerated the financialization of the economy.23
Reagan fired the government employees who worked in the air traffic control 
system who went on strike in 1981. This sent a powerful signal, since most other 
46    The End of American Exceptionalism
working people could be replaced far more easily. Employers took advantage by 
forcing unionized employees to make wage concessions and increasing the use 
of contingent workers. Reagan also made significant cuts in spending in a range 
of government programs designed to aid the poor and eliminated the revenue-
sharing program that had eased the fiscal strain on cities.24
Most of these Reagan-era policies were continued and intensified all the way up 
to the Wall Street meltdown in the fall of 2008. Subsequent administrations tilted 
taxes even further in favor of the rich and continued to encourage the rapid expan-
sion of the financial sector. The Clinton administration was friendlier to unions 
and expanded a program that provided additional income to low-wage workers. 
However, the Clinton efforts did not halt the trend toward greater inequality.
From 1945 to 1975, the federal government had provided state and local gov-
ernments with considerable support to build and repair infrastructure. This sup-
port eased the fiscal pressure on these units and facilitated increased funding of 
public education, including higher education. But from the 1980s onward, fiscal 
pressures on state and local governments intensified. Politicians became extremely 
reluctant to push tax increases. The end of revenue sharing and other federal cut-
backs meant that states and localities had to cover a substantially larger share of 
infrastructure outlays at a time when such projects were rising in cost. Finally, 
the “war on crime,” which dramatically increased incarceration rates, particularly 
for minority men, meant that the costs of the prison and criminal-justice systems 
were adding additional strain to state and local budgets.25
State and local governments also cut back a variety of services that had previ-
ously provided assistance to poorer households. The most dramatic impact has 
been the consequence for expenditures on public higher education. In the first 
thirty years after World War II, public colleges and universities were often tuition-
free or had nominal fees that did not represent a burden for enrollees. But as a 
result of ongoing budgetary pressures, more and more of the cost of public higher 
education now falls on the students.26 Large sectors of the population are effec-
tively priced out of the market for higher education, and many college graduates 
are weighted down with tens of thousands of dollars of educational debt.
This represents a reversal of one of the longstanding patterns of American 
exceptionalism—greater investments in increased educational attainment than 
other nations. U.S. educational leadership came to an abrupt end in the last quar-
ter of the twentieth century.27 Other nations surged ahead of the United States with 
ever-larger shares of their young people directed to higher education or sophisti-
cated apprenticeship programs. The reading, writing, and math skills of adults in 
Scandinavia are now substantially higher than those in the United States. This, in 
turn, puts U.S.-based firms at a competitive disadvantage as they try to compete 
in global markets.
It is still the case that large investments by the U.S. government in science 
and technology have given the United States an advantage in the development 
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of cutting-edge technologies. Specifically, the U.S. global leadership in develop-
ing the internet and computer technologies has allowed firms such as Microsoft, 
Apple, Google, and Facebook to earn fabulous profits from their global operations. 
But this sectoral success has also served to mask deeper problems with the U.S. 
economic model.
C ONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHT TURN
Theorists of the free market insisted that policies of the right turn—such as cutting 
taxes, removing burdensome regulations on business, and shrinking the size of 
civilian government operations—would operate like a magical elixir and revital-
ize the U.S. economy. But the consequences of these policies have been exactly 
the opposite; they have undermined the historic sources of vitality in the U.S. 
economy.
The right turn accelerated the concentration of wealth and income in the hands 
of the top 1 percent. Middle-income and poor households responded to con-
strained income growth by taking on greater debt, and this was a major contribu-
tor to the mortgage meltdown in 2007 and 2008.28 The concentration of income 
at the top also intensifies speculative activity, since those with vast fortunes have 
strong motivation to put excess funds into more risky investments that promise a 
higher return. At the same time, the ideology that corporations should be managed 
to maximize shareholder value has justified the shifts in corporate compensation 
that have allowed top managers to pocket a growing share of corporate profits.29 
The major corporations have accumulated huge cash hordes, but their investment 
outlays remain anemic. Finally, the concentration of income and wealth at the top, 
as we shall see, is a major contributor to de-democratization, as the very rich use a 
small share of their resources to tilt tax and regulatory policies in their own favor.30
The largest firms in different sectors of the economy have become entrenched, 
so they can avoid competition and extract unjustified rents. This is most extreme 
with the largest financial institutions, those that were encouraged from the Reagan 
administration onward to grow ever larger. And even after the government res-
cue, the surviving firms continue to control a more substantial share of consumer 
deposits.
Big pharmaceutical companies have developed few effective new medica-
tions in their own laboratories, but they have been able to leverage their ability to 
finance clinical trials and their access to physicians, so that smaller firms need to 
work with them to get their innovations to the market.31 Similarly, the giant tech-
nology firms are able to use their vast portfolios of patents to intimidate would-
be competitors from challenging their entrenched positions. They are also able 
simply to buy out potential competitors who are in the early stages of developing 
a competing technology, since such startups face such difficulties obtaining the 
finances to remain independent.
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One of the keys to this process of entrenchment has been the relaxation of anti-
trust enforcement that began during the Reagan administration.32 Corporate prac-
tices that in an earlier period might have precipitated vigorous antitrust actions 
were seen by the Justice Department and the courts as harmless. Economic dyna-
mism is diminished, because many entrenched firms have too many weapons in 
their arsenal to blunt competitive challenges.
De-democratization goes along with entrenchment and enrichment.33 Demo-
cratic practices in the United States have long been flawed, because elections are 
run by partisan local officials, numerous barriers to broad electoral participation 
were erected in the early decades of the twentieth century, and expensive elec-
toral campaigns have given rich donors disproportionate influence. However, 
since the right turn, a series of court decisions have further weakened the voice 
of the people. A decades-long conservative campaign to reverse the protections 
provided by the Voting Rights Act culminated in a Supreme Court decision in 
2013 that gave local jurisdictions much greater leeway to discriminate against 
minority voters.
Most importantly, the conservative majority on the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly held that campaign donations are equivalent to speech, so that efforts to limit 
the impact of big money on campaigns violates the constitution. With this logic, 
the court has opened the floodgates of donations by the rich and corporations 
and gutted regulations that were intended, at least, to force the disclosure of such 
contributions.
De-democratization makes the political system unresponsive to reform 
demands. For example, it is widely recognized that the current tax system, in 
which multimillionaires routinely pay taxes at a lower rate than their rank-and-
file employees, is grossly unfair. However, strategic campaign contributions assure 
that key congressional leaders will be able to block reform legislation from coming 
to the floor.
The combined consequences of enrichment, entrenchment, and de-democra-
tization has been a stagnant economy, characterized by insufficient demand and 
diminishing opportunities for upward mobility. Aggregate demand has been weak-
ened by the tilting of income toward the rich, by all levels of government facing 
ongoing fiscal crises, and by the reluctance of wealthy corporations to invest in 
new projects. At the same time, for the last generation, the combination of foreign 
competition and technological advances have dramatically reduced manufacturing 
employment, significantly weakened new job creation, and have pushed a growing 
share of the labor force into poorly paid jobs in services and retail trade.
The impact is indicated by studies showing elevated death rates in the United 
States in 2014 as compared to 1999 among white men between ages of forty-five 
and fifty-four with only a high school education.34 This finding goes against the 
general trend of declining death rates for people in midlife, and the apparent rea-
son for the uptick is suicides and deaths related to drug and alcohol abuse. The 
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finding is limited to white men; Hispanics and African Americans in that age 
group continue to show declining death rates. The logical explanation is that while 
Hispanics and African Americans continue to face difficult labor-market condi-
tions, racial barriers have diminished over the last generation. But white men, who 
historically enjoyed an advantaged position in the labor market, face both worsen-
ing conditions and an erosion of their historic privileges.
While this represents just one piece of data, it highlights the end of  American 
exceptionalism. The same population group—prime-age working-class white 
men—that through much of U.S. history did not rally to the banners of radical 
movements, are now experiencing increasingly difficult circumstances. Some of 
them are dying at a higher rate, and others are, in fact, rallying behind the banners 
of outsider political figures such as Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders.
PART 3 :  THE LIVED EXPERIENCE OF POL ARIZ ATION
For many social scientists, it is almost a reflex to think in terms of class and jump to 
the conclusion that people who are in similar structural positions should respond 
in similar ways to economic hardship. But the reality of American exceptionalism 
is that class position has always been mediated through other identities, such as 
ethnicity, religion, generation, and region, in shaping political behavior. Different 
population groups have responded to parallel economic shocks with extremely 
divergent forms of political responses. Here, the U.S. pattern looks similar to that 
of Europe, where economic shocks have significantly weakened centrist political 
parties and have strengthened the oppositional parties of the right and the left.
The best way to conceptualize the economic dislocations is in terms of what 
Jacob Hacker has called, the “great risk shift.”35 Basically, the transformations in 
the United States since the right turn of the 1980s have significantly increased the 
volatility of family income. Hacker shows that by 2002, basically one household in 
six, headed by a prime-age adult, was likely to experience a 50 percent or greater 
income drop from one year to the next, and more recent analyses have shown that 
this volatility has continued to rise.
The most important cause is the increasing amount of turnover in the labor 
market. Informalization means fewer people enjoy job security. Total employment 
at large corporations in the United States has been falling sharply for decades, and 
a greater share of those that they employ work on a contingent basis.36 Ongoing 
fiscal pressures have produced comparable changes for public-sector employees, 
who have also become increasingly vulnerable to layoffs. An ever-larger share of 
the labor force works at small- and medium-sized firms that are very exposed to 
ups and downs of the business cycle.
The second key cause is the weakening of the safety net that is supposed to pro-
tect households from this kind of volatility. Over the decades, the share of those 
facing unemployment who qualify for benefits has been falling; it is now at less 
50    The End of American Exceptionalism
than a quarter of all those counted as unemployed. Moreover, even for those lucky 
enough to receive benefits, the ratio of those benefits to the lost wages has also 
been falling. At the same time, a variety of state and local programs that provided 
cash assistance have been phased out, and the national program that was designed 
to protect children from poverty was effectively gutted by legislation passed in 
1996.37 Furthermore, the dramatic increases in health care costs and the spotti-
ness of safety-net programs means that families can also be driven into poverty by 
either the uncompensated costs or the lost income precipitated by a severe health 
crisis.
In fact, the largest single cause of personal bankruptcy in the United States 
remains costs associated with a medical crisis. For a large portion of the U.S. popu-
lation, when a doctor’s visit detects a serious illness, it raises both the threat of mor-
tality and the possibility of financial ruin. The Affordable Care Act ameliorated this 
problem by providing health insurance to many families that previously could not 
afford coverage. But families remain at risk of impoverishment caused by a health 
crisis. A study released in early 2016 reported that 37 percent of respondents living 
in households with earnings below $50,000 experienced difficulties paying medical 
bills.38 This is one of the reasons why Republican attacks on the Affordable Care Act 
had some political traction; the law has not alleviated the public’s economic anxiet-
ies about health costs.
These two primary factors, in turn, set in motion two secondary processes. The 
first is family breakup. Households that are strained by income instability are at 
greater risk of dissolution, which often means a significant income loss for some 
members of the original household. Second, economic stresses, including loss of 
income or sustained fears of an imminent loss of income, often produce anxiety, 
depression, and loss of self-esteem. This, in turn, can result in alcohol or drug 
abuse, as individuals self-medicate to manage their symptoms. However, drug or 
alcohol dependence can lead to arrest, job losses, and further shocks to household 
income.
Households in the United States have sought to protect themselves from 
incomes that are volatile or insufficient through increased resort to borrowing. 
However, this expedient frequently backfires, leaving households facing even 
greater economic uncertainty. During the long increase in housing prices from 
the 1990s through 2007, many households increased their mortgage debt. When 
house prices stopped rising, millions of households owed more on their mortgages 
than the houses were worth. The defaulted loans and foreclosures that continued 
for years meant that many formerly middle-class households lost whatever saving 
they had been able to accumulate.39
There has also been a vast increase in student debt over the last decade. The 
problem has been particularly egregious for students attending for-profit institu-
tions, where instruction was supposed to lead to job opportunities, which failed 
to materialize. But as the job market has worsened in the post-2008 period, many 
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students who attended legitimate colleges and universities have found themselves 
unable to find employment while they still carry loan burdens of $100,000 to 
$200,000. Since student debt is difficult to discharge with personal bankruptcy, it 
becomes a durable burden that individuals carry for years.40 Recent reports have 
indicated that thousands of elderly people have portions of their social security 
checks withheld, because even as they reach retirement, they still owe payments 
on student debt.41
DIVERGENT RESPONSES
Those at the Bottom
Ethnographic accounts have illuminated the misery of those living at the bottom 
of U.S. society.42 Edin and Shaefer document the lives of people living on $2.00 a 
day or less.43 The stories are basically similar—a family is surviving on the basis of 
a paycheck from a low-wage job, but a conflict with a boss or a health crisis or an 
arrest leads to the loss of the job and a downward spiral that includes spells of living 
with relatives or living on the streets. Welfare is not an option either because they 
do not know it exists or because they are unlikely to be deemed eligible, despite 
desperate circumstances. Similar stories have been told by Desmond, document-
ing the moment at which families are put out on the street because the landlord 
has decided that they are no longer acceptable as tenants.44
But both these households that are in extreme poverty and many of those who 
are a single paycheck away from extreme poverty are unlikely to have any political 
response to their economic marginalization. Just getting by, just surviving is a full-
time job, and they are unlikely to vote. Low-income households that are vulner-
able to evictions or frequent change of residence are unlikely to have updated their 
residence information to remain eligible.
In fact, in many parts of the country, there is no longer an entity or organi-
zation that seeks to connect poor people to the political process. This role was 
filled for decades by labor unions, which played a role in getting their members 
and their members’ neighbors registered to vote. But as unions have declined or 
disappeared in many communities, no other organizations are available to fill 
the vacuum. Exit polls from 2016 showed that households of all ethnicities with 
income below $50,000 voted for Clinton over Trump by about ten points, while 
most other income groups were close to evenly split. However, voters in the bot-
tom quintile have turnout rates of about 55 percent in presidential elections, while 
those in the top quintile reach 80 percent turnout.45
Working-Class Minorities
There are many African American and Latino households who live one or two 
rungs up the social ladder from those living in poverty or at daily risk of poverty. 
Members of this group face continuing insecurity in the labor market, many of 
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them were victimized by subprime mortgage lending, and they disproportionately 
face displacement, as gentrification drives them out of urban neighborhoods that 
have become attractive to higher-income households. Members of this group have 
particularly high anxieties about the prospects for their children. On the one side, 
repeated episodes of police violence have exposed the vulnerability of minority 
youths and young adults. On the other, poor schools and financial barriers to 
higher education create significant barriers to upward mobility.
However, men in this demographic group do not face the higher levels of mor-
tality reported for working-class white men. The usual explanation is that minor-
ity men have long faced racial barriers and discrimination in the labor market, 
so they do not confront growing instability in labor markets as something new 
and surprising. But it might also be that a recent history of political mobilization 
within these communities provides an alternative to despair and self-medication.
In fact, there has been a resurgence of political engagement in these commu-
nities. Movements such as Black Lives Matter, the Fight for Fifteen—to raise the 
minimum wage—and campaigns for an end to deportations and a path to citizen-
ship within immigrant communities are indicators of the potential for broader 
political mobilization.46 But as we saw in the 1960s, such claims making within 
minority communities generates an instant backlash, provoking political figures 
such as Donald Trump to double down on anti-immigrant and pro-police rhetoric.
Whites without College Degrees
Here is where one sees the most divergent responses to greater economic insecu-
rity. Depending largely upon the specific communities where they live, people in 
this demographic group rallied behind the very different candidacies of Donald 
Trump and Bernie Sanders. In a number of Northern states, Sanders won big vic-
tories over Clinton in white working-class communities. However, in the Novem-
ber election, non-college-educated whites favored Trump over Clinton by close to 
a 70 to 30 margin.47 But this figure has to be adjusted for the regional reality that 
whites without a college education in the South tend to vote Republican by even 
larger margins. For example, white evangelical voters, many of whom live in the 
South and do not have college degrees, voted for Trump over Clinton by 81 percent 
over 16 percent.
What seems indisputable is that a slice of non-college-educated whites in mid-
western heartland states, such as Wisconsin, Iowa, Ohio, Michigan, and Pennsylva-
nia, who had been part of the Obama coalition in 2008 and 2012, crossed over and 
supported Trump in 2016, and that shift in those five states accounted for Trump’s 
narrow Electoral College victory. The actual number of people who made this 
shift was not particularly large; it could have been as few as half a million voters, 
since Trump’s margin in some of these states was small. However, this was enough 
to make the difference, given that other parts of the Obama coalition—African 
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Americans and young people—did not turn out to the polls for Clinton as strongly 
as they had for Obama.
These non-college-educated switchers in the industrial heartland had presum-
ably voted for Obama because of his promise of significant change, but they are 
still hurting, and they probably voted for Trump because of his promise to bring 
back manufacturing jobs. For these and many other voters, Clinton was seen as an 
unattractive establishment figure who was unlikely to pursue a bold and disruptive 
agenda.
To be sure, a much larger portion of Trump’s total vote came from those non-
college-educated whites who had rallied to the Tea Party political insurgency that 
first emerged in 2009. Well-funded national right-wing organizations such as 
Americans for Prosperity played a key role in turning grassroots activism into 
a national political force. However, the movement has a very real popular base 
among whites, particularly in the South and in rural communities and small 
towns across the nation. Arlie Hochschild has explained the “deep story” of Tea 
Party activists with the metaphor of people patiently standing on a line stretch-
ing for miles toward a horizon of opportunity and success, but suddenly others 
start cutting in to the line, including minorities, immigrants, and even endangered 
species.48 This story resonates both with those who have achieved some level of 
economic security, as well as those who are struggling to keep their heads above 
water.
Two of the core issues for Tea Party activists featured prominently in the rhet-
oric of Donald Trump. Tea Party activists were particularly mobilized by both 
the economic and cultural threat of immigration; they did not want immigrants 
coming into the United States, taking jobs and speaking other languages. Also, 
the iconic Tea Party slogan was “Keep your government hands off my Medicare.” 
Activists wanted to protect their own entitlement to Medicare and Social Security 
while urging political leaders to cut back spending on the undeserving.49 Trump’s 
campaign was unusual for the Republican Party in his strong stance against cuts to 
both Social Security and Medicare, since the party’s orthodoxy has been that the 
entitlement programs need dramatic retrenchment.
Some voters in this group chose Trump; and others, Sanders, because voters 
go with the version of economic populism that makes sense to them, given their 
locality and their voting history. For many voters, partisan identification is deeply 
held and often inherited from their parents. But what happened in places like Wis-
consin, Michigan, and Ohio is that some unionized workers rejected the advice 
of their own unions and cast a protest vote in favor of Trump. The irony is that in 
all of these states, strongly anti-union Republican governors had pursued aggres-
sive policies since 2011 to weaken trade unions. In short, these voters risked a vote 
for Trump knowing that the unions had been too weak to fight back successfully 
against the right.50
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Whites with College Degrees
Within this demographic group, the key dividing line appears to be age. Histori-
cally, a college degree made a significant difference for labor-market outcomes, 
and those with such degrees experienced lower unemployment rates and a sig-
nificant wage premium. The consequence was that whites with a college educa-
tion have slightly favored the Republicans in recent elections. However, the same 
cannot be said for younger college graduates. Those who have entered the labor 
market over the last decade faced either a massive recession or a weak recovery. 
Even when jobs are available, employers often prefer to increase the number of 
temporary or precarious workers, who can easily be fired in the event of another 
economic downturn. Older employees are less likely to move on or retire, given 
the uncertain economic environment. Finally, many industries are facing disrup-
tive changes that create additional pressure on employers to limit the number of 
relatively secure positions.
The combination of a difficult labor market and the heavy burden of student 
debt have pushed many young college-educated whites leftward.51 This was a big 
factor in the Sanders campaign. However, the ultimate impact of this political shift 
remains uncertain, because young people are substantially less likely than their 
elders to participate in elections and some older college-educated white voters, 
who had been enthusiastic members of the Obama electorate, have grown disil-
lusioned with the Democrats in recent years.
C ONCLUSION
The right turn in U.S. politics that began in the 1980s has effectively dismantled 
some of the key structures of American exceptionalism, especially the confidence 
that individual initiative and hard work are sufficient to achieve upward mobil-
ity. The consequence has been growing ideological polarization, political stale-
mate, and the rise of new political currents, such as populist authoritarianism and 
socialism, that were previously restricted to the margins of politics in the United 
States. But this analysis also suggests that the future direction of the United States 
is extremely difficult to predict, since it is dependent on the complex interaction 
among leadership personalities, the political choices made by diverse population 
groups, and global events.
To be sure, the likeliest possibility remains a continuation of the status quo, 
with polarization and stalemate growing even worse. Since the U.S. constitution 
provides multiple veto points, the election of Donald Trump will likely result in 
continuing stalemate between Congress and the president, with few significant 
legislative changes. Ironically, the new administration’s only significant legislative 
achievement—the massive tax-cut bill that was successfully pushed through in 
late 2017—will further intensify wealth and income inequalities, contributing to 
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greater economic instability and rising public anger and discontent. But intensify-
ing polarization and growing popular dissatisfaction cannot go on indefinitely. 
Sooner or later, the pressure for a break will become overwhelming, but that still 
leaves two distinct and radically different trajectories.
The first is an extended episode of authoritarian governance as domestic 
 turbulence and perceived foreign threats are used as a pretext for suspending the 
constitution and giving the executive branch broad powers to impose new policies. 
Such a turn would probably coincide with a new hot or cold war against one or 
another foreign enemy or an escalation of ongoing fighting in the Middle East or 
Afghanistan. In both the recent and distant past, the need to defeat foreign  enemies 
has been used as the justification for such departures from  constitutional govern-
ment as the internment of the Japanese during World War II, anti- communist 
witch hunts in the 1950s, or the use of torture against suspected terrorists after 9/11. 
A new authoritarianism is likely to use similar tactics.
The second possibility is another epoch of reform, comparable to the New Deal, 
in which a reform administration, pressed by powerful social movements, pursues 
an aggressive project of redistributing income and revitalizing the U.S. economy. 
Suggestions of this possibility lie in the broad resistance to the Trump adminis-
tration that began with the huge women’s marches that took place the day after 
Trump’s inauguration in 2017 and again a year later. The Trump administration 
has simultaneously mounted frontal attacks on immigrants and immigrant-rights 
supporters, labor unions, African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, advo-
cates for the environment and environmental justice, the women’s movement, 
advocates for prison and criminal-justice reform, gun-control groups, proponents 
of marijuana decriminalization, defenders of an open internet, advocates for pub-
lic schools, supporters of transgender rights, opponents of unlimited corporate 
power, and those fighting to reduce shocking inequalities of wealth and income 
inequality. These broad and indiscriminate attacks provide organizers with the 
opportunity to fuse these diverse constituencies into a powerful and majoritarian 
reform coalition.
However, historically even the most powerful resistance movements have found 
it difficult to maintain unity once they have driven their opponents from power. 
Moreover, in the United States, there are few signs thus far that Trump’s many 
opponents have coalesced around a coherent reform agenda. But it is also possible 
that the seriousness of the threat posed by Trump’s authoritarian impulses could 
produce a surprising level of cooperation between centrist Democratic politicians 
and social-movement activists.
Whether the United States moves toward authoritarianism or a new reform 
epoch will depend ultimately on both events internal to the United States and 
on what goes on in the rest of the world. Increased global disorder and mount-
ing threats of war could strengthen anti-democratic forces. On the other hand, 
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successful reform initiatives in other parts of the world to strengthen democratic 
governance while reducing inequality and environmental degradation could 
inspire similar efforts in the United States.
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The Social Question as the Struggle 
over Precarity
The Case of China
Ching Kwan Lee
The modern welfare state owed its origin to the disruptive power of workers’ 
movements and the threat of communist revolutions in Europe. Bismarck’s pio-
neering compulsory social insurance funds in the 1880s was a response to the 
“worker question”—the social upheaval in the wake of proletarianization and 
the rising political power of organized labor. Progressive and protective social 
policies (insurance for sickness, pension, injuries, unemployment) gradually 
expanded coverage from the male proletariat to other social groups, broadening 
the terrain of the “social” to include workers’ families, future workers, former 
workers, lapsed workers, thereby achieving the domestication of the working 
class and “regulation of the social” by the state.1 Other European nations  followed 
suit in the ensuing decades, with the impetus to establish full- employment 
 capitalism reinforced by the political need to match the gains workers won in the 
Communist bloc during the Cold War era.2 If the specter of Communism kept 
capitalism on guard, what kind of “security” was available to the working masses 
under Communism? And how did that system evolve to shape precarity under 
neoliberalism?
This chapter examines these questions through the trajectory of China’s pre-
cariats from state socialism to the country’s integration with global capitalism. The 
“social question” here refers to the multifaceted contestations, or relational strug-
gles, over precarity. Analytically, at least three contested terrains can be identified: 
the regulation of class relation and power at the point of production, usually by the 
state and the law; the social reproduction of labor beyond wage work, or the provi-
sion of care and subsistence for maintaining and renewing workers’ labor power 
on a daily and generational basis; and the recognition of labor, or the ideological 
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and symbolic resources that members of society can use to make claims on col-
lective security and well-being. The overall argument is that over the past seven 
decades, the most salient terrain for relational struggles has shifted from recogni-
tion to regulation and now to the social reproduction of labor. Notwithstanding 
China’s spectacular economic development, the social question qua labor question 
remains, albeit in changing forms.
PRECARIOUS VERSUS PERMANENT PROLETARIAT S 
UNDER STATE SO CIALISM
Notwithstanding the communist ideology of equality and protection, state pater-
nalism during the planned-economy period was practiced on the principle of 
exclusivity, not universality, resulting in a hierarchy of inequality and insecurity. 
The famed “iron rice bowl”—permanent employment with the guarantee of cra-
dle-to-grave welfare—was available to only one-fifth of the Chinese workforce, 
almost all of them urbanites.3 The vast majority of the working population, includ-
ing workers in collective industries and the even larger contingent of farmers, 
were categorically excluded from state-funded and guaranteed welfare. Instead, 
these workers depended on revenues of their own collective enterprises or com-
munes for wages and collective benefits, which varied widely across work units, 
villages, and regions. The main driver of precarity in this period was the Com-
munist state’s strategy of accumulation and domination. Worker resistance was 
spearheaded by marginalized workers who appropriated the communist ideology 
of equality and proletarian leadership to demand recognition of their status and 
equal compensation.
Of particular importance to the Maoist regime of accumulation was the state-
sponsored rural-urban divide and the concomitant unequal citizenship regime. 
The transfer of surplus from agriculture to industry, from country to city, and from 
peasants to workers could not have been possible without the hukuo (household 
registration) system, which essentially locked rural workers down in their birth-
place, and the state-imposed “price scissors,” which  artificially devalued agri-
cultural labor relative to industrial labor. Not guaranteed or supported by state 
budget, agricultural collectives (i.e., a three-level system of commune, brigade, 
and team from 1958 to 1979) were self-sufficient basic units of production and 
accounting, and depended on self-generated resources to buffer risk and provide 
basic medical services, primary education, and emergency relief.4 Rural precari-
ousness was starkly displayed during the Great Leap famine: nearly all of the esti-
mated ten to twenty million who starved to death were rural residents. Based on 
data on the differential reduction in grain consumption during the famine, it was 
clear that the state protected urban residents from  starvation.5 Sociologist Martin 
Whyte calls this rigid regime of unequal citizenship a “ socialist caste” system.6
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In cities, during the first three decades of state socialism in post-revolutionary 
China, a “dual” labor system separated permanent workers from marginal and 
temporary workers, with each of these two categories marked by elaborate internal 
differentiation in wages, benefits, and political status. The much-touted “prole-
tariat master” of the Communist nation, who enjoyed permanent employment, 
and full and free medical care, housing, and pension amounting to more than half 
of their former wages, represented only a small minority of the Chinese workforce 
at any point in time, and they were found only in the urban, state-owned, heavy-
industrial sector. The split and inequality between the regular and the contract 
proletariat coexisted inconveniently and incongruously with the official ideology 
aimed at creating a united proletarian political backing for the party. The con-
tradiction between reality and ideology—between policies geared to incentivize 
productivity by differential compensation and policies aimed at realizing “work 
according to need” and protection for all—surfaced most publicly during mass 
mobilization of the Hundred Flowers Campaign (1957) and the Cultural Revolu-
tion (1966–1976). The “contract proletariat” was at the forefront of labor activism, 
seizing these state-endorsed moments of class struggle to demand equal treatment 
in wages, benefits, and permanent terms of employment.
Several political economic conditions led to institutionalized inequality among 
Chinese workers. During the revolution, the Chinese Communist Party drew its 
working-class support mainly from southern skilled artisans—printers, copper 
fitters, metal workers, mechanics—whose guild tradition of exclusivity and pater-
nalism found expression in the new Communist industrial order in the People’s 
Republic. Former leaders of the Communist labor movement in Shanghai, the 
industrial heartland of prerevolutionary China, became top officials in charge of 
instituting labor insurance regulations and according trade unions with important 
welfare functions.
But just as only a portion of labor had been actively engaged on the communist side 
during the revolution, so the fruits of struggle were enjoyed by a limited constituency 
as well.  .  .  . In 1952, when the new labor insurance system was first implemented, 
a mere seven percent of the work force was covered by its generous provisions. By 
1958, following the socialization of industry, coverage reached a high point of thirty 
percent. In 1978, at the beginning of the post-Mao reforms, only some twenty-two 
percent of the labor force could claim such benefits—a figure that remained steady 
throughout the 1980s.7
Contrary to its connotation, the “planned” economy had to deal with financial 
constraints, production pressure, and input shortages and fluctuation by creat-
ing flexibility in its workforce. It also depended on the deliberate use of unequal 
rewards to incentivize productivity among workers, spawning different kinds of 
polarities within the labor force, across sectors (light and heavy industries and 
service), ranks (seniority), occupation (skills), and ownership type (state or 
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collective). On the eve of economic reform, there were thirteen million temporary 
workers (or 16 percent) in industrial employment alone.8 A bewildering numbers 
of informal arrangements allocated these urban and rural residents to different 
kinds of temporary positions to provide necessary flexibility to state industries 
under the planned economy. Temporary workers were needed to do work perma-
nent workers resisted doing, to pitch in during hot summer months when absen-
teeism of permanent workers was common, to undertake enterprise expansion 
or building addition, and so forth. Then there were the apprentices, who endured 
years of training at substandard wages and benefits and were often resentful of 
their masters. Migrant workers from the countryside took up contract jobs in the 
cities, receiving salaries without any benefits. Their numbers expanded rapidly 
during the Great Leap Forward. Social youth, a euphemistic term for the unem-
ployed youth, usually of urban bourgeois family backgrounds, who refused to go 
into agriculture, were encouraged to join propaganda work to ensure their politi-
cal loyalty. City governments set up labor service stations, which functioned as 
labor contractors and charged service fees, to help people looking for temporary 
jobs. In Shanghai, China’s premier industrial center, as Lynn White remarked, “the 
social division between secure and marginal workers is as notable in a developing 
Communist city as in a developing capitalist one.”9
If the state-socialist strategy of accumulation called for instituting a hierarchy 
of rural and urban precarity and vulnerability, its legitimating ideology directly 
contradicted this reality. Ironically, precarious workers under Communism devel-
oped heightened consciousness of their class position and disadvantages because 
official propaganda trumpeted equality and unity. Historians of Chinese labor 
have established that marginal workers played a disproportionately active role in 
responding to significant episodes of political mobilizations—the Hundred Flow-
ers, the Cultural Revolution, and the April Fifth Movement in 1976. In 1957, after 
a national outpouring of labor unrest in 1956, partly spurred by popular dissent 
during the Hungarian revolt, labor disturbance erupted in more 587 enterprises, 
involving nearly thirty thousand workers. Workers in “joint-ownership” enter-
prises, apprentices, temporary workers, and those who had lost their permanent 
status through job reassignment, all resentful of their inferior conditions of ser-
vice, drove the unrest.10 A decade later, the “economistic wind” (workers demand 
for material improvement) during the Cultural Revolution originated among long 
term irregular workers and those workers who had been mobilized to go down to 
the countryside to support the peasants. Later, the demands of these groups spread 
to workers in the interior and to intellectual youths who had been part of the 
up to the mountain down to the countryside resettlement campaign.11 Eventually 
the economistic fever infested even permanent state employees with secure urban 
household registration.12 Then, in 1976, mass demonstrations and riots broke out 
in more than forty places across the country. Young and marginalized workers 
who were persecuted for their bourgeois leanings during the Cultural Revolution 
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seized this occasion of commemorating the late premier Zhou Enlai to express 
their dissatisfaction with the political persecutions and injustices they suffered.13
In short, notwithstanding the mythology of communist egalitarianism, worker 
solidarity, and state paternalism, the Chinese working class under Mao was 
 fragmented and marked by inequalities in the realms of production, social repro-
duction, and social status. On top of prerevolutionary cleavages of gender, skills, 
and native-place origins, the Communist party-state sponsored and  solidified 
labor divisions along lines of state- or collective-ownership, core and periph-
eral industrial sectors, rural-urban hukuo, party and nonparty membership, and 
permanent and temporary status. The state, or its politics and policies, was the 
main driver of protection and precariousness, both material and symbolic. The 
centrality of ideological domination in the Mao era and the glaring contradic-
tions between socialist ideology and reality fueled working-class discontents and 
resistance. Workers were able to seize the moments when the political opportu-
nity structure was periodically opened up by elite struggles at the top. Relational 
struggles of precarity in this period pivoted on recognition targeting the state, 
that is, marginalized categories of workers leveraging symbolic resources offered 
by official ideology to make material claims on the state. Production relations in 
the workplace were regulated by the party-state’s direct presence and bureaucratic 
rules. Despite its uneven distribution, the social reproduction of labor provided 
by either state and collective welfare or rural collective welfare was not the focus 
of labor strife. As we shall see, in the de-ideologized reform era, the hegemony of 
market competition and individual responsibility has the effect of silencing work-
ers’ recognition struggles. Regulation would become the main contested terrain 
as the Communist regime pursued market reform and maintained social stability 
through the law, the court, and related bureaucratic channels.
HIGH-GROW TH MARKET REFORM ER A:  1980–2009
If the driver of precarization during the Mao era was the state, China’s reform 
and opening since around 1980 has ushered in global capital as an added force 
aggravating the social question qua labor question. To catch up with the devel-
oped world, and finding its competitive niches in the lowest nodes of the global 
production chains, China’s industries and workers bear the disproportionate costs 
(razor-thin profit margins and exploitative labor conditions) of global capital’s 
flexible accumulation. Beyond global industries, Chinese domestic strategies of 
growth (fixed asset investment and state-led urbanization) have also led to the rise 
of precarity in construction and urban services, while its strategy of domination 
(by monopolizing representation of worker interests) and of legitimation (market-
driven trickle-down developmentalism) have seriously hampered the bargaining 
power of labor vis-à-vis capital. If in the pre-reform period, state domination via 
ideology fueled recognition struggles, in the reform period, it was labor laws that 
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mediate and mitigate class exploitation, making regulation the pivotal contested 
terrain of labor precarity.
This section on the high-growth phase of Chinese reform (1980–2010) first 
depicts a spectrum of informal labor modalities in manufacturing, construction, 
and services, and discusses how their emergence is predicated on the state’s eco-
nomic-development strategies. While the Chinese labor literature has spotlighted 
the archetypical semi-proletarianized migrant worker in global factories, this sec-
tion brings to light less visible (i.e., less recognized) forms of precarious labor—the 
self-exploited, “rush order” micro-entrepreneurs, student interns, dispatch work-
ers, construction workers, street vendors, care workers, and others. The second 
part discusses the state’s strategies of legitimation and its alliance with various 
types of capital in the making of precarious labor. Contrary to the commonplace 
understanding of precarious labor as the absence of state regulation, I will show 
that the state is actively involved in the relational struggles that define precar-
ity in China. The third part of the discussion turns to workers’ capacity, interest, 
and activism, a constitutive moment of precarity. As the state used the law and its 
elaborate bureaucratic apparatus (arbitration, mediation, and petition systems) to 
regulate class conflicts between capital and labor, legal mobilization also became 
the prevalent mode of worker struggles. When these channels failed to resolve 
conflicts, the state would resort to bargaining with protesting workers or selective 
repression to maintain social stability. The strong performance of the economy 
gave the state the fiscal capacity required for economic absorption of labor con-
flicts, and it shaped workers’ interests in opting for “exit” (i.e., job hopping) as a 
strategy of survival. As we shall see later, in the current period of slow growth, 
these conditions may no longer hold.
A SPECTRUM OF PRECARIT Y ARISING FROM  
THE STATE’S  STR ATEGIES OF DEVELOPMENT
Global Factories, Ghost Workshops, and Shadow Workers
After the crackdown of the 1989 Tiananmen uprising, the Communist regime con-
fronted simultaneously a legitimacy crisis and a severe economic downturn. In 
response, the Deng Xiaoping leadership in the early 1990s made a decisive move to 
hasten the pace and scope of economic liberalization and internationalization. The 
first casualties of urban reform were state workers in old industrial regions. But the 
death of the socialist working class also saw the birth of a new working class made 
up mostly of migrants from the countryside.14 By then, global capital had con-
solidated a regime of flexible accumulation, spinning commodity chains around 
the world, with profits reaped mostly by multinationals in advanced core coun-
tries that specialized in design, brand, and market development. The logistical and 
information technology revolutions had made global sourcing and contract man-
ufacturing the paradigmatic organizational mode of capitalist production. China 
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found a niche as “the workshop of the world,” thanks to its large, disciplined, and 
relatively educated and healthy rural workforce—legacies of the state-socialist 
period.15 Therefore, precarious labor in the reform period resulted partly from the 
historical timing of China’s insertion into the global economy, where it has found 
competitive edge in the lowest nodes of the commodity chain.
Nike, Gap, Apple, Samsung, Walmart, and the likes stand at the commanding 
height of many “buyer-driven commodity chains” that have extensive networks 
and elaborate hierarchies of contract manufacturers and subcontractors in China. 
The despotic factory regime that exploits and disciplines tens of millions of Chi-
nese migrant workers has been the focal concern of China labor studies in the past 
two decades. In reality, hidden within and beneath this factory regime are many 
other modes of precarious work. For instance, since the mid-2000s, global and 
domestic factories have increasingly turned to a new group of vulnerable, informal 
workers—student interns. In Foxconn and Honda factories, interns, accounting 
for 15 percent to 50 percent of the workforce, are sent to work, for anywhere from 
two months to two years.16 These are students enrolled in vocational schools’ nurs-
ing, auto maintenance, or business administration programs, but they are sent to 
these factories as a mandatory part of their training. Working without labor con-
tract or social insurance, doing tasks unrelated to their majors, these workers are 
not recognized as workers under the Labor Law, although they work and live like 
other full-time workers.17
What has also escaped media and scholarly attention are the layers upon lay-
ers of subcontractors working for global contractors in a wide range of industries. 
Buffering suppliers of global companies from market fluctuations, and concealed 
in shadowy workplaces are many modalities of informal production arrangements, 
ambiguous class relations, and precarious livelihoods that defy the binary catego-
rization of “labor” and “capital.” Chinese sociologists Huang Yan, Fan Lulu, and 
Xue Hong have discovered a hidden world of mobile “rush-order” workshops.18 
Kin, familial, and locality ties and trust, not legal contracts, bind workers together 
as “on-call” mobile but skilled work groups. They show up in subcontractor fac-
tories to fulfill particular rush orders. Some even show up in factories with their 
own sewing machines and production equipment, which they bought from other 
on-call enterprises that moved on when orders disappeared. Hence the numer-
ous “factory-for-sale” advertisements plastered on public walls in many industrial 
areas.
Experienced and well-connected workers became micro-entrepreneurs toil-
ing alongside family members in rented workshops. Lacking employment secu-
rity and insurance protection, but working at an intense pace, rush-order workers 
reported making more money than regular factory employment, if and when 
orders existed. These workers and the factories that hired them seldom showed up 
in industrial statistics. “Most small factories like ours are not registered businesses. 
We do not issue invoices, so officials from Industry and Commerce Office, as well 
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as the Tax Office, rarely come to visit. But the Labor Department does come to 
inspect regularly, so we do need to offer a bribe on different occasions, otherwise 
they will just come to check our labor agreements, pension, child labor, and etc.”19
Many of these on-call micro-enterprises or worker cooperatives have emerged 
as vast networks or clusters of production: garments in Humen, Dongguan; elec-
tronics assembly in Shijie, Dongguan; leather in Shiling, Huadu District of Guang-
zhou; lighting fixtures in Gu, Zhongshan; footwear in Wenzhou, Zhejiang; and 
textiles in Shaoxing, Zhejiang. Native-place networks also bring migrant workers 
from particular hometowns to corner labor-market niches: workers from Hubei 
Province’s Jingzhou City are engaged in Humen’s garment industry, Jiangxi Prov-
ince’s Ganzhou in Dongguan’s electronics assembly, and Hunan Province’s Shaoy-
ang in Huadu’s leather industry.
Construction Workers
Besides China’s niche in the global value chain, the centrality of state investment in 
infrastructure as a motor of economic growth has contributed to a three-decade-
long construction boom. Between 1978 and 2008, fixed-asset investment grew 
from 30 percent to 45 percent of GDP, whereas household consumption dropped 
from 50 percent to 35 percent.20 The $570 million stimulus package Beijing rolled 
out after the global financial crisis in 2008 created another infrastructure construc-
tion binge, in a sector already plagued with overcapacity.21 In 2010, construction 
accounted for some 25 percent of China’s GDP. A steady 30 percent to 50 percent of 
the 260 million–strong migrant workforce have found employment in construc-
tion, which is also the number-one industry employing male migrant workers.22
Worldwide, construction is one of the most informally organized industries, 
thanks to its project-based, mobile nature, its intricate, labor-intensive work pro-
cess requiring a plethora of skills, and a long tradition of extensive subcontract-
ing through labor brokers. Sarah Swider’s book on China’s construction workers 
differentiates three types of informal employment configurations, revealing the 
slave-like conditions for those workers relegated to the bottom tier of this hier-
archy of informal work. The least vulnerable condition, what she calls “mediated 
employment” is where an employment relationship is established, mediated, and 
regulated through a contract-labor system based on standardized, widespread, yet 
informal agreement. Then there are those operating under “embedded employ-
ment,” which regulates work and workers through social networks. Finally, under 
“individualized employment,” workers find employment through street labor 
markets and face despotic employment relations regulated through violence or 
the threat of violence. While the Chinese press and the Chinese government have 
exposed the rampant problem of the nonpayment of wages experienced by the first 
two types of informal employment in construction, the blatant abuses suffered by 
the last category of workers have gone under the radar. Most of the time, these 
workers work for food and shelter rather than wages. When they get paid, they are 
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paid at a piece rate that requires an inhumane pace of work and long hours. The 
main control mechanism is violence, and their main alternatives are begging or 
criminal activities.23
Service: Street Vendors, Domestic Workers, and Dispatch Workers
Besides heavy investment in infrastructure, the Chinese state’s growth strategy 
through breakneck urbanization has also generated a sizable informal service 
economy in its major global and metropolitan cities. At times visible, at times not, 
subsistence, low-wage, or “wage-less” labor of self-employed petty  commodity 
traders, street vendors, maids, and personal service providers of all kinds meet 
the cities’ consumption and entertainment needs (shopping, strolling, and social-
izing). In 2010, there were an estimated eighteen million street vendors in  China’s 
urban areas, or 5.2 percent of the urban workforce and 16 percent of those in 
informal urban employment.24 Many of them worked as street vendors of food, 
fruit, and consumer commodities, waste and trash sorters, cooks and servers in 
small  restaurants, hair stylists, porters, motorcyclists, itinerant interior-decoration 
workers, and so forth.25 Domestic workers, another prevalent mode of informal 
work, reached twenty million in 2015, according to government statistics.26 Most of 
them are middle-aged female migrant workers or laid-off urban workers.
Finally, dispatch workers, or agency workers, emerged only in the late 1990s, 
when the government encouraged “flexible employment” in response to the mass 
unemployment induced by the restructuring of state-owned enterprises. By 2012, 
there were an estimated thirty-seven million dispatch workers, accounting for 13.1 
percent of registered employees. The trend of increasing prevalence is particularly 
visible in the service sector.27 Even though dispatch workers are defined and regu-
lated by the Labor Contract Law (2008) and their protection augmented in the 
revised Labor Contract Law (2013), widespread violation and evasion of the law 
by employers are well documented. Most ironically, state-owned enterprises are 
found to be major users of dispatch workers.28
REGUL ATION STRUGGLES
In the period of high-growth, export-led development, relational struggle over 
precarity played out on the terrain of state regulation. A common conceptual 
error in the literature is that precarious and informal labor is caused or defined 
by the absence of state regulation. Quite the contrary is true in China and other 
places where the state is central to the structuring and reproduction of precar-
ity through laws and government policies. Let’s mention three examples to illus-
trate the alignment of state and capital interest in legalizing precarious labor but 
according them inferior rights and entitlements. First, the Labor Law and the 
Labor Contract Law stipulate inferior treatments for dispatch workers as opposed 
to regular workers by defining the dispatch workers relation to employers as one 
the Struggle over Precarity    67
of a “labor service” relation rather than a “labor” relation. As “employees” rather 
than “workers,” dispatch workers are legally excluded from the social insur-
ance and other labor protections stipulated in the Labor Law.29 Second, the state 
actively regulates the supply of the massive migrant population (about 250 mil-
lion today). Their rights and entitlements are stipulated by local government poli-
cies in different regions, forming a variety of citizenship regimes that reflect the 
need of capital for a particular kind of workers.30 Third, the supply of student 
interns is orchestrated by the Ministry of Education, vocational school adminis-
trators and teachers, and local education departments and is mediated by private 
labor agencies.31
Since China’s first-ever National Labor Law took effect in 1995, the legal arena 
has become the main site of labor struggles. On paper, Chinese labor legislations 
set such a high standard that according to an OECD report on employment pro-
tection, in 2008 China ranked second in employment protection across ten major 
developing economies and exceeded the OECD average substantially.32 The prob-
lem is that rather than submitting itself to the rule of law, the Chinese state, both 
central and local, uses law as an opportunistic instrument to achieve policy and 
political goals. This means that sometimes, some labor laws are enforced if they 
are in the interest of the government at various levels of the political system. A 
few official statistics illustrate the gaps between legal rights and actualized rights 
among migrant workers. In 2014, 62 percent of migrant workers still lacked writ-
ten contract, 84 percent lacked pension, 83 percent health insurance, and 90 per-
cent unemployment insurance.33
The pivotal role of the law is in regulating labor-market and labor relations 
and channeling labor resistance to the terrains of the law and related bureaucratic 
institutions. The state uses labor resistance as a “fire alarm” mechanism that alerts 
local government to particularistic and particularly egregious labor violations.34 
When the volume of labor disputes points toward certain serious abuses by the 
employers, the Central Government resorts to another round of legislation requir-
ing more stringent labor protection, triggering new responses by employers to 
bypass new legal constraints on their use of labor. In this process, both the state 
and employers have common interest in preempting workers from developing col-
lective organization capacity.
Industrial workers have been most prominent in labor unrest. In the 1990s, 
rust-belt workers took to the street, making moral economic claims often 
enshrined in state regulations about their health care and pension benefits. In the 
sun belt, tens of millions of young migrant workers employed in export-oriented 
factories waged their own struggles against exploitative labor practices and viola-
tions of their legal labor rights—nonpayment of wages, excessive overtime, unsafe 
workplaces, arbitrary dismissal, and dehumanizing shop-floor discipline. In both 
cases, labor unrest—taking the forms of street protests, public demonstrations, 
road blockages, strikes, and legal mobilizations—was characterized by localized, 
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workplace-based, cellular activism, privileging socioeconomic demands, and 
observant of limits set by the law and the state.
On the part of the state, social stability has been maintained by a deft combina-
tion of protest bargaining (i.e., buying them off during mobilization), bureaucratic 
absorption (channeling workers into mediation and court procedures), clientelism 
(exchanging cooperation for material advantages), cooptation (recruiting workers 
as party members and sponsoring NGOs under official banners), and selective 
repression (the arrest and harassment of influential activists as warnings for all).35 
State policies and market development fragment workers’ interests and identi-
ties, while repression and cooptation have largely been effective in crashing and 
preempting any attempt at cross-enterprise, cross-class, cross-regional, and cross-
sectoral mobilization. Over time, even without institutional empowerment, the 
volume and persistence of worker activism has created pressure on the state to 
improve their lot—from the establishment of minimum wage regulations and state 
provision of minimum livelihood guarantee to the promulgation of various labor 
laws and steady increases in wages.36
Meanwhile, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the only legal 
workers’ union in China, is tightly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party at 
the national and local levels and is dominated by management at the enterprise 
level. The ACFTU is deeply alienated from its 285 million–strong rank-and-file 
workers. Union membership typically includes management, from whom most of 
the union chairs at the enterprise level are appointed or indirectly elected. Unions 
are financed by a 2 percent payroll tax paid by the enterprise rather than mem-
bership dues.37 Above the enterprise level, union cadres are recruited through the 
same civil service examination as all other government officials, and they behave 
and think like government officials. As Eli Friedman writes, “Union officials’ first 
response to strikes is that of an agent of the state: intervene, ‘rationally’ encour-
age dialogue, convince the workers the make ‘reasonable’ demands . .  . and per-
haps try to persuade management . . . to meet some of the workers’ demands.”38 
The monopolization or appropriation of worker representation by the party-state 
deprives Chinese workers of a powerful leverage to bargain with capital, buttress-
ing an institutional foundation for precarious labor to spread in China.
In the shadow of the official trade unions, grassroots labor NGOs have prolif-
erated slowly but steadily since the late 1990s. Nationally, there are an estimated 
seventy-two or so labor NGOs operating semi-legally in major industrial regions 
to provide legal counseling, training, and recreation services to migrant workers. 
Reliant on foreign foundations and domestic donations, established by concerned 
academics, journalists, or former workers turned rights activists, these NGOs lead 
a very precarious existence in the legal limbo.39 Harassment and crackdown by 
officials and employers, even physical assaults by thugs are commonplace. Most 
of them pursue a self-limiting form of mobilization: coaching individuals or small 
groups of workers to make rights claims against the government and thereby 
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raising their consciousness. But once these NGOs go beyond this contained mode 
of mobilization to actually mobilize workers for collective bargaining or strikes, 
the government reacts by arresting and imprisoning their most prominent leaders 
and subjecting them to smear campaigns on national television, as a way to disci-
pline the rest of the NGO sector.40
INTO THE VOID:  AUTHORITARIANISM IN EC ONOMIC 
D OWNTURN (2010 TO THE PRESENT)
Since the global financial crisis of 2008 and a prolonged downturn in China’s 
traditional export markets, many internal imbalances of the Chinese economic 
“miracle” have been exacerbated.41 If sustained economic growth has buttressed 
the legitimacy of one-party authoritarian rule for three decades, China is certainly 
entering unchartered waters. Concurrent with what the government has called an 
economic new normal, a political new normal—the state’s repressive turn against 
civil society—has also taken roots since 2012, when President Xi Jinping took 
power. In this new phase of slow growth but augmented authoritarianism, labor 
will be hard hit. I argue that as more workers fall outside the recognition and 
regulatory framework of the law, the most salient contested terrain of the social 
question is shifting to the social reproduction of labor, or livelihood itself. Beyond 
exploitation, more workers are compelled into relations of dispossession, indebt-
edness, and exclusion. These relations may reorganize precarious labor’s interest 
and capacity in new ways and spur labor activism to take a more disruptive and 
volatile turn outside institutionalized and regulated arenas. They may also prompt 
the state to reform its social protection policies in order to preempt a livelihood 
crisis for many in a period of economic downturn.
THE “NEW NORMAL”
The Chinese Government has officially announced the end of the high-growth 
period.42 The Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) recognized that the annual 
growth in excess of 10 percent (the average over 2003–2010) was unsustainable, 
and it envisaged the annual growth rate to be around 7 percent, which was fur-
ther revised down to 6.5 percent in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016–2020).43 
Plagued by overcapacity in steel and coal and other “zombie” state-owned indus-
tries, the government announced in 2015 a scheduled massive laid off of five to six 
million in 2016.44 Top officials in Beijing have blamed the Labor Contract Law for 
creating rigidity and neglecting business interests, while some local governments 
have frozen wage increases and reduced employers’ contribution to social secu-
rity accounts. The government has signaled its intention to revise the labor law to 
reduce protection for labor and create more labor-market flexibility in the face of 
economic slowdown.45
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But the challenge for the working population is much more complicated than 
a sheer reduction in aggregate growth rate and lower demand for labor. Besides 
labor-market exclusion and precarization, I want to note the rise of two other 
kinds of power relations—dispossession and indebtedness—contributing to a 
potential crisis in the social reproduction of labor.
Dispossession
In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the Chinese government rolled out 
an aggressive stimulus package equivalent to 12.5 percent of China’s 2008 GDP, to 
the tune of $586 billion. This unleashed a period of debt-fueled growth whereby 
local governments borrowed heavily from state banks to fund transport and power 
infrastructure projects, build housing, and invest in rural health and education. 
While these measures stabilized the economy in the short run, they also exac-
erbated the problems of overcapacity and local debts. Local governments have 
since relied more heavily on selling land to repay the massive debts and interest 
payments, leading to rampant land grabs, which were intensified by another state 
policy to stimulate domestic consumption—state-led urbanization. The National 
New-type Urbanization Plan, announced in 2014, aims to elevate China’s urban-
ization rate from 54 percent to 60 percent of the population by 2020. The rationale 
is simple: to boost domestic demand and increase consumption.
As a result of land grabs and state-enforced urbanization, a double crisis of land 
dispossession and unemployment is spreading among farmers, who have moved 
to the cities from the countryside.46 Land grabs have happened in 43 percent of 
the 1,791 villages sampled in a multiyear seventeeen-province survey.47 One recent 
ethnographic study depicts the grim reality for migrant workers after their land 
was dispossessed. In Sichuan, one of the largest labor-sending provinces in China, 
they became the most undesirable workers for labor brokers in the construction 
business. Since labor brokers have to underwrite the cost of transportation and 
living during workers’ employment period, and laborers must survive until the 
end of the year for wages to be paid, landless workers are seen as too precarious for 
this precarious occupation. “Without land, brokers and laborers face new financial 
pressure. Brokers must shift recruitment to other sites where laborers hold land 
and are better able to withstand precarious employment.”48 In short, China’s land-
less migrant workers, now nominally urban residents in townships, find them-
selves in an emerging underclass position that is even more precarious than the 
conventional landholding migrant workers.
Indebtedness
Just as jobless growth is a global trend, the Chinese government’s response con-
forms to trends elsewhere—promoting entrepreneurship and the gig economy. 
To manage popular expectation about a prolonged economic slowdown and to 
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create a culture of entrepreneurship rather than a culture of employment, the Chi-
nese premier announced in his 2015 Government Work Report that “innovative 
entrepreneurship” is the “new economic normal” for Chinese citizens. From 2014 
to 2015, three and a half million new private business entities were formed, 90 
percent of them were micro-enterprises in information, software, entertainment, 
and services.49 The gig economy has taken off, with a workforce estimated at sixty 
million in 2016.50 Different levels of the government have set up funding schemes 
to encourage “mass entrepreneurship”:51 more than twenty provinces now provide 
loans, rent subsidies, tax reduction to encourage university graduates to set up 
micro-enterprises, technological incubators, and online businesses. The increase 
in both public debt (discussed earlier) and private debt is tantamount to deploying 
future resources to secure present social peace. The politics of credit will become 
a major arena of struggle as the debt state and the debt society compete for the 
allocation of credits. The Chinese government’s recent national experiments with 
using big data to assign social credit rating to all citizens ominously portents the 
rise of credit as a means of authoritarian control.52
Disempowerment
In short, an increasing number of workers face multifaceted precarity—being 
excluded from the labor market (laid off, unemployed, or underemployed), dis-
possessed of their land as a means of social security and subsistence, and forced 
to incur debts in order to launch their micro-business ventures as self-employed 
entrepreneurs. As the economic pressures on livelihood mount, the political 
space for collective mobilization and self-organizing is also narrowing. The cur-
rent top leader, Xi Jinping, compared to his predecessors, Hu Jingtao and Jiang 
Zemin, has launched exceptionally harsh, widespread, and repressive crackdowns 
on the human rights and NGO communities. Reversing Hu’s emphasis on social 
harmony and Jiang’s on rule of law and internationalization, Xi has announced 
zero tolerance for dissent and has demanded total submission both at the elite 
and grassroots levels in the media and education arenas. Anticorruption cam-
paigns are used selectively to target his political opponents at the top. Arrests and 
imprisonment of rights lawyers and labor NGO activists have had chilling effects 
on worker capacity, just as some labor activists have begun taking bolder action 
beyond cellular and legal mobilization.
PRECARIAT S’  STRUGGLES FOR LIVELIHO OD
Since around 2010, economic downturns, plant relocations, and restructurings 
have contributed to a rising trend of strikes in the formal sector. In the wake of 
some high-profile strikes in foreign-invested companies making global consumer 
products, such as Honda, Foxconn, IBM, and Yue Yuen, some journalists and 
72    the Struggle over Precarity
scholars of Chinese labor saw a tendency of labor empowerment. Their argument, 
in a nutshell, is that the second generation of migrant workers are more conscious 
of class and rights and savvy about social media and technology, demanding union 
representation in addition to increased compensation and adopting an extra-legal 
action repertoire. Yet closer empirical analyses of the processes and outcomes 
of these strikes conveyed quite a different picture. Except on the issue of wage 
increases, workers did not make any lasting gain in union election, security of 
employment, and workplace reforms. Also, action based around single factories is 
still the norm, and so is workers’ concern to stay within the boundary of the law 
in their action. There is no evidence to show that second-generation workers are 
more prone to collective action than the first generation.53
A critical and new development was emerging around the time of these 
 attention-grabbing strikes, but away from the media limelight. In the past five 
years, a dozen or so grassroots NGOs, after years of providing individual rights–
based legal assistance to workers, sought to augment their impacts by mobilizing 
 workers to undertake worker-led collective bargaining with their employers. With 
the financial support of labor groups outside of China and legal advice of rights 
lawyers within China,  daring NGO activists built networks of worker activists 
across factories and recruited cross-class participation by students and academics 
in sustaining strikes. NGO activists coined a new term “labor movement NGOs” 
to distinguish themselves from their former self as service providing NGOs. They 
provided moral, legal, and training support to striking workers and, most impres-
sively, liaised worker leaders from different factories to share their experience in 
bargaining with employers and organizing workers. Labor scholar Li Chun-yun has 
documented forty-two strikes in South China between 2011 to 2014 involving eleven 
labor movement NGOs.54 However, in late 2015, Xi Jinping’s government reacted by 
arresting key labor NGO leaders and orchestrated smear campaigns against them 
and their organizations on national television, stifling the confidence and  capacity of 
a budding worker movement. It is uncertain whether repression under the  political 
new normal will end up thwarting or radicalizing these NGOs.
Even as the political space for grassroots NGOs is curtailed, self-mobilized 
worker struggles have continued. A new tendency is that workers’ demands have 
increasingly turned toward issues of pension, housing, and livelihood, or the social 
reproduction of labor. As the first generation of migrant workers approach retire-
ment age, they have become more vigilant about employers’ making the legally 
required contributions to their pension and housing funds. Rustbelt state-sector 
workers newly laid off by the state’s call to reduce overcapacity also demanded en 
mass for the state to protect their livelihood and retirement. For informal work-
ers who occupy the blurred boundaries between capital and labor, employed and 
self-employed, their demands are framed and experienced broadly as crisis of 
livelihood. For instance, in 2015, a wave of taxi driver strikes hit major cities in 
coastal and interior provinces due to the competition of on-demand app-based 
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car services. Even though taxi drivers are self-employed—they own the means of 
production (taxis), pay for their own gasoline and car insurance and maintenance, 
and are not employees of taxi companies—they have to pay a fixed “membership 
fee” every month to their company in order to participate in this semi-monopolis-
tic industry. The competition of on-demand drivers threatens taxi drivers’ liveli-
hood and survival, which is how they described the reasons for their strikes.
In cities, government encroachments on the use of the “urban commons” are 
increasingly depriving precarious workers a crucial resource for their subsis-
tence economy in the Chinese cities. Street vendors’ clashes with chengguan, a 
para–police force first set up in the late 1990s, at times turned violent and esca-
lated into mass protests involving local residents resentful of official brutality.55 In 
Zengcheng in 2011, the scuffle between a pregnant female street vendor and the 
chengguan turned into several days of riots by migrant informal workers, who 
burned government offices and destroyed police cars. In a much smaller scale, 
violence clashes erupted in 2013 between citizens and police after the death of a 
watermelon vendor who was attacked by the chengguan in Linwu, a city in Hunan 
province.56 Such dynamics are reminiscent of the unanticipated consequences of 
a street vendor’s self-immolation in Tunisia in January 2011, which touched off a 
powerful political tsunami throughout the Arab world.
Another scenario is also possible. While the struggles of precarious workers 
have the potential to be more violent, volatile, and less institutionally incorpo-
rated, workers can easily become more atomized and acquiescent. This is so not 
just because of the frequent change of jobs, depriving them of stable social relations 
and spatial concentration and communication. As workers cobble together vari-
ous sources of incomes and resources, their interests (whether based on market or 
production) are also differentiated and fragmented.57 Finally, we cannot underes-
timate the responsiveness of the Chinese state. Despite its autocratic politics, the 
state has a track record of weathering many socioeconomic crises by responding 
to social discontents with policy innovations in order to maintain social stability. 
As it has done so in the past in both rural and urban China, the state has been 
compelled by popular unrest to gradually develop and strengthen social and wel-
fare policies to protect the livelihood of the most vulnerable citizens.58 As the gig 
economy grows, boundaries of labor and capital are blurred, and livelihood pres-
sures increase for the general citizenry, the regime may be compelled once again 
to find policy solutions.
C ONCLUSION
Defining the social question as relational struggles over precarity, we can see a 
shift in the most salient terrain of contestation from recognition to regulation and 
now social reproduction of labor, as China evolved from a state-socialist politi-
cal economy to one of high-growth market economy and then to a new normal 
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of slow, job-scarce growth, overcapacity, and enhanced authoritarianism. The 
driver of precarity in each period also differs, shaping workers’ interests, capaci-
ties, and claims. This chapter is a reminder of the tenacious salience of the social 
 question in China, even if there is no denying that China’s capitalist boom has 
lifted  millions out of absolute poverty (declining from 84 percent to 16 percent 
of population between 1981 and 2005). Echoing a point made in the introduc-
tion, poverty  reduction does not nullify the existence and politics of precarity, 
if only because workers everywhere experience and act on precarity in relative 
and relational ways. Precarity, or the social question, and the struggles emanating 
from and against it, should always be theorized in historical, cultural, and context-
specific terms.
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5
Migrants, Mobilizations, and Selective 




Numerous industrializing economies have failed to transition from low- to high-
value-added manufacturing. In these countries, there is limited evidence that the 
promise of well-remunerated wage labor and comprehensive social security is 
likely to be realized anytime soon. Mekong (continental) Southeast Asia is one 
such region, in which the social question is imbricated with low-value-added 
accumulation models. Indeed, the potential for product or functional upgrading 
remains extremely limited in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, while both Thailand 
and Vietnam struggle to “escape” the middle-income trap. Industrial centers in 
these countries draw on domestic and cross-border migrants, and, increasingly, 
special economic zones (SEZs) are being established in rural and border areas to 
avail of congested labor at the bottom of the rural economy. In mainstream devel-
opment planning, manufacturing-led development utilizes “pro-poor” economic 
growth paradigms anchored in SEZs, yet local labor regimes of informality and 
precarity reproduce poverty rather than ameliorate it. The evident contradiction 
between the promise and reality of contemporary development strategies has led 
to disillusionment with industrial employment among affected workers and grow-
ing political tensions at sites of low-wage industrial labor. How, we thus need to 
ask, do states, development planners, and workers adapt to and address the failure 
to address pressing social concerns?
This question is addressed through case studies of border SEZs in Cambodia 
and Thailand. At first blush, these two economies are quite different, with Thai-
land’s GDP at $406.8 billion and Cambodia’s at $20.2 billion. The Thai economy 
is more diversified, with industrial exports including electronics, agricultural 
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commodities, automobiles and parts, and processed foods. Cambodia, on the other 
hand, lacks diversity, and its economic “growth pillars” are restricted to textile and 
garment manufacturing, construction, agro-industry, and tourism. Garment man-
ufacturing makes up roughly 70 percent of total exports, and over-reliance on this 
volatile sector for export revenue and employment presents a developmental chal-
lenge. The two economies are similar in that they are both characterized by low 
potential for value capture; low levels of firm, labor, and state stability; and a high 
degree of external dependency in directing strategic coupling.1 As such, they rely 
heavily upon highly precarious gendered and immigrant workforces. Labor femi-
nization and the use of migrant labor act as a powerful mechanism for controlling 
and disciplining the workforce, while typically favoring the spatial detachment of 
labor production from social reproduction and thus the spatial externalization of 
the costs of social reproduction to realms that are outside industrial sites.2
Bearing these economic development challenges in mind, the social question is 
analyzed through the selective hegemony lens to understanding how forms of cap-
italist socialization do not result in a form of hegemony that might extend to “the 
whole of society.”3 Rather, there is a discernable disconnect between state legiti-
macy derived from increases in productivity and linked economic growth, and 
legitimacy derived through hegemonic projects that offer (limited) concessions 
to particular groups linked to popular sovereignty. Faced with pressing social 
reproduction demands unmet through selective policies, I identify two  prominent 
forms of workers’ countermovements. The first is characterized by expanded 
mobility that contributes to labor shortages, and thus undermines capital- 
accumulation strategies, while the second is increasingly militant wage protests, 
which spill out of the preapproved tripartite channels.
The cases examined below highlights how the localized regimes of informality 
reproduce poverty and the ways in which state and international organizations 
selectively respond to countermovements. Prominent state responses include 
the introduction of social protection policies for both manufacturing and cross-
border migrant workers. Social protection policies are at times utilized to acquire 
greater control over migrant labor forces, while in other cases they are utilized 
to depoliticize a dismal status of the laboring poor in light manufacturing— 
concessions that neither carry over to other occupations nor ameliorate pressing 
social  reproduction concerns. A second top-down response is the proliferation of 
border SEZs. Zones are framed as panacea for development that couple regional 
economic growth with access to formal employment, yet are more usefully 
 conceived of as spatial containers of countermovements that challenge low-value-
added accumulation regimes. Zones further institutionalize poverty through 
informalized labor regimes that absorb congested labor at the bottom of the 
subregional rural economy. Far from a resolution, selective hegemony, like any 
 hegemonic project, is fraught with tensions that, in the cases examined, scale up 
from border nodes to the subregional scale.
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map 5.1. Mekong Asia.
SELECTIVE HEGEMONY AND THE SO CIAL QUESTION
Studying the social question through particular localized labor regimes of infor-
mality that are embedded in wider national and subregional political economic 
relations presents both methodological and theoretical challenges. To address a 
multi-sited, multi-scalar analysis, the relational comparison as developed by Gilian 
Hart is utilized to provide a conception of place as nodal points of connection in 
socially produced space.4 This concept helps researchers move beyond case stud-
ies to make broader claims in a non-positivist understanding of generality. Hart 
asserts that “particularities or specificities arise through interrelations between 
objects, events, places, and identities; and it is through clarifying how these rela-
tions are produced and changed in practice that close study of a particular part can 
generate broader claims and understandings.”5 Such an approach rejects notions 
of global impacts on the local. The objective is not to analyze different particular 
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cases as local or national variants of general “global” processes. Rather, it helps 
to focus on how particularities co-constitute the power-laden interplay between 
the different institutional interests and actors involved, where agendas are medi-
ated for specific political economic objectives through a mix of distanciated and 
embedded actors.6
This approach is salient in Mekong Asia, a subregional economy in which the 
promise of full employment and social welfare remain far removed. It is in this 
context that the social question in Mekong Asia should be viewed. Social security 
policies in Mekong Asia are characterized by the forty-year running attention to 
the formal-informal economy binary, with the formal held up as a protected insti-
tutional space, and informal labor more prone to the uncertainties of the unregu-
lated market.7 “Inclusion” in textile-, garment-, and shoe-production networks, 
the primary focus of this article, is often upheld as an inherent good, with wage 
earning under an employer-employee contract, from one ontological position, 
deciding the boundary between inclusion and exclusion, privilege and marginality, 
prosperity and poverty.8 Yet for the majority in Mekong Asia, formal employment 
is not the way out of poverty; rather, it is the informalized manner in which work-
ers are included that reproduces poverty. Indeed, poverty is structured through 
formal labor markets, countering common perspectives in the region that exclude 
the formally employed from definitions of “the poor.”9 The existence of the labor-
ing poor is not a policy oversight or technical error, but integral to labor regimes 
and development paradigms in Mekong Asia.
The continued reliance on low-wage, precarious labor informs state and inter-
national development interventions and efforts to enhance selected targets to opti-
mize their comparative advantage in global production networks. This includes, 
for instance, promoting export manufacturing and the establishment of SEZs. 
Such targeted, spatially regulated interventions do not set out to resolve wider 
issues of social inequalities. Aihwa Ong’s work has contributed to theorizations 
on such heterogeneous state spatial strategies to accommodate particular forms 
of globalized capital accumulation and population management that are deemed 
necessary to foster growth and reproduce state legitimacy.10 The state goal, Ong 
explains through the China case, is to manipulate the political situation in order to 
achieve an implicit state-society bargain that trades acceptance of (authoritarian) 
political rule for sustained improvements in economic and social well-being. The 
state, in its multifaceted embroilment with global capital, she contends, cannot be 
frozen in a posture of opposition to the masses but must strategically intervene in 
unstable conditions, one moment acting as a draconian oppressor of workers, the 
next as a protector of labor against the depredations of global capital.
This approach links social space to capital accumulation strategies, implicitly 
addressing state practices of coercion and consent. This theorization marks the 
shift away from political economic regulation in which nationally bounded policy 
attends to a coherent body politic. In sum, Ong’s approach is useful in drawing 
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attention to state efforts that set out to enhance the comparative advantages of 
specific subnational zones, lead economic sectors, and laboring populations at the 
expense of broadly coordinated interventions across an entire national territory, 
thus highlighting a shift in the scale at which development is targeted. What ends 
up being missed from this perspective are the conflicting claims to the right and 
legitimacy to rule, which frustrate the unified implementation of any state proj-
ects.11 Hence, the statecraft optic that privileges the determinative role of state and 
capital risks obscuring the power workers and other actors may have to reshape 
social relations through countermovements.
In this regard, Gavin Smith offers a useful critique of Ong’s theorizations on 
“variegated” state effects, specifically, that she overlooks “the dialectical interplay 
between people and production in terms of an ongoing struggle emanating from 
a contradiction that becomes a perpetual preoccupation for the state.”12 Selective 
hegemony as developed by Smith helps in unpacking forms of consent (conces-
sions) and coercion (violence) directed at particular groups of workers based on 
perceived value of their labor and/or the threat their countermovements pose. His 
intervention helps in understanding how forms of capitalist socialization do not 
result in a form of hegemony that might extend to “the whole of society.” Rather, 
it points to the potential for disconnect between state legitimacy derived from 
increases in productivity and linked economic growth with legitimacy derived 
from hegemonic projects that offer (limited) concessions to particular groups 
linked to popular sovereignty, including the gradual rollout of social protection 
policies across the Mekong subregion.
THE CAMB ODIA CASE
UN-mediated elections in 1993 signaled the end of nearly three decades of war in 
Cambodia. Cambodia entered the neoliberal global economy with an eviscerated 
state, ruined infrastructure, and social disintegration. Since that time, the ruling 
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) has maintained legitimacy by staving off war and 
facilitating rapid economic growth. Yet this has been called into question as the 
country continues to lag behind its neighbors in terms of life expectancy, poverty 
alleviation, education, and other core socioeconomic concerns.
As previously stated, Cambodia’s economy currently lacks diversity. Although 
the country remains largely agrarian, with 70 percent of the population living in 
rural areas (NIS and ILO 2013),13 Cambodia’s recent urbanization rate has been 
one of the world’s most rapid, with Phnom Penh’s population tripling in the past 
twenty years. Across rural Cambodia, nearly one in four households has at least 
one working-age member emigrate, with nearly 60 percent of younger migrants 
moving to urban areas in Cambodia.14 Rural-urban migrants’ interests and iden-
tities remain largely agrarian in orientation, with non-farm work centered on 
contributing to rural household livelihoods. When factoring agricultural work, 
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60.2 percent were in informal employment, followed by 33.3 percent in agriculture, 
and 6.5 percent in formal employment.15 Although unemployment rates remain 
low and even fell further over the past decade, and GDP growth robust for over 
a decade, averaging roughly 7 percent, it has not lifted all boats, highlighting the 
need for comprehensive social and labor protections.
Social security initiatives
Low-value-added garment and shoe manufacturing has come to be a mainstay of 
Cambodia’s development strategy. Employment has increased from roughly twenty 
thousand in 1994 to some seven hundred thousand in 2016. Figure 2 shows that real 
minimum wage stagnated and even declined between 2001–2013, paradoxically 
while the ILO and International Finance Corporation, U.S. Department of Labor, 
and numerous international apparel buyers have branded garment manufacturing 
in Cambodia as “fair” or “ethical” due to a high-profile ILO  factory-monitoring 
regime.16 Despite efforts to monitor work conditions in export garment factories, 
wages have remained low and, along with the proliferation of fixed duration con-
tracts and excessive overtime shifts, they form the country’s primary competitive 
advantage in global garment production networks. In other words, Cambodia’s 
figure 5.1. Nominal and real minimum wage of garment and footwear sector, 2000–2015 (US$ 
per month). Source: ILO 2015.
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labor rights monitoring regime has aimed to repackage dead-end jobs that treat 
the developing-world woman’s body as a site of exploitation and disposability into 
exemplars of the export-led development project.17
Cambodia’s export garment industry has largely been concentrated in the 
Phnom Penh vicinity. In recent years there has been an explicit effort to decentral-
ize garment production through a nation-wide SEZ program initiated in 2005. 
Research by the author conducted in Bavet between 2009 and 2015 points to a 
workforce sharing many of the same wage and working condition concerns as 
those employed in other parts of the country, in addition to unique features as 
proletarians of a particular kind. According to a 2015 survey of one hundred fac-
tory workers in Cambodia, including twenty-one in Bavet, 90 percent of Bavet 
factory workers do agricultural work at various times of the year, while only 12.7 
percent of garment workers in the Phnom Penh vicinity report any farming activi-
ties. In Bavet, 71.4 percent of workers or their spouse own land (66 percent below 
one hectare, 20 percent one to two hectares), while 10 percent of Phnom Penh 
garment workers report land ownership (86 percent below one hectare). In Bavet, 
60 percent of respondents sell over half of their agricultural produce on the mar-
ket, 13 percent report selling half on the market and keeping half for personal 
consumption, and 27 percent consume all their crops. All of the surveyed Bavet 
workers’ parents own land, while 70 percent of Phnom Penh workers’ parents are 
landowners. When asked to estimate their remittances as proportion of household 
income—Phnom Penh workers reported, an average, 19 percent of family total, 
while in Bavet, it is nearly 50 percent. This can be attributed to roughly equivalent 
wage levels, while most workers in Bavet commute daily from the family farm/
home rather than rent accommodation, as is common in Phnom Penh and vicin-
ity. The Manhattan SEZ marketing director noted in a November 2014 interview 
that most workers commute at least one hour each way to and from work in the 
zones, while ten Bavet SEZ workers interviewed at the same time all commute two 
hours each way to work in the factories, noting this is quite common. Combined, 
the interviews and survey points to a workforce in Bavet that is literally living with 
one foot in the industrial and the other in the rural-agrarian realm.
Workers in Bavet are poor but not destitute; they are at the fringes of the rela-
tive surplus population. They are precariously positioned between small landhold-
ings, with their limited livelihood potential, and low-paying work in firms in an 
SEZ that is struggling to maintain its grip on bottom rungs of the global economy, 
as discussed in further detail below. Both agrarian and industrial livelihoods could 
diminish or dissolve without a sufficient replacement or effective social safety net. 
Frustrated with limited wage gains and virtually no welfare gains in national tri-
partite forums, workers in Bavet and elsewhere have become increasingly militant 
in their demands. The number of strikes nationwide rose dramatically between 
2010 and 2013—up nearly 250 percent.18 Several strikes were met with coercion, the 
first of several armed responses by authorities occurring in Bavet. On February 20, 
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2012, Chhouk Bandith, then governor of Bavet, opened fire on a crowd of roughly 
six thousand protesters at the Manhattan SEZ in Bavet, outside the Kaoway Sports 
shoe factory, a Puma supplier.19 Two were shot in the hand, and one nearly died after 
a bullet punctured her lung, barely missing the heart. Furthermore, nationwide 
garment workers’ strikes have occurred in September 2010 and again in December 
2013–January 2014, both sparked by the breakdown of national wage negotiations. 
The latter nationwide strike turned violent, and police armed with AK-47s fired 
on a crowd of protesters outside the Canadia Industrial Zone in Phnom Penh on 2 
January 2014.20 Five protesters were killed, over thirty-eight were shot or suffered 
other wounds, and thirteen were arrested.21 These incidences of state violence in 
industrial zones and SEZs demonstrate that maintaining a docile labor force is 
critical to maintain investor confidence in the country’s garment sector.22
The growing workers’ movement had begun to coalesce with the opposition 
Cambodia National Rescue Party during the 2013–2014 protests, contributing to 
a reformulated position by Cambodian People’s Party. First, the minimum wage 
has increased from US$80 per month in 2013 to $170 in 2018, which applies only 
to the textile-, garment-, and shoe-manufacturing sectors. Ministry of Labor and 
Vocational Training spokesperson Heng Sour asserted in a January 2015 inter-
view that a range of initiatives should be considered alongside recent minimum-
wage increases. Foremost, the government implemented its health care scheme 
in mid-2015. In the first phase, one hundred thousand workers are expected to 
take part, restricted to factory workers in Phnom Penh and the immediate vicin-
ity (interview, Malika Ok).23 According to Sour, a government survey found that, 
on average, workers spend 10 percent of their wage on health care. With the 
new health care scheme, workers and employers will each contribute 2 percent 
and the government 6 percent, meaning workers can save 8 percent for other 
expenditures. Furthermore, in early 2015, Prime Minister Hun Sen announced 
an initiative that aims to lower electricity costs for workers to 610 riel—they 
now typically pay 2,000 riel per unit (roughly $0.50) in urban areas—and in 
January 2015, the government increased the income tax threshold to $200. 
Finally, the government also promises to look into rental and housing issues—
as rents typically increase along with pay raises, nullifying wage gains. Social 
security pensions, as specified in the Social Security Law (2002) were planned 
for introduction in 2015.24 However, an ILO representative noted in a January 
2015 interview that benefit provisions have not yet been developed.25 There are 
no government-backed employment creation programs or unemployment pro-
grams in Cambodia, but small-scale donor-run food-for-work programs exist in 
rural areas. All said, according to Heng Sour’s calculations, $135 is what work-
ers are actually getting, when considering these social benefits (compared to the 
$128 minimum wage at the time of the interview).
While important concessions, these gains fall short of addressing core pov-
erty concerns. protection measures—excluding minimum wages applicable to the 
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entire garment- and shoe-manufacturing sectors—target workers in Phnom Penh 
and vicinity, and there is limited evidence that the pilot programs will scale up, 
meaning that workers in places like Bavet are excluded. In short, concessions have 
the effect of delimiting potentially politicized redistributive demands in urban 
areas that could be linked up with broad-based social movements. The hegemonic 
imperatives are selective in that they target only urban, formal sector workers.26 
Another shortcoming of protection policy is it does not take into consideration 
workers’ geographic and labor-market mobility. A trade union leader estimates 
that workers are employed in garments, on average, for five to seven years (inter-
view, Kong Athit, January 2015). Thus, the initiative presumes fixed occupational 
identity and time horizons that stretch well beyond what is the norm for a Cambo-
dian garment worker. By selectively targeting a specific sector in Phnom Penh, the 
state is able to blunt criticism that it has failed to address workers’ concerns, yet it 
does not address the manner in which poverty is structured through participation 
in the formal labor market. Rather, it offers insufficient wage gains and restricted 
social insurance that reinforce the outsourcing of social reproduction to the rural-
remittance economy.
THE THAIL AND-MYANMAR B ORDER CASE
For over two decades, Mae Sot has been a prominent migrant-labor and refugee 
hub, and it is a window into Thailand’s migrant-regulation practices. Burmese ref-
ugees living along the Thai border currently number over two hundred thousand. 
Alongside this, large numbers of Burmese have been migrating to Thailand for 
work, from the tens of thousands in the early 1990s to some three million today. 
The regional transformation from refugee to labor-migrant flows are far from lin-
ear, yet are central to understanding the place of migrants in the Thai body politic, 
a process in which social protection increasingly plays a role.
Mae Sot is a border district in Tak Province across the Moei River from 
Myawaddy, Myanmar; it is roughly five hundred kilometers northwest of Bang-
kok (see map 5.1). The Mae Sot regional economy remains tethered to neighbor-
ing Myanmar, where militarization and agricultural management are central to 
contemporary migration trends. Agricultural policies in central Myanmar, which 
forced farmers in areas long under military control to sell a fixed proportion 
of their crops to the Tatmadaw (military) below market prices, contributed to 
extreme poverty in the rural economy. Fujita concludes, based on case studies in 
Yangon and Bago Divisions (areas in central Myanmar), that peasants and farm 
laborers “were reduced to a bare subsistence level during the last two or three 
decades, and are now suffering ‘absolute poverty.’ ”27 Alongside this, in the 1990s 
the Tatmadaw consolidated control over most of the Myanmar-Thailand border 
areas by forcibly relocating villages, which led to rapidly increasing numbers of 
internal and international refugees and migrant workers.28
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In the mid-1990s Burmese migrant workers and refugees in Thailand came pre-
dominantly from border areas.29 In the 2000s, as the economic situation continued 
to deteriorate, migrant networks and recruitment expanded, and as the need for 
migrant labor in Thailand deepened, they increasingly came from all over Myan-
mar. This trend has continued seemingly unabated with the reintroduction of 
(partial) electoral democracy in Myanmar in 2015. Burmese migrants are located 
throughout Thailand and remain a critical component of the Thai economy, work-
ing in sectors including light manufacturing, agriculture, fisheries and seafood 
processing, domestic work, and construction. In sum, both the successive military 
regimes and the current National League for Democracy–led government have 
outsourced the financing of social reproduction across the border, with migrants’ 
remittances propping up much of the rural economy.
Mae Sot, formally part of an SEZ from 2015, is the most industrialized of the 
border zones in the subregion. This has been driven by expansion of textile and 
garment manufacturing, with Mae Sot factories first opening in the mid-1990s, in 
response to declining profit rates for textile and garment firms in central Thailand 
and the availability of low-cost migrant labor at the border.30 Furthermore, manu-
facturers’ efforts to upgrade into original design or original brand manufacturing 
have generally not succeeded, and Thai-based regional trading companies manag-
ing value chains for global brands and retailers did not materialize as they have in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong.31 The lack of indigenous technological capabilities and 
lead firms has compelled Greater Bangkok to take the low road to industrialization 
and strategic coupling.32 These value-chain dynamics contributed to the relocation 
of many Bangkok-vicinity firms to Mae Sot. At its peak, approximately 470 gar-
ment factories were located in Mae Sot, employing more than 60–80,000 migrant 
workers from Myanmar, out of some 150–300,000 Burmese migrant workers in 
the area. In 2013, only 23,156 were “regular,” roughly 7 percent to 14 percent of all 
migrants in the area.33
The Thai state has many years’ experience in activating a multiplicity of social 
borders around the life and labor of Burmese migrants in Mae Sot, including 
racialized minimal social and labor protection practices to differentiated legal sta-
tuses that, combined, maintain a precarious workforce at the border and beyond.34 
Policing has been prevalent, with migrants lacking documentation subject to 
police shakedowns, harassment, as well as arrest and deportation. These authori-
ties have made use of migrant registration schemes to regulate the labor force at 
the border. In turn, employers have regulated their workforces in and around the 
border area to prevent arrest and deportation, creating a highly precarious labor 
regime along the border that is characterized by policing and control. Burmese in 
Mae Sot have been excluded from the Thai body politic and the potential to make 
counter-hegemonic demands of the central state or influential employers’ associa-
tions. Underemphasized in this line of analysis on deployments of migrant-labor 
control mechanisms has been the role of migrants’ mobility in inducing recent 
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top-down responses. Campbell asserts that migrants can be seen as “active geo-
graphical agents” who threaten the spatial organization of capital at the border 
and beyond.35 Migrants pursuing work in central Thailand contribute to labor 
shortages in Mae Sot, generating calls from local business and state authorities to 
prevent migrants, even those legally registered, from “escaping” the border region. 
Thus, workers’ mobility threatens the spatial organization of capital at the border 
and beyond, eliciting a different type of selective hegemony from the one outlined 
in the previous Cambodia case.
National and social security initiatives
Burmese migrants are critical to the Thai economy, yet they are also perceived as 
a national security threat. The Thai state sets out to control not only the spatial 
allocation of migrants’ labor but also their life, and social protection policies 
are increasingly utilized to both ends in this biopolitical labor regime. Burmese 
migrants’ access to social protection is predicated on formal employer-employee 
contracts. By linking migrant registration to as many services and facilities as 
possible, the security regime—security in the double sense of national and social 
security—closes the net around migrants, isolates them, and redefines what it 
means to be inside a territory by assimilating exclusion into the jurisdiction of 
the state.36 Rather than de-commodify labor, Thailand’s social insurance system 
seemingly aims to complete the commodification of migrant workers by devis-
ing a policy framework that resembles “neo-bondage,” in which information on 
and access to social insurance is dependent upon employers will.37 It is a state 
practice that extends administrative reach over migrant populations within its 
territory.
Thailand’s constantly changing, Kafkaesque migrant registration and verifica-
tion programs, first implemented in 1992, are the basis of access to social insur-
ance programs. By law, registered migrant workers in Thailand have access to the 
national social security program, which includes universal health care, a child 
allowance, a pension, and maternity, invalidity, death, and unemployment insur-
ance. De jure access to health insurance for regular migrants is significant, with 
over 1.8 million migrants from Myanmar, Cambodia, and Lao eligible.38 Migrants 
who have completed the nationality-verification process or have entered Thailand 
under one of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreements with neigh-
boring countries are eligible to receive benefits under both the Social Security 
Fund and the Workmen’s Compensation Fund administrated by the Social Secu-
rity Office.39 On paper, then, migrants are covered by a range of social services also 
available to Thai citizens. However, in 2014 only some 10 percent of all migrants 
were actively enrolled in the Social Security Fund, thus policies are effectively 
restricted to Thai nationals.40
Due to the short-term nature of work contracts, with an initial legal limit of 
two to four years, migrant workers cannot access any long-term benefits.41 Somkiat 
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Chawatsriwong, permanent secretary to the Ministry of Labor, said that migrants 
are only allowed in Thailand to work temporarily and not to establish a family 
or permanent life in the country. He also noted that migrants were not eligible 
for unemployment benefits, because migrants are not permitted to remain in the 
country for longer than seven days if they are unemployed. Furthermore, many 
migrants work in occupations excluded from social security coverage, including 
fisheries, the agro-industry, and domestic work, or are not employed continuously 
through the year, such as subcontracted or seasonal workers. For these irregular 
migrant workers—a conservative estimate being over two million—health care is 
generally financed through a collage of out-of-pocket payments, hospital-granted 
exemptions, voluntary health insurance schemes provided in some provinces, 
and NGO-operated migrant health programs.42 Thailand implemented a univer-
sal health program in 2001, and even though the National Health Security Act 
stipulates that every person in Thailand is entitled to health services, the law is 
interpreted to apply only to those of Thai nationality.43
The benefits provided by law for regular migrants are usually out of reach in 
practice because of employers’ reluctance to pay contributions into the funds—
in some cases, colluded by migrants’ own wishes to avoid salary deductions. 
Enrollment is optional, since there is no enforcement system to hold employers 
accountable if they do not enroll migrant employees in the social security system. 
The assumption is that employers will inform migrants of their benefits under 
the schemes. For those who do register, typically employers advance the cost of 
 registration and hold onto the migrants identification papers as collateral that the 
advance cost would be repaid, reflecting a long-running practice among employ-
ers to keep IDs, rendering workers effectively illegal once they step outside the 
workplace, leaving them prone to the “policing” identified earlier.44
In sum, social protection programs for migrants are uncertain and becom-
ing even more confusing. This is often framed as policy miscalculation and 
ineptitude on the part of the Thai government, yet it should be seen as a means 
of control by keeping people in state of uncertainty.45 It is a social bordering 
regime aimed at the protection of Thai citizens’ welfare entitlements, reproduc-
ing laboring poor status for those excluded from the citizenship regime. This 
reflects, as James Ferguson has argued, that such projects, even when they fail 
to achieve their stated goals, function to expand bureaucratic state power and 
embed populations more firmly within networks of governmental rule.46 The 
implication is that power relations are increasingly referred through state chan-
nels, with employers’ more extensive control over migrants acting as capillar-
ies. It is selective hegemony that sets out to reinforce state control over a large 
migrant population that is deemed a security concern for the general Thai popu-
lace, and at the same time, it seeks to shore up state efforts to reinvigorate the 
lackluster economy that is dependent upon migrant labor, as addressed in the 
following section.
mekong asia’s sezs    89
SEZS AND INSTITUTIONALIZING PRECARIT Y
The cases studied thus far reinforce contentions that transitions from farm to fac-
tory, country to city, informal to formal sector-led capitalist industrialization has 
not occurred in the same ways that it developed in the advanced industrialized 
countries.47 Yet the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and related economic plan-
ners continue to line countries up along what they assume to be a linear march 
toward industrial-led global integration characterized by “pro-poor development” 
and shared prosperity enabled by “job-driven” economic growth.48 In advancing 
this project, the ADB advises governments to be “wary over excessively tightening 
labor laws, . . . [as] rigid laws could drive an exodus of foreign firms and/or shift 
to more capital-intensive production that would affect long-run labor demand.”49 
Indeed, the bottom of the regions’ rural economy is congested, the potential for 
“upgrading” in global production networks is limited, thus growth led by low-
value-added industries appears to be a mainstay of development planning for the 
foreseeable future. SEZs play a clear role in this growth paradigm, and under-
standing their rationale in the course of economic growth strategies in the region 
helps to clarify how the social question is subverted.
With global competition intensifying in labor-intensive export-oriented sec-
tors, the ADB has been actively promoting borders SEZs, which aim to increase 
export competitiveness and integrate long-overlooked rural and cross-border 
areas to foster “sustainable, decentralized growth.”50 From the ADB’s perspective, 
enhanced trade and transport links centered on SEZ development embedded in 
subregional economic corridors can facilitate integrated regional trade and struc-
tural change conducive to development, generating “a wider range of economic 
benefits.”51 SEZ development without regional cooperation, the ADB asserts, could 
lead to enclave planning with limited returns.52 The ADB stresses that SEZs should 
be seen as components of an Asia-regional and global liberalization and trade 
facilitation project, not ends in themselves.
Border SEZs have emerged as incubators of national and cross-border eco-
nomic development that set out to embed global production networks in place. 
From a selective hegemony lens, they are economic-planning interventions that 
demonstrate state efficiency and soft and hard infrastructure and logistics acu-
men, while further institutionalizing informalized labor regimes deemed neces-
sary for growth. From this perspective, the social question is not marginalized 
from development discourse; rather, it is repackaged as part of a growth-led para-
digm in which social concerns are to be addressed after the subregional geo-eco-
nomic model has been institutionalized.
The Mae Sot SEZ
On May 22, 2014, the Thai military took control of the government, Thailand’s third 
successful coup since 1991. Two months later the junta, led by former commander 
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in chief of the Royal Thai Army and current prime minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, 
announced its SEZ initiative, which is central to their international trade policy 
agenda. The stated objectives are to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), gener-
ate employment, improve living conditions through income distribution, improve 
border area security, and enhance Thailand’s competitiveness and boost its lethar-
gic economy to take advantage of the ASEAN Economic Community, which took 
effect on December 31, 2015. Moreover, SEZ establishment will purportedly help 
tackle the smuggling of migrant workers and goods from neighboring countries, 
though it remains unclear how the Thai police and military will react, as they are 
central actors in Thailand’s human-trafficking networks.53
The Mae Sot border manufacturing and trade enclave was, at a time, considered 
an anomaly in the broader Thai economy, and the ADB’s SEZ-led development 
project considered a policy designed primarily for neighboring Least Developed 
Countries.54 Political turmoil has negatively impacted the Thai economy, and the 
threat of FDI continuing to bypass Thailand for neighboring countries has con-
tributed to a revised geo-economic strategy led by border SEZ and economic cor-
ridor planning.55 The infrastructure, trade, and transport facilitation and logistics 
components of the Tak SEZs and proximate economic corridors are set to roll out 
by 2018.
Five SEZs in five border provinces are being implemented in project phase 
1, 2015–2018 (figure 5), with five more to follow in phase 2. The Tak (Mae Sot) 
SEZ, at the forefront of SEZ discussions from the beginning, covers an area of 
1,419 square kilometers, comprising three border districts.56 Mae Sot is deemed a 
vital gateway, linking trade, investment, and tourism to Myanmar’s capital, Yan-
gon, and the proposed deep-sea port and SEZ in Dawei. It is also promoted as 
an emerging logistics hub, distribution center, and retail center, located in the 
ADB-initiated East-West Economic Corridor linking Da Nang, Vietnam, to 
Dawei, Myanmar. As discussed above, it has been a light manufacturing center 
for roughly two decades, and one that many economists and business interests 
hope to strategically couple with the recently opened Myawaddy industrial zone 
in Myanmar located ten kilometers away (interview, Tak Chamber of Commerce, 
December 2013). The zone is embroiled in geo-political concerns that have long 
held Thailand as the “natural” center of subregion, as well as geo-economic efforts 
to maintain low-value capture necessary as Thailand is mired in the “middle-
income trap.”57 Embedding the border regions in subregional manufacturing, 
trade, and transport routes is an initiative that has emerged from relative discur-
sive obscurity and ad hoc policy measures to a prominent position in national 
development planning.
Combined with the previous section’s attention to labor control across the 
national territory, the pieces of a top-down spatial development planning model 
are moving into place. It is not yet clear whether the SEZ initiative, coupled with 
the social protection regime, will answer employers’ calls to secure the migrant 
labor power deemed necessary for economic revival. It is clear, however, that the 
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map 5.2. Thailand’s SEZ development. The SEZs numbered 1 are from phase 1; those numbered 
2 are phase 2.






Bangkok 1. Aranyaprathet / Sa Kaeo
1. Khlong Yai / Trat
2. Narathiwat
1. Sadao / Songkhla
junta is tethering its beleaguered hegemonic project to the subregion by promot-
ing border SEZs.
The Bavet SEZ
SEZ initiatives in Cambodia take on added urgency as compared to the Thailand 
case. Lacking advanced infrastructure and logistics capacity, and struggling to 
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control an increasingly militant workforce, the Cambodian government is tak-
ing steps to appease uneasy investors to maintain its precarious foothold in light 
manufacturing. The government has approved over thirty SEZs since a 2005 SEZ 
decree; eleven were operational in 2014, with 145 firms employing some sixty-eight 
thousand.58 One is in Phnom Penh, the rest are located at Cambodia’s borders with 
Vietnam and Thailand and in the coastal cities of Sihanoukville and Koh Kong. 
Compared to Thailand’s SEZs, Cambodia’s are small, roughly from fifty to one 
thousand hectares. The central state has facilitated the privately developed and 
operated SEZs—indeed, all of Cambodia’s SEZs are private, which reflects global 
SEZ trends, in contrast to Thailand’s public zone administration.59 Investment in 
light manufacturing, such as garment and shoe manufacturing and bicycle assem-
bly, are most prominent. The primary logic behind Bavet border SEZs is proximity 
to Ho Chi Minh City and its port and manufacturing inputs, offering reduced 
transit and other costs compared to industrial zones further inland. Furthermore, 
Cambodia maintains preferential market access to the European Union under the 
Everything but Arms duty- and quota-free arrangement for least-developed coun-
tries. In Bavet, there are five operational SEZs employing some forty thousand 
local workers.
Economists indicate that improving both soft and hard infrastructure and logis-
tics efficiency is critical for Cambodia’s capacity to leverage its abundant, low-wage 
labor, with border SEZs deemed to be on the leading edge of such efforts.60 Tell-
ingly, while discussion of economic upgrading is not absent in ADB documents, 
spatial planning is oriented around anchoring low-value-added sectors at the bor-
ders to foster cross-border production-sharing arrangements. However, with wage 
gains in Cambodia between 2013 and 2016, Cambodia’s wage advantage vis-à-vis 
Vietnam has been greatly reduced, and it is plausible that entire zones could dis-
appear in the next round of spatial fixes. A Manhattan SEZ representative is clear 
(interview, November 2014), “To be honest, they [investors] come to Cambodia for 
low labor costs; to remain competitive, this has to be maintained.” Reinforcing this 
view, Heng Sour of the Ministry of Labor asked, “If we want the country to grow, 
[we] need foreign investors, and policies to attract them. . .  . To attract FDI, tell 
me what can we do other than low wage?” (interview, January 2015). Indeed, the 
viability of Cambodia’s garment sector has long been under strain, and Cambodia 
remains far removed from upgrading into new value chains or industries such as 
high-value electronics or auto assembly. In this sense, Cambodia is struggling to 
maintain its grip on the bottom rungs of the global economy, with manufacturing 
centers like Bavet at the margins of global capital circuits.
There is no indication that the promise of well-remunerated wage labor with 
social security is likely to be galvanized by SEZ development. The ADB frames 
SEZ development as necessary components to address socioeconomic concerns, 
but there is little room to maneuver in terms of advancing workers’ core concerns, 
as the zones themselves are predicated on a precarious labor force. State selective 
mekong asia’s sezs    93
hegemony, as manifest in the zones, is likewise precarious, since zone workers in 
Cambodia are part of the body politic, and their interests cannot be marginalized 
as readily as is case for Burmese migrants in Thailand. In sum, zones depend upon 
and reproduce poverty, and the opportunities to overcome this arrangement are 
extremely limited. Selective hegemony in Cambodia is constrained by both inves-
tors’ demands for cheap labor and workers’ demands to address poverty wages.
C ONCLUSION
Mekong Southeast Asia has transformed from a geopolitical territory character-
ized by interstate wars and conflicts to a more integrated geo-economic region that 
sets out to embed border SEZs into the Asia regional division of labor. These ADB-
led growth logics exhibit a plurality of local labor regimes, patterns of economic 
development interventions and spatial administration that are paradigmatic for 
understanding contemporary transformations in the region. In mainstream devel-
opment models, the social question has been inserted into such growth regimes, 
yet local labor regimes of informality reproduce and are indeed contingent upon 
poverty. The social question in Mekong Southeast Asia is thus delimited by a low-
value-added growth model that selectively targets particular spaces, populations, 
and economic sectors for development.
The Cambodia case has demonstrated that the commuter laborers employed in 
the zones are facing land poverty, to a large extent part of the outcome of agricul-
tural commodification processes promoted by the ADB and state actors. Formal 
sector employment in the zones does not ameliorate poverty; rather, it becomes 
a site of tension and protest that has induced state violence. These workers have 
responded by informally linking up with wider national-scale wildcat protest 
movements, and state concessions include wage increases and select social protec-
tion measures. These policies represent a small victory for workers’ movements, 
however, the selective urban garment sector labor force orientation sets out to 
blunt political opposition rather than addresses workers social reproduction con-
cerns. Thus, the potential for workers employed in border zones to access Cambo-
dia’s limited social protection program is even more restricted that those working 
in Phnom Penh and vicinity.
The Thailand case argues that Burmese migrants in Mae Sot have long been 
subject to racialized exclusions from the Thai body politic, which delimits their 
potential to make demands of employers and the state. Workers’ mobility and sub-
sequent labor shortages have challenged the border growth model, and irregular 
migrants numbering in the millions have contributed to national-scale security 
concerns. The Thai state has responded with a migrant labor registration scheme 
that utilizes social protection to cast the net over migrants. Again, these policies 
do not address livelihood and social reproduction concerns, rather, they extend 
the reach of the state. Selective hegemony targets investor concerns and a more 
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general concern for migrant regulation, and social reproduction strategies of 
Burmese in Thailand remains a tenuous cross-border arrangement. This expands 
bureaucratic state power and embeds populations more firmly within networks 
of governmental rule, shoring up state efforts to reinvigorate the lackluster Thai 
economy heavily dependent upon migrant labor.
To understand how localized border regimes of informality act as nodes within 
wider subregional development trends, the SEZs’ prominence in geo-economic 
ambitions has been presented. SEZs are key to the regional informality- mobility-
poverty nexus, yet the ADB and state officials assert that SEZs are necessary 
components of cooperative cross-border development planning. This discourse 
overlooks the ways in which the zones structure poverty through labor. In this 
sense, the social question is not necessarily marginalized by mainstream devel-
opment planning but is understood through growth logics, deferring realization 
of widespread benefits to a seemingly unattainable future of full employment in 
high-wage manufacturing. The sector-specific, selective approach creates further 
tensions and scales up contestations from the border zone to the region.
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A Mirage of Welfare
How the Social Question in India Got Aborted
Jan Breman
AN AMBIGUOUS START
The struggle for national independence was waged to gain not only freedom from 
foreign rule but also redemption from poverty, which held the large majority of 
the population captive. The development task at hand was entrusted to the van-
guard of the Congress movement, which had launched the fight for autonomy 
against colonial domination. The constitution of the new nation prescribed equal-
ity before the law of all citizens and democracy as the organizing principle of the 
political order. Universalizing suffrage was an act of considerable civil courage 
in a society marked by hard-core social inequality. The recognition of this heri-
tage remained veiled. The hierarchical ranking in a superiority-inferiority bind 
was attributed to the divisive impact of colonial policies that created contrasts and 
conflicts where togetherness in harmony existed. Mutuality was highlighted in the 
postulate of a village community founded on a division of labor in which peas-
ant, artisan and service castes cooperated in reciprocity. It was an image strongly 
contested by B. R. Ambedkar. This advocate of the discriminated rearguard argued 
that enfranchisement of the pariah underclass would not result in their emanci-
pation if they were not simultaneously rehabilitated to a proportionate share of 
economic and social rights.
India came out of colonialism with the large majority of the population living 
in villages and working in agriculture. Land distribution was highly skewed and 
the All India Congress Committee had gone on record promising “land to the til-
ler.” To the extent land reforms were carried out, they benefitted the already better-
off and not the majority of the peasants who belonged to land-poor and landless 
castes-cum-classes. The Gandhian model of small-scale village development was 
A Mirage of Welfare    99
completely ignored. The pretense of a socialist blueprint to the future was fore-
grounded in political statements, but the bottom ranks of the peasantry, identi-
fied in official reports as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, were often still 
tied in debt bondage to substantial landowners. The relationship, one of exploita-
tion mixed with a veneer of patronage, which provided sustenance to the land-
less household, broke down when, in the late colonial period, capitalism gained 
prominence.1 Labor became increasingly casualized, but wages remained as low 
as before, and the erosion of patronage inherent to the former bondage was not 
compensated by state-supplied social benefits at old age, disability, or bouts of 
unemployment. Agricultural labor was excluded from the redistribution of the 
surplus land that became available. Population growth went on unabated, and 
bringing down the high pressure on the resource base was a must. Agriculture had 
to be released from a low-productivity workforce redundant to regular demand. 
A better life was awaiting the rural underclasses in the city, where they would 
find steady employment in the mills that were expected to absorb and skill a huge 
amount of labor from the countryside. The path lying ahead was meant to repeat 
the urbanization-industrialization trajectory that the Global North had passed 
through one century earlier and for which “development” became the catchword. 
It was a scenario that, in the wishful thinking of India’s founding fathers, would 
ultimately result in the creation of a welfare regime as it already existed in the 
advanced economies.
In the late colonial period, a city-based class of factory labor had emerged. 
While miners and plantation coolies in the remote hinterland constituted a much 
larger industrial (although unorganized) workforce, factories manufacturing tex-
tiles had emerged in urban growth poles such as Mumbai and Kolkata. Mill hands 
made up a tiny fraction of the total working population, but their presence was 
supposed to signal what the future would look like. The vanguard of the industrial 
times to come became organized in trade unions, which lobbied for the introduc-
tion of labor rights in legislation aimed to safeguard conditions of employment, 
including social security benefits and protection against adversity. Infrastructural 
modernization required huge capital investments, which called for state participa-
tion in the planned restructuring of the economy. The regulation of employment 
upgraded the welfare of the workforce engaged in what became known as the pub-
lic sector. In official parlance, “labor” was understood to signify industrial work. 
The “workers” were identified as male factory hands in the  modern economy, and 
their numbers would rapidly increase. The vast majority of the working  population 
still engaged in agriculture lagged behind in backwardness and remained, beyond 
the care of government, stuck in deep poverty. The rural population increased 
from 298.6 million in 1951 to 837.7 million in 2011, respectively 83 percent and 
69 percent of the total population. In this interval, the percentage of owner-cul-
tivators in the agrarian workforce dropped from 72 percent to 45  percent, while 
agricultural labor doubled from 28 percent to 55 percent.2 Guided more by fear 
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of a growing restiveness than by the urgent need to improve the appalling plight 
of the rural poor, the Congress government of Gujarat finally decided in 1972 to 
prescribe what landowners would have to pay to agricultural labor, but the legal 
minimum wage failed to become effective. Mahatma Gandhi had insisted that the 
main worker’s income should satisfy the basic needs of his household and went 
on public record asking for a family wage that identified the male head of the 
household as the sole provider. Underlying his proposal was the idea that wives 
should not engage in waged work but should stay at home and take care of their 
husband and children. In spite of his strongly biased gender leanings, the yardstick 
of the nation’s founding father was the right to a human subsistence that included 
a broad package of basic needs. His subsequent reduction of a fair wage to a living 
wage was based on the argument that a decent reward for waged labor had to be 
fixed in accordance with what the employer could and should afford. However, no 
enterprise or industry would be allowed to operate without adequate remunera-
tion for the labor employed.3
A TURN FOR THE BET TER?
In the mid-1970s a slight improvement could be observed among the subaltern 
ranks in the rural locations of my local-level research in Gujarat. The widening 
scale of the labor market facilitated daily commuting to the nearby town by bus 
or bicycle or going off for longer periods as migrants for the duration of the dry 
season. The increasing connectivity would have strengthened the bargaining posi-
tion of the landless and land-poor in the village if the influx of outsiders had not 
correspondingly gone up at the same time. More space opened up also because 
of government schemes targeted on the rural poor to consolidate the vote bank, 
which the Congress Party required to stay in power. What became known as 
positive discrimination gave access to jobs in the public sector for the somewhat 
educated among its downtrodden constituency. Although only a forward section 
of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes benefited from job reservation in the 
public economy, it encouraged parents to send their children to primary school, 
in the hope that their offspring would be able to escape from the bottom of the 
labor hierarchy in which the victims of lifelong illiteracy remained entrapped. In 
my fieldwork locales, I found that toward the end of the twentieth century, two-
thirds of the men and three-quarters of the women in the landless class were still 
illiterate, but among the age cohorts below thirty years, that proportion was much 
smaller. Another hopeful sign was the promotion of public health care. Primary 
centers were set up to cater to the low-income population in the surrounding vil-
lages with free professional help and medicine. However, the services on offer were 
of an inferior quality. Opening hours were irregular, while absence of competent 
personnel, adequate equipment, and cost-free medication added to the lack of 
efficiency.
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Government agencies were somewhat more successful in settling the landless 
households in new quarters, although without giving them title deeds to their 
homestead plots. A major drawback was that these colonies were built on waste-
land at the village outskirts and were difficult to access in the monsoon. Their 
shelters on their employer’s land before had been self-built mud huts with over-
hanging thatched roofs that almost reached the ground, scattered over the locality 
but close to where they worked. Being clustered in compact settlements must have 
strengthened togetherness and a shared communal identity as tribal castes. Hid-
den out of sight, these jerry-built colonies without basic utilities resembled urban 
slums. House construction and provision of electricity came, of course, at a price 
but the rural underclasses expected these amenities to be uncharged public goods. 
Their daily wages fell already short of what they had to spend on bare survival. 
In the countryside, human resource development and gratification of basic needs 
stagnated.
The necessity to canvass votes motivated Congress politics to initiate the first 
social protection schemes that would reduce the threat of extreme vulnerability. In 
1991, the National Commission on Rural Labour pointed out in its report that with 
2.5 percent of GNP, India’s spending on social security was lower than almost any-
where else in the world.4 Moreover, that budget targeted only formally employed 
labor in the urban economy, one-tenth of the total workforce. Congress reckoned 
to make political capital out of the state pension for aged and disabled workers 
without adult children and without any means of their own. However, the benefi-
ciaries turned out to be few and far between. In 1987 I came across an old woman 
in one of my villages of fieldwork who had once received the prescribed monthly 
payment of fifty rupees. She herself and everybody else saw it as an unexpected 
act of charity, a stroke of luck rather than a right to which she could lay claim in 
future. Nobody was able to tell her what to do and where to go to get her state 
pension.
Declaring the state of emergency in 1975, Indira Gandhi launched the Twenty 
Point Program to eradicate poverty and to improve the quality of life for the under-
classes. The slogan Garibi Hatao (Get Rid of Poverty) made her a popular, even a 
venerated figure as Mataji among the masses down and out. The Bonded Labour 
System (Abolition) Act of 1976 decreed the end of captivity, which held workers 
attached in debt to their employers. The new ordinance was inspired more by the 
idea that bondage was an uneconomic way to utilize labor than that it degraded 
and oppressed the workforce exposed to it. The legal prohibition of debt bond-
age stemmed above all from government’s desire to accelerate the pace of capital-
ism by doing away with an employment modality held to be a relic from a feudal 
past. Declaring illegal what remained widely practiced turned out to be as ineffec-
tive as it had been before. The prime minister unleashed an authoritarian regime, 
resorted to forced sterilization practiced on Muslims especially, but was amazingly 
unsuccessful in imposing a diktat, during her rule of emergency.
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Were there no initiatives from civil society to improve the condition of the 
lower castes, which are also the lower classes, left behind by politics and policies? 
Gujarat has a proud record of what used to be called constructive work by grass-
roots activists. The Gandhian movement made special efforts to bring the tribal 
communities into mainstream society, and the landless serfs were told that they 
were going to be redeemed from bondage and poverty. To uplift the rural prole-
tariat, a welfare organization was founded in 1961, but the misery in which they 
lived remained unaddressed. The promised progress did not materialize because 
its high-caste leadership refused to confront exploitation and oppression head-
on. In the orthodox Gandhian mission, disputes on the terms and conditions of 
employment had to be solved by arbitration and compromise. Whenever relation-
ships between farmers and laborers became tense and strikes or fights broke out, 
the social workers insisted on nonviolence and rushed to restore class “harmony,” 
The Gandhian welfare agency that became part of the Congress machinery obfus-
cated rather than advanced the emancipation of the rural poor.
Labour Circulation
I used to trace the landless from my fieldwork localities wherever they went. Going 
off was due to the growing lack of demand for agricultural labor but was also 
inspired by a strong distaste among the younger age set to remain stuck in sub-
ordination to the local farmers. The problem land-poor and landless families face 
is a perpetual budget deficit. The dispossessed do not have the cash required for 
all kinds of expenses in the capitalist economy that has emerged. Credit expresses 
for the dispossessed an obligation to repay the provider of the “loan” with labor. 
The cash received demonstrates the supplicant’s incapacity to meet basic needs 
without being forced to acquire part of the cost of maintenance and reproduction 
in advance and restricts the latitude to move around beyond restraint. Members 
from the land-poor and landless households are mobilized in a state of immobility. 
They leave home, to return only when the self-skilled and low-paid work under 
the open sky for which they are recruited comes to an end, many months later. 
When the subsistence deficit in their hamlets is at its most urgent because of lack 
of work and income, jobbers go around shelling out earnest money that commits 
their catch to depart to faraway work sites when the monsoon ends. The gangs of 
migrants cannot leave the destination to which they are brought until they have 
worked off the advance payment. Once the debt has been cleared, they should be 
free to leave, but their wages are held back until the end of the season. If they run 
away in between, they lose the net balance of their earnings. Sometimes migrants 
are still in arrears on departure if they have asked for a large amount in advance to 
cover the expense of life cycle events such as a wedding among their kinsmen or a 
family member’s failing health, or to pay off an outstanding debt, which includes 
usurious interest on the loan provided.
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The rural distress continues to be ignored by the government. More than half of 
India’s workforce is still reported to make their living somehow in agriculture, but 
that sector’s share has steadily fallen to about one-sixth of GDP. Footloose hordes 
roam around in search of escape from lack of income at home. In the early twen-
tieth century, barely 5 percent of the population was urban based, and that figure 
remained low throughout the colonial era. That proportion went haltingly up to 
18 percent in 1961 and further increased to 28 percent in 2001. A drastic change in 
economic policy has subsequently accelerated urban growth. But the assumption 
that under the regime of neoliberalism, employment would surge ahead and raise 
urban life standards all around is misconceived. Both housing and jobs in cities lag 
far behind the accelerated intrusion of rural migrants desperate to establish a firm 
foothold in the urban economy.
Waiting for a Bright Future
In the mega-cities that have emerged during the last half century, slum dwellers 
outnumber the better-off inhabitants. While the classes mired in poverty try to 
hang on where they have squatted down, as close as possible to where the well-
established citizens live, the latter experience their nearby presence as a nuisance. 
Driven out from their makeshift and unauthorized shelters, the unwanted inhabit-
ants are dumped at the city’s outskirts—removed from sight but as a reserve army 
of labor, still sufficiently near at hand for occasional part-time and cheap usage. 
The spatial-cum-social divide is articulated by a change in policy to informality. 
The concept owes its origin to Keith Hart, who published in 1971 a pioneering 
paper on what he called the informal sector.5 The term referred to a motley crowd 
of unskilled, low-paid, and irregular labor at the low and inchoate end of the urban 
economy to be found in the erstwhile third world at large. The idea was that these 
newcomers would gradually qualify for steady and decently paid jobs. Getting 
more skilled and bargaining their way up, they were going to cross the boundaries 
that kept them apart from formal employment opportunities.
Until the late 1970s, Congress and its leadership remained wedded to a social-
democratic pathway of sorts. Progressive taxation and stringent regulation of pri-
vate enterprise paved the road to what should have ultimately culminated in a 
welfare state. Inequality did not wither away, but neither was there an escalation of 
conspicuous wealth at the top end. Captains of industry, both respected and sus-
pected, were held on a short leash. The buildup of a public economy created some 
space for upward social mobility. In 1947 India had fewer than ten million indus-
trial workers, of whom only a quarter were employed in modern factories. This 
tiny fraction of the workforce was regarded as spearheading the new economy. 
Industrial employment was the shape of a future in which employers, workers, and 
the state would synchronize their interests for the common good. The state took 
a leading role in the infrastructural layout, and heavy industries were established 
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in the public sector for the production of capital goods. The system of steady and 
regulated employment introduced in these enterprises helped to give labor a new 
dignity and was held up as the standard for private business to emulate. These 
workers enjoyed proper jobs and were paid a time-rated wage. In addition to their 
protected terms of engagement, a wide range of social benefits became statutory, 
bargained for by the trade unions in which the industrial workers and public sec-
tor employees were organized. This vanguard remained small in size, was reluctant 
to share its privileges with the overwhelming majority of workers outside of their 
ranks, and developed traits of a labor aristocracy. Endowed with prerogatives, 
the gap in life standard with the main body of the workforce, which remained 
stuck in agriculture and in the informal economy, escalated. Toward the end of 
the 1980s, the government had lost control over its agenda of development and 
became subservient to “liberalization,” as dictated by the Washington consensus. 
It was a setback sealed by the collapse of a second world order that had attempted 
to find an alternative path to the future than the one traversed by the advanced 
capitalist economies. With most other third world nations, India became incor-
porated in a regime of neoliberalism under Western hegemony, a setting in which 
institutions operating under the auspices of the Bretton Woods and World Trade 
Organization constituted the globalized directorate. The structural adjustment 
policies carried out were instrumental in dismantling the public economy and bla-
tantly announced as a poverty reduction strategy, severely cut down expenditure 
on social sectors such as housing, health, and education for the working classes.
INFORMALIT Y AS THE REMEDY
Informality turned out to be not a waiting room but an end station for the swelling 
workforce locked up in it. Industrialization did occur, but much more slowly than 
anticipated, while more and more people were being pushed out of agriculture and 
the village. They were mainly accommodated in construction, transport, trade, 
and services, or floated between them. Together these sectors far outweigh labor 
absorption in industry, and, as a consequence, the economic policy has radically 
changed course. Spurred on by the financial agencies of transnational capital, for-
malization of employment was not any longer the trajectory to follow. Informal-
ization was now considered to be the solution rather than the problem. The new 
policy suggested that casualization would generate more and better paid jobs. By 
a sleight of hand, irregular, insecure, and unprotected work was proclaimed to be 
in the best interest of labor. Closure of the mills in the formal economy toward the 
end of the twentieth century meant the overnight dismissal of a massive workforce 
that lost, together with their regulated jobs, all labor rights and social benefits. 
Trade unions faded away from the laboring landscape.
In a case study, I traced the workers sacked from their mill jobs to the bot-
tom of the urban economy, where they engaged in cutthroat competition for the 
A Mirage of Welfare    105
trifle chores on hand.6 It put an end to class-based solidarity. The victims did not 
have any other option than to fall back on their primordial loyalties for livelihood. 
In their search for casual work, they articulated their identity of gender, caste, 
and creed as the only form of social capital left to them. In 2002 a pogrom swept 
through Gujarat with horrendous ferocity. Hindu politics were blamed for the 
orgy of violence that targeted the Muslim minority in what was a politically man-
aged and state-backed operation, but the changing fabric of the economy played 
a major role. Lumpenized elements were at liberty to hunt and kill non-Hindu 
targets in the streets, forsaking the bonds of fraternity they had shared in the mills. 
As a consequence to the riots, the religious minority was driven out of the neigh-
borhoods in which they cohabited with their Hindu workmates. The communal 
separation has hardened and expresses the politics of apartheid dictated from 
above. Downward mobility was not the only fallout of informalization, but it also 
put in jeopardy a democratic fabric that is based on balancing the interests of all 
stakeholders in a spirit of proportional equivalence and social justice.
From the commanding heights one more myth percolated, maintaining that 
the absorptive capacity of the informal economy is infinite and pretending that 
newcomers are always welcome to join their swollen ranks. The premise stands 
corrected when one bothers to find out how these niches are watched over against 
uninvited intruders. The work at hand may go on day and night, but bouts of over-
employment alternate with underemployment—nothing to do for days on end. 
A major cause for ceaseless mobility is due to the need to leave wife and children 
behind in the village for lack of earning capability, as well as living space. Having 
these dependents around would be an unbearable burden, both in terms of care 
and cash spent on their maintenance. Within a cycle of fifteen to twenty-five years, 
the harsh conditions of employment and shelter result in premature exhaustion. 
It means an end to their working lives, if this does not happen earlier, when they 
fall prey to lasting injuries or chronic illness often caused by occupational hazards. 
The story adds up to concluding that dislocation, labor circulation, and informal-
ity are each other’s handmaiden.
Of India’s workforce—at the end of 2017, roughly half a billion in a popula-
tion of nearly 1.4 billion—the overwhelming majority is stuck in the informal 
economy.7 Over half of the men and women in what has remained of the formal 
economy—a small slice estimated to hover around 10 percent of the economically 
active  population—are also engaged on informal terms in a race to the bottom. 
With the upswing to neoliberal policies since 1991, labor market dualism fur-
ther accelerated. In the urban economy, regular work is still the most common 
employment status, but in the rural economy, casual work dominates. Of the total 
workforce, less than half is wage dependent and more than half self-employed.8 So-
called own-account work indicates the lack of proper jobs and is often disguised 
waged labor of outsourced activity. Since supply of labor far exceeds demand, the 
income of the casualized workforce tends to remain stuck close to or below the 
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poverty line. There can be little doubt that the drive toward informalization is 
in the end self-defeating. What is going to happen next? Once privatized, public 
space, agency, and institutions are difficult to restore. To generate solidarity rather 
than rank competition and individuated self-reliance is bound to be an uphill task. 
The public sector has shrunk and is manned by employees paid out of the coun-
try’s treasury: army, police, and a corps of major and minor officials, secure in 
their waged prominence, and in their elevated roles safeguarding what the state 
is and does.
A TALE OF INCLUSION
Which policy interventions have provided relief to the laboring poor? The oldest 
one is the public distribution system (PDS). Having its origin in the famine of the 
1940s, rationing was revived in the early 1960s to cope with acute food shortage. 
PDS makes subsidized food and some nonfood items available through a network 
of licensed fair-price shops. After decades of weak implementation, better target-
ing has slowly made PDS more effective. Still, wrong inclusion (of the nonpoor) 
and exclusion (of large chunks of the laboring and non-laboring poor) continues 
to be a major problem. The ration card is not valid outside the place of residence, 
which means that circular migrants hailing from other states remain excluded. 
A high percentage of adults or minors in the population at large suffer from 
undernourishment (one out of five) and of children underweight (close to half). 
Households need to provide proof of their improvidence. To qualify not only for 
low-priced grain but for all relief schemes, they have to be registered as being stuck 
below the poverty line (BPL) and are issued an identity card as testimony of their 
vulnerability. To be put on the list is a favor granted or withheld at the discretion of 
upper-caste gatekeepers, all the way from the village to higher up in the machinery 
of governance. I was around when, in 2002, the order from above came to close the 
local register to new BPL claimants.
Public housing has for many years been provided under the Indira Awas scheme: 
one-room tenements with brick and plastered walls, an iron-sheet entrance door, a 
window, and a roof of durable material. The annual quota remained low, sparingly 
allotted and spread over a large number of colonies, to impress a landless con-
stituency that the Congress government was actively promoting the welfare of the 
underprivileged. Public health facilities were introduced in the 1970s and 1980s 
to provide medical care to the poor. Whatever little access to professional and 
cost-free expertise was made available fell short of solving their health problems. 
The usual practice is to stick to self-medication, and if that brings no reprieve, the 
next step is to consult a quack for an injection. The changeover to privatization 
means that over four-fifths of health expenditure comes out of people’s pockets. 
A national health insurance scheme was introduced in 2008, limited to families 
officially recorded as poor. The scheme allowed for in-patient treatment in selected 
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private or public hospitals, but it excluded coverage for many ailments and dis-
abilities to which the laboring poor are prone.
Which measures have been taken to redeem the poor from the illiteracy in 
which I found them at the beginning of my local-level research more than half 
a century ago? Nowadays most children do go to school. It is a change for the 
better, to which the government contributes, with incentives such as a meal at 
noon, crèches for younger kids, and care for young mothers and infants by locally 
recruited and trained women. However, the village school has become the domain 
of the poor since the nonpoor send their offspring to town for private education at 
considerable cost. Public schools have become the domain of the working classes 
and are of inferior quality. At the end of their short educational track, children 
are able to confirm identity by writing their name instead of falling back on their 
thumbprint, but the teaching they have received is not enough to allow them to 
read even a simple form and fill it out with the required data. It means they remain 
cut off from all information and incentives that would connect them to main-
stream society.
How to generate employment for the land-poor and landless classes in the rural 
economy? A time-hailed recipe has been to arrange for public works. Pressured by 
social activists, the Congress government launched in 2005 a scheme that offered 
paid work for one hundred days a year to self-selected rural households at the 
legal minimum wage rate on projects designed and executed by the village council. 
The policy makers retracted extending coverage also to the urban economy. The 
employment provided has to be productive in nature: land leveling, digging wells, 
building check dams, and improving access roads, further increasing the lead of 
those endowed with assets. The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (in daily parlance abbreviated to narega) did not envisage upgrad-
ing the habitat of the rural proletariat with house construction or sanitation, let 
alone to arrange for care for the elderly, the disabled, and for all those unable to 
cope with their misery and in dire need of some support. The number of days 
worked are much lower than promised. Also, the clause stipulating that people 
who want to participate in the locally framed and managed projects should be paid 
the regulated wage on days no work is made available has remained ineffective. To 
do so would amount to an unemployment benefit, a largesse that is politically not 
condoned. Irrespective of these shortcomings or outright failure to achieve the 
targeted objectives—as, for instance, in Gujarat—the nuanced conclusion must be 
that narega has been much better handled in the southernmost states. In Kerala, 
in particular, where wages are above the legal minimum, the program has become 
a feat of female participation and assertion. But wherever pressure from below for 
participation remains absent, fraud and corruption are rampant: men and women 
listed as working on a project are simply not there; those who manage to become 
enlisted neither get the full wage nor do they receive it in time. An argument in 
favor of continuation and expansion of the scheme is demonstrated by the fierce 
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disapproval with which local employers react to public works, because they appear 
to act as a lever on the going wage rate.
The plight of a workforce doomed to footloose circulation seems to defeat 
the idea that the global countryside has reached its maximum population and 
will begin to shrink after 2020.9 In a worst-case scenario, the countryside may 
remain the waiting room for a reserve army of labor. A return of social Darwin-
ism could imply closing the cities off from a further influx of surplus people in 
the hinterland. Locked away in villages, it would be easier to keep them in check 
than on the urban front. Out of sight in their rural slums, their massive presence 
can be ignored, and the policy of abandonment would keep them separated from 
the better-off citizenry. The plausibility of such a “solution” is given impetus by a 
bourgeois mentality aggressively antagonistic to a drift into the city of growing 
contingents of landless and land-poor from their scattered backyards.10 They are 
seen as a dangerous class not so much because they are found to pose a threat to 
social and political stability, but because their polluting nearness is considered a 
health and safety hazard and a hindrance to civic morality.
A STATE IN DENIAL
The scale of public relief required to bridge the gap from improvidence to well-
being has not been made available. Still, the pledge of successive political regimes 
is and remains the inclusion of all. How to realize this objective laid down in the 
constitution? The policy is summed up in the slogan that the poor should be helped 
to help themselves, even if this implies self-exploitation and a gross denial of their 
human quality. It is part of a neoliberal dogma that sets the government free from 
providing social security and protection. The drive toward self-employment, self-
provisioning and self-representation is to hold people accountable for their own 
work and welfare arrangements. This is the marvel of Soto’s brand of capitalism 
and its glorified success in sinking down to levels earlier unheard-of.11 Has the 
magic of making the poor bankable, obliging them to stand security for each other 
when applying for petty loans, resulted in less improvidence? Attempts to set up to 
the rural landless in petty business have by and large failed, also in my fieldwork 
localities.12 The wages paid out to them at day’s end are instantly spent on basic 
maintenance, food before anything else. None of it can be saved to cope with the 
adversities that are an ironclad feature of their deficient subsistence. Animators of 
micro-credit schemes tend to portray the underclass as undeserving poor, afflicted 
with ailments attributed to their own defects—steadfast refusal to save up, above 
all—rather than to bonds of un- or underemployment and inadequate income. 
Refusal to pay a living wage to the rural poor, even when profits higher up con-
tinue to accrue, is accompanied by an unflagging insistence on the privatization 
of property. Articulation of ownership rights has led to the depletion of common 
resources such as access to the village wastelands. It meant the loss of communally 
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held benefits that used to contribute crucially to the coping strategies of the rural 
poor and to denial of the right acknowledged in the past to squat down on unoc-
cupied space in village or city.
Established by the government in 2004 to take stock of the informal economy, 
the National Commission on Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS) 
recommended the promulgation of a “social floor” of labor rights and standards: 
a national minimum wage and its effective payment, decent conditions of work, 
and the provision of social security. It would mean cost-free insurance against fail-
ing health and other benefits for the non-laboring poor. Parliament mandated in 
late 2008 the Unorganized Workers’ Social Security Act, which sought to bring a 
modicum of public relief for people unable to take care of their own subsistence.13 
There is little doubt that the stony silence in the official circuit to this piece of 
legislation had much to do with the evidence produced that a very large portion 
of India’s informal workforce is mired in deep poverty and that their deprivation 
went unabated in the first decade of the new century. This was unwelcome news 
for policy makers and politicians who indulged in the comfort of high-growth 
rates without bothering to find out at what cost. The NCEUS panel clarified its 
point of view that inclusion is condition sine qua non to progress for the masses 
lagging behind, an intrinsic feature of participatory involvement without which 
the development objective is bound to fail.
Is there no anxiety in the top echelons of society that the anguish and anger 
building up down below might spill over in outbursts of violence? A century ago, 
the notion of la classe dangereuse played a pivotal role in the willingness of vested 
interests in the Global North to accommodate the underclasses into mainstream 
society. While the haves in that part of the world decided to change tack and facili-
tate the inclusion of the haves-not and built up the welfare state, India’s better-off 
classes appear not to be unduly bothered by the prospect of a social revolt. In 
contrast to the working poor in the advanced economies, who got organized in 
trade unions and political parties when the pace of industrialization and urbaniza-
tion started to accelerate, the drive toward informalization means that the under-
privileged masses are a fragmented assortment, unable to team up in collective 
action. The social question came up in the Global North to address the growing 
imbalance between labor and capital in the transition from an agrarian-rural to an 
industrial-urban way of life. The underlying trend toward equality in the fabric of 
society gave impetus to the demand for a proportional share in the distribution of 
economic gains. In India, the social question does not even arise in a neoliberal 
economy bent on favoring the well-to-do and shutting up the voices of the poor. 
Coming close in my fieldwork to where they live and how they make do, I have 
never failed to be impressed by their courage and resilience to oppose the ordeal 
imposed on them. However, their protest and resistance in a low-key and low-
profile capacity tends to be much understated in writings on collective action, in a 
sphere of domination and repression very difficult to resort to.
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A C OURSE OF EXCLUSION
A drastic political reversal came in spring 2014 with the transfer of power from 
Congress to the Bajap Political Party (BJP) anxiously trying to canvass the Hin-
duized majority in its fold. The electoral outcome demonstrated the collapse of 
the Congress subterfuge and its credibility in trying to placate the underclasses 
while serving neoliberal interests. Popular anger in reaction to massive corruption 
implicating politicians and bureaucrats contributed to the defeat. Underlying what 
cascaded into a rout was the loss of support from underprivileged segments—
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Muslims—disillusioned by what had 
been promised but never delivered. In an ironic twist, many of the non-poor also 
deserted the party, which used to prioritize their well-being. The dissatisfaction 
of this middle- to higher-ranking segment stemmed from the proclaimed intent 
of Congress to spread welfare to the bottom classes. Catering to these underprivi-
leged needs was met with strong disapproval by the better-off classes of citizens 
bent on remaining the exclusive beneficiaries of growth. Redistributive policies 
had to be pretended for reasons of political legitimacy and, if not practiced right 
away, then at least forecasted, in order to appease a deprived multitude that within 
a fabric of democracy could not be alienated. This ballot-box logic has fallen on 
deaf ears in a civilizational setting of stifling inequality. Bailing out the people 
stuck far below the poverty line is not an acceptable proposition higher up, even 
when that policy vow does not go beyond paying lip service to it. What has been 
the fallout of the new political equation?
As far as handling the social question is concerned, a definite change for the 
worse. Of course, this opinion is not shared by the Hindutva set of power-mongers. 
The former entitlement approach, never properly implemented, was replaced by a 
faked empowerment policy. Narendra Modi was elected prime minister with the 
promise that growth and development for all and sundry would be his agenda. His 
declared strategy is to go along with what big business wants: an infrastructural 
buildout at the public expense, lower taxation, and a free hand for corporate capi-
tal. This course of unrestrained capitalism, he insisted, would be in the best inter-
est of labor, since it was going to result in a hundred million jobs. Neoliberalism 
never had a better advocate in India, and captains of finance and industry eagerly 
sponsored his campaign. From the onset, a frontal attack lined up to do away with 
whatever small gains labor had been able to make under Congress patronage in 
the preceding decades. The new budget drastically cut back on already toned down 
social sector expenditure—public health, housing, and education—as part of a 
reform meant to promote privatization in all these fields. Government expendi-
ture on health care is 1.4 percent of GDP, lower than nearly everywhere else in the 
Global South. The meager budget set aside for public education makes India once 
more stuck at the world’s rock bottom. The next step was to withdraw laws called 
archaic that secure and protect the dwindled contingent of workers employed on 
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conditions of formality. In the Indian Labour Conference held end July 2015, Modi 
labeled such regulations as counterproductive to free enterprise.
Funding set aside for the public works program offering employment to rural 
households was slashed at lower levels of governance. The Food Security Act, 
valiantly fought for by civil rights activists, has been held in abeyance in states 
under BJP rule. As long as Congress was in charge, the policy makers were tardy 
to concretize the right to inclusion, and the promised welfare for the underprivi-
leged did not materialize. Under the new regime, there is a brutal unwillingness 
to arrange for public relief that addresses the agony of the destitute underclass. 
The Antyodaya Anna scheme, which provided a monthly grain ration to the non-
laboring poor, was phased out. It shares this fate with other benefits now scrapped 
as wasteful expenditure. The state-funded pension allowances are being retooled 
into contributory and self-financed ones. To facilitate market accessibility for the 
poor, a Unique Cash Transfer scheme has been announced that aims at shoring 
up workers in the informal economy. Equipped with a biometric identity card, a 
clientele deprived of state-financed largesse is encouraged to open bank accounts 
in which they will deposit pension payments from savings they themselves are 
supposed to make. It could be the running up to a Universal Basic Income (UBI) 
scheme, which may be experimented with as a policy ploy for self-provisioning. 
The beneficiaries would be kept responsible for all expenditure made by taking 
away much-needed subsidies on food, shelter, health care, education, and social 
security. In a newspeak jargon, Narendra Modi tries to cover up the reality of 
massive destitution. Politics of promised (though not practiced) inclusion have 
made way for rigorous exclusion. At the end of 2016, the prime minister sud-
denly demonetized high-value banknotes with the pretension to squeeze out 
black money. The operation completely failed to achieve this stated objective but 
created havoc in the cash-based informal economy, and it led to large-scale dis-
missal of its casual workforce and an income crunch for many months for the 
affected households. The introduction of a Goods and Services Tax a half year 
later had a similar devastating impact. Both interventions were meant to formal-
ize the flow of capital and subject all financial transactions to state taxation while 
keeping labor thoroughly informalized in their condition of underpaid off-and-
on employment.
What will be the fallout of the widening divide between haves and haves-not? 
India’s constitution prescribes inclusion of all, irrespective of social identity and 
economic status. Politicians and policy makers of diverse ideological denomina-
tions have no option but to repeat the mantra that welfare for all remains their 
modus operandi. As one of the state makers, B. R. Ambedkar, popularly called 
Babasaheb, drew attention to the discrepancy between the doctrine of political 
equivalence and the brutal praxis of socioeconomic inequity. The paradox could, 
in his opinion, only be solved by giving the downtrodden segments access to the 
rights they are due as citizens. The declaration of universal suffrage and the legal 
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imposition of the equality principle, Babasaheb argued, collided with an ingrained 
hierarchy that implied sustained subordination for the people at the bottom. Their 
status beyond the pale was reinforced by an extremely skewed distribution of the 
sources of existence. Mahatma Gandhi tackled the social question suggesting that 
the lower castes should remain under high-caste tutelage, a guardianship that 
would oblige the latter to raise the morality as well as standard of living of the 
former in a benign relationship of dependency and care. However, on the dark 
underside, dispossession went on unabated, resulting in a degree of poverty that 
spirals into pauperism, while on the shiny side, unbound consumerism whets the 
appetite of the better-off for ever more. In 2017, 1 percent of the Indian population 
owned 58 percent of the nation’s wealth.14 The idea that the more and the less well-
off should be balanced in reasonable proportion to each other was never a popular 
credo and has faded away over time. That Gandhian wisdom of caring for the least 
and the last is incompatible with a predatory capitalism that drives the winners to 
unbridled accumulation while leaving the losers behind in misery.
FROM DEFIANCE TO ASSERTION
Does it mean that emancipation of the laboring and non-laboring poor has become 
unstuck? That would be a premature conclusion. First and foremost because the 
analysis in the preceding pages has to be nuanced since it cannot be generalized 
for India at large. Gujarat, where I have conducted most of my empirical research 
and which is one of the fastest-growing states, is at or close to the national bottom 
as far as wage rates for the laboring poor is concerned, an achievement that cor-
responds with its laggard score on the human development index. In the second 
place, due to an amorphous climate of defiance rather than because of concerted 
and collective action, even in the localities of my recurring fieldwork in Gujarat, 
absolute poverty is less stark than when I first came around more than half a cen-
tury ago. The deprivation experienced is, in many cases, a relative one, caused by 
the widening gap with the better-off classes for the majority of the landless and 
land-poor households. Finally, the critical balance drawn fails to do justice to the 
social churning from below throughout the country. In some states other than the 
one on which I have concentrated my recurrent investigations, the underclasses 
appear to have acquired some more room to manoeuver.
It is not so easy to nail down the regional variation that exists and the causes 
of diversity. There are zones, mainly in the southern parts of the subcontinent, 
with moderate economic growth but more social progress, the outcome of pop-
ulist politics. The so-called BIMARU states (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, 
and Uttar Pradesh) together with Odisha are marked by the least momentum of 
socioeconomic progress. Then there is a middle rank to which Maharashtra, Guja-
rat, West Bengal, and Karnataka belong, where, despite high industrialization and 
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urbanization, the pace of social change is rather mediocre, and hence inequality 
spilling over into exclusion is very high. These regional contrasts have to be fur-
ther complicated in terms of a vast divide between top and bottom ranks. In that 
frame, an uneven ranking is noticeable among the various communal categories 
of the underprivileged. Dalit assertion is spreading and has gained strength in 
Punjab and the Gangetic belt of North India in recent decades, but already much 
earlier it had surged forward in Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamilnad. It 
took longer for tribal identity to get articulated, but running through central India, 
covering one fourth of the country’s districts, the adivasis are up in arms, in pro-
test against oppression and dispossession, if not the destruction of their resources 
and habitat by corporate business. Sections of what are called the Other Backward 
Castes (that is, not scheduled in the lower ranks of identification) equipped with 
some assets are upwardly mobile in the informal economy and have managed to 
get more political clout in many states. Among Muslims, the assertion of commu-
nal profiling is least visible, clearly to avoid the risk that its manifestation might 
arouse suspicion of falling prey to an anti-national mindset.15 The convoluted pat-
tern explains the differentiation throughout the country, for instance, in wage lev-
els, rates of literacy, as well as success (or not) in getting access to state-provided 
benefits. In all these struggles, whatever progress made is due not to benevolence 
granted from above but to claims tenaciously fought for from below. The reserva-
tion that needs to be expressed is that the prioritization of communal identities 
has so far not resulted in a joint action front militating for inclusion on a shared 
platform of common claims. Moreover, the individual or collective backlash from 
the higher echelons against the growing assertion from below is ferocious.
In order to upgrade conditions of work and life to a basic level of human decency 
and dignity three factors in particular have to be foregrounded as preconditional: 
the presence of social activism propelled from civil society, a clean and efficient 
government machinery committed to the implementation of pro-poor policies, 
and, finally, effective participation of the targeted beneficiaries in the struggle for 
welfare. Jointly, these considerations seem to have found better ground in South 
India. Hopeful also is an ongoing restructuring of the social order. An upsurge of 
a social consciousness can be detected among the lower castes-cum-classes spread 
over the subcontinent, manifest in their refusal to continue living in subordination. 
What used to be a hierarchical ranking in a relationship of proclaimed superiority 
versus imposed inferiority collapsed when neither the claim by the higher castes 
of preeminence nor professed acceptance by the lower castes of their subalternity 
remained the thrust of their interaction. In my perception, the lower ranks never 
internalized their submissiveness and refused to retreat in a culture of poverty. 
Entrapped in servitude in the past, they were obligated to a show of deference, but 
those days of a compelling need to acknowledge ritualized domination have gone. 
They do not any longer dwell in the shadow of the high and mighty but are settled 
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in their own makeshift colonies in village or city. Living together has stimulated 
common cause. Ela Bhatt, the founding mother of the Self-Employed Women’s 
Association, captured this notion of constituting a collectivity with her autobi-
ography, We Are Poor but So Many.16 These words convey the habitus of the rank-
and-file membership that she mobilized to join her trade union for self-employed 
female street vendors, scavengers, cart pullers, home-based workers, and others, 
recruited from a gamut of Scheduled Castes, Other Backward Castes, Scheduled 
Tribes, and Muslims. Another recent step in the same direction is the initiative of 
labor activists and nongovernmental associations to formulate a charter for work-
ers’ rights in the informal economy and to get organized for representation along 
those lines.
The caste ranking has veered away from being spread over a vertical slope to 
stretching out on a horizontal plane in a frame of which inequality and not hier-
archy is the most striking feature. The assertion to equivalence from down under 
is expressed in the claim to be included into mainstream society. But the steep 
inequality inherited from the past has, since 1980, further spiraled in a context 
of globalized capitalism. If the plunder going on does not end, and if capital is 
not brought under public control, the democratic fabric of politics is bound to 
collapse. Narendra Modi has gone on record declaring that his “Gujarat model of 
growth with development”—which amounted to a gross denial of the rule of law, 
civil liberties, social justice, ghettoization of the religious minority and not just the 
practice but also the principle of equality—has become the agenda for national 
policies. It is up to the country’s citizenry at large to open the gates to inclusion. 
The denial to do so cannot but lapse into in a regime of naked authoritarianism, to 
further fracture, if not annihilate, what is left of public agency and multiclass rep-
resentation. With the communalist adage that all people are unequal, but some are 
more unequal than others, the BJP supremo may be tempted to give this regime a 
more exclusionary slant. Narendra Modi was already an avid adept of a post-truth 
style of politics in Gujarat long before it became practiced wide and far. No doubt, 
the state has to be blamed for its failure to alleviate mass poverty spilling over 
in destitution, but the social activism fighting this remissness should not merely 
focus on the lapse of public governance. Beyond that, the owners and managers of 
capital have to be held accountable for the manner in which they treat or, increas-
ingly, either misuse or disuse the country’s massive labor force. In the globalized 
economy, capitalism as the hegemonic mode of production still gets away scot-
free from contributing to human existence also for the down-and-out. When the 
social question was originally raised, labor directly confronted capital to seek a 
fair deal in the sharing of profit and cost. That spirit has to be brought back again 
in the struggle for emancipation, but not any longer at the national level only. 
Capital has come to operate more and more worldwide, and to engage with it at 
this transnational site of confrontation is going to be a major challenge for labor 
and its well-wishers.
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The Labor Question and Dependent 
Capitalism
The Case of Latin America
Ronaldo Munck
INTRODUCTION
The current debate on the social question at a global level needs to recognize 
very clearly the overarching structural divisions between the dominant impe-
rialist countries and what we might call “dependent capitalism.”1 What is com-
monly known as “globalization” has not produced a “smooth,” more equal world, 
as its advocates proclaimed it would, but has, rather, accentuated the inequalities 
between the Global North and the Global South, thus creating very  different con-
texts for the relationship between the development of capitalism and the social 
question. This chapter explores, in a broad-brush manner, the particularities of 
the related “labor question” in Latin America, showing the inextricable links 
between it and various forms of the “national question.” We start with a review 
of the National Developmental State era, running roughly from the 1950s to the 
late 1970s, followed by the so-called lost decade of the 1980s and after, coincid-
ing with the heyday of neoliberal economic policies. We then review the debate 
around the Marginality Question, in which Latin American scholars made a 
somewhat neglected contribution to the formal/informal divide in labor relation 
that has more recently become known as the “precarity debate.” The way capital 
interacts with labor is, of course, a two-way process, and thus we turn to the rise 
of significant social countermovements in the 2000s known as the “left decade” in 
Latin America. We note major changes in the capital/wage-labor relations and a 
partial reversal of the ongoing process of precarization. We conclude with some 
final thoughts on matters arising around the nature of the labor question under 
dependent capitalism following our review of the Latin American case and the 
global issues it raises.
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The social question arguably takes a specific form in those parts of the world 
that were once colonized and that have since been characterized by dependent 
capitalist development. The structural nature of uneven development has not 
been surpassed by the globalized capitalist development of the last quarter of a 
century, and, in fact, these differences have become more pronounced.2 In terms 
of the capital/wage labor relation—and what Marx called the “hidden abode of 
production”—a systematic form of global labor arbitrage has emerged that drives 
the extraction of surplus value in a “fragmented and hierarchically organized labor 
market” in which wage differentials create the dynamic for both labor outsourcing 
and labor migration. It is in this context—set by colonialism and imperialism—
that labor in the South has been always-already precarious and where the social/
labor question has been inseparable from the national question.3
Latin America is a particularly apposite region to take as a case study, given its 
complex position in terms of global development. In terms of Gramsci’s famous 
East/West distinctions, Latin America could be said to be in a liminal  position 
betwixt and between tradition and modernity, North and South, due to its 
 particular history of uneven development.4 Latin America has always experienced 
mixed temporalities, leading to multiple overlapping modernities. The most up-to-
date modern technologies could be introduced in rural exporting areas while, on 
the other hand, traditional small-scale production and various forms of coerced 
labor played a key role in the industrialization process. The state also played a much 
greater role in the development process, and the national-popular dimension of 
politics prevailed over “classic” class-development patterns.
THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTAL STATE
During the phase of outward-oriented growth under an oligarchic state (roughly 
1860 to 1930) the social question, as famously put by a minister in Brazil, was 
a “police matter.” There was little perceived need for co-option or anything 
 resembling a welfare state. The working class was being forged through internal 
but also external migration. Apart from a weak socialist current, anarchism and 
anarcho-syndicalism were the main ideologies at play. Unionization coincided 
with the main sectors of the agro-export economy—dockers, railroad workers, 
and miners, for example—although artisans, bakers, shoemakers, and tailors were 
also  unionizing. While  modernization required, in theory, a “free” labor force, 
landowners, in particular, found it too expensive and not docile enough. Thus, 
in many rural areas (not least in Brazil, where slavery was abolished only in 1888) 
relationships of personal dependency and subordination were recreated during 
the modernization period. Traditional patterns of labor control—including extra-
economic forms of coercion—were prevalent in Mexico and the Andean countries 
in particular, in contrast to the more proletarianized Southern Cone (Argentina, 
Chile, and Uruguay).
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The stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930s led to 
a decisive shift toward industrialization based on a more inward-oriented devel-
opment model. Pivotal to the import substitution industrialization (ISI) model 
was an interventionist or developmental state. It was the state that promoted 
industrialization and accelerated the social division of labor. Hand in hand with 
industrialization went a massive process of urbanization that made or remade the 
working classes. Prompted by changes in the global economy, the twin processes 
of industrialization and urbanization resulted in the forging of a new working 
class. Latin American urban growth rates in the 1950s were practically double what 
they were during Britain’s Industrial Revolution.5 Instead of overseas migration, 
it was internal rural-urban migration that, in this period, accounted for the bulk 
of new workers joining the work force. This was the first of Latin America’s “great 
transformations” and one that shaped both the social relations and the politics of 
the era.
Import substitution industrialization was always seen by its promoters as a 
means to an end. This was a national development project, committed to the health 
and education of the nation’s workers. The state expanded vastly in economic terms 
through the creation of new public enterprises and through nationalizations. It 
played a key role in financial intermediation and developed a synergistic relation 
with foreign capital. The expectation, as Garretón and his colleagues put it, “was 
that industrialization brought national wealth” and that “this wealth could be dis-
tributed indirectly to the population at large through government programmes.”6 
This model had emerged because the old agro-export model was not viable dur-
ing the recession of the 1930s, as international trade declined. While it created a 
new industrial bourgeoisie and working class, it did not, necessarily, confront the 
agrarian oligarchy. It was about creating a new model of capital accumulation that 
also harnessed the “old” relations of production in the rural and informal sectors 
to the benefit of the emerging monopoly capitalism, based on the extensive (rather 
than intensive) subordination of labor.
One of the key theoretical debates to emerge during the 1950–1980 period was 
that around “dualism” in relation to the modern and traditional sectors. Modern-
izers and Marxists alike agreed that the traditional sector (often associated with 
feudalism) was an obstacle to social progress. As with the binary logic seen in the 
opposition between formal and informal labor, the two sectors were seen to oper-
ate on quite distinct dynamics. In reality, as Oliveira has shown, these sectors were 
in a symbiotic relationship, because, as he argued, “the expansion of capitalism . . . 
occurred through the introduction of new relations [of production] in the archaic 
[sector] and through the reproduction of archaic relations in the new [sector].”7 
This critique of dualist reason may well explain the emergence of what, in Grams-
cian terms, we might call a “compromise state” during this period and, among 
other things, the failure to extend the emerging labor legislation to the rural areas.
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There is, of course, no one model of the national development state that pre-
vailed across Latin America. However, we can legitimately take Peronism in Argen-
tina as an ideal type, with Varguismo in Brazil and Cardenismo in Mexico also 
sharing many of its characteristics. Peronism developed as a coalition between a 
nationalist military, an incipient industrial bourgeoisie, and a well-organized labor 
movement. Some of the profits of the agro-export sector were diverted to build up 
the industrial sector. Workers achieved labor dignity, but they were also expected 
to deliver better labor productivity. The developmentalist state promoted capitalist 
expansion and ensured the stable reproduction of the labor force through better 
education and the beginnings of a welfare state, previously neglected by the oligar-
chic state. The overwhelming statistic of this period is in relation to the share of 
labor in the national income, which went from 40 percent in 1945 to nearly 50 per-
cent in 1955. Peronism went through many mutations subsequently, but the classic 
variant is emblematic of the national development state and can help explain later 
phenomena, such as the rise of Chávez in Venezuela.
Peronism, in many ways, encapsulates the national-popular nature of the social 
question in Latin America. It is often classified as populism (although this has 
given rise to conceptual confusion), which, as Octavio Ianni notes, “is a form of 
political organization of the relations of production in a period of expansion of 
the forces of production and internal market.”8 Populism was the form in which 
many of the postwar nationalist regimes incorporated the working class and gen-
erated a new expansive phase of capital accumulation. The trade unions were a 
key element in this process and in some cases became virtual state institutions and 
“transmission belts” (as in the communist model) for the populist leader. Never-
theless, many trade unions acquired during this period, and then sustained, the 
capacity to articulate worker demands and obtain a greater share in the national 
income. Favorable political conditions could allow the trade unions to engage not 
only in successful collective bargaining but also in political bargaining and strike 
actions that brought labor to the center of the national stage.
By the mid-1960s the “easy” phase of import substitution industrialization had 
become exhausted.9 Part of this was due to ISI reaching technical limits in terms 
of what previous inputs could be substituted by locally manufactured goods. A 
leap into more sophisticated forms of production—both for local consumption 
and for export—was now called for. This would require new skills and greater 
levels of efficiency. There was a need for greater investment as well, something 
that could not be generated locally. Undoubtedly, though, it was the external envi-
ronment (the debt crisis was then about to explode) that would provide the key 
impetus for a change of direction in Latin America, though the endogenous aspect 
of this transformation should not be neglected. ISI was seen as failure and the 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) argued that “structural hetero-
geneity” (dualism) had led to unbalanced growth and that the capital-intensive 
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manufacturing sector and its modern technology had been able to absorb only a 
fraction of the growing workforce and thus led to the overexpansion of margin-
ally productive activities. Labor “quality” and gender equity in employment had 
not been priorities, given the abundance of labor, and that now caused problems.
Later, more sober analysis, developed after the “lost decade” of the 1980s, led 
to a more positive overall balance sheet of this period. Various studies have con-
cluded that the period 1950–1970 witnessed major transformations in the compo-
sition of the labor force as non-manual occupations in the secondary and tertiary 
sectors expanded and significant upward social mobility ensued.10 The post–World 
War II industrialization had generated productive employment and, most signifi-
cantly, brought a working class onto the stage and created the conditions for a 
dynamic labor movement.
Regardless of these arguments the horizontal expansion of capitalist relations 
was more or less achieved but now vertical integration was required. To achieve 
this, the labor process and relations of production needed to be brought fully 
under the sway of capital. The “formal subsumption” of labor needed to be fol-
lowed by the “real subsumption” of labor to ensure the continued expansion of 
capitalism. Marx distinguishes between the “formal” and “real” subsumption of 
the labor process by capital. In the first phase of capitalist development, capital 
draws into its domain preexisting labor processes (for example, deploying non-
capitalist techniques), markets, means of production, and workers. This Marx calls 
“formal” subsumption, under which the labor process as such continues much as 
before. Capitalism, however, cannot develop on this limited basis and is compelled 
to continuously transform the relations of production. The prerequisite for the real 
capitalist subsumption is a shift to a labor process created by capital itself. Thus 
capital gradually transforms the social relations until they become thoroughly 
imbued with the requirements of capital, and the labor process is then really sub-
sumed under capital. The “deepening” of industrialization thus required greater 
labor discipline, which was a major raison d’être in the rise of military or authori-
tarian regimes from the 1970s onward across most of Latin America.
THE MARGINALIT Y QUESTION
At this point, we carry out an excursus to consider what has been Latin America’s 
particular theoretical contribution to the study of precarity, namely the “marginal-
ity” theory of the 1960s and 1970s. It is necessary due to the growing importance 
of the informal sector but also as example of where Southern knowledge needs to 
come into play in global debates.
The origins of the term marginality lie in the U.S. sociology of the 1930s, at which 
time it referred to the psychological disorientation supposedly felt by individuals 
at the interface of two cultures, for example, after migration. In Latin America it 
was taken up by the early modernization theorists to refer to the consequences of 
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the postwar urbanization process referred to above.11 Various names were used 
to describe the informal settlements that arose around the big cities due to rural-
urban migration—villas misérias, barriadas, favelas, callampas, ranchos, campa-
mentos, and so forth—but in all cases, they were physically on the periphery of 
the city, and they lacked even the basics of communal services. Thus, marginality 
could refer to the social condition of these new urban dwellers, or, more often, it 
was the people who were deemed marginal in terms of their access to decent jobs, 
housing, or living standards. There is some common ground here with the much 
later European concept of “social exclusion.”12
The most systematic Marxist study of marginality was that of José Nun as well 
the work of Aníbal Quijano.13 What Nun was essentially doing was creating a new 
category—a “marginal mass”—to distinguish the Latin American situation from 
Marx’s classic categories of “industrial reserve army” and “relative surplus labor.” 
As with their modernization theory counterparts, Nun and Quijano were address-
ing the issue of why the postwar industrialization drive had failed to absorb the 
rapidly increasing labor force. Marginalization theory addressed the layer of the 
working population not utilized by monopoly capital, which was becoming domi-
nant from the 1960s onward. Thus we see a category of the poor not envisaged by 
Marx, a relative surplus population that is not functional (or may even be dysfunc-
tional) for the monopoly sector. The reason that it is not deemed to be functional 
is that it has no influence on the wages of the monopoly sector, whereas the classic 
reserve army of labor helped depress wages.
The positions of Nun were vigorously contested by a Brazilian think tank, the 
Brazilian Center of Analysis and Planning, with clear positions articulated by 
F. H. Cardoso and F. de Oliveira, in particular.14 For Cardoso, the phenomenon of 
combined and uneven development could explain the emergence of the marginal 
urban population, and there was no need to go beyond Marx’s original theory of 
relative surplus population and reserve army of labor. Oliveira’s “critique of dual-
ist reason” focused on the underlying dualism that Nun and Quijano shared with 
the modernization theorists. The activities of the so-called marginal sector were, 
in fact, both profitable and totally integrated into the overall pattern of capital 
accumulation. Small-scale commerce could facilitate the distribution of industrial 
goods, and the construction of informal settlements saved capital considerable 
costs. The dialectic of capital accumulation required the provision of labor and raw 
materials from the “backward” geographical areas and economic sectors.
The debate around marginality has continued sporadically, and its original pro-
tagonists came back to it at the end of the century.15 It was clear that the original 
polemic of Nun and Quijano had been addressed to the 1960s left, which saw the 
shantytown dwellers as a new revolutionary vanguard. The underlying and con-
tinued mission was to distinguish what was happening in Latin America from 
the wage-labor society as theorized by Castel, in which most workers are sala-
ried, there is full employment, and wage workers enjoy status, dignity, and social 
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protection.16 Latin America never shared this model, and even under ISI (and 
those countries where some form of welfarism was adopted) vast layers of the 
population fell outside of the capital/wage labor relation. The 1990s, indeed, saw 
a massive shift toward informal employment, which, to some degree, confirmed 
the original underlying message of the marginality thesis. The impact of structural 
heterogeneity, poverty, and social inequality in Latin America cannot be blamed 
on its victims (as the World Bank and the whole “poverty industry” still does) but 
requires objective and specific analysis, which the marginality writers at least tried 
to do.
Today we are clearly not just dealing with a debate that is of historical interest 
only. A symposium in 2004 entitled “From the Marginality of the 1960s to the ‘New 
Poverty’ of Today” argued that “there is now increasing evidence that although 
classical marginality may have lacked empirical veracity in its earliest iteration, 
changing economic conditions born out of the structural adjustment and auster-
ity of the 1980s, together with the neo-liberal restructuring of the 1990s, is today 
creating the very conditions and cultural constructions conceived and predicted 
by Nun, Quijano and Lewis in the 1960s.”17 Certainly rising unemployment, gener-
alized precarity of employment, privatization, and declining opportunities even in 
the informal sector had accentuated the phenomenon of marginality. What is dif-
ferent is a much more interventionist state in terms of social policies and a much 
greater degree of political participation than was possible in the conditions of the 
1960s.
What is most noticeable in the current literature on precarity and the precariat 
is that it is almost totally Global North–centric in its theoretical frames and its 
empirical reference points.18 There is a totally Global North sensibility at play here, 
it seems. In Guy Standing’s case, it is really just Britain in the 1950s that is the 
model of economic and political development that he has in mind. There is hardly 
a reference to any part of the world outside the North Atlantic, which is simply 
assumed as the center and the norm that will apply everywhere. There is little cog-
nizance that the type of work described by the term “precarity” has always been 
the norm in the Global South. In fact, it is Fordism and the welfare state that is the 
exception to the rule, from a global perspective. “Decent work,” as the ILO calls 
it—even though it is a rather dubious term—has never been the norm in the post-
colonial world. Rather, super-exploitation, accumulation through dispossession, 
and what might be called “permanent primitive accumulation” have by and large 
prevailed. From a Southern perspective, work has always-already been precarious, 
a basic fact that unsettles the notion that something new has been discovered. The 
genealogy of the concept of precarity and the precariat already shows its South-
ern origins, but this is never really acknowledged. While the precariat discourse 
exudes nostalgia for something that has been lost (the Keynesian/Fordist/welfare 
state), it does not speak to a South that never experienced welfare-state capitalism. 
The Southern experience of precarity is marked by the nature of the postcolonial 
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state and, later, by the developmental state, where this has emerged. The changing 
nature of work as a result of the erosion of the welfare state is but one modality 
of precarity, others have been in existence for a long time in the fraught relations 
between workers, capital, and the state.
THE LOST DECADE
Returning now to our narrative, we will recount how the national developmen-
tal period (1950–1970) was followed by the so-called lost decade of the 1980s and 
the advent of neoliberalism, which was to operate a second “great transformation” 
in relation to capital/wage labor relations. Import substitution industrialization 
had been waning since the mid-1960s, but by the mid-1970s it was clearly  failing 
as a hegemonic strategy, not least because of the changes then underway in the 
global economy. The horizontal expansion of capitalism had been achieved; now 
the vertical integration of capitalism was required. The “formal” subsumption of 
labor had been achieved; now what was required was the “real” subsumption of 
labor. The deepening of industrialization required greater labor discipline, and 
this gave rise to a series of emblematic military coups in Brazil (1964), Argentina 
(1976), and, in somewhat different circumstances, Chile (1973). The international-
ized sector of capitalism—now clearly dominant—had outgrown the quite basic 
inward-oriented growth model and was not too concerned with the potential loss 
of workers as national consumers, hitherto a major factor.
The new economic model was gradually realized across Latin America under 
the so-called Washington Consensus, with varying degrees of brutality. Under the 
Orwellian title “structural reforms,” these regimes implemented a coherent pro-
gram of trade liberalization, labor flexibilization, and widespread privatization, 
designed to increase the power of capital and atomize the organized labor move-
ment and social networks as a whole. As a systematic program of social transfor-
mation, dependent neoliberalism wielded considerable power to discipline society 
and the subaltern classes if they put up any resistance. The bottom line of the 
1980s “reforms” was quite blunt, as expressed by Sebastian Edwards, then Latin 
American head at the World Bank, who stated that “in order to take full advantage 
of the opportunities offered by the world economy, . . . countries need a lean and 
dynamic labor market. Companies should be able to adjust their payrolls quickly 
and at low cost. This means that employment laws should be flexible and the hir-
ing and dismissal costs should be kept as low as possible.”19 It is that subjection of 
labor that we now turn to.
During the 1980s, informal work and self-employment emerged as the domi-
nant form of labor exploitation in Latin America, going up from 30 percent to 40 
percent of total employment over the decade. Early definitions of informality, as 
used by the ILO, were not able to capture disguised forms of informality. Thus, in 
2002, this definition was changed, following arguments by Portes and Hoffman, 
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to embrace all workers not covered by social security.20 Informal work, along with 
“flexibility” in the formal sector, became the drive of a new period of capital accu-
mulation in Latin America that normalized what was before the exception to the 
rule. Organized labor was further marginalized after the politico-military attack 
it had undergone at the hand of the military regimes in the 1970s. According to 
Druck and Franco, in this period precarity as the dominant labor condition “takes 
on a central and strategic role in the logic of capitalist domination, ceasing to be 
something residual or peripheral [and becoming] institutionalized in all regions of 
the world,” not least in Latin America, we might add.21
The dominant theories of informality, even in the 1980s tended to view it as 
a counter-cyclical sector taking up the labor surplus shed by the formal sector 
during the decade’s regional crisis. In reality, we see how informality as a sector 
is linked closely to flexibilization in the formal workplace, which gives rise to 
what some authors have called a “new informality.”22 The informal sector does not 
exist as a separate sphere of refuge for those expelled from formal employment 
but is, rather, part of an integrated pattern of capital accumulation in dependent 
development. When we conceive of formal and informal elements as part of the 
same system, their dynamic becomes clearer. Thus we can see that the dramatic 
increase in subcontracting and outsourcing in the 1980s closely linked the formal 
and informal sectors. It is not that the formal economy is not able to absorb more 
workers—which the ECLA argued is the problem—but, rather, it is the dynamics 
of a system that creates increasing heterogeneity and informality as part of its con-
tinuous drive to maintain the subjection of workers and atomize their collective 
organizations.
At this point we need to clarify the definition and composition of the infor-
mal sector. Informal workers can be identified across a wide range of employment 
relationships, including own-account workers, subcontracted workers, casual day 
laborers, informal employees (of both formal and informal firms), and employer-
owners of informal firms and unpaid contributing family members. These are all 
types of workers without social security or any form of legal protection, whether 
they work in industry, agriculture, or the service sector. Whereas this informal 
sector steadily declined in the ISI period, it grew steadily under neoliberal adjust-
ment. To clarify what this meant on the ground, Portes and Hoffman have argued 
that “the informal proletariat is defined as the sum of own account [sic] work-
ers minus professionals and technicians, domestic servants, and paid and unpaid 
workers in microenterprises.”23 In some countries, it was own-account workers 
who increased in numbers when structural adjustment reduced the number of 
regular jobs, while in other cases, it was domestic service or microenterprises that 
grew in importance.
The so-called lost decade of the 1980s led to a huge increase in informal work 
in Latin America as the economic and debt crisis deepened. In the 1980s nine out 
of ten new jobs were in the informal sector, and by 1990 the ILO estimated that 40 
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percent of the economically active population was engaged in the informal sector.24 
Deregulation, privatization, and trade liberalization deepened the tendency toward 
informality. Remarkably—as it was against all the evidence—neoliberal economists 
still insisted that growth would resume once the earlier inflation had been con-
quered and that informality was but a temporary stage on the way to moderniza-
tion. In practice, labor “flexibility” was a key element in the neoliberal strategy, 
which took informality into the heart of the productive economy through a system-
atic policy of outsourcing. Legal restrictions on “atypical” contracts were removed; 
“standard” jobs were replaced by part-time work; subcontracting and other precar-
ious forms of employment proliferated; there were cuts to both wages and benefits 
such as social security contributions; and employer contributions to payroll taxes 
were severely cut back in the 1980s and 1990s, more or less across the region.
Given that this era was the high-water mark of neoliberalism in ideology as 
much as in practice, it is not surprising that a vigorous defense of informality 
was mounted. Hernando de Soto became globally influential when he general-
ized from the case of Peru to create the image of a dynamic and entrepreneurial 
informal sector.25 De Soto’s social-legal discourse focused on economic activities 
rather than individuals or households. He showed, with ample evidence, how the 
poor struggle to house and feed themselves and earn a living. This was a positive 
reading, showing how the poor could enhance a nation’s resources through their 
entrepreneurial skills. Their economic activities are only deemed illegal because of 
irrational government regulations on licensing and operational business laws. The 
solution was thus simple for De Soto: the unrelenting reduction of the role of the 
state through deregulation, de-bureaucratization, and privatization. That would 
lead to a win-win situation: better economic growth and enhanced social mobility 
for the poor. De Soto’s libertarian populism attracted many international follow-
ers, but in the Peru of the 1980s, it had little impact on either economic growth or 
social mobility for the poor.26 De Soto opened up an important debate but did not 
resolve the impasse of the ILO ideas and strategies.
During this neoliberal phase, there was a marked change in the gender compo-
sition of the informal sector. The ISI period was one that favored male employment 
in heavy industry and was based on the male-breadwinner model. Early studies 
of the urban informal sector did not disaggregate by gender and thus suffered in 
terms of precision and missed the impact on the changing gender division of labor. 
What emerged in the 1980s was a picture in which men were a majority working in 
the urban informal sector, but a higher proportion of women worked in the infor-
mal than in formal urban labor markets, thus shaping the majority experience of 
working women.27 Not surprisingly, in terms of comparative international experi-
ence, women in the same occupational category as men earn considerably less. 
This is based partly on segregation (women clustered in certain occupations) but 
also on direct ongoing discrimination, despite gender-equality legislation, which, 
anyway, does not reach into the informal sector.
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The gendered dimension of the economic restructuring characteristic of the 
1980s and 1990s was quite marked. Sylvia Chant points particularly to women’s 
disproportionate concentration in the informal sector leading to a fall in income 
and describes how the reduction in social services expenditure impacted women, 
particularly in relation to the household and childcare.28 So, while in theory, eco-
nomic development can enhance the position of women in the gendered divi-
sion of labor, that was not the case in Latin America during the neoliberal phase. 
Women’s participation in the workforce has increased steadily, from 18 percent in 
1950 to 26 percent in 1980, and in absolute numbers, the female labor force more 
than tripled during that period.29 This trend continued in the 1990s, with women’s 
share of employment reaching 36 percent by the turn of the century. But, over-
all, women earned nearly 40 percent less than men and were disproportionally 
affected by economic restructuring, informalization, and the growing precarity of 
employment.30
THE LEFT DECADE
The crumbling of the neoliberal accumulation regime was at first gradual but then 
quite sudden, when Argentina’s most orthodox model collapsed at the end of 2001. 
The illusion of the Washington Consensus as a viable development strategy had 
already begun to fade with so-called Tequila Crisis in Mexico in 1995.31 Even Sebas-
tian Edwards of the World Bank was admitting that while the region “had gone 
through a notable transformation, economic results were disappointing and the 
region’s social situation showed little signs of improvement.”32 Dependent neolib-
eralism had been based on a mirage that convinced many (across society) that it 
was the royal road to modernity or, more crudely, a belief that markets + torture = 
modernization. Open financial systems had not led to a more stable global order, 
rather, it had vastly increased instability and the propensity to crisis. This issue 
came to a head in 2001, when Argentina, which had followed the neoliberal recipe 
to the letter and even tied its currency to the U.S. dollar, simply collapsed, provid-
ing the first harbinger of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis.
The collapse of neoliberalism led, in an internationally quite unprecedented 
way, to the emergence of left-wing, or at least progressive and post-neoliberal, 
governments more or less across the region from 2000 onward. The end of neo-
liberalism occurred not only due to its own internal contradictions but also due 
to the capacity of the trade-union movement (and others as well) to resist attacks 
(especially in the workplace) and form alliances with populist and/or socialist 
movements. To varying degrees—and in quite different ways in each country—the 
labor movement played a role in creating the conditions for the new progressive 
governments. The question then arises as to whether these governments were able 
to address the issues of poverty and inequality. Specifically, we need to consider 
the extent to which labor regimes were reformed and whether informality was in 
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any way reversed. Clearly there were many constraints, not least the continued 
dependence on agro-mineral exports, sometimes referred to as the “new extrac-
tivism.” Nevertheless, this section shows that politics matter when it comes to the 
social question and that the advance to precarization is not inexorable or immune 
to political intervention.
Far too often, the debates on Latin American politics have downplayed the 
role of the labor and other social movements in the process of democratization 
and beyond. Indeed, most of the military dictatorships of the 1980s fell precisely 
because the trade-union movement had kept up resistance in the workplace, along 
with neighborhood associations, women’s groups, and new human rights orga-
nizations, which often had transnational links. Then, in terms of the rise of the 
left-wing governments after 2000, we need to factor in the growing importance 
of the labor movement in the 1990s. The progressive governments of the 2000s 
all signaled a widespread societal reaction against the free market policies of neo-
liberalism in classic Polanyian countermovement mode. They also, as Cook and 
Bazler argue, point toward the need to adopt a “labor lens [to] show that some left 
governments have jettisoned neoliberal ideas about unions. In the 1990s union 
power was seen as an obstacle to growth redistribution and investment. . . . In the 
2000s [these] governments rejected the notion of a necessary trade-off between 
union strength and economic health.”33 This was a fundamental shift in the domi-
nant discourse that would have massive social and political consequences.
There was, as would be expected, considerable variety across Latin America 
during the so-called left decade. For example, in Chile, while the centrist and pro-
gressive governments post-Pinochet increased social spending and expanded the 
social safety net, there was no decisive shift in terms of changes in labor law in the 
area of collective rights. In Uruguay, by contrast, the various left governments “had 
built up the unions’ organizational resources while doing little to limit their power, 
and they have done so in spite of employer opposition.”34 This led a renewed role 
for collective bargaining between labor and capital, with only a limited role for the 
state. Brazil stood somewhere in between, with some more restricted elements, 
while the role of the trade unions in forming the governing Workers’ Party gave it 
a certain degree of leverage. It is important to remember that the Workers’ Party 
governments that were in office from 2003 (and longer at regional level) to 2016 
were there as part of an unprecedented political project created by trade unions. In 
practice, these governments sought to accommodate the interests of capital—both 
domestic and foreign—while increasing social spending, raising the minimum 
wage, and shifting the balance from informal to formal employment.
Taking Argentina as an example, we can see in detail how path dependence 
and structural constraints regarding the social question can be altered by deci-
sive political intervention.35 We can recall that in the 1990s Argentina was consid-
ered the model neoliberal exemplar that should be emulated by the rest of Latin 
America. When the economy crashed at the end of 2001, this spelled the end of 
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neoliberal hegemony, some years before the Northern catastrophe of 2008–2009. 
What emerged, after a period of great political instability, was a left-nationalist 
regime under the Kirchners that, to some extent, looked back at the ISI period for 
the inspiration. An outward-oriented growth model was moderated by a much 
greater orientation toward the internal market. A new labor regime began to cut 
down on the proportion of precarious jobs versus stable jobs. There was also a 
much stronger commitment to an inclusive social policy, which began to rapidly 
reduce the poverty and unemployment generated by the 2001–2002 economic col-
lapse. A new decade opened up with nearly 10 percent annual growth rates, which 
addressed the “social debt” as a priority over the foreign debt.
The basic fact in Argentina’s decisive and rapid shift away from neoliberal-
ism toward a more inclusive social model was the proportion in the number of 
those registered under state security versus unregistered workers. While in 2004 
the difference between the two categories was barely 200,000, by 2007 there were 
2,000,000 more registered than unregistered workers: the first had gone up by 1.25 
million while the latter had decreased by 0.5 million.36 The previous labor regime 
characterized by precarization had been replaced by one characterized by social 
protection and the legal registration of employment. Where in the past the market 
ruled supreme, now the state took on a strongly regulatory role. Both employed 
and unemployed workers’ associations were active players in this process whereby 
society seeks to protect itself from the free market, as Polanyi had predicted. In 
many ways acting as a model for the ECLA’s strategy of “growth with equity,” this 
model created a virtuous circle from employment to consumption to productive 
investment and back to employment. This had a tangible effect on the workplace—
both formal and informal—and in the working-class household.
Conventionally an indicator of labor’s ability to constrain the free operation 
of capital has been union density, that is, the percentage of the workforce covered 
by trade unions. Much is made of declining union density globally and in most of 
the North during the neoliberal era. While reliable data is hand to come by, there 
is enough household-sample-survey and other data for some countries to give us 
a general picture. In Argentina, male union membership in manufacturing stood 
at 50 percent in 2000, compared to 30 percent for women. In the public sector, 
unionization rates in Argentina were around 65 percent. In Brazil, union member-
ship increased after 2000 to reach 30 percent across the formal private and public 
sectors, with male and female unionization rates being more or less similar. In 
Mexico, overall unionization fell in the 1990s, but there was a lot of variation, 75 
percent coverage in education, but manufacturing dropping from 45 percent to 
34 percent in 2000, and clerical workers going from 30 percent to 22 percent over 
the same period.37 Overall, union density is moderately high by international stan-
dards, albeit with significant variations across countries and time.
Across Latin America there are many examples of the left turn impacting the 
tendency toward informalization and precarization. To “organize the unorganized” 
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has always been a challenge for the trade-union movement, as these workers are 
less accessible, and they do not fit into standard industrial-relations bargaining 
structures. It is not always clear who the bargaining counterpart is when neither 
the state nor a capitalist employer is present. Yet the unions do recognize that 
they need to reach beyond the standard workplace if the working classes are to 
exercise their full potential power. Thus, in 1992, the powerful Central Worker’s 
Union (CUT—Central Unica dos Trabalhadores) in Brazil sponsored the forma-
tion of the Informal Economy Workers’ Syndicate (SINTEIN—Sindicato dos Tra-
balhadores na Economía Informal), which took up issues around micro-credit and 
entrepreneurship supported by the Ministry of Labor’s Solidarity Economy Board. 
It also promoted the formation of cooperatives that would strengthen the sector 
in bargaining with wholesale dealers. A wide range of organizations—some more 
durable than others—have been formed by informal workers and street traders in 
Brazil and elsewhere.
In Argentina we have also seen a range of cross-sectoral labor organizations 
emerging, especially since the collapse of the economy in 2001. For a period of 
time, a retreat to a barter economy led to a flourishing of local community orga-
nizing, often led by the trade unions. The newly created layers of unemployed—
often including impoverished middle-class and white-collar sectors—began to 
organize in a very militant way, creating the piquetero (picket) movement. This 
operated not only in the cities but also in rural areas, where there was a history of 
rural cooperatives. Eventually this wider working-class organizing initiative was 
defused by the left populist governments of the Kirchners, backed by the big trade-
union leaders. Nor was it absent of contradictions, such as the mass mobilization 
of the Argentinian Building Workers Union (UOCRA—Unión Obrera de la Con-
strucción de la República Argentina) in early 2002 against the presence of building 
workers from neighboring Bolivia and Paraguay, in a clear breach of commitments 
toward regional solidarity given in the past.
MAT TERS ARISING
There is clearly a broad research and policy agenda emerging out of our summary 
consideration of the labor question in Latin America today, in the past, and in 
the future. It needs to be integrated, I would argue, into the broader review of the 
social question at a global level to the mutual benefit of both problematics. At a 
structural level, we need to recognize the dependent nature of capitalist develop-
ment in Latin America and the impact this has had on the capital/wage labor rela-
tion. In particular, the salience of the national-popular, which cannot be reduced 
to facile accusations of “populism,” needs to be recognized. It is also clear from 
the Latin American case study that we cannot reduce the scales of human activity 
to the global and the local domains and that we need to constantly think in terms 
of the national and regional. We have found that social or analytical categories 
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developed in Europe or North America cannot be imposed on a recalcitrant subal-
tern reality. Above all, agency is crucial to any consideration of the social question 
and politics matters, to put it bluntly.
It would seem prudent, given the conventional inflation (and dubious politics) 
of the term precariat, to return to the focus on travail précaire as highlighted by 
Robert Castel in his influential treatment of the social question.38 Precarious forms 
of work and precarious modalities of employment were on the rise as the Ford-
ist social regime of accumulation began to lose its hegemony from 1970 onward 
(at least in the North). Employment norms were being eroded from within, and 
various forms of “nonstandard” working relations were coming to the fore. Pre-
carity was probably more of a descriptive than an analytical category, and it was 
not regarded as a particularly new or self-contained category. Castel, in particular, 
placed his emphasis on travail précaire, not on precarity in general, and its erosion 
of the centrality of the wage relationship in the making of capitalist society. In the 
Global South, work was always-already precarious, and the wage relation was not 
the core element in the making of dependent capitalist countries. We should bear 
in mind, finally, Castel’s statement that “There is a risk of confusing a phenomenon 
that has become more visible with a new phenomenon, or of believing that start-
ing to assess how many people are affected by a problem marks the appearance of 
a new problem.”39
In terms of the more specific current debates on the politics of labor precarity, 
we also have rich empirical material to consider above. In conceptual terms, we 
might usefully revisit the earlier Latin American debates on marginality that have 
somehow been airbrushed out of “global” accounts of informality. A broader issue 
is the problem caused by any attempt to think in terms of “standard” or normal 
wage relations, against which the real world is found wanting. While the discourse 
on labor formalization is a progressive one, there is the danger that supports a 
mythical non-precarious form of “decent work” that never existed in most of the 
world. The dichotomy between stable/protected versus precarious/vulnerable 
employment tends to defuse the inherently exploitative nature of capitalism. In 
conclusion, precarity denotes and highlights the divisive nature of capitalism and 
points to the need for broad economic, political, and social reforms that might 
reintroduce a degree of social control over capitalism and an unregulated market.
We might also consider what we mean by placing the social question at the 
“global level.” This is not simply a question of scaling up a traditional European 
concern, insofar as the standard employment relationship—as deployed by the 
ILO and others—has never prevailed globally and only made its mark for a short 
period of time and in a limited sphere of the world. For the so-called majority 
world, capitalism was imposed from the outside, and its development remained 
dependent on the rhythms of development in the advanced industrial countries. 
The social question was deemed a “police matter” for a whole historical period, 
and the notion of welfarism or co-option of labor were absent concepts. In the last 
the labor question, dependent capitalism    131
fifty years, however, labor has come to the fore in the majority world with massive 
industrialization producing a Marxist working class in the classic sense. In that 
sense, we do now have a “global social question,” where the workers of the world 
are subject to similar regimes of accumulation and have common interests as they 
did at the time of the First International.
In Latin America, one of the main matters arising is the future role of social 
policy in regards to the labor question.40 Historically, if we go back to the national-
popular state period, we find around two-thirds of the working population cov-
ered by national insurance, bearing in mind that the early Latin American welfare 
state was based on Bismark’s nineteenth-century European model. The neoliberal 
period changed all that, as did the rise of informality from the 1970s onward, so 
that only a minority of the working population was covered by national insurance. 
What we saw in the post-neoliberal period was the rise of the conditional cash 
transfers model that became the main support for nearly a quarter of the poor, 
providing a conditional safety net while still supporting the free market model. 
Latin America has always had a truncated welfare state, and the prevalence of 
informal work beyond labor institutions is becoming a pressing problem. While 
formal workers have minimal coverage, the growing informal sector does not, and 
conditional cash transfers are a palliative, at most. What we now see emerging is 
a gradual recognition that this welfare apartheid is not sustainable, and various 
extensions of welfare are being trialed. Whereas in the national state era workers’ 
needs in relation to housing, health’ and transport were recognized, since the neo-
liberal revolution, that was not the case, while at the same time, informality/mar-
ginality became the norm. The formalization of labor relations and the extension 
of social protection (and, of course, poverty reduction) are now key issues on the 
agenda. Poor workers need better jobs, but they also need unemployment, health, 
disability, retirement, and other forms of insurance. That is a political battle in a 
region where tax avoidance is rampant, and one the organizations of labor need to 
play a leading role in.
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Labor and Land Struggles in a  Brazilian 
Steel Town
The Reorganization of  Capital under Neo-Extractivism
Massimiliano Mollona
INTRODUCTION
When I started my fieldwork, in 2008, Brazil was the world’s success story. In the 
midst of global recession, the country was growing at a rate of 8 percent, the real 
currency was getting stronger, and there was a self-proclaimed communist party 
in power led by an ex-metalworker from the poor northeast. But for more than 
three years now, Brazil’s economy has receded, public debt and inflation are hik-
ing, the value of the real is collapsing, and the country’s investment status has been 
demoted to junk. The economic crisis sparked a political upheaval. In September 
2016, President Rousseff was impeached, ending thirteen years of the Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (PT—Workers’ Party) in government. The impeachment came after 
the investigation called “Car Wash” (Lava Jato) showed that top echelons of the PT, 
including the party treasury and the president of the lower house, were involved in 
a massive corruption scheme by Petrobras—Brazil’s mighty state-run oil company, 
the fifth biggest oil producer in the world.
Soon after being elected president in 2003, Ignazio Lula da Silva, the former 
leader of the metalworkers’ union, set up the massive program of poverty reduc-
tion, Bolsa Familia, which today reaches thirteen million families—one-quarter 
of the national population. As a result of the Bolsa Familia, the percentage of the 
population living below the poverty line decreased from 36 percent in 2003 to 23 
percent in 2008. But in the second mandate, Lula cut welfare expenses and deregu-
lated the labor market, which radically increased casualized work. The casualiza-
tion of precarious sections of the working class went hand in hand with pro-labor 
policies, particularly the indexing of the minimum wage at inflation, plus GDP 
growth recorded two years previously. Seeing their nominal wages increase, 
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wage earners turned to debt to finance their consumption. The radical austerity 
measures of Dilma put an end to Lula’s pro-labor trend. Advised by Minister of 
Finance Joaquim Levy, a Chicago-trained economist, Rousseff radically cut social 
spending and credit, privatized state assets, and put together the proposal for Lei 
4330, which, if approved, will radically deregulate Brazil’s labor-relations system. 
According to Perry Anderson, the PT’s sudden fall from grace is due to the elector-
ate feeling “cheated” by Dilma suddenly embracing right-wing austerity policies.1
The cracks started to show in June 2013, when a small gathering against a rise in 
the cost of public transport in two weeks spread to four hundred cities and town, 
bringing millions of people in the streets and forcing president Rousseff to start a 
process of constitutional reform. The demonstrators opposed the violent reloca-
tions of favelas, increases in transport fares, the privatization of public utilities, 
and the proposed Lei 4330 that the government had set in motion in preparation 
for the World Cup and Olympic Games. This demonstration was, according to 
Göran Therborn, a “movement of movements” and a cross-sectional coalition that 
challenged the Eurocentric model of socialism premised upon the assumption of 
the vanguard of the industrial working class.2
In this chapter I present an ethnography of the Companhia Siderúrgica do 
Brasil (CSB—Brazilian Steel Company), a multinational Brazilian steel company 
based in Volta Grande, a steel town in the state of Rio de Janeiro. The chapter 
shows a structural coupling between Brazil’s neo-extractivist model—a mixture of 
financialization, labor deregulation, and extractivism—and the strategies of accu-
mulation by dispossession by the CSB based on rent seeking, commodity export, 
and open conflict with the local community. Brazilian neo-extractivism is the con-
sequence of the wider “internalization of imperialism”3 by the Lula administration 
and the transformation of the Brazilian state from developer to financial investor.4 
In this chapter I show how the state-driven financialization of the economy impacts 
the shop floor in terms of labor deskilling and intensification and on working-
class debt and conspicuous consumption. I particularly look at the impact of neo-
etxractivism on three sections of the working class. In 2008, at the beginning of my 
fieldwork, most wage earners of the CSB considered themselves as middle-class 
“class C.” Today, they struggle with unemployment, debts, and mortgage defaults. 
Another section of the working class, informal and tertiarized workers in the ser-
vice and building industries, face a similarly harsh employer—the municipality 
of Volta Grande, which exploits their labor in the desperate attempt to develop a 
new economy, independent from the CSB and based on service and tourism. A 
third section of the working class, subcontractors and car workers, are faring bet-
ter, thanks to their militant struggles against labor deregulation and their regional 
alliances with municipalities and local businesses. The trade union’s factory-based 
struggles, the land activism of the civic coalition, and the legal and business activ-
ism of the new working class are different strategies of labor struggle happen-
ing at different state levels and reflecting historically and geographically diverse 
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trajectories of capitalist development. Thus, this chapter witnesses the resilience of 
the Brazilian working class in the context of an epochal shift in national  politics—
that is, the collapse of the Workers’ Party and of its model of state capitalism.
SUB C ONTR ACTORS ON STRIKE
In 2005 subcontracted maintenance workers led three major strikes that paralyzed 
the city of Volta Grande. They were striking against their employers and the steel-
maker Companhia Siderúrgica do Brasil, which they held jointly responsible for 
their decreasing wages5 and benefits;6 inhuman working conditions, such as lack 
of air conditioning or fresh water; and stigmatization by direct workers. In that 
year, outsourced workers continued to lead strikes, slow-downs, and sabotages. 
In response, the CSB backsourced several maintenance jobs, starting a trend of 
re-internalization that continues today. The trajectory of subcontracted workers 
that I describe in this chapter goes against standard narratives of class struggle 
and flexible capitalism. In fact, the resurgence of working-class activism in Volta 
Grande came by the hands of outsourced workers, notoriously the weakest link of 
the labor movement. How did such a traditionally unskilled and politically frag-
mented section of the working class become the political vanguard of the labor 
movement, overshadowing even the leadership of the PT?
The CSB is the biggest steel complex in Latin America, located in Volta Grande, 
a steel town in the middle of a dilapidated coffee valley. The company was built in 
1946 by the dictator Getúlio Vargas with American technology and money. It was 
the core of Vargas’s developmental dream to turn Brazil into a modern industrial-
ized country. As a state-owned enterprise, the CSB was under a mixed economy 
and run by generals, military personnel, and highly educated civil servants until 
1992, when it was privatized. The new owner, a textile magnate from São Paulo 
with no experience in steel making, cut the workforce by two-thirds and turned 
the company into a conglomerate with diversified businesses including mining, 
logistics, and finance. Moreover, privatization turned the state into major stock-
holder of the CSB through direct and indirect shares controlled by public pension 
funds and the National Economic and Social Development Bank (Banco Nacional 
de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social—BNDES). From the 85 thousand tons 
of crude steel produced in 1946, the plant currently produces 4.8 millions tons 
of crude steel and 4.7 tons of laminated steel. It employs 12,000 direct and 5,000 
tertiarized workers. Overall, the CSB employs 22,000 direct workers and 17,000 
subcontractors and is the largest fully integrated steel producer in Latin America. 
During the recent economic crisis, the company’s profits continued to be driven 
by sales in crude steel fed by the government’s Growth Acceleration Programs 
(Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento—PAC), which boosted the national 
construction and housing sectors. But a third of the company’s profits came from 
its iron ore business, reflecting Brazil’s extractivist model. After the impeachment 
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of president Rousseff in 2016, PACs were suspended, and foreign carmakers fled 
the region, and China’s economic slowdown, the main importer of CSB’s iron ore, 
hit the company hard. Like many steelmakers in the Global South, the company 
is locked in a position of financial weakness and of “dependent development.” Its 
low-value and highly polluting crude steel and tin plates production and com-
modity exports can hardly compete with the high-value special steel production 
for the automotive and aerospace sectors, dominated by EU and U.S. steelmak-
ers. In addition to their more advanced technology, these steelmakers are backed 
by strong nation-states in terms of antidumping and labor deregulation.7 Below I 
describe how labor law, a force emanating from Brazil’s developmental state, blurs 
the boundaries between wage labor, subcontracting, and informal and cooperative 
labor and affects the workers’ insurgent strategies and identities.
STATES OF L AB OR
One way in which the Brazilian state has a major influence on the economy is 
through its labor legislation. The Labor Code (CLT) was created by the Vargas’s 
Labor Ministry in 1943 and continues to be one of the most comprehensive labor 
legislations in the world. Among other things, the CLT establishes the right to 
a minimum wage, vacation, leave, professional training, housing, pensions, and 
child benefits, and it regulates trade-union affiliation, training, and education. The 
code made unionization de facto compulsory by establishing that only unionized 
workers were eligible for social benefits and nominated workers’ representatives 
in charge of collecting trade union dues on behalf of the state. Compulsory union 
contribution is still in place. In the same year, Vargas’s constitutional assembly 
created the Brazilian Workers Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro—PTB), the 
biggest workers’ party in Latin America. The CLT’s generous social benefits were 
given based on the workers’ affiliation to state-controlled trade unions and the 
PDT, rather than on their demands. Hence, sociologist De Castro Gomes describes 
the Estado Novo as an “occupational welfare state” where the working class gained 
political emancipation through concessions from above,8 rather than from grass-
roots activism. Unlike her, French argues that the CLT empowered the working 
class by creating a new legal framework through which it articulated its struggles.9 
The metalworkers’ union (SMSF) won the right to paid overtime and night shifts, 
and recreation and health and safety provisions10 through legal challenges to the 
CSB and the Employer Federation rather than by top-down concessions. In Bra-
zil, working-class formation diverges from the master narrative of working-class 
emancipation crafted on nineteenth-century England and based on the opposition 
between class struggles and identity struggles.11 Unlike nineteen-century capital-
ist England, Brazil was traditionally a mixed economy based on a labor regime 
that mixed slavery and wage labor and where struggles for civic emancipation 
and struggles for economic redistribution always went hand in hand. Labor rights 
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were heavily cut by president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who was determined 
to break the power of trade unions, deregulate the labor market, and “put an end 
to the era of Vargas.” When Lula da Silva was elected president, he passed Amend-
ment 45 to extend the labor law to informal labor, which had peaked during Car-
doso’s presidency.
I have argued above that during the second mandate, Lula cut welfare expenses 
and deregulated the labor market. A full 94 percent of the jobs created during the 
Lula and Rousseff administrations are low income (1.5 times below the minimum 
wage)12 and in non-industrial sectors, such as clerks, construction work, transport 
and general service;13 60 percent of these involve young people,14 mainly women 
and ethnic minorities. So in the national context of decreasing levels of inequal-
ity, labor incomes are slowly converging toward a median just above the poverty 
line. This convergence creates political instability, because people on the same 
income level come from radically different backgrounds: upwardly mobile poor 
and downwardly mobile casualized workers. Moreover, low-income and casual-
ized labor, as well as informal and unremunerated work, currently make up 38 per-
cent of the labor market. But the Brazilian labor law is heavily focused on formal 
employment. Below I discuss how subcontracting blurs the labor forms of wage-
work, informal work, and entrepreneurship—and in so doing, along with creating 
exploitation, it opens new forms of workers’ resistance.
OUT SOURCING IN BR AZIL
Broadly speaking, there are two models of externalization of labor: subcontract-
ing and outsourcing. Subcontracting refers to the practice of hiring an outside 
company or provider to perform specific parts of a business contract or project, 
and the work done by subcontractors is normally temporary. Outsourcing gener-
ally refers to processes that could be performed by a company’s internal staff but 
which are contracted to outside providers working independently. For example, 
contracting an outside provider to manage internal technology. This model of 
externalization of non-core economic activities is normally associated with short-
term cost-cutting, radical reorganizations (from vertical to horizontal structures) 
and changes in work relations (from wage contract to market exchange).
In Brazil the situation is complicated even more by the way labor informal-
ization tends to blur with outsourcing and subcontracting. But, in fact, these are 
different economic practices. Informalization is a process of marginalization of 
laborers from the formal workforce, which, in Brazil, emerged with “dependent” 
industrialization from the 1940s onward. By contrast, subcontracting is a symmet-
rical transaction, and outsourcing is a form of precarization of the formal work-
force—a more recent phenomenon concentrated in the service and IT  sectors, 
mainly dominated by foreign corporations.
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There are different kinds of outsourcing, entailing different degrees of vulner-
ability and precariousness. Contracts between workers and subcontractors can be 
permanent or temporary. Outsourced workers who are permanently employed 
experience a contradiction: while their contract with outsourced firms is per-
manent and stable, the contract between their employers and the main firm is 
temporary; it typically lasts between one and four years. Besides, the relation-
ship between the main contractor and outsourced workers can be formal or 
informal. In Brazil, there are various forms of outsourcing: hiring autonomous 
workers for domestic work; subcontracting companies for supplying products, 
pieces, or machinery; subcontracting auxiliary and support services to specialized 
companies;  subcontracting services within the central production area to auton-
omous  professionals; and subcontracting to subcontractors (quarterization— 
quarterização) or cooperatives.
Subcontracting: Main contractor → subcontractor
Tertiarization: Main contractor → external company
Quarterization: Main contractor → external company → subcontractor
It must be stressed that, as yet, there is no law on subcontracting in Brazil. The 
main regulation on subcontracted work is Article 331 of the Labor Tribunal (now 
incorporated into the Labor Code), which establishes two principles. First, that 
the contract of outsourcing takes place between two employers (the contractor 
and the subcontractor) and not between employer and employee (the contractor 
and the subcontracted workers). Unlike direct workers, outsourced workers are 
not legally subordinated, and, hence, they are “juridical persons” with only civic 
rights. For instance, in case of their employers’ bankruptcy, they have the right 
to their outstanding wages and pensions. Thus, subcontracting establishes a state 
of exception within labor law, which is active only within hierarchical relations. 
Secondly, the article establishes that the externalization of core (“end”) activities 
is illegal, whereas it legalizes the externalization of marginal (“means”) activities. 
This distinction between core and marginal activities, inherited from the corpo-
rate world, is easy to circumvent.15 For instance, the CSB currently uses contract 
workers for the core maintenance operations of waste extraction, cleaning, and 
sealing the pig iron channels and the furnace—which were previously performed 
by internal workers—after the reclassification of those tasks as “not core.” Article 
331 had the merit to reduce the illegal and informal subcontracting of cleaners, 
maintenance workers and builders that spread in Brazil in the late 1980s. On the 
other hand, the legalization of outsourcing led to an intensification of tertiariza-
tion from the late 1990s onward.16
The issue of subcontracted work was one of the triggers of the public’s moral 
outrage against Rousseff. Her proposed Law 4330, if passed, will allow firms to 
outsource their core activities and to operate without full-time and permanent 
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workers. The model of the “ghost factory” adopted by some global carmakers in 
the region, where all core operations are outsourced, which I describe below, may 
become the norm. Outsourcing is a global phenomenon. It follows the flows of 
global finance and the patterns of commodity chains, overflowing the boundar-
ies of nations and cultures. Yet the centrality of the legal system in Brazil and the 
rapidity through which it adapts to new capital reconfigurations and shapes new 
labor struggles is worth investigating.
OUT SOURCING IN THE CSB
This chapter focuses on outsourced maintenance workers with permanent con-
tracts. These workers are based at the CSB, are formally registered (and hence, 
unlike informal workers, are covered by the Labor Law), and perform skilled tasks 
such as mechanical and electric repairs, welding, and refractory work. In this sec-
tion, I show that the company embraced labor outsourcing during privatization in 
order to purge the militant and skilled workforce but that, as a consequence of the 
measure, the company became heavily dependent on outsourced labor. Thus, this 
section shows that in specific circumstances, outsourcing can increase the bargain-
ing power of labor. Since the beginning, the CSB resorted to various forms of legal 
and illegal outsourcing, especially of cleaners and builders. In the late 1980s, when 
Brazil returned to democracy, the company started to extensively outsource main-
tenance workers into a separate unit (FEM), a subsidiary of the main company.
The privatization of the CSB totally restructured the company. First went the 
many unskilled builders, carpenters, and bricklayers, who had been employed 
during the recent expansion of the firm, also called “Plan D.” Then, more than half 
of the maintenance workforce and engineers, the firm’s most militant section, were 
outsourced and dispersed into several external, outsourced firms. This mass out-
sourcing was made possible by Article 311, which was approved only a few months 
after the CSB was privatized. Outsourcing of maintenance jobs took a pyramidal 
form. The CSB outsourced, via FEM, to a “smaller FEM”—feinha.17 The feinha, 
in turn, outsourced to smaller subcontractors—a structure called quinterização 
(quinterization). The FEM maintained only the functions of supervision and cost 
accounting. The few maintenance workers who stayed in the FEM were deskilled 
and turned into line managers in charge of supervising a vast and often under-
qualified external workforce. For instance, in the coke oven, there were more than 
two hundred outsourced maintenance workers. Initially, outsourced workers lost 
all their labor rights and pensions and suffered a radical deterioration of their 
working condition and status. In 2002 the FEM was closed, and all maintenance 
operations were outsourced to two multinational firms—the Italian Comau and 
the Japanese Sankyu.
The CSB kept only the functions of supervision, marketing, distribution, 
and extraordinary maintenance, led by a small team of maintenance workers. 
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Subcontracted workers gained permanent positions, but their wages and work-
ing conditions worsened further. Permanent maintenance workers would describe 
outsourced workers as a “subrace,” but, in fact, these very permanent workers were 
being deskilled by a managerial system, SIGMA, that standardized maintenance 
and embedded supervisory control into the line. This standardized maintenance 
system was extremely distressing for line operators. For instance, Nené, a mill 
operator, claimed, “This continuous attention to mechanical breakdowns is emo-
tionally draining. Two years ago, the ‘old guy’ [the billet mill] broke down while 
I was in the control cabin. It was a traumatic experience. I felt guilty and anxious 
about the financial implications of my actions, about my own life, and about the 
future of the company. For long time I felt that my whole body was paralyzed 
too. . . . I lived in a state of suspension.”
One of the effects of the financialization of the economy is that financial returns 
become more important than industrial profits in the strategic decisions of com-
panies. The SIGMA system actualized the financial logic onto the shop floor by 
establishing a regime in which preventing depreciation (that is, of the value of 
assets) is more important than increasing productivity.
Besides, the state privatized the company right after it completed Plan D, which 
brought a new furnace and oxygen shop and two laminating mills on the shop 
floor, boosting the production capacity of the plant from one million tons to 
nearly five million tons. The workers remember Plan D as the company’s golden 
age, which attracted skilled workers from all over Brazil and turned Volta Grande 
into a world-leading steel-making center. But they also remember that period as 
the dark era of privatization. Many “second-generation” workers, hired during 
the firm’s expansion, were traumatized by witnessing the mass redundancies of 
colleagues, friends, and relatives. A big portion of the employees who had been 
made redundant, especially black and female labor, ended up in the informal and 
domestic labor market. Indeed, for many workers, it was difficult to understand 
what was really going on during privatization. The general feeling was that the 
firm was making new investments and expanding production capacity rather than 
cutting costs.
The SIGMA system had a catastrophic impact especially on the smelting shop 
(AF), where a third of the workforce was cut. Today, half of AF’s seven hundred 
employees are subcontractors. In the AF, subcontractors have the harshest jobs, 
such as putting the molds on the furnace door or breaking the molds of slabs. 
But the working conditions and rights of permanent workers are often worse than 
those of the contractors. For instance, during the crisis of 2009, all the workers of 
the AF2 were immediately laid off for three months, and only some of them were 
reemployed when the crisis was over. For a long time, confusion reigned. Many 
permanent employees end up as contractors, and contractors were hired perma-
nently. But on the whole, the company made a dramatic turnaround and from a 
net loss of US$749 million in 1990 went to a net profit of US$110 million in 1995. It 
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was easy for workers to buy in to the management’s narrative that these improve-
ments were the result of labor cuts rather than of the investments that preceded 
them. Some workers’ narratives reflect this cognitive dissonance between cuts and 
expansion. For instance, Bobo, a top manager, got his job at the CSB three days 
before the general strike of 1988. When the strike paralyzed the factory, all con-
tracts were frozen, including his. Bobo was officially registered on the working 
card only one year into his job. A few years later, seeing the workforce being cut 
from twenty-two thousand to fourteen thousand during privatization was another 
life-changing event:
Privatization came as a shock. Volta Grande entered in a state of collective hysteria. 
Initially I was worried too, but then the SIGMA system totally changed me. First, 
it made me appreciate the importance of money in my life—monetary losses of 
faulty set-ups, monetary gains of preventive operations, monetary cost of deprecia-
tion. Then, I had an epiphany: privatization had made employees more vulnerable 
as workers but more powerful as investors. I bought company shares and invested in 
the pension scheme. Now I think about myself in terms of ownership—ownership 
over my life—rather than in terms of my wage. The state and the company do not 
own me anymore, I am the sole responsible for my pensions, housing, and education. 
If this is capitalism, then, I am a capitalist.
Second-generation permanent workers like Bobo accepted privatization from a 
position of weakness and uncertainty. They were experiencing a historical trans-
formation, comparable to some post-socialism transitions—from dictatorship to 
democracy and from mixed economy to capitalism, which they did not under-
stand. They were in between classes and generations. Neither skilled and political 
connected like the older generation nor formally educated and pragmatic like 
the younger one; neither opposing capitalism, like the former, nor endorsing 
it, like the younger “wage hunters.” During my fieldwork, I was always struck 
by their docility vis-à-vis the management and their lack of identification with 
their job, reflected in the way they talked about themselves as “passers-by” or a 
“fleeting workforce” and as arigos (migratory birds), even if they had permanent 
contracts.
In contrast to them, the tertiarized maintenance workers of the CSB have a 
strong occupational identity and are politically militant. From 2005, for three con-
secutive years, they confronted the CSB with strikes, slow-downs, sabotage, and 
absenteeism. Many of them were dismissed and blacklisted. In 2007 direct workers 
agreed to support the outsourced workers’ demands for higher wages and better 
working conditions by halting the production line with them for one day. But at 
the last minute, they pulled out. As result of their activism, the contract workers’ 
wages grew more rapidly than those of direct workers. In fact, the salary level estab-
lished in collective agreements for outsourced workers became the benchmark for 
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qualified direct workers too, which meant that they were on the same wage level 
of skilled engineers and technicians. Having won the right to have their collective 
negotiations jointly with those of direct workers, their company-related health and 
pensions plans, participation to profits, monthly food provisions, and salary levels 
were nearly in line with those of direct workers. Their health and safety standards 
and working environment improved radically. Moreover, maintenance workers 
were in high demand by the global carmakers and steel companies that had just 
moved to the region.
As for the China sunset workers described by Lee, the main “insurgent iden-
tity” of maintenance workers was their citizens’ right to legal justice sustained 
by a recent change in labor law, which was achieved through the activism of 
left-wing judges and lawyers.18 Going against the logic of Article 331, the new 
law established the principle of “subsidiary responsibility,” which made the 
main contractors jointly responsible with their subcontractors on accidents and 
underpayment of wages and benefits to their employees. But, political and legal 
activism aside, outsourced maintenance workers won these important conces-
sions because they were the only one left in the CSB who could run the company. 
When the SIGMA system was introduced, engineers and skilled maintenance 
workers were laid off, entirely wiping out the internal memory and knowledge of 
the technical system. The few internal engineers and maintenance workers left 
were turned into cost accountants and supervisors. But in order for the plant to 
run smoothly, the management needs experienced maintenance employees. The 
company is now dependent on those outsourced maintenance workers, often ex-
CSB workers who have this knowledge. In fact, it continues to renew contracts 
with the same maintenance firms in the hope of winning the trust of its skilled 
ex-employees. Every day, gangs of subcontracted builders, mechanics, and elec-
tricians enter the shop floor, commending both respect and resentment from the 
direct workforce. Some small subcontractors have worked in the CSB for decades 
and are considered quasi-employees. Some are ex-CSB maintenance workers 
who set up their own business and now have higher remunerations and better 
working conditions that the internal workers. Both internal subcontractors and 
independent firms are expensive to monitor. So it is not surprising that in 2007 
the CSB started a process of re-internalization (back-sourcing) of maintenance 
workers, as well of security and transportation workers, in the newly created 
General Maintenance Unit (GMU).19 In 2010 the CSB back-sourced two-thirds 
of the maintenance workers previously employed by its main subcontractor, 
COMAU. Maintenance workers “changed their shirts back again.” Direct work-
ers cost about 150 percent to 200 percent more than outsourced workers, but 
they come with lower political risks. Outsourced workers are conscious of their 
power and knowledge vis-à-vis the company and can hit it hard through strikes, 
slowdowns, and absenteeism.
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OTHER FORMS OF TERTIARIZ ATION
In the meantime, the global carmakers Peugeot and Volkswagen (VW) had moved 
to the region, lured by the tax exemptions, free land, and cheap labor offered 
by cash-stripped municipalities. These global carmakers work with a model 
of extreme outsourcing. The most extreme version is VW’s “dream factory” in 
Resende, which is totally tertiarized. This so-called factory of the future pushes 
the Japanese lean model to its extremes. Unlike the traditional Japanese model, in 
which core activities are internalized, in the dream factory, all operations—both 
direct, such as production and assembly, and indirect, such as cleaning, transport, 
food, health service, data processing and logistics—are externalized to indepen-
dent subcontractors operating in situ. The only core functions retained by VW 
are brand development and quality control. Essentially, the firm is like a mer-
chant capitalist operating through a spatially concentrated putting-out network. 
The dream factory is both a market and a firm. But this extreme marketization is 
disguised by the fact that the subcontractors are under the same roof and share 
the same human resources management and VW overall—although with a fine-
printed logo of their company on the front. As I mentioned earlier, this total sub-
contracting is against Article 331.
In 1996, when the factory opened, of a total of 1,500 workers, 1,300 were sub-
contracted. The situation was complicated further in 2007, when the German 
MAN-AG bought the factory and logistical operations were externalized to a 
separate firm located to the rear of the firm, adding a third level of subcontract-
ing. The employer agreed that negotiations with all subcontractors (previously 
held separately) should be held in the same collective negotiations between the 
VW and the metalworkers’ trade union (SMSF). But tertiarized ancillary work-
ers (such as cleaners and transport workers, who represent more than half of the 
total workforce) and externalized logistical workers are not represented in fac-
tory councils (FC) or in collective negotiations. The “new class”20 of car-workers 
is radically different from the steel workers. The majority of subcontracted car-
workers are young, well educated, relatively well off, non-unionized, and loyal to 
their employer and their “brand”—with whom they develop trusting and long-
term relationships. In 2012 50 percent of the factory’s total workforce (6,000 
workers) was subcontracted. For the VW management, brand management 
and quality control are the company’s sole core businesses, and all the other 
activities, both direct and indirect, can be legally outsourced. Free from any 
legal obligation toward its workers, VW combines a tight taylorist labor regime 
and putting-out operations. The outsourced workers of the modular factory are 
of a different kind from the outsourced CSB workers. First, they are internally 
fragmented between ancillary workers—such as cleaners and transport  workers—
and direct workers. The former have a poor educational background, little 
 experience of formal employment and political activism, and an instrumental 
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attitude to work.21 In spite of representing more than half of the total  workforce 
of the factory, they are not represented in factory councils or in collective 
 negotiations between VW and the SMSF, and they have a marginal status vis-à-
vis the car workers.
Yes, in spite of their apolitical attitude, the car workers of Resende and Porto 
Real kept their real wages intact and avoided layoffs in a context of declining prices 
and profits in the industry22 by entering in tripartite negotiations with municipali-
ties and management23 and reviving the early experiments of the PT in São Paulo. 
Car workers rescaled their action from the factory to the region and created soli-
darities with municipalities and workers in other industries, setting in motion a 
new process of class struggle. Unlike them, steelworkers focused on factory-based 
struggles24 concerning wages, participation to the company’s profits, and working 
conditions with the management and refused the cross-sectional regionalism of 
the car workers. This conflict between factory-based activism of steelworkers and 
the regional activism of car workers must be considered in relation to the ongoing 
tensions between the municipality and the company, an issue that I discuss in the 
next section.
FROM FACTORY STRUGGLES TO L AND STRUGGLES
Some studies of deindustrialized cities and rust-belt regions have argued that 
political decentralization, both regionalism and municipalism, may foster new 
forms of participatory democracy and cross-sectional alliances between the tradi-
tional working class and civic movements, including middle-class and employers’ 
organizations. Some Brazilian scholars have used this framework in the context of 
deindustrialization of the ABC region of São Paulo.25 Indeed, the cross-sectional 
alliances between municipalities, employers, civic movements, and trade unions 
against global carmakers in the industrial region of São Paulo were central engines 
for the raise of the PT to power. But the economic geography of Volta Grande 
does not match the classic profile of an industrial rust belt. The CSB is, at the same 
time, a global financial operator, with a globally dispersed production process; a 
Taylorist employer; and a powerful landowner. Historically in Brazil, industrial-
ization coexisted with slavery and a rentier economy, and these are coming to the 
fore with deindustrialization. The CSB currently employs about 30.6 percent of the 
population, and jobs are concentrated in the service, commerce, and the public 
sectors.26 Yet the company owns one-third of the municipal land and continues 
to control the local economy. Besides, 40 percent of the municipality’s revenues 
come from the CSB in the form of urban rents, taxes, and environmental fines.27 
The municipality is entirely dependent on the industrial economy of the CSB, for 
it brings employment and income in the form of taxes, rents, and environmental 
fines. But in the rentier economy, the municipality and the CSB compete with 
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each other over land, in what is described by local residents as a “mortal embrace” 
between the company and the town.
Indeed, the “land question” has a long history in Volta Grande. Even if the steel 
town was planned by the best Brazilian architects and the world’s most renowned 
engineering company—the same that designed United Steel in the United States 
and Magnetigorsk in the Soviet Union—the city developed the same pattern 
of “predatory development” of most megalopolis in the South.28 Since the early 
beginnings, the company housed only permanent workers, using most of its land 
for real estate speculation. In 1942 there were only 662 houses and three hotels, 
mostly for foreigner managers, and a total of 6,160 residents. Between 1941 and 
1967, when the CSB’s housing stock was privatized, the company maintained a resi-
dential deficit between 30 percent and 40 percent of its workforce. The company 
gave to its wage- workers two-bedroom family houses, membership to the Work-
ers Club—a luxurious sport complex with an Olympic-sized swimming pool, 
three tennis courts, an Olympic-class gymnasium with a auditorium—a cinema, a 
hospital, and a child welfare center. The informal working class was excluded from 
these public provisions.
But a civic coalition developed around the municipality and led by the landed 
aristocracy opposed the company’s monopoly over the land. In 1963 came the 
coalition’s first success. The CSB was forced to pay seventy millions cruzeiros in 
back taxes to the municipality. In the 1970s, with the labor movement silenced 
by the military, a coalition of urban squatters29 and grassroots Catholic organiza-
tions30 led a “rights to the city” campaign, demanding the regularization of fave-
las, poor working-class neighborhoods, and the right to home ownership. This 
cross-sectional anti-dictatorship movement led to a renewal of the Brazilian labor 
movement famously described as “new unionism.” According to Morel, this cross-
sectional labor movement was facilitated by the existence of a capillary social 
infrastructure that the CSB had built in the city as a tool of labor control, but that, 
under the military, became autonomous and counter-hegemonic.31 But privatiza-
tion broke the labor movement. The company made mass redundancies and relo-
cated the administrative departments and the central office away from the city. Its 
main hospital and school went under the municipality. But most of the land, as 
well as the leisure, cultural, and educational facilities in the city—remain under its 
control.32 The focus of anti-corporate activism shifted from the plant to the land. In 
1992 the PT-affiliated mayor expropriated the company from its unproductive land 
and forced it to pay environmental taxes in line with the new Program of Environ-
mental Compensation (PAC). For first time in history, the company was charged 
R$60 million in environmental fees—a sum well above the municipality’s yearly 
budget.33 For the first time in history, the company was liable for land and service 
taxes like the any other private company.34 The alliance between municipality and 
civic movements strengthened further with the establishment of a municipal body 
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for participatory planning,35 involving squatters, militant Catholic organizations, 
and women’s and civic movements.
Besides, these municipal alliances extended into regional networks of social 
movements, trade unions, and businesses aiming at containing the power of the 
CSB and the global carmakers who had moved into the Sul Fluminense region. 
Well into the 2000s, these regional alliances were grassroots and focused on par-
ticipatory planning and land redistribution. They were modeled on the cross- 
sectional coalitions with employers and civic movements led by the metalworkers 
union36 in the ABC industrial region of São Paulo in the 1980s, which were now 
being displaced by the industrialization of the Sul Fluminense region. But these 
regional alliances slowly turned into business alliances between municipalities, 
new unions, and local entrepreneurs aimed at attracting foreign investors with 
cheap labor, as well as fiscal and environmental incentives and infrastructures. 
Cash-strapped municipalities waged ruthless “fiscal wars” against each other.37 
For instance, in 1996 the VW’s dream factory in Resende was opened due to the 
 generous gift—of credit and land—by the state of Rio de Janeiro. The metalúrgicos 
did not take part in these cross-sectional alliances. With their high wages and 
purchasing power, they kept themselves busy with conspicuous consumption of 
white goods, electronics, cars, and homes.38 Ironically, at the apex of the global 
crisis, the working class of Volta Grande was officially ranked as “class C”—middle 
class. But in 2010, as the first signs of economic slowdown hit the country, local 
unemployment rose to 19 percent, and the steelworkers found themselves strug-
gling with debt, unemployment, and house evictions. The company continues to 
lay off workers and to reclaim land from residents and the municipality through its 
army of private police and lawyers. The SMSF has tried to contain the most recent 
waves of mass redundancies. The municipality continues to seek foreign investors 
and campaigns against the CSB on environmental and fiscal issues in order to 
stay alive. In February 2016, the CSB was fined R$13 million (US$3.25 million) for 
failing to meet the conditions of an environmental and safety accord with the Rio 
de Janeiro state environmental agency to reduce air, water, and noise pollution, as 
well as safety risks at UPV.
BET WEEN TERTIARIZ ATION AND INFORMALIZ ATION
Privatization led to a peak in informal employment at both the national and local 
levels.39 Under the PT, formal employment rose exponentially, but mainly in low-
income jobs and for the female, black, and rural workers traditionally outside 
the formal working class.40 These newly created low-income jobs border with the 
informal economy, which still makes up 40 percent of the GDP. The core of the 
Brazil’s formal employment system is the carteira de trabalho (working card)—the 
official document containing people’s employment history. Only workers with a 
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carteira are entitled to pensions, social contributions, and trade-union affiliation. 
One obvious way to informalize wage labor is not to register the workers on the 
carteira or to register them after they have started to work for the company. It is 
not unusual for companies to register their employees many years after the start-
ing date or just before they go burst. Workers lose their rights to social contribu-
tions and additional salaries for the period in which they are unregistered. Besides, 
in order to dodge taxes, companies keep nominal wages lower than real wages, 
asking their employees to declare minimum wage in exchange of a top-up in cash. 
Employees do not know that by doing so, they lose social contributions. It is not 
unusual for them to realize it only after retirement.
A third way to informalize the wage relation is to underpay overtime and haz-
ardous work. It is also frequent for companies to outsource work to ghost com-
panies or fake cooperatives, which they can shut down without notice, leaving 
the workers without wages and social contributions. At the lower end of the labor 
market, cleaners, domestic workers, builders, and garbage pickers work without 
working identification, sixteen hours per day, and on a daily salary of R$5. Domes-
tic workers make up an astonishing 27 percent of the national population—nearly 
7 million people41—and face the harshest working conditions. Four-fifths of these 
are undocumented and hence have no right to social contributions. The presence 
of maids, cleaners, nannies, chauffeurs, personal trainers, and security guards in 
the houses of the hyper-affluent families of Rio de Janeiro or São Paulo or the land-
owning families of the rural north is not as surprising as in the households of the 
steelworkers of Volta Grande. Most domestic workers are employed as day labor-
ers (diarista), paid in cash at the end of the day. The jobs of builders and garbage 
pickers are the most informalized. Some garbage pickers set up cooperatives or 
small businesses and have stable contracts with municipalities, housing associa-
tions, or condominiums. But the majority barely survives. Several garbage coop-
eratives, in fact—small firms dressed up like cooperatives—sell to the municipality 
and recycling companies the garbage that they buy at a much lower price from 
informal garbage pickers.
The recent construction industry boom, sparked by federal housing and 
infrastructural programs, boosted the building sector, where 40 percent of the 
workforce is informal. The biggest employer of informal workers is the munici-
pality, which regularly tenders to illegal subcontractors working with unregu-
lated labor. After the CSB, the municipality is the biggest “labor offender” in the 
city and often appears in labor courts, charged with exploiting cleaners, builders, 
and garbage workers. In the 1980s and 1990s this section of the working class— 
made up of the unemployed, informal workers, rural squatters, and community 
 leaders—led the “right to the city” struggle against the CSB that I described 
above. But today,  conservative evangelical organizations and neighborhood asso-
ciations belonging to the municipality have co-opted them through programs of 
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grassroots evangelization, poverty reduction,42 popular home  ownership,43 and 
cultural entrepreneurship.44
C ONCLUSION
In this chapter I have presented an ethnography of a Brazilian steelmaking plant 
and framed the patterns of workers’ protests and identity formation that I observed 
on the shop floor at the urban and regional levels with the aim of unveiling the 
broader dynamics of dependent development, land dispossession, and state accu-
mulation. I have argued that there is a structural coupling between Brazil’s depen-
dency in the global economy and the strategies of accumulation by dispossession 
by the CSB based on rent seeking, commodity export, and open conflict with the 
local community. In Volta Grande, the rentierist logic of late capitalism described 
by Harvey45 takes a conglomerate form, encompassing global logistics, mining, 
steelmaking, and local landownership. In this chapter I have shown how the state-
driven financialization of the economy has impacts on the shop floor in terms of 
labor deskilling and intensification and of working-class debt and conspicuous 
consumption. In 2008 wage earners like Bobo thought about themselves as capi-
talists. Today, they struggle with unemployment, debts, and declining purchas-
ing power. With a powerless metalworkers’ union, it is conservative evangelical 
organizations and loose business-citizen platforms that increasingly take up the 
struggles of the metalúrgicos. Another section of the working class, the informal 
and tertiarized workers in the service and building industries, face a similarly 
harsh employer—the municipality of Volta Grande. A third section of the working 
class, subcontractors and car workers, are faring better, thanks to the newly estab-
lished legal principle of subsidiary responsibility. Less formally politicized than 
the metalworkers, car workers, subcontractors, and a growing number of IT work-
ers have experienced first-hand the extreme tertiarization practiced by foreign 
corporations. Their militant struggles against labor deregulation and regional alli-
ances take the form of legal and civic recognition. Up until the recent crisis, three 
sections of the working class—impoverished wage earners, the upwardly mobile 
urban poor, and tertiarized workers—formed a magmatic and internally divided 
“center” oscillating between left and right and kept together by various programs 
of urban development, wage indexation, poverty reduction, home ownership, and 
cultural regeneration. Besides, reflecting the principle of decentralization embed-
ded in the democratic constitution, regional coalitions between municipalities, 
grassroots movements, trade unions, and local industrialists sprung up in the 
1990s against the state which under Cardoso was quickly embracing neoliberal-
ism. Until Dilma’s impeachment, the PT administration managed to control the 
regional block developed around Rio de Janeiro through its strong grip over the 
national economy. But with the current economic crisis, the populist consensus 
150   labor and land struggles in brazil
and the fragile architecture of the financial state—after all, still subsumed to global 
finance—is crumbling.
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From Poverty to Informality?  




Jan Breman and Marcel van der Linden argue that “the real norm or standard in 
global capitalism is insecurity, informality or precariousness.”1 If this is the case, 
then Africa in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries could be seen as a 
model case for global capitalism. Much of the history of the continent during this 
period was characterized by poverty, precarious labor relations, and the absence 
of state or company welfare measures, as well as the failure or the lack of efforts 
to challenge precariousness. This paper analyses the social question in Africa 
since the colonial period with a focus on social (in)security and labor against the 
backdrop of a related research literature that largely ignores the continent. In the 
rich field of social sciences’ studies of the welfare state, Africa does not feature 
prominently, to say the very least. Esping-Andersen’s famous typology of welfare 
states completely ignores Africa.2 In the index of the more recent, authoritative 
Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State, Africa is only listed twice, and these refer-
ences are related to trade unions and unemployment insurance. When we look at 
the referenced pages, we learn only that unionization rates are lowest worldwide 
throughout much of Africa and that Africa is the weakest area of social insur-
ance development.3 For a long time, Africa seems to have served as the epitome of 
“otherness,” not only in the history of welfare and labor but also in much Western 
scholarship. A Europe- or West-centered perspective still often places Africa at the 
other end of the developmental spectrum—a clear instance of a region that simply 
does not fit the patterns familiar to a North Atlantic framework. However, as will 
be argued here, the history of the social question in Africa has a great many lessons 
to offer to those who are interested in tracing the historical connections between 
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regions and in critically engaging with the idea of the North Atlantic world as 
“normal” and the rest as “exceptional” and “in need of explanation.” If our his-
torical analysis of the social question has to transcend the notion of a single telos 
modeled after the example of the West that is supposed to be achieved everywhere, 
or if we are to go beyond the conception that the non-realization of this telos 
represents somehow a “lack” or a “lag” in those societies to understanding their 
specific examples coevally—to echo Johannes Fabian’s insight4—with that of the 
West, then we must take the different social forms in Africa seriously in all their 
complexity and all their linkages with welfare and labor forms elsewhere.
This paper chronologically discusses the social question with a focus on sub-
Saharan Africa and emphasizes a context in which capitalist production regimes 
have not led to employment relations typically characterized by stable and pro-
tected wage labor.5 While often drawing from examples from specific regions, it 
attempts to provide a broad historical view on larger trends and transformations 
of the social question in Africa, referring to a literature that tackles questions of 
welfare, social security, and social marginality within a wide array of topics such 
as labor, state, or urbanization.
WHITES ONLY:  C OLONIALISM AND WELFARE BEFORE 
WORLD WAR II
Until World War II, the colonial state and European private employers delegated 
the field of social security and poverty care more or less completely to what they 
labeled “traditional African solidarity,” occasionally also to a few private and 
especially church welfare institutions. There is little detailed information about 
related initiatives.6 In 1931, for instance, the Holy Ghost Fathers alone managed 
132 orphanages and 176 hospitals or dispensaries in sub-Saharan Africa. During 
the following year, 648 people passed through the poor asylum run by the Sisters 
of Cluny at Walezo in Zanzibar. Missionaries also provided most of the rapidly 
expanding institutional care of leprosy. In some parts of Africa, mostly in the set-
tler colonies, the Salvation Army undertook some welfare work among Africans. 
The Red Cross, the world’s first international secular charity and the first to estab-
lish itself in Africa, mainly worked among European communities in French and 
Belgian Congo. In British colonies, local governments made little provision for the 
poor beyond some general services such as famine control, free (but very limited) 
public health services, or rudimentary urban sanitation.7
In his influential African Survey, published in 1938, Lord Hailey, the great theo-
retician of British colonial rule, praised the practice of “externalizing” systems of 
social security. He stated that “it is clear that by treating the native reserves as res-
ervoirs of man-power, there is, in effect, a saving in that outlay on social services 
which in other circumstances might have to be incurred on behalf of industrial-
ized labor.”8 Thus it is no wonder that until World War II, the few measures in the 
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realm of social policy benefited Europeans almost exclusively. Programs associated 
with the “modern” welfare state were first and most comprehensively introduced 
in South Africa, where noncontributory, means-tested old-age pensions were cre-
ated for elderly people classified as “white” or “colored.” For the National Party 
and Labor Party—partners in the coalition Pact Government of 1924–1929— 
noncontributory old-age pensions were a crucial pillar in the “civilized labor” 
 policies designed to lift “poor whites” out of poverty and reestablish a clear racial 
hierarchy. Welfare reform was thus, in significant part, a response to the swart gevaar, 
or menace of black physical, occupational, and social mobility.9 Programmatic 
 provision was extended to the disabled, poor mothers with children, and the unem-
ployed. By the late 1930s, South Africa had a comparatively well-developed welfare 
state for its white and colored citizens. Similar noncontributory old-age pensions 
were introduced for white residents in Southwest Africa and Southern Rhodesia. 
The construction of welfare states in these settler societies reflected a combination 
of elite ideology, shaped both by racist and progressive elements, and democratic 
politics within the enfranchised white and colored population.
In other parts of Africa, it was only in the field of health where, after 1900, 
some colonies like German East Africa (which became Tanganyika after World 
War I) introduced decrees concerning industrial law that were relevant to a small 
minority of African workers.10 In 1909 the governor of German East Africa issued 
a “decree concerning the rights of indigenous workers” that introduced the duty 
of employers to guarantee medical care of their employees. However, this measure 
was seldom put into practice. In 1923 the British passed the Master and Servants 
Ordinance, which provided for small compensation to be paid by employers in 
the case of industrial accidents. African government clerks were initially classified 
into lower administrative ranks with neither pension rights nor other employers’ 
contribution. The Provident Fund (Government Employees) Ordinance, issued in 
November 1942, introduced a fund also for lower ranks that provided for at least 
small payments in the case of retirement or premature inability to work.11
Right from the beginning of colonial rule, access to labor was crucial to Euro-
pean colonizers in Africa. However, before World War II, this importance was 
reflected neither in the administrative order nor in colonial archives. Until the 
mid-1930s there was hardly any African colony with a “labor department.” In its 
prewar heyday, colonialism, even when administered by relatively democratic gov-
ernments in the home context, evaluated its African subjects essentially as primi-
tive and ineffably “different” tribesmen with a patriarchal and rural mold. The 
conservation of an ossified tribal Africa coupled with the extraction of unskilled 
seasonal or casual labor was common wisdom. The debates of the day were 
about the necessity for forced labor and the extent to which Africa was becom-
ing diseased and depopulated due to colonial labor demand. Dynamism in this 
system was confined to white settlers or energetic Levantine and Asian traders.12 
Against this backdrop, colonial officials found it convenient to leave agricultural 
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production to former slave owners and chiefs, or enlist their aid to supply the 
labor required for public, and even private, purposes. Moreover, desperate to make 
their territories economically viable, they resorted to various devices for mobiliz-
ing unfree labor themselves, including forced labor, conscription into the army or 
police forces, and the recruitment of contract labor by all kind of dubious means. 
The Portuguese colonies were particularly notorious for relying on forced labor, 
and parts of Portuguese-ruled Africa fell at the far end of a spectrum of brutality 
of labor practices. However, at least until the 1940s, institutionalized violence to 
extract African labor was by no means solely a Portuguese approach.13
After World War I, the newly founded League of Nations took up this issue. The 
debates culminated in the Forced Labor Convention of the International Labor 
Organization of 1930.14 The realities on the ground in Africa were much more com-
plex, and the hierarchies and forms of exploitation much more subtle than what 
the discussions about forced labor in Geneva addressed. Moreover, neither the 
missionary critics who asked “Africa: Slave or Free?” nor League of Nations inves-
tigators questioned the premise of colonial rule itself; consequently, the resulting 
debate sought only to draw distinctions among labor policies considered accept-
able and not acceptable in a European-dominated Africa. Officials in the colonies 
wanted to use the labor of Africans as much as they could, but at the same time, 
they firmly believed in the necessity of stable African communities under the con-
trol of male elders. European administrators saw mining towns or cities as sites 
of labor, but not of the reproduction of the labor force. Those Africans who had 
left this imagined traditional village life and permanently settled in the cities were 
labeled “detribalized.”15
During the Great Depression, the first substantial debates about the problem 
of unemployment emerged. According to John Iliffe, “the great novelty of the 
depression was tropical Africa’s first serious experience of unemployment.”16 In 
the formal sector, in branches where Africans worked under contracts, a rapid 
decline of working places took place during the early 1930s. Between 1930 and 
1933, the copper mines in Katanga reduced their African workforce from 73,000 
to 27,000.17 However, only a small portion of the African population was officially 
“working” and thus qualified for appearing in statistics. In French West Africa, 
120,000 people were in official employment in 1933, plus 39,000 migrant peanuts 
laborers in Senegal, 1.1 percent of the population.18 The Inspecteur du Travail of 
French West Africa remarked in 1934 on the absence of unemployment but had 
a circular definition of it: since the African family took care of its members and 
had access to land, only the most detribalized Africans, notably urban artisans, 
could be unemployed. Such an argument is “indeed a telling instance . . . of how 
belief in the peculiar nature of African society could define an entire problem 
out of existence.”19 One example of this circular argument comes from a report of 
1936: “There are no unemployed in French West Africa. Anyone who so desired 
could go back to the soil and any worker who does not prefers to vegetate in the 
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city which he only will leave at the last extremity. There is thus constituted a float-
ing urban population of ‘sans-travail’ of a particular nature, seeking daily labor 
without enthusiasm, living most often at the expense of more favored brethren.” A 
year later the Inspecteur du Travail indicated that he did not believe that African 
workers were quite like other workers. He opposed unemployment compensation, 
saying, “I am not a partisan of unemployment indemnities in a country where the 
soil can nourish those who wish to cultivate it.”20
DEC OLONIZ ATION AND THE SHORT SUMMER OF THE 
WELFARE STATE
These assumptions began to be challenged in the 1930s, first by minority voices 
and then, as one approaches the 1950s, on a broader front. For this, there were 
various reasons, not least the realization that such policies led to semi-stagnation 
in a world where development became more and more an imperative.21 The sud-
denly manifest capacity of African workers to organize and throw a wrench in the 
works of the extractive economy was, however, also of fundamental importance.22 
Arguments mounted that African workers needed to be treated as workers, not 
as Africans. They should be permitted to form trade unions, critically, a strategy 
of containment and boundedness. And they should benefit from a social welfare 
system. The colonial state tried to conceptualize structures that would allow for a 
stable detribalized urban working class in towns, focused on a European family 
model. “By the mid to late 1940s,” Fred Cooper writes, “influential officials wanted 
Africa to have a working class, to separate an identifiable group of people from 
the backwardness of rural Africa, attach its members to particular jobs and career 
ladders and over time make them into a predictable and productive collectivity.”23
Over the following decade, colonial administrators and experts worked on a 
new labor policy that was called “stabilization.” This term referred to the fact that in 
the eyes of the Europeans involved, the task in Africa was not to make wage labor 
the basic form of production, as in ideal-type capitalism, but to separate a domain 
of wage labor from a domain of traditional production. Above all, colonial admin-
istrations had to be insured that the reproduction of the wage-earning class would 
take place uncontaminated by the “backwardness” that apparently lay outside it, in 
the villages. In many reports, a vision of a male African appeared who was weaned 
from dependence or nonwage income and lived with his wife and family in an 
urban location, sending his children to school and, over time, becoming accultur-
ated to industrial and urban life. The gender bias in all of this was too self-evident 
for much contemporary discussion. Throughout the colonial period, employment 
and unemployment were overwhelmingly associated with men. For long, women 
had entered urban centers and, with waged employment deemed appropriate for 
them being restricted, had made a significant contribution to sectors outside the 
realm of wage work. However, no one at the time commented on the fact that the 
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definition of the worker in the Code du Travail for French West Africa—the result 
of intense debates between French officials and African trade unions and accom-
panied by numerous strikes—placed the kind of tasks that women most often did 
outside the law’s conception of work. That women were crucial to the commerce 
of West African cities or that they performed a great variety of income-generating 
activities did not enter into the discussion of any aspect of the code.24
The rising global importance given to social security after World War II 
is reflected by the UN Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which stated that 
“everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security.” Already four 
years earlier, a declaration had emerged from the ILO conference in Philadelphia 
that announced that “labor is not a commodity” and called for international effort 
for the “common welfare.” Furthermore, it sought measures “to provide a basic 
income to all,” for regulation of working hours, for collective bargaining, and for 
measures to improve public health, housing, nutrition, education, child welfare, 
the status of women, and public services. The last paragraph of the document 
emphasized that the principles listed were “fully applicable to all people every-
where”; it called specifically for “their progressive application to peoples who are 
still dependent, as well as to those who have already achieved self-government.”25 
Soon after, the ILO began to develop its “social policy in dependent territories,” 
which set out to globalize its “standards” on work regulations, housing, education, 
health, and family life. ILO resolutions were weak on supranational enforcement 
mechanisms and did not mandate the colonial powers in Africa to act in a particu-
lar way, but legitimized and delegitimized certain policy strategies. In some ways, 
Britain and France thought that the “social” direction put forward by the ILO was 
consistent with their reformed postwar colonialism and even celebrated the 1952 
ILO convention “Minimum Standards of Social Security” as the “internationaliza-
tion” of their respective social policies. However, the standards soon hit a wall. The 
British held the view that their African colonies should raise the revenues neces-
sary to pay for social security themselves. Given the financial situation of their 
territories, the implementation of substantial social security systems was delegated 
to a distant future.26
In 1958 the ILO published the African Labour Survey, which made some reflec-
tions about the state of social security as part of the stabilization project on the 
continent. The authors saw “evidence of the interest of the authorities in Africa 
in the possibility of introducing social security measures and their awareness of 
the urgency and growing importance of the question.” However, they also listed 
the factors that, according to them, militated against the successful introduction 
of social security, for instance “the instability of the labour force, the low level of 
wages, the inadequacy of population registers, polygamy, the illiteracy of workers 
and even of small employers in rural areas, poor communications and the diffi-
culty of supervising migrant workers who, at times, disappear, never to be heard of 
again.” Still, they happily acknowledged that “it is generally accepted that one way 
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of stabilising labour is to give workers effective protection against occupational 
and other risks.”27
Admittedly, this new approach was often expressed in a restrained manner, as 
in 1952 in the Tanganyika Standard: “The average African labourer has sprung 
from generations of men content to sit under the shade of the nearest tree and 
do little or no work whatsoever. . . . But, the African, while inherently lazy, is by 
no means beyond redemption. . . . If he can adapt himself to regular employment 
under conditions where food, accommodation, medical and other amenities are 
available, he can and does become worthy of his hire.”28 Still, in contrast to pre-
vailing low-wage, labor-extensive forms of employment, from the 1950s, increased 
skill levels were rewarded with higher salaries. Paradoxically, this increase in 
wages formed a prime cause of growing urban poverty. According to John Iliffe, it 
“attracted people into towns, encouraged employers to replace workers by machin-
ery, and bred the unemployment, overcrowding, and ancillary problems which the 
authorities had intended to prevent.”29 A background context profoundly shap-
ing the phenomenon was demographic change. Rapid African population growth 
from the mid-twentieth century, alongside a diminishing resource-to-population 
ratio, resulted in a shift from famine-related “epidemic starvation for all but the 
rich . . . to endemic undernutrition for the very poor.”30 One of the most promi-
nent forms in which this “structural” poverty manifested itself was the growth of 
urban joblessness. In the context of rapid urbanization, the problem of a reserve 
army of unemployed or jobless young men observable in towns caused increasing 
attention.
In a number of African colonies, a set of social institutions was created for rela-
tively small groups of formal-sector workers. One striking aspect about social wel-
fare measures in late colonial Africa is, however, that unemployment insurances 
were never seriously discussed. In the 1950s, unemployment in urban Africa was 
recognized and discussed by contemporaries, but belittled by colonial officials.31 
The Code du Travail for French Africa from 1952 contained no fewer than 241 arti-
cles and provided for a comprehensive arsenal of welfare measures. However, there 
was no mention at all of unemployment compensation.32 The ILO in its  African 
Labour Survey observed “considerable underemployment” on the continent, 
but concluded that “unemployment, except in a few towns in the form known 
in highly industrialized countries, exists only to a limited extent; there are usu-
ally more offers of employment than applications for jobs.”33 In most late-colonial 
labor laws, unemployment compensation was held to be particularly undesirable, 
because most officials would not acknowledge that the African wage earner who 
was not working was, in fact, a worker. One also has to emphasize the gendered 
way in which the “unemployment problem” was interpreted. In the official imagi-
nation, it was once more male youth who constituted a potentially insurrectionary 
unemployed class, who were more visible “loitering” on urban streets. The absence 
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of female unemployed in surviving commentary reflects the gendered occupation 
of urban space. In contrast to young men, whose street presence has remained 
a concern up to the present, women were more restricted to the home and/or 
the workplace. Or they simply did not constitute a threat in the eyes of the male 
colonizer.34
Especially in the French African colonies, the main instruments in social wel-
fare policies were family allowances. After long and controversial debates, and due 
to massive pressure from African trade unions, on January 1956, family alloca-
tions went into effect in French West Africa, six months later in French  Equatorial 
Africa. In Senegal, a family would receive 4,800 francs “allocation du foyer” for 
the birth of each of its first three children; each pregnancy would bring the family 
3,600 francs prenatal allocation and 4,800 francs maternity allocation; in addi-
tion, 400 francs per month would be paid as the basic family allowance for each 
dependent child, through the end of his or her schooling. The 400 francs per 
month would be around 8 percent of the minimum wage; the maternity alloca-
tion, around a month’s minimum pay. Such allocations would make a considerable 
difference to the life of a worker. The decrees provided support for the children of 
female workers as well as of male; there was even a special provision for benefits 
for wage-earning women who gave birth. But the expectations of the planners 
were that of the male worker and the female child-care provider. In the studies 
on which these cost estimates were based, the surveyed population in industry 
included 25,357 African males, but no females; in commerce, there were 14,045 
males and 105 females. The language in which officials addressed the burdens of 
raising children on a worker’s salary was comfortably masculinist, and officials 
allocated, using their workforce data, minimal funds for working mothers.
The implementation of family allowances got off to a slow start. One reason 
was that the administration had the utmost difficulties to put these schemes into 
practice, because the required information, such as documentations of birth, 
was difficult to obtain. Still, by 1956, family allocations had been extended to the 
entire wage-labor force of French West Africa, and officials now embraced them 
for much the same reason that they rejected them earlier—the peculiar nature of 
the African family. But now it was a question of weaning workers away from its 
debilitating effects, of creating family norms that resembled those presumed to 
predominate in Europe, of insuring the reproduction of a working class on the 
basis of workers’ earnings and within the milieu of the workplace.35
In many ways, the dualism imagined by the colonial administrators and experts 
of a small, restricted modern African working class separated from the “tradi-
tional rest” was a mere fantasy. African workers in regulated jobs did not cease 
to be African; they did not cut themselves off from the wider range of social and 
cultural relationships in their lives, including their home villages. They regularly 
opted to live in a family arrangement rather than that of the monogamous male 
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breadwinner with his dependent wife and children. They began to invest in the 
education of their children and to accumulate savings and pension rights toward 
retirement. However, they did not necessarily simply accept the notions of the 
European welfare state, but often used part of their wage resources to invest in 
social networks and rituals to foster their patriarchal authority.36 African trade-
union leaders were rather successful in using European officials’ hopes for a pro-
ductive, “modern” working class in order to make claims. They argued that if the 
Europeans wanted Africans to produce like a European working class, then Afri-
cans should be paid like their counterparts in Europe. Wages increased consider-
ably, especially in key industries, in the civil service, and for vulnerable areas like 
railroads and ports. These increases were by no means uncontested but rather the 
result of protests, strikes, and negotiations.37
In effect, the colonial state could not respond to demands for increased ben-
efits and rights from organized labor—which would put its members on par with 
metropolitan workers—without dismantling the justification of colonialism. 
There is an ironic charm—but also a kind of Pyrrhic victory—in the African suc-
cess in defeating European developmentalist logic. One could view the decision 
by Europeans to accept unionist demands that African laborers be treated on the 
same basis as their European counterparts as a mutual failure to comprehend the 
African social reality. It was a consequential failure, since the cost of providing 
European-scale wages and benefits under African economic conditions could 
not be borne by either colonial or postcolonial regimes. European governments 
were thus encouraged to withdraw from Africa, while their local successors co-
opted some of the labor leadership but rather quickly suppressed the unions as an 
autonomous force. The leaders of the newly independent countries, former trade-
unionists among them, were acutely aware that they lacked the resources to ensure 
that the demands of the citizenry would be met. Many of them build up relations 
of patronage with power brokers inside the nation but also clientelistic networks 
with former colonizers. By this, they undermined democratic processes and the 
kind of social movements, such as labor movements, that had helped them get 
into power.38
HOPES AND DISILLUSION:  INDEPENDENT AFRICA 
AND THE RISE OF THE INFORMAL
Around 1960, when many African colonies gained independence, numerous 
observers thought that with population growth having accelerated after 1945, and 
with the urban population growing faster than the rural, a class of landless manual 
workers would be created, and Africa would reproduce European patterns. But 
wage laborers made only a small percentage of the overall working population 
in Africa, both in colonial and postcolonial times. It was, however, exactly this 
small group of miners, dockworkers, factory workers, and railway workers that 
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constituted the focus of African labor historiography between the 1960s and 1980s. 
The academic focus on wage labor went hand in hand with the assumption that 
Africa was becoming “proletarianized”; its working class was growing and becom-
ing better defined and more self-conscious.39 From the late 1950s to the 1970s, many 
African countries experienced at least modest economic growth, life expectancy 
rose considerably, and education became more accessible. The emergence of ele-
ments of a welfare state raised considerable expectations. State employees, workers 
in copper mines, or railway workers, for instance, had reasonable hopes that they 
could get something out of participation in economic activities. But these decades 
proved to be not a mid-point in a natural “transition” from a nonwage-labor to a 
wage-labor economy in a welfare state. While it is difficult to count precisely, it is 
clear that the number of hired workers in sub-Saharan Africa was vastly greater by 
1960 than it had been in 1900, and is much greater today than it was around the 
time of independence. Yet labor markets since the end of colonial rule are charac-
terized much more by short-term hiring and a high turnover of workers than by 
long-term, stable employment. Precarious labor prevailed, both in the formal and 
in the informal sector.40
The seemingly reasonable aspirations of millions of Africans of turning jobs—
especially stable, unionized jobs, with pension funds promised at the end—into 
careers proved unrealizable. The mining sector in the Zambian copper belt ini-
tially promised steady material rewards—a salary and health and retirement 
benefits—as well as other, more ineffable rewards in terms of cultural cachet and 
social status. That pathway to working-class stability and respectability soon came 
to an end with the oil crisis, structural adjustment programs, and the fluctuating 
global prices of copper. What meager resources these miners kept for their old 
age came not so much from the formal institutions of modern welfare capital-
ism—social security, pensions, medical insurance—or the contractual gains won 
by trade unions, but from sets of personal relationships that ex-miners could draw 
on or forge.41 Petty trade, access to farmland through social relations in a village 
of origin, or support of kin-networks became necessary to survive in the context 
of a contracting regulated wage-labor sector. The notion of being a “big man,” an 
element of men’s self-esteem that had been given a new dimension by wage earn-
ing, increasingly had to confront the fact that women engaged in urban marketing 
and other activities were contributing more to the family economy and providing 
the stability that male wages could not. The bureaucratized world of work had not 
been eclipsing the world of social relations; if it had done so, the collapse would 
have been even more deadly than it was.
Today, young men whose social power long rested on their ability to earn wages 
increasingly find themselves in a more precarious position. In turn, others, nota-
bly women and pensioners, acquired new powers and possibilities. This transfor-
mation is partly due to the relative expansion of work in service industries that 
are more open to women than the blue-collar industrial jobs of the past.42 The 
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increasing instability of economic prospects in many African countries today has 
also changed migration patterns. Seasonal labor migration, which was central to 
African economies in the first half of the twentieth century, has been overtaken 
by more permanent rural-urban migration and by large-scale labor migration to 
Europe and beyond. Africans are more likely to travel longer distances in search of 
employment. In the twenty-first century, many African countries have apparently 
become increasingly dependent upon the productive activities and remittances of 
their citizens who live abroad in other African countries or in Europe, Asia, the 
Gulf States, or the United States.43
By the 1970s, the ILO began to use the evocative but sloppy term “urban infor-
mal sector” for the urban dimension of what did not fit inside national labor 
legislations and a bounded, stabilized working class. The term points to the con-
tinued—indeed, growing—importance of forms of work that lie outside the form 
of labor legislation that African countries inherited at independence and outside 
the limits of the imagination of policy makers who thought they were modern-
izing Africa.44 Although some Africanists insist that “African economies are the 
most informalized in the world,” nonwaged economic activities, unregulated by 
law and unprotected by social regulations or services, have become increasingly 
visible in many parts of the world, including the North Atlantic region.45 The dis-
covery of the “informal” went in hand in hand with the observation that full-time 
wage labor with relatively good social benefits over the course of an entire career 
was not a global norm, but rather the exception in many parts of the world, the 
contingent product of a particular conjuncture in twentieth-century world history.
A critical literature seems to agree on the inadequacy of the term “informal” but 
has failed to produce alternative terminology.46 I would argue for an understand-
ing of “informal labor” not as a residue of earlier and obsolete modes of socially 
organizing labor. Rather, it should be understood as a contemporary and adapt-
able sociopolitical category that distinguishes a heterogeneous and unstable set of 
transformed and new “informal,” mainly socially regulated labor forms from an 
equally diverse and malleable set of “formal,” predominantly state-regulated labor 
forms. These two sets of labor forms are mutually constitutive and interdependent, 
and they have assumed diverse features and proportions over the course of histori-
cal time, as well as in different local and territorial contexts. The social content and 
the interrelationship of “informal” and “formal” labor is shaped and persistently 
transformed by economic and social policies, business strategies, and social con-
flicts. Accordingly, the politics of informal labor is often connected to efforts at 
the resolution of crises of capitalist over-accumulation, including efforts to solve 
such crises by way of spatial expansion and relocation. It is crucial to emphasize 
the political character of formal/informal divisions in the contemporary world of 
labor across the continents, as well as to reconstruct the historical genesis of this 
divide. It is not by accident that as an academic and political concept, “informal 
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labor” gained currency in the course of the 1970s, the middle of that decade being 
a crucial chronological marker for a major shift in the pattern of economic and 
social policies, business strategies, and social conflicts the world over. In fact, the 
career of the term “informal sector” may be linked to the rise of the political and 
ideological formation that is commonly referred to as “neoliberalism.” Thus, it 
would be important to study more carefully the political and social processes that 
had rendered the informal/formal division conceivable. Finally, many activities 
labeled “informal” are not relatively new and exclusively spawned by neoliberal 
reforms and structural adjustment programs of the 1980s. Such assertions would 
overlook the deep roots of African productive systems and the relationships that 
contemporary skilled workers and craftsmen share with older services and forms 
of fabrication. Indeed, one of the shortcomings of studies on informality is that 
they often present snapshots of specific activities and processes, but they do not 
necessarily locate them within larger trajectories of historical change.47
While the term “informal” might be problematic and not sufficiently differen-
tiated as an analytical tool, it refers to processes crucial to the social question in 
Africa. When the world economic recession of the 1970s hit Africa hard, most gov-
ernments were forced to seek aid from the International Monetary Fund and other 
international institutions, which, in turn, enforced the destruction of much that 
could be considered “social.” The right to education, medical care, and a livable 
wage were undermined in the name of financial rigor. Cutbacks in the public sec-
tor and in social programs eroded the number of waged employees. Households 
were forced to diversify their sources of income, and people involved in informal 
activities increasingly suffered from their work’s uncertain juridical status and 
the volatility of their finances. Small-scale workshops were often characterized 
by low surplus and strong competition and were usually not more than severely 
undercapitalized and unskilled businesses. Market women particularly suffered, 
as they faced the falling incomes of poor and working-class customers, and more 
and more they had to compete with men who began working as street vendors 
after losing their waged jobs.48 What also could be observed was “dividing a given 
activity in ever-finer morsels.”49 As Fred Cooper emphasized, “a young man, who 
in the 1970s would have sold tiny packets of peanuts in the streets of Dakar or in 
the 2000s low-denomination phone top-up cards, finds a niche because his labor 
is worth so little that an entrepreneur can employ him to sell things to people too 
poor to spend a significant sum of money at a time.”50 This reality on the ground 
stood in stark contrast to celebratory statements of the World Bank or NGOs high-
lighting the energy and skill of the small-scale entrepreneur. There is the bitter 
irony that empowerment through informal enterprise so cherished by neoliberal 
commentators was undermined by neoliberal politics that drastically weakened 
the very institutions—such as family, education, and basic safety nets—upon 
which informal entrepreneurship is based.51
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C ONCLUSION:  PRECARIOUS AFRICA?
The terrifying leviathan “assumes more and more the traits of a milk cow,” the 
conservative German philosopher Arnold Gehlen stated some forty years ago in 
his polemic against mass democracy and the welfare state. In the meantime, we 
see that politicians in the industrialized countries prescribe various diets and fit-
ness training for this milk cow. The situation is very different in Africa, however. 
Because of the low importance of formal, institutionalized labor markets, state-
sponsored systems of social security were never widely spread south of the Sahara 
anyway. During the twentieth century, these state systems had only very limited 
and socially selective spheres of operation, which, after a peak in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, constantly diminished over the last decades. On the other hand, those 
institutions, practices, and resources of “welfare production” that were not under 
state management enjoyed great importance. In this context, government offi-
cials, development experts, and scholars alike usually referred to the “traditional 
solidarity” of African families and communities. Already in the colonial period, 
European administrators returned to this “solidarity,” because it was supposed to 
arrange what to colonial officials—despite all rhetoric—seemed far too expensive: 
absorbing, at least partially, the manifold risks of working life.
African independent states inherited a complex and potentially explosive 
combination of authoritarian governance, high expectations for improved liv-
ing conditions, a limited extent of formal employment, and already fragmented 
trade unions. Thus, even before the devastating impact of the oil crisis, followed by 
structural adjustment programs, wage labor was never available as the foundation 
of an egalitarian and democratic society. Labor coercion and personal dependence 
did not disappear; it was often facilitated by poverty at all levels. The colonial dis-
course of development that began in the 1930s and continued after independence 
relabeled work that otherwise could have been classified as forced labor as “vol-
untary work,” “self-help,” or “human investment.” In this process, certain sections 
of African labor were rendered invisible as workers and instead constructed as 
“beneficiaries,” “participants,” and “volunteers.”52 The issue of forced labor con-
tinued to be debated after independence. In 1962, the ILO Committee of Experts 
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations criticized a number 
of recently independent African countries, such as Guinea and the Ivory Coast, 
for having set up new forms of forced labor in the form of compulsory labor ser-
vices for young people. As Daniel Maul points out, “To be accused of a ‘classically 
colonial crime’ such as forced labour was particularly hard for the postcolonial 
nations to stomach,” and they reacted bitterly.53 The problem of “un-freedom” 
never went away: it is diffused and can be found in many sectors or embedded in 
various labor relations. In 2016, the ILO estimated that “there were a total of over 
9.2 million victims of modern slavery in Africa.”54 Immigrant workers from Africa 
are part of this number. The question is how to label all those Africans who, by 
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their own initiative, cross the Mediterranean Sea to Italy or Spain, or the Atlantic 
to the Canary Islands, to seek wage labor? Those Africans who, between the six-
teenth and nineteenth centuries, were sent across the Atlantic to work on slave 
plantations in the Americas were coerced, and they were called “slaves.” Today’s 
migrants, however, are in some ways the freest of the free: “they not only agree to 
leave Africa for Europe, but they go to great effort and great risk to do so.”55 Often 
people with some means and education dare the dangerous and expensive trip, 
with the idea to make some money in Europe in order to support the family back 
home. Those Africans who make it to Europe, usually after a traumatic voyage via 
the desert and the Mediterranean, definitely work under conditions that deserve 
the label “precarious.” Their ideas about a Europe full of opportunities soon van-
ish. They are mostly sans papiers and thus subject to deportation or exploitation by 
employers who misuse their vulnerability.56
It would be misleading to see informal and precarious work only as a new phase 
in capitalism in which workers in many parts of the world, and most notably in 
Africa, have become unnecessary, disposable. Multinational capital might still 
need many workers from Africa, as long as they are cheap, particularly to reach 
customers of modest means.57 Moreover, precarity could be seen as a constitu-
tive feature of capitalist labor, inasmuch as uncertainty and instability have always 
been inherent characteristics of wage labor, in Africa as elsewhere.58 Yet politi-
cal mobilization of and collective bargaining for precarious and informal workers 
remain a challenge. In West Africa, for example, the share of informal employment 
ranges from 76 percent (in Senegal) to 93 percent (in Benin) of the labor force; 
the total unionization rate was 12.8 percent in 2007.59 However, given the ongoing 
increase of “land grabs,” with states helping to alienate land to both foreign and 
domestic capitalists, in combination with the increasing pressure of the popula-
tion on land and on soil fertility, it is not unlikely that landlessness will supersede 
the lack of labor power as the major source of poverty in Africa.
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The Social Question in South Africa
 From Settler Colonialism to Neoliberal-Era Democracy
Ben Scully
INTRODUCTION
The classical social question of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is usu-
ally thought to pertain to Europe and North America, where the expansion of cap-
italist production brought social dislocation and political upheaval, especially in 
growing urban industrial centers. Yet South Africa experienced similar processes 
of industrial expansion and rapid urbanization in roughly the same period. Cou-
pled with this, colonial occupation and racialized restrictions on land ownership 
dispossessed significant portions of the rural population from the land, precipitat-
ing a simultaneous crisis in the traditional agrarian economy, which the majority 
still relied on as a main source of livelihood. As a result, South Africa had its own 
version of the social question, the history of which provides a lens for rethinking 
the social question on a global scale.
In the Northern capitalist countries, conflict over the inequality and immisera-
tion produced by capitalism led to the rise of labor movements as major political 
forces in many countries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 
many cases, labor movements were key actors in expanding formal democracy. This 
democratization can be thought of as one aspect of the Northern response to the 
social question, and it was followed by, in most places, the expansion of labor mar-
ket protections and welfare provisions. By the mid-twentieth century, some form 
of a welfare state had been established in almost all advanced capitalist countries.
South Africa followed a different trajectory, which could be considered as a set-
tler colonial response to the social question. Rather than an opening of a democratic 
political space, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were marked by 
an institutionalization of racial inequalities that expanded citizenship for the white 
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minority and restricted it for the majority. Long-standing practices of segrega-
tion and racism came to be codified in law, as the state attempted to accommodate 
organized white workers whose demands for protection from the vagaries of the 
market included a demand for protection from labor-market competition with the 
black majority. During this period, South Africa’s political movements pushing for 
democratization and economic justice usually framed demands in terms of anti-
racism and anti-colonialism rather, or in addition to, anti-capitalism. The rejection 
of the state’s legitimacy forestalled demands for state social protection, and social 
policy implemented in the Apartheid era was often looked upon with suspicion.
Despite this history, South Africa is not just a negative example for thinking 
through the social question. The country achieved democracy in 1994, when the 
influence of neoliberal ideology was at its height. The new government faced the 
task of replacing the racialized social compact it had inherited at precisely the time 
when the mid-twentieth-century model of welfare states was coming under pres-
sure in much of the rest of the world. In response to this challenge, South Africa 
has come to be a site of innovation both in policy and in scholarly debates on new 
forms of social protection.
This chapter will trace the changing meanings of and responses to the social 
question in South Africa. I concentrate on two key moments of state policy forma-
tion. The first part describes the settler colonial response to the social question, 
which emerged in the late nineteenth century and culminated in the formalized 
Apartheid system from the middle of the twentieth century. During this period, 
the expansion of capitalist development and colonial dispossession created crises 
of poverty and landlessness among the indigenous majority, as well as among a 
section of the white working class. However, the state’s response was to define the 
social question as the “poor white problem.” The policies that were implemented 
in this era aimed to protect white workers not only from the market in general but 
especially from competition with the black majority in the labor market. By giving 
white workers privileged access to the labor market, much of the work of social 
protection was accomplished through private employment, and explicit social pol-
icy was necessary only as a safety net to protect the few whites who could not gain 
security through wage work. This “solution” of the social question intensified the 
already established link between race and citizenship rights in the country.
The second part of this chapter will discuss the post-1994 democratic period, in 
which the contradictory forces of neoliberal ideology (at both the local and global 
levels) and a political and ideological imperative to expand access to social welfare 
for the previously excluded black majority have produced a new,  neoliberal-era 
response to the social question. The liberalization of the economy from the 1990s led 
to increasing informalization of work and rising  unemployment. This meant that 
the labor market could not provide security to the majority in the  post- Apartheid 
period as it had in the middle of the twentieth century for the minority. As a result, 
state-provided social protection became more important, but its growing role 
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had to be reconciled with the neoliberal ideology that shaped economic policy 
after 1994.
The third and final section of the chapter draws on my own research and sec-
ondary literature to show how gaps in the state’s response since 1994 put pressure 
on households and other social connections, which highlight the continued rel-
evance of the social question today.
THE SO CIAL QUESTION IN THE SET TLER C OLONY
The nineteenth century as whole, even before the diamond and gold rushes, had 
been a period of conflict and dispossession across what is today South Africa. 
However, widespread, permanent landlessness remained a rarity, as did concen-
trated urban poverty. The Europeans’ discovery of diamonds and gold in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century transformed the economy and society of southern 
Africa, creating widespread urbanization and proletarianization for the first time. 
The new demand for labor led to a number of policies that were aimed at under-
mining the economic security of the rural African population in order to compel 
them to seek wage labor. Subsidies for white farmers ensured that new oppor-
tunities for commercial farming afforded by growing urbanization would not 
be captured by the African peasantry.1 The 1913 Native Land Act went further by 
preventing Africans from owning or renting land outside of the 13 percent of the 
country set aside as “reserves.” The group who were most affected by this restric-
tion were Africans who had been operating under sharecropping arrangements 
on white-owned farms outside of these reserves. Such arrangements were banned 
in the Orange Free State and severely curtailed elsewhere. In total, one-fifth of the 
five million Africans in South Africa at the time were proletarianized by the act.2
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also saw class differentia-
tion among rural whites, with small-scale farmers being pushed out by larger 
enterprises. As a result, newly proletarianized African workers were joined in the 
urban labor market by growing numbers of landless Afrikaners. These two groups 
entered primarily into low-skilled wage work in the mines and related industries, 
like construction and transportation. The new mining industries also attracted 
skilled immigrants with mining experience in Europe and the gold-producing 
areas of North American and Australia. These workers formed the core of the first 
trade unions to develop in the urban centers. By the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, urban slums were a feature of almost all South African cities. John Iliffe 
notes that although these concentrated areas of urban poverty were multiracial 
spaces, “South Africa’s rulers identified multiracial poverty as the Poor White 
Problem. Although destitute white men had long been numerous, they were first 
seen as a social problem—rather than as a victim of their vices—during the 1880s 
and 1890s, when new European notions of poverty as a social phenomenon min-
gled with South Africa’s growing concern with racial categorization.”3
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Already in the 1890s city leaders in Johannesburg established a public works 
program and relief fund for poor Afrikaners.4 In 1906, also in Johannesburg, a 
group of white workers organized around the identity of the “unemployed,” 
demanding support from the state. In response to these workers’ protests, the 
city established a public works program to absorb the labor of unemployed urban 
whites.5 Despite these developments, social protection remained piecemeal and 
uncoordinated at a national level.6
In the first decades of the twentieth century, trade unions began to emerge a 
serious political force. Major strikes, especially among white workers in the mines, 
but also including black dockworkers in Cape Town and Asian sugarcane workers 
in Natal, made industrial conflict a central issue of the early Union government. 
One outcome of these early strike waves was the emergence of private pensions 
and other forms of company-backed social protection, almost exclusively for 
white workers. Initially, however, the state’s role remained limited.
In contrast to welfare provisions, labor law was coordinated by the state at the 
national level, and this period saw increasing attempts to formalize a legal system 
of industrial relations for the first time. National workers’ compensation insurance 
was implemented in 1914. The Mines and Works Act of 1911 instituted basic pro-
tections for workers, including setting a limit on working hours, outlawing child 
labor, and giving government inspectors the ability to monitor and sanction safety 
violations. However, this law is most remembered not as an early example of work-
place safety legislation, but rather for the fact that it was the first legal implemen-
tation of a color bar, which allowed skilled jobs to be reserved for white workers.
The juxtaposition of safety protections and legalized racial discrimination in 
the same law is emblematic of the way in which settler colonialism shaped South 
Africa’s response to the social question. In this same period, in parts of the Global 
North, burgeoning labor movements were forcing reforms that mitigated both 
absolute poverty and the growing inequalities that accompanied capitalist growth. 
In South Africa, by contrast, both the politics of organized workers and the state’s 
response to them served to deepen settler colonialism’s pattern of racialized 
inequality. The African labor force had been created, in part, by undermining the 
security of African peasants, and the approach to labor and social protections did 
little to reverse this impact.
Early labor legislation barred black workers from striking (the 1911 Native 
Labour Act) and from participating in collective bargaining (the 1909 Industrial 
Disputes Prevention Act). White workers’ demands for protection were frequently 
couched in racial terms. The first major strike on the gold mines, in 1907, was 
led by white workers fighting the use of Asian immigrant labor. Among the first 
agreements signed, once the mines recognized the white workers’ union in 1918, 
was one that sought to halt the mines’ practice of replacing skilled white workers 
with cheaper black workers, demanding that the ratio of seventeen black workers 
to every two higher-paid white workers—the earlier status quo—be continued. In 
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1922, the Rand Revolt, a major general strike that spread into a mass insurrection 
against the government, was carried out under the slogan “workers of the world, 
unite and fight for a white South Africa.”
Two years after the Rand Revolt, South Africa passed its first comprehensive 
industrial-relations legislation. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 aimed 
to recognize trade unions in all industries and to formalize wage negotiations 
and dispute settlements between workers and employers. However, the law only 
applied to white workers, meaning black workers’ wages and working condi-
tions continued to be the prerogative of employers, and any improvements in 
the conditions of black workers relative to that of their white counterparts could 
be resisted in collective bargaining by white unions. Black trade unions were not 
illegal during this period. In fact, one of the most celebrated black trade unions 
in the first half of the twentieth century, the Industrial and Commercial Workers 
Union (ICU), reached its peak membership in the late 1920s. But the prohibition 
on black workers striking, and their exclusion from the institutions of collective 
bargaining, made organizing a challenge, as exemplified by the collapse of the 
ICU by the early 1930s.7
As more white workers were absorbed into privileged positions in the labor 
market, the workplace became increasingly important as a location of welfare 
provision. A means-tested national social pension was introduced in 1928 for 
white and colored workers, but it affected a relatively small portion of the white 
population, most of whom tended to have access to higher-value private pensions 
through their workplaces.8 In 1933 the state established the first national social 
welfare agency. The agency was initially situated within the Department of Labor, 
signifying the association between poverty and wage work. In 1937 Social Welfare 
was made an independent government department. Its primary programs were 
pensions and child welfare, but it also promoted the introduction of a limited 
unemployment insurance, which was instituted for white workers in 1945.9
These developments left South Africa with a widespread social welfare sys-
tem for white workers, even before the 1948 victory of the National Party that 
ushered in Apartheid as official state policy. Apartheid made explicit the racial-
ized definition of the society that the state and social policy should serve. Whites 
were provided exclusive access to superior education, various basic state services, 
democratic representation, collective bargaining institutions, and institutions of 
social protection. Nonwhites were restricted, with inferior education; pass laws, 
which limited their physical movement (especially to cities); forced removal from 
areas designated for exclusive white residence; and a range of other forms of insti-
tutionalized disadvantage. In short, the state’s response to the social question was 
bifurcated between protection for whites and repression for nonwhites.
However, the Apartheid government did give increasing attention to the social 
and economic lives of black South Africans, especially as a widespread crisis of 
social reproduction was developing in rural parts of the country as a result of 
the decline of rural economy that followed the 1913 Land Act. The government’s 
The Social Question in South Africa    175
main concern with this crisis was not the moral imperative to protect citizens, but 
the economic and political implications that would result from a collapse of rural 
economy. The centrality of “traditional” rural spaces to the social and economic 
lives of black people was a fundamental tenant of Apartheid ideology. The official 
justification, for example, of excluding black people from the state pension system 
was “the assumption that Native custom makes provision for maintaining depen-
dent persons’ in rural areas.”10 The rural area was seen not only as a source of social 
security for black South Africans but also as important to the profitability of urban 
mining and industry. Mine companies openly argued that migrant workers’ access 
to rural income allowed them to be paid lower wages in the cities.11
This idea of a rural source for black workers’ social security was likely always 
little more than a convenient assumption on the part of employers and the Apart-
heid state, and it became increasingly difficult to reconcile with reality throughout 
the twentieth century. The Land Act and subsequent forced removals from “white” 
areas put enormous population pressures on the black rural areas, as the growing 
black population was restricted to the 13 percent of the land set aside as “native 
reserves.” This led to overstocking of pastures, soil erosion, and other problems 
that undermined the viability of the reserve economies. Charles Simkins estimates 
that already by 1918, the agricultural production of the reserves could meet less 
than 50 percent of the food requirements of residents. This proportion declined 
significantly, especially after 1950.12
It is noteworthy that some of the main sources of data on the crisis of the 
reserve economies are reports and studies from the South African state itself. State 
officials were concerned with maintaining the reserves both as a source of labor 
for urban industry and as a viable place of residence for the African majority, who 
were legally prevented from permanently settling in cities. One response of the 
government was to promote industrial development in or near the reserves. For 
African residents, this policy offered an alternative to decreasingly viable agricul-
tural activity. Concurrently, for the white government, this policy offered an alter-
native to the politically untenable relocation of African residents to main urban 
centers. From the 1950s, cities in and near the reserves were identified as “growth 
points,” and businesses were offered tax breaks and subsidies to relocate produc-
tion to these places.13 This support for the economies of the reserves was the flip 
side of the state’s repressive answer to the social question for black South Africans. 
The developmental thrust of “separate development” was an attempt to preserve, 
and even strengthen, the self-sufficiency of the reserves, which was necessary to 
underpin the settler colonial response to the social question.
SO CIAL QUESTION IN A NEOLIBER AL-ER A 
DEMO CR ACY
The settler colonial resolution to the social question was remarkably successful 
for the white citizens who were its primary beneficiaries. By the latter part of the 
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twentieth century, absolute poverty was virtually eliminated among the white pop-
ulation. Whites had enjoyed many decades of state policy aimed at advantaging 
them over nonwhite South Africans in the areas of education, land, employment, 
health, and security (see table 1). A testament to the Apartheid state’s success in 
this regard is the durability of whites’ advantages, even after two decades of explicit 
policy aimed at reducing racial inequalities.
However, while the system was successful for its white beneficiaries, its unravel-
ing was, at least in part, a result of its failure to answer the social question of the 
black majority. Waves of protests from workers and students in the 1970s marked 
the beginning of a sustained anti-Apartheid protest movement, which eventually 
Table 10.1 Key aspects of the policy base of racialized inequality under Apartheid.
Policy Sphere Metric of Inequality Description
Education Spending per Pupil Spending levels per pupil were ten times higher in white 
schools than in schools for black Africans.1
Teacher-Student 
Ratio
“In 1987, whereas the student-teacher ratios for whites  
was 16 to 1, that for blacks in so-called white areas was  
41 to 1, and for KwaZulu [a Bantustan or reserve area] 
primary schools was 53 to 1 and KwaZulu secondary 
schools 37 to 1.”2
Labor Market Collective 
Bargaining Rights
Collective bargaining was established for white workers in 
1924. Black workers were prevented from participating in 




Through a range of legislation, occupational categories in 
a number of industries were segregated by race, with black 
workers restricted to low and semi-skilled positions while 
skilled and managerial positions were reserved for whites.
Social Policy Pension Levels When pensions for black South Africans were first 
introduced, in 1944, their levels were set at one-tenth the 
level of white citizens’ pensions. Although racial disparity 
in pensions decreased through the Apartheid era, levels of 
pay were not uniform until 1993.3
Unemployment 
Insurance
A nonracial unemployment insurance scheme was 
established in 1947, just before the Apartheid government 
came to power, but was amended in 1949 to exclude 
black workers4 who did not gain access to unemployment 
assistance again until the late 1970s.5
1 Edward B. Fiske and Helen F. Ladd, Elusive Equity: Education Reform in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institute Press), 5.
2 J. Keith Chick, “Safe-Talk: Collusion in Apartheid Education,” in Society and the Language Classroom, ed. 
H. Coleman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 33.
3 Van der Berg, “South African Social Security,” 488.
4 Iliffe, The African Poor, 141.
5 Van der Berg, “South African Social Security,” 491.
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achieved the victory of nonracial democratic elections in 1994. This was the height 
of the period of neoliberal economic ideology. While neoliberal ideas shaped 
social pacts across the world, South Africa is a uniquely complicated example of a 
state tackling the social question under neoliberalism. The political moment of the 
new democracy compelled the state to deliver tangible improvements in the lives 
of the black majority, but the promises of freedom had to be realized within the 
constraints of a neoliberal global political economy.
As the previous section showed, labor and welfare policy were building blocks 
of white advantage in the pre-Apartheid period of rapid industrialization and 
urbanization. However, between these twin pillars of racialized social policy, it 
was labor laws that gave the strongest support for a white advantage. In the con-
text of sustained economic growth through the mid-twentieth century, the labor 
market became the primary engine of inequality, while the welfare state acted as 
a buffer for white workers who fell through the cracks. In the democratic neolib-
eral era, labor and welfare policy remained the primary levers of addressing the 
social question, this time for all citizens. However, their relative importance was 
reversed. The informalization of wage work and the decline of the manufacturing 
sector in the face of global competition meant that the state had limited ability to 
deliver on its election promise of “a better life for all” through the labor market. It 
was, however, able to expand the already significant welfare state that it had inher-
ited from the Apartheid government.
This is not to say that the post-Apartheid state has not been concerned with 
labor law or the world of work. One of the first major pieces of legislation passed 
by the democratic government was the Labour Relations Act (LRA) of 1995. This 
act made a firm commitment to collective-bargaining institutions and promoted 
co-determination in the governance of workplaces. However, the hopeful vision 
behind the law has never been realized. Collective bargaining has been imple-
mented in unionized sectors, but it has done little to move workers out of the 
“Apartheid wage structure” that confines a significant portion of the employed 
working class to poverty.14 For the majority of workers who are not covered by 
collective bargaining, there have been even fewer improvements. A recently 
introduced national minimum wage is a recognition that these workers have not 
been able to improve their own situation through bargaining, and unions have 
expressed disappointment with the low level at which it has been set (R3,500, or 
roughly US$250 per month).
The failure of the new industrial relations system to improve workers’ situations 
is partially explained by the growth of precarious forms of labor since 1994. The 
1980s had already been a period of economic crisis for the Apartheid state. The 
immediate post-Apartheid economic policy, inspired by the neoliberal orthodoxy 
of the time, tended to exacerbate, rather than alleviate this crisis.15 South Africa has 
experienced a transformation of its labor market, with declining absolute levels 
of employment in both mining and agriculture; the only significant employment 
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growth has taken place in the retail sector, which is dominated by precarious 
work.16 While levels of employment have remained steady in manufacturing, there 
has been a major trend toward precaritization. Some formally unionized manu-
facturing industries have been decimated by the removal of tariff protections, with 
clothing and textiles being the most dramatic example.17
This situation has led some scholars to talk about a growing “representation 
gap” in the private sector, where increasing sections of workers don’t have the asso-
ciational power necessary to utilize the bargaining structures, which were set up 
with a very different workforce in mind.18 A further blow to the functionality of the 
legal system of industrial relations has been the crisis within the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU), the country’s largest union federation, which 
has been plagued by factionalism and splintering. This situation gives little hope 
that the labor market can play the same role for the neoliberal-era social question 
that it did in the settler colonial period. As a result, the importance of welfare 
and social policy has been magnified. Because of the power of neoliberal ideol-
ogy when South Africa achieved democracy, a major expansion of state-provided 
social welfare was unlikely to gain widespread support. However, the democratic 
government was fortunate to inherit one of the more widespread social welfare 
systems among middle-income countries. Since 1994 there has also been the intro-
duction of new forms of state social support, but not without debates and resis-
tance, which serve clarify the contours of the neoliberal-era social question.
A major plank of the post-Apartheid welfare system, the old-age pension, was 
actually put in place by the outgoing Apartheid government on the eve of demo-
cratic elections. The pension first introduced for white and colored workers in 
1928 was expanded to all races by the 1940s, although at much lower levels for 
nonwhites. As the Apartheid system came under political siege in the 1970s and 
1980s, the state began to move toward eliminating racial biases in an attempt to 
gain some legitimacy.19 Throughout the 1980s the value of pensions for black South 
Africans was increased while the value of whites’ pensions was decreased, and by 
1993 pension levels were equalized across races. The democratic government has 
largely maintained the pension system. It has even increased the value of pension 
in real terms after 1994; and in 2008 the pensionable age for men was lowered from 
sixty-five to sixty (making it equal to the age for women).
Yet other aspects of the inherited welfare system could not simply be main-
tained and expanded. The second largest social grant program of the Apartheid 
era, the support for poor mothers with young children, remained skewed toward 
white beneficiaries. While the law did not explicitly set different grant levels 
based on race, a number of logistical challenges were put in the way of nonwhite 
women (in particular, rural black women), who would otherwise qualify for the 
grant. The most significant barrier was that the grant required a court judgment 
to be obtained that demonstrated that the mother had no other sources of sup-
port. Rural black women had far less access to courts than did their urban white 
counterparts.
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In 1996, recognizing the racial bias of the grant, the new government estab-
lished a commission to look into reorganizing the grant for children. The main 
concern of the state was that simply expanding access to the majority of the citi-
zens at given benefit levels would be exceedingly expensive. Therefore, the com-
mission’s proposal, which eventually was implemented, was to expand access, but 
at a significantly reduced grant value. However, COSATU was strongly against 
this solution, and their resistance prompted a brief but important debate about the 
appropriate form of a post-Apartheid welfare state.
COSATU was not against the child grant itself, but the federation pointed out 
the virtual absence of a system of protection against long-term unemployment in a 
country that had one of the highest unemployment rates in the world. Rather than 
simply a “piece-meal tinkering with the elements of the inherited, fragmented 
social security network,”20 COSATU argued for “restructuring the social welfare 
system.”21 COSATU’s position highlighted the inadequacies of a welfare system set 
up by the Apartheid government in the mid-twentieth century for a democratic 
country in a neoliberal global economy. In particular, COSATU called for new 
forms of protection for the unemployed, which had been poorly developed in the 
Apartheid era.
The Apartheid state had used labor market tools to ensure that unemploy-
ment was no more than a residual social problem among the population who were 
included in the settler colonial social compact. The national Unemployment Insur-
ance Fund, which had been first introduced in the 1940s, was aimed a short-term 
cyclical unemployment.22 This had little effect in a post-Apartheid situation, where 
unemployment fluctuated between 25 percent and 30 percent. Furthermore, this 
unemployment was, in part, a legacy of Apartheid-era social policy. The restriction 
of education and job mobility for black workers before 1994 left South Africa with 
a workforce dominated by low-skilled workers. The liberalization of the economy 
after 1994 put these workers in competition with much cheaper low-skilled work-
ers elsewhere in the world.23
One of the solutions that COSATU proposed for rethinking the welfare state 
in light of the post-Apartheid unemployment crisis was the introduction of a 
Basic Income Grant (BIG). The BIG was to be a universal monthly payment that, 
although small in value, would take a step toward decommodifying livelihoods in 
an environment where the labor market had proven to be an insufficient at regu-
lating access to basic needs. Some of its supporters called it a “solidarity grant”24 
and trumpeted it as a form of “ ‘citizen’s income’ that acknowledges a kind of 
nationwide membership and solidarity that would go beyond such (often empty) 
political rituals as voting to include rights to subsistence and consumption.”25 In 
this sense, the debate about reformulating the welfare system was a debate about 
the way in which social policy would structure social inclusion and citizenship in 
the neoliberal era.
The proposal for a BIG received widespread support from unions, 
churches, and other sections of civil society. It was even recommended by the 
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government-appointed Taylor Commission, which was established to evaluate the 
post-Apartheid social policy framework. Yet the proposal was never implemented 
and never even received the backing of the ruling ANC party.26 Instead, the gov-
ernment went ahead with the reforms to the child grant, which is now the second 
largest social grant in terms of value and the largest in terms of recipients. The 
ANC government’s skepticism of the BIG reflected an enduring commitment to 
the idea of wage work and to the labor market as a key vehicle of social inclusion, 
even in a situation where work was not able to serve this function for a significant 
section of the population.27
An adherence to market logic has also shaped the expansion of access to basic 
government services. One of the most onerous legacies of Apartheid that the post-
1994 government had to address was the extreme imbalances in the provision of 
housing and services. Large sections of both urban and rural areas where black 
South Africans lived were not provided with national and municipal services such 
as water and electricity. While the new government has achieved a significant 
expansion of connections to both water and electricity, the provision of these ser-
vices has been marketized, meaning that many poor households remain unable 
to access these basic needs, despite being connected to national and municipal 
infrastructure.
Apartheid policies that limited urban housing construction, in an attempt to 
slow urbanization, also left an enormous housing backlog, estimated by the gov-
ernment to be between 3 and 3.7 million houses in 1999.28 Since 1994 the gov-
ernment has undertaken an enormous project of building new low-cost housing 
for the poor, and by 2010 it had completed between 2.3 and 2.8 million houses.29 
Unlike water and electricity, government houses are usually provided free of cost.
The ANC government’s solution to the neoliberal social question has estab-
lished access to services and grants as a defining feature of citizenship for poor 
South Africans. It has come to be understood as a right, with social movements 
and community protests often explicitly linking the demand for social welfare pro-
visions to the act of voting. For example, beginning with the Landless Peoples 
Movement’s campaign for a boycott of the 2004 national elections (under the slo-
gan “No Land! No Vote!”), calls for election boycotts have become a standard tac-
tic of social movements. In 2009 the Durban shack-dwellers movement Abahlali 
baseMjondolo used the slogan “No Land! No Houses! No Vote!” and the Anti-
Privatisation Forum of Johannesburg included demands for electricity and water 
in their boycott campaign.30
C O OPER ATION AND C ONFLICT:  SO CIAL PROTECTION 
BEYOND POLICY
The expansion of grants and access to services has built a relatively extensive 
system of social welfare in South Africa in comparison to other middle-income 
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countries in the Global South. However, the system remains inadequate to meet 
even the basic needs of the country’s poor. A major portion of the burden of pro-
tection has fallen onto the households of the masses of unemployed and working 
poor in the country. Households have become an important social space in which 
the neoliberal-era social question is addressed. However, in contrast to Apartheid-
era assumptions about traditional forms of social protection among African fami-
lies, households are not simply sites of altruism and communalism. The pressures 
that poverty and unemployment have placed on households has fueled conflict as 
much as cooperation. This section will discuss the household-level social protec-
tion that has become so important. It will also touch on other non-policy social 
spaces in which the social question is present, namely, spiraling personal debt, 
patronage and protest at the level of local government, and xenophobic violence.
The most significant gap in the post-Apartheid social policy framework is the 
lack of significant direct support for the working-age unemployed. As table 2 








Coverage of Total Eligible 
Population
The Elderly Old Age 
Pension
People over sixty-
five who live in 
households that 
meet a means 
test.
3.25 million Covers the vast majority 
of older people, including 
80 percent of age-
eligible black Africans. 
Technically means-tested, 
but in practice, this only 









eighteen who live 
in households 
that meet a 
means test.
12.02 million A means-tested grant. 
There are some problems 
with means and age 
eligible recipients not 
applying,2 but overall, 
an estimated 85 percent 
of poor children are 
covered.3
The Disabled Disability Grant People with 
disabilities 
whose spouses 
meet a means 
test and who 
do not receive 
another grant for 
themselves.
1.08 million Coverage difficult to 
estimate because of 
ambiguities in the 
definition of disabled, but 
a much larger portion 
of disabled people are 
















People who lose 
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contributed to the 
fund can claim 
for a period based 




200,000 at any 
given time5 
As few as 1.3 percent 








is not a right. 








1 million per 
year7
In 2015 there were 1.1 
million beneficiaries of 
EPWP8 who got short-
term (four to six months) 
part-time jobs against 7.4 
million unemployed.9
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shows, coverage is reasonably good for the elderly, poor children, and the disabled. 
However, for the unemployed, there are only two programs available, the Unem-
ployment Insurance Fund (UIF) and the Expanded Public Works Programme 
(EPWP). Both cover only a small portion of the total unemployed. The UIF is 
available only to those who previously had formal work and paid into the fund, 
and even then, the duration of benefits is limited. UIF is not available to those who 
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have never been employed, workers in the informal sector, government employ-
ees, and the long-term unemployed.31
Given this gap, other social grants, and the old-age pension in particular, have 
become a de facto safety net for the long-term unemployed and underemployed. 
These grants reach the working-age unemployed through household and famil-
ial connections. A range of studies drawing on different data sets have shown 
that one of the most common strategies for coping with unemployment is to join 
or remain in the households of grant recipients in order to have some access to 
income.32 The informal welfare system of the household is a gendered one. Wom-
en’s pensions have been shown to have a positive influence on the health of chil-
dren in poor households, an effect that does not extend to pensions paid to men.
Grants are often used as a base from which to develop other income sources. 
Contrary to the common view that social grants disincentive wage work, the South 
African old-age pension has been shown to be positively associated with both 
migration and employment of working-age household members.33 This is evidence 
of what might be called “reverse remittances.” In the Apartheid era, young male 
migrants would send remittances to support family who remained in rural areas. 
However, in the present, older grant recipients often use their grant to support 
younger family members migrating to urban areas. Because unemployment and 
short-term informal work are so prevalent, rural-to-urban migrants might have to 
be supported for some time, often years, before they can find work.
However, to say households are important is not to suggest that they are a 
panacea to the challenges of poverty and precarity. The increased significance of 
resource allocation within the household leads, in many cases, to increased con-
flict.34 Fakier and Cock have described a “crisis of social reproduction” that has 
developed within poor households, in which the female household members who 
bear the burden of caregiving are unable to compensate for the inadequacies of the 
labor market and basic service provision.35 Individuals and households do draw on 
mutualistic ties of solidarity at the community level, but even these are put under 
strain in situations of extreme poverty.36 Erik Bähre has described mutualistic sav-
ings societies in Cape Town as being characterized by “reluctant solidarity,” which 
is as conflictual as it is cooperative, based not on “extensive unifying bonds of 
comradeship, but [on] small bonds fraught with social tension.”37
In addition to the social connections of the household and community, formal 
debt has become an increasingly central feature of the economic lives of many 
South Africans. Poor households often rely on informal lenders, who charge very 
high interest rates, sometimes reaching triple figures.38 Social grant recipients are 
often the most reliable customers of informal lenders, since they have a more 
regular source of income than the precarious and informally employed. It is not 
unusual for grant recipients to pay a significant portion of their payment to lenders 
on a monthly basis. However, the most heavily indebted are not the most poor, but 
the lower middle class, especially civil servants and low-level salaried employees 
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whose access to a steady wage allows them to gain credit with formal lenders.39 
The primary causes of debt for these borrowers are payments for major life events, 
such as marriage, funerals, or higher education for their children.40 The student 
protests that swept the country in the latter part of 2015 demanding free tertiary 
education highlighted the enormous anger and anxiety over the financial barriers 
to universities, which are seen as gateways to some level of financial security and 
stability.
Karl von Holdt, in a study of protest and violence around local government 
across South Africa, has argued that these struggles are, in part, marked by contes-
tation over the meaning and content of citizenship. The most extreme form of this 
contestation is both individual and collective violence, which has led von Holdt 
to characterize South Africa as a “violent democracy.”41 Community violence in 
South Africa takes place at multiple levels. On the one hand, there is the upward-
oriented violence against the state, which explicitly advances demands for pro-
tection and inclusions. This is often intertwined with horizontal violence against 
political opponents, which seeks to gain or protect access to the state for particular 
individuals or groups. Finally, there is downward-oriented xenophobic violence, 
which has become a feature of South African struggles in recent years. In 2008, a 
wave of attacks against foreigners across the country killed sixty-two people and 
displaced thousands. In the years since then, periodic smaller waves of attacks 
have been a regular occurrence, as is the daily reality of a widespread popular 
resentment of non–South Africans among a significant portion of the country’s 
citizens. The xenophobic violence is an explicit expression of subaltern contesta-
tion over the boundaries of inclusion.
The violence and conflict that is present in so many social spaces in South 
Africa is evidence of the degree to which the neoliberal response to the social 
question has pushed the burden of insecurity into the social spaces of households, 
communities, and the market. However, even in these private spaces, the informal 
systems of protection bear the imprint of state policy. Grants, connections to local 
government, and the identity of “citizen” are all resources that are drawn upon, 
and contested, in the livelihood strategies of poor South Africans.
C ONCLUSION
South Africa’s history provides a microcosm of the social question when consid-
ered at a global scale. The initial dislocations of capitalist growth led to a system of 
citizenship-based protection for a privileged minority, while the demands of the 
majority were dealt with through a combination of repression and developmental-
ism. Eventually, contestation from below opened up new democratic space, which 
was accompanied by new forms of generalized social protection. However, the 
social benefits of democracy were limited by changes in the labor market, which 
had been a primary vehicle of protection for the privileged minority of the past, 
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but now came to be marked by widespread insecurity and exclusion. As a result, 
families and communities have become spaces of informal social protection and 
conflict.
At a global scale, the contemporary situation has made clear what was always 
obvious in the South African context: twentieth-century answers to the social 
question are inherently exclusionary and cannot be universalized across the world. 
However, the contemporary limits of the neoliberal-era social question are not set 
in stone. The neoliberal economic orthodoxy that constrained South Africa’s pol-
icy options in its early years of democracy were thoroughly discredited by the 2008 
financial crisis. South Africa is one of the many places where welfare protections 
have been expanded and new types of provision, not linked to the labor market, 
have been debated (for example, the BIG) or implemented (the child grant) over 
the past twenty years. At the same time, demands for seemingly “old-fashioned” 
social protection, such as a national minimum wage and increased access to 
affordable health care, stand beside new visions, such as basic income protection.
An important factor in whether and how these new directions are pursued is 
the protection and extension of democratic spaces. Earlier answers to the social 
question were accompanied by limited expansion of democracy. In the neoliberal 
era in South Africa, as in many countries around the world, the social benefits of 
democracy were limited by the global constraints that neoliberalism placed on 
state actions. In the current moment, it seems possible that such limits could be 
challenged, as evidenced by contemporary debates in South Africa such as those 
raised by recent student protests, which raise possibilities that extend significantly 
beyond the limits of neoliberal orthodoxy. However, an equally plausible possibil-
ity is that the limited gains of democracy lead to frustration and disillusionment 
with the state, leaving space for corruption, empty populism, and other  political 
forces that are unlikely to push forward answers to the still-pressing social  question 
of contemporary global capitalism.
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The Social Question in the Middle East
Past and Present
Kevan Harris
In 1840, a coalition of European powers decided to take on an alarming prob-
lem to their south. The Albanian-born governor of Ottoman Egypt, Mehmed Ali, 
had spent the past two decades building up a formidable industrial and military 
capacity among his assigned territories. A veteran of the Napoleonic wars, the 
Wahhabi revolt, and the Greek rebellion, Ali administered Egypt as a province of 
the Sublime Porte in name only; in reality, he was forging a Mediterranean Prus-
sia. Ali’s troops marched on Palestine, Syria, and then Greece, claiming territory 
and stationing men. The Ottoman sultan could do little about it. Eventually, the 
British and Austrian navies cut off Egyptian supply lines and entered Alexandria’s 
waters. Ali signed a series of capitulations under duress that opened Egyptian mar-
kets, dismantled its manufacturing base, and defanged its military. Egypt experi-
enced rapid underdevelopment, becoming an exporter of raw commodities and 
an importer of European manufactures for the next century.1 It was not until the 
rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser that such statist attempts would occur again in North 
Africa, to be met again with external military response. Today, not coincidentally, 
Egypt lags behind other middle-income states in industrial capacity, and it is the 
world’s largest importer of wheat.
Amid these mid-nineteenth-century efforts of geopolitical renewal, writers 
such as the Egypt-based intellectual Rifa’a al-Tahtawi attempted a synthesis of 
Islamic political thought and European political economy.2 Qasim Amin’s The Lib-
eration of Women and The New Woman appeared not long after. Though the actors 
have changed since al-Tahtawi and Amin paid heed to the emerging social ques-
tion in relation to state building, the debates over the prospects for regional order, 
popular cohesion, and political rejuvenation remain largely unaltered. To chart 
The Social Question in the Middle East    189
the historical terrain, this chapter provides a survey of social regulation and politi-
cal economy for states in Middle East and North Africa (MENA), amid changing 
political-economic conditions, across five broad chronological periods: the tail 
end of the Ottoman and Persian Empires, the colonial interlude, the era of politi-
cal independence, the infitah years of economic opening, and the current upheaval 
of unrest and militarization.
EMPIRES UNR AVELED
Notwithstanding the lack of a settled conceptual or geographic definition for the 
region itself, few zones of the world have been placed in opposition for so long 
than Europe and the Middle East. Mostly recently, the institutional turn in eco-
nomics has produced attempts to explain anew the divergence between them. 
These accounts focus on the persistence of “bad” institutions in MENA areas 
over the longue durée—lack of primogeniture, for instance, or dominance of 
state rulers over local elites.3 Yet economic historians of the region counter that 
institutional pluralism, not uniformity, was the rule. Land-tenure patterns ranged 
from small peasant holdings to tax farming by notables to imperially adminis-
tered estates. Commerce and credit tended to flow through and between urban 
locales, overcoming or bypassing religious dictates against usury through flexible 
interpretations of scripture; women’s and religious minorities’ roles as traders were 
not insignificant. Nomadic tribal confederations ranged across large swaths of the 
region, coexisting within and around agrarian empires and their urban metropo-
les. The “gunpowder empires” of the early modern period—as Marshall Hodgson 
termed the Ottomans and Safavids—more successfully centralized a ruling appa-
ratus and market penetration over large territories compared to previous centu-
ries. Long before Western colonialism, the internal and external borders marked 
out by these and subsequent warring empires laid the foundations for twentieth-
century state-building in the MENA region.
As elsewhere, the internal authority of these empires was irregularly exercised. 
By the end of the eighteenth century, merchants, artisan guilds, and religious 
endowments tended to administer most social aid and welfare in imperial urban 
zones. Charitable giving was, of course, an Islamic injunction. Through the pool-
ing of donations and assets under religious endowments, Hodgson noted, “various 
civic essentials and even amenities were provided for on a private yet dependable 
basis without need or fear of the intervention of political power.”4 Yet the few stud-
ies that exist show that inequality was quite high in West Asian empires. The Gini 
index during the eighteenth century for sampled records in Cairo and Damascus 
hovered around 0.75, while northern Anatolian locales stood at 0.60.5
There was no generalized effect from increased commercial trade with the capi-
talist world economy and penetration by European merchants and militaries in 
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the region. The variation of peasant tenure patterns, merchant-state relations, and 
artisan-guild politics widely differed, based on relations between local elites and 
imperial centers. Hardly the paragon of “Asian despotism,” Ottoman capacity for 
state regulation was, in fact, limited and reached its apex in the sixteenth  century. 
Most revenues were kept by tax-farming notables, while merchant entreaties 
against foreign competition from European trade went largely unheeded.6 The 
recentralization of the Ottoman bureaucracy through nineteenth-century reforms 
brought the state back into social regulation and class formation, most notably in 
Mehmed Ali’s Egypt and the wealthier Ottoman provinces.7 The Persian Empire 
under the Qajar dynasty fared worse at fiscal-military centralization, as evidenced 
by a series of famines during the 1860s and 1870s. During these catastrophes, an 
imperial ban on cereal exports was mandated but unenforceable. Most of the fam-
ine aid came from European missionaries, not the imperial government in Tehran, 
and was directed toward religious minorities.8
Given the unevenness of state penetration combined with social deprivation, it 
is not surprising that unrest broke out. The nineteenth century witnessed a wave 
of uprisings on MENA imperial peripheries that Eric Hobsbawm would have 
instantly recognized as led by primitive rebels: the Sudanese Mahdi, the Dagh-
estani Imam Shamil, the Shirazi Bab (precursor to Bahaism), the Sokoto’s Usman 
dan Fodio (across the Sahara along the Niger), or the Somaliland’s Mohammad 
Abdullah Hassan (the original “Mad Mullah”). These were generally millenarian 
movements that devised radical worldviews and appealed to social justice under 
the guise of Islamic tradition. Whether quickly extinguished or successfully con-
verted into proto-states, their presence was often the pretense for intervention of 
Western colonial armies.
The inability of MENA empires to confront external and internal challenges 
spurred urban intellectuals to argue for more radical social and political measures 
to be carried out by the state. Along with other agrarian empires, such Russia, 
India, and China, the Ottomans and Persians underwent anti-imperialist revolts 
at their urban centers in the early twentieth century. The dynamics were similar: 
elites attempted to redirect their remaining imperial resources toward military 
upgrading, popular mobilization, and nationalist myth-making, often combined 
with a degree of emancipation for women of the elite, at least.9 It is not a coinci-
dence that the first successful attempt occurred at the heart of West Asia’s imperial 
arena: Kemalism. The MENA social compacts of the mid-twentieth century owed 
much to its example.
THE C OLONIAL INTERLUDE
The exercise and profile of European power in the Middle East and North Africa 
varied by subregion. The British pushed Napoleon’s army out of Egypt, but the 
restored Bourbons entered Ottoman Algeria in the 1830s and forcefully integrated 
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territory into the French state. For most of the region, in contrast with sub- Saharan 
Africa, inter-imperialist rivalries slowed the formal usurpation of power. The 
British viewed a contained Ottoman empire as a useful bulwark against Russian 
expansion. Tunisia fell to French gunboats only in the 1880s; Morocco, which had 
always maintained independence from the Ottomans, was partitioned into French 
and Spanish protectorates in the 1910s. The priority of British imperial policy in 
the MENA expanse was geopolitical control over travel routes to South and East 
Asia. The Persian Empire slowly lost territory during the nineteenth century to 
Russian and British incursions, but never formal independence, largely for this 
reason.10 In fact, there was only one direct colony established over two centuries of 
European imperialism in the region—the port of Aden on the Yemeni coast, ruled 
as part of British India.
European capital was less hobbled. French and British banks financed  Ottoman 
state reforms in the mid-nineteenth century, which put them in sound position after 
the Ottomans defaulted. Eventually a European consortium took over Ottoman 
finances in the late nineteenth century, an arrangement that was, unsurprisingly, 
favorable to creditors.11 The vehicle of debt arrears furthered British machinations 
for control over the Suez Canal and indirect rule in Egypt and Sudan. As with 
Iran, the Maghreb region from Morocco to Egypt was racked with famines in the 
1870s. A prime culprit lay partly in the shift to monocropped  agriculture— usually 
wheat and cotton exports—which had suffered from American competition 
and  declining terms of trade during the global depression of the late nineteenth 
 century.12 Yet even amid minor British and French imperial efforts at fostering 
plantation agriculture, a small landholding peasantry persisted throughout most 
of the Ottoman empire into the early twentieth century.
A crucial analytic point for the MENA region, then, is that European imperial-
ist penetration of political and social structures was highly uneven. So was Otto-
man rule, of course—some stretches of the Libyan coast were limited to trading 
posts for warding off Bedouin raids. After the Ottoman Empire shattered in World 
War I, some areas were ruled by mandate administration, others in an indirect 
fashion, and other areas won formal independence through rebellion. Though 
vogue, it is hyperbolic to believe that a Franco-British colonial order created the 
modern Middle East; such an order rather cobbled together structures of rule out 
of a diverse Ottoman-Persian imperial zone. As this zone collapsed on itself dur-
ing the early twentieth century, elite-led nationalist movements of both minority 
and majority varieties—such as Greeks, Serbs, Armenians, Kurds, Turks, Arabs, 
and Maronites—maneuvered among the ruins.13 Some of these intelligentsias 
converted into state rulers; others formed the transnational diasporas that today 
reside in Western metropolises.
The interwar period drew together the challenges of external colonial impo-
sition and domestic political rejuvenation in contradictory relation to the social 
question. In British and French administered territories such as Egypt or Syria, 
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nationalist elites mobilized on social as well as political grounds. In areas where the 
colonial question was largely settled, as in interwar Turkey or Iran, splits appeared 
earlier between nationalist elites and labor movements.14 Unlike Latin America, 
where the interwar years provided a spur toward industrialization, in European-
controlled MENA the emphasis was on regulating the safe flow of goods through 
the region. Early oil discoveries in Khuzestan, Baku, and Kirkuk added to such 
imperatives.
Though the geopolitical priority was control over transit, inter-European 
rivalries allowed for acquisition of capital goods in trading zones. Industrial pro-
duction finally resumed as another world war loomed, leading to increased pro-
letarianization in mandate-administered urban centers. The irony is that, while a 
Bismarckian state-led development project had commenced under the guise of an 
anti-imperialist push for independence in the newly forming nation-states of Tur-
key and Iran, similar processes were occurring under British and French colonial 
administration. Unlike independent states, however, less was spent on welfare and 
public works by colonial elites, and nascent industrial drives remained based in 
enclave areas.
The period from the 1900s to the 1940s forged another of the great ironies of 
modern Middle Eastern history. Amid crises of domestic authority, transnational 
networks of intellectuals—religious and secular, liberal and communist—created 
a common set of frameworks for nation building, myth making, and postcolonial 
citizenship (industrial Japan was a widely held exemplar). Their eventual success 
in forming coherent nation-states out of imperial clay would result in the era-
sure of the memory of their own roles. The transmissions of pamphlets, laborers, 
and revolutionaries along the paths of Istanbul-Tabriz-Baku-Tashkent or Cairo-
Damascus-Baghdad were possible only in a late imperial milieu of cosmopolitan-
ism. Bolstered by armed uprisings and mass organizations, these energies poured 
into the containers of the state over subsequent decades. Yet once the actual work 
of state building commenced, political theory was not easily translated into prac-
tice. If there is a common lesson for MENA states in the interwar and postwar 
periods, it is the failure of elitist liberalism and the success of popular mobilization 
for the purposes of state building. With a freer hand, Kemalist Turkey and Pahlavi 
Iran had already engaged in such efforts during the 1930s. The Wafd (delegation) 
Party in Egypt achieved popular appeal while under British protectorate status, 
but it focused doggedly on independence at the expense of a radical mass agenda. 
European interwar left movements were of little help—the 1936 French popular-
front government refused independence to Syria, Lebanon, and Algeria.
Once decolonization set in, however, a region-wide social compact began to 
coalesce. To map out its contours, a contrast with Latin America is useful. During 
the 1930s rise of populist states in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, public goods and 
social citizenship were extended de jure to the entire citizenry. Latin American 
elites crafted nationalist appeals to mestizaje or racial democracy, which attempted 
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to reverse the stark colonial legacies of ethno-racial classification under slavery 
and indigenous servitude. Yet de facto distribution of these public goods tended 
to fall along preexisting hierarchical lines of social distinction. Unequal access to 
basic health care, education, and infrastructural improvements led to the notori-
ously high inequality observed within much of twentieth-century Latin America.15 
In the MENA region, the opposite occurred, due to the postwar configuration of 
state formation though corporatism.
THE POST WAR C ORPOR ATIST C OMPACT
Initially welcomed by newly independent states, postwar U.S. hegemony was dou-
bly edged in the MENA region. On the one hand, the lack of major U.S. corpo-
rate interests compared to Latin American markets meant that U.S. policy makers 
largely encouraged import substitution and aided state-led development during 
the 1950s and early 1960s. On the other hand, U.S. geopolitical strategy of securing 
favorable access to oil resources through informal alliances laid the foundation for 
a subsequent direct militarization of vital MENA areas. The Cold War context and 
its coalescing divides masked a widely shared approach to social compacts in the 
postwar era. No matter the ideological sheen, state-led planning amid scarcity of 
capital ruled the day. This was the context for nationalization projects from Nasser 
in Egypt to Mossadeq in Iran. Resources could be mobilized through maneuver-
ing among Cold War alliances, but claims of a distinctive model of “Arab social-
ism” were partly aimed at warding off or co-opting the growing power of left-wing 
movements.16
The Turkish example loomed large. In response to the chaos of Ottoman 
collapse and radical domestic upsurges, the Kemalist Republic forged its own 
authoritarian version of Polanyi’s double movement in the 1930s and 1940s: Soviet-
inspired five-year industrialization plans, Italian-inspired corporate labor control, 
and U.S.-inspired distribution of state lands to middle peasants and large land-
owners. As a result, the decentralized land-tenure patterns in Ottoman Anatolia 
were, even into the 1960s, preserved.17
For the new nation-states of the MENA region, this corporatist model of 
industrialization allowed a newly emergent political class to undercut the power 
bases of economic and social rivals. Iran’s Pahlavi monarchy built up a military 
and bureaucratic corps in the 1930s, a concentrated industrial class in the 1960s, 
and only afterward began to force landowners to divest their holdings of village 
lands. The shah compared what he labeled Iran’s 1960s “White Revolution” with 
the examples of Meiji Japan and Bismarckian Prussia.18
Other countries took the same approach in speedier fashion, thus appearing 
all the more radical. Unlike Anatolia, in Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia, and greater Syria, 
land enclosures by tribal chiefdoms and landlords had intensified during the 
early-twentieth-century imperial breakdown. The longevity of new Arab states, 
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therefore, was connected to how their leaders dealt with the social question in 
the countryside. Sixty percent of the Egyptian peasantry was landless in 1950, the 
same ratio existed in Syria, and Iraq’s tribal areas were racked with peasant revolt. 
In Algeria, an extreme case of proletarianized rural wage labor policed by colonial 
arms remained in existence.
These were not traditional social structures inherited by postwar states, but 
rather a product of rapid consolidation by local agrarian elites that dislocated seg-
ments of the population. As Hanna Batatu explained, “Extensive tracts of state 
domain and communal tribal land passed into the hands of new men of capital, 
European colons, ex-warring shaykhs, or retainees of ruling pashas, often through 
forced purchases or without ground of right or any payment whatever.”19 Under 
this politics of notables, sometimes with liberal democratic guises, peasants were 
displaced from kinship networks and communal mechanisms of social repro-
duction. Amid these fraying ties, the revolutionary Arab state promised to step 
in—Egypt in 1952, Tunisia in 1957, Iraq in 1958, Algeria in 1962, Syria in 1963, and 
Libya in 1969, not to mention revolutionary guerrilla movements in Oman, Leba-
non, Yemen, and Jordan from the late 1960s onward. To a large extent, the social 
origins of this new power elite were rural or provincial men who had risen up 
through military and other state institutions. The goal was not a peasant revolu-
tion, however, but a Kemalist revolution to be carried out by bureaucrats from 
above. Democracy was largely seen as a divisive distraction from the task of state 
consolidation.
These processes are often jumbled together under an umbrella category of cli-
entelist rule or neo-patrimonialism, sometimes claimed to be a fixed legacy of 
Ottoman sultanism in Arab lands. But as James Gelvin notes, this line of argu-
ment tended to reveal more about mid-twentieth-century historians and social 
scientists than the actual region itself.20 As Gelvin saw it, Arab corporatism was 
a form of class warfare. Not between capital and labor, but between the new state 
elite and the old oligarchical landed classes. To some degree, the repressive appa-
ratus of many MENA states stem from this rapid and stealthy capture of political 
power by men of rural lower-middle class backgrounds, such as Nasser and Hafez 
al-Assad. Forever paranoid of retaliation by enemies, real or conjured, these men 
first deployed security forces against the “feudal” elite and the same apparatus was 
subsequently marshaled against any perceived threat of ouster.
The incorporation of peasant, worker, and professional strata into state-linked 
bodies provided a countervailing social base from which to break up landholdings 
and dismantle mercantile networks. As a result, rural peasants were not emanci-
pated as a class, but many of their children ended up in public employment in the 
city. A key outcome of the corporatist model—ideological patinas about rule of the 
masses aside—was the provision of rapid upward social mobility for select individ-
uals. As Gilbert Achcar stressed, “the state went so far as to largely substitute itself 
for the private sector by means of both far-reaching nationalization programs and 
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massive public investment.”21 The average annual rate of manufacturing growth 
among MENA states was 13.5 percent in the 1950s and 10.6 percent from 1960 to 
1973. In the realm of social protection, non-state charities and philanthropies of 
the liberal interwar period—schools, workshops, clinics—were eventually taken 
over by the state and homogenized.22
The social compact involved a huge push in credentialing citizens through edu-
cation and high status professional-technical employment. The Nasser period in 
Egypt (1954–1970), for example, saw primary school enrollment rise by 234 percent 
and higher education by 325 percent.23 Education was the path of least resistance 
for many of these states to reduce preexisting class privileges and reorder status 
hierarchies. It also was a tried-and-true method of creating loyal citizens who 
identified with the nation-state’s imagined community more than its competitors.
Once in place, the MENA state-led social compact had an impressive impact 
on livelihoods over the next three decades. The World Bank deemed the model as 
“rapid growth . . . and generous transfers to large parts of the population.” From 
1960 to 1985, Arab states outperformed all other Third World regions except East 
Asia in income growth with equitable income distribution. Infant mortality was 
cut in half, life expectancy increased by ten years. As far as we can trust interna-
tionally comparable poverty lines, MENA became a relatively low-poverty region 
in the Global South: 5.6 percent of the population lived under the $1 per day pur-
chasing power parity (PPP) line in 1990 versus 14.7 percent in East Asia and 28.8 
percent in Latin America.24 The same can be broadly said for internal inequality. 
Though household surveys in MENA tend to measure consumption, not income, 
Gini levels of inequality in the region floated around 0.35 to 0.50, well below the 
extremes faced in Latin America. As shown below with a set of non-income devel-
opment indicators in table 11.1 and figure 11.1, a generation of social leveling argu-
ably took place in the postwar era, with positive trends lasting into the subsequent 
neoliberal period.
As a social compact, however, corporatism contained at least three contradic-
tions that intensified over time. First, a sharp urban bias sat at its core. Even where 
living standards rose in the countryside from land reforms, rural migrants flocked 
to cities in search of higher wages in the form of cash income. With the rise in 
population due to investments in public health, urban bias led to a relative depeas-
antization of the region. The increasing scale of subproletarian life in urban areas 
was impossible to absorb into the state and semi-state apparatus, much less govern 
in a systematic manner. The response by MENA states was to implement systems 
of subsidies and price ceilings for staple goods and fuel. Inefficient in structure 
and regressive in absolute terms of total distribution, but progressive in terms of 
household consumption effects, subsidies were the only universal social policy in 
the Middle East other than primary education. They were blunt but effective forms 
of social protection—an understandable approach by states that did not possess 
the capacity to make their populations “legible” enough to target with anti-poverty 
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Table 11.1 Human development indicators for MENA 10, 1960–2000. (Data from combined 
 averages of ten MENA states—Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, 
 Tunisia, and Yemen. See Farrukh Iqbal, Sustaining Gains in Poverty Reduction and Human 
 Development in the Middle East and North Africa (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), 23.
Indicator 1960 1980 2000
Years of education (average per person over fifteen) 0.9 2.6 5.5
Years of education (average per female over fifteen) 0.5 1.8 4.6
Child mortality (deaths per 1,000 births) 262 138 47
Life expectancy 47 58 68
figure 11.1. Comparative trends in human development indicators, Middle East and North 
Africa, 1960–2000. Data from combined averages of ten MENA states (Algeria, Egypt, 
Iran,  Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen) and thirty non-MENA 
 comparators (defined as middle-income countries in 1980). 
source: Farrukh Iqbal, Sustaining Gains in Poverty Reduction and Human Development in the 
Middle East and North Africa (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), 24.
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programs. After a generation, low prices for commodities became understood as 
citizenship rights, not state privileges. As population and urbanization increased, 
the relative weight of subsidies in state budgets also increased.25 Here lay the social 
setting for the so-called International Monetary Fund riots in Egypt and Tunisia 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when these states attempted and then balked at 
raising prices on subsidized goods. Eventually, most MENA states would open 
up the countryside to capitalist agriculture after the 1980s, which pushed another 
generation into the cities.26
Second, staple subsidies and import substitution industrialization put increas-
ing pressure on MENA states’ balance of payments. There was no single source of 
stable foreign exchange with which to buy capital goods from wealthy countries: 
migration remittances, oil-money transfers, and agrarian surpluses were all too 
volatile and dependent on cyclical fluctuations in the world economy. The easy 
phases of manufacturing, from textiles to consumer goods to auto assembly, had 
pushed up against the demand limits of the domestic market. The OPEC price 
hikes of the 1970s could have, hypothetically, produced the capital to fund a cam-
paign to sustain a region-wide diversified industrialization strategy. That capital, 
however, largely ended up in the hands of financiers in London and New York, 
with Beirut as a secondary beneficiary, due to its regional entrepôt function.
Third, even with the exclusionary form of corporatism practiced by MENA 
states, wherein entry to formal-sector employment was limited, middle-stratum 
beneficiaries began to protest. If the corporatist social compact was limited on the 
outside by the extent of public-sector expansion, it was limited on the inside by the 
empowerment of middle-stratum workers and professionals who demanded the 
democratization of that social compact. This resulted in a regional wave of “unruly 
corporatism.” In countries where “authoritarian elites have attempted to force asso-
ciational life into a tighter state corporatist mold their regimes have been deeply 
shaken or overturned by unanticipatedly powerful oppositions.”27 From Iran to 
Egypt to Syria to Algeria, these oppositions took secular and religious forms—or 
sometimes an amalgam—but they all shared similar social bases. In short, MENA 
corporatism produced its own gravediggers through the twin processes of pro-
letarianization and professionalization. Hardly the stabilizing “authoritarian bar-
gain” pronounced by Western analysts, by the late 1970s the social compact was 
being reassessed by elites and masses across the region.
What of the smaller oil-producing states (and city-states)? Though Saudi Arabia 
had won its independence in the 1930s, some of the littoral Gulf states had come 
into formal sovereignty only by the 1970s, such as the United Arab Emirates or 
Qatar. In most of these territories, an oligarchy of mercantile chiefdoms had long 
ruled, with migrant labor utilized in the pearling and portage industries. British 
patronage and preference led to the rise of selected families as state rulers by the 
late 1930s. Yet unlike in West Asia and North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula was 
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penetrated earlier by U.S. corporate capital, though limited to select sites. In Saudi 
Arabia, labor regulation was borrowed not from the Kemalist model of Turkey, 
but from the racialized model of the United States. U.S. firms such as ARAMCO 
exported labor practices from U.S. mining and oil sectors to the Gulf oilfields, with 
hierarchical tiers of pay and benefits for white versus nonwhite labor. The same 
practices occurred in U.K.-established oil-company towns in southern Iran and 
Iraq, but in those areas, nationalization put an end to racial stratification of labor. 
Not so in the Arabian Peninsula, where state-led development codified a tiered 
racial citizenship in key zones of production well into the 1960s, underpinned by 
a hard gender division of labor. As the Gulf increased in political and economic 
relevance during the late twentieth century, this citizenship regime spread as a 
peninsular model.28 These states’ legitimacy rested on a combination of invented 
tradition and spectacular forms of outwardly displayed modernization. Kinship 
lineages became vital for bounded citizenship and informal networks of capital 
accumulation that spilled over into large Arab states in the 1970s. The Gulf sheik-
doms are not tribal throwbacks by any means, but a subcategory of semi-peripheral 
state formation.29
By the late 1970s, then, the social compact in most MENA states appeared 
similar irrespective of ideological persuasion. Its outlines were a relatively large 
public sector with corporate linkages to various subaltern groups, an expansion 
of primary health and education to most of the population, a subsidization of 
staple goods and services for urban classes, and a piecemeal land reform tailored 
toward strategies of import-substitution industrial growth. Each of these segments 
underwent partial liberalization from the 1980s onward. In Arab states, the overall 
approach was labeled infitah: openness.
The Infitah Years
Asserting that the Middle East’s main dilemma is neoliberalism—that this was the 
cause of the 2011 Arab uprisings, for instance—tells us little about the key dynam-
ics of recent decades. During this period, the MENA region was not subject to 
external or internal pressures of neoliberalization to the extent that occurred in 
most of sub-Saharan Africa or Latin America. Arab states did not actively dis-
mantle their welfare systems as much as let them ossify. Non-state entities moved 
into these states’ widening gaps of service provision. Turkey and Iran expanded 
their social compacts due to intra-elite factional politics and continued reliance 
on popular mobilization. Gulf monarchies, lastly, cordoned off access to social citi-
zenship while actively regulating flows of disposable migrant labor.
Two factors help explain why the region was less subject to the dictates of 
the neoliberal wave of the 1970s–2000s. First, after the Sino-U.S. détente and 
denouement of the Vietnam War, the main theater of military buildup, geopo-
litical conflict, and mass warfare shifted from East Asia to the MENA region. For 
most MENA political elites, and no matter the side of the conflict, war and war 
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preparation served as a useful excuse to fight off technocratic efforts to shrink 
the state’s budget and privatize national “mother” industries. When state elites did 
eventually engage in such activities, they did so dragging their feet, a half-hearted 
neoliberalism at best.
Second, even though many MENA states were not oil producers, the commodity 
bubbles of the 1970s generated sufficient intra-regional transfers of capital, which 
enabled states to keep segments of corporatist welfare systems in place. These 
capital flows, coupled with new sources of external finance for MENA states, pre-
vented the deep balance-of-payments crises that Latin America and sub- Saharan 
Africa experienced in the 1980s and 1990s and allowed for the continued use of the 
public sector as a provider of employment and status attainment. Jordan’s public 
sector, for instance, employed more people in the 2000s than in the 1980s. Egypt’s 
public-sector salaries rose, rather than fell, over the same period.30 To this must be 
added U.S. flows of military and development aid that buffered political elites in 
U.S.-friendly states, such as Egypt and Jordan, from ever being removed, no matter 
the internal situation. Neoliberal elites abound in the Middle East, well received 
among the chattering classes of Northern countries. But they arguably never held 
the reins of power for a long period in anywhere but Turkey, and there were no 
crises deep enough to allow the takeover of Arab states and purging of old guards 
until the 2011 protests.
Given that many of these states’ association with a hazy secular-left discourse 
was embedded in the popular imagination, Islamist movements could more easily 
take advantage of oppositional politics as disillusionment with these states’ social 
compacts mounted. The main beneficiaries of the postwar MENA social compact 
were the middle urban strata created by and linked with state-led development. As 
states began to experiment with piecemeal liberalization, cleavages within these 
middling groups appeared. Political Islam in most Arab states was a phenomenon 
with middle-class roots, often linked through university and professional asso-
ciations. Rarely developed within the seminary traditions of teaching jurispru-
dence, political Islam largely originated outside of existing religious institutions. 
Lay individuals who had amassed prestige in other social spheres also laid claim to 
the application of spiritual knowledge toward social and political reform. Though 
traceable back to the late nineteenth century, political Islam in the late twentieth 
century possessed divisions homologous with its radical secular cousins. There 
were Leninist-type institutions, vertically organized and based on seniority, the 
most successful (and exportable) being Egypt’s Muslim Brothers. And there were 
more anarchic, cellular organizations, often revolving around a charismatic spiri-
tual guide, which appeared from mid-century onward.31
Arab states’ relations with these Islamists were instrumental at best, often seen 
as a tool to harass or compete with the left. When the 1979 Iranian revolution pro-
duced an Islamic-garbed state to replace a crucial ally of the United States, political 
Islam received a wave of prestige among many who knew little about Iran or Shi’a 
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Islam at all. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan produced another “international” 
of Islamists whose varying ideological persuasions collectively cascaded toward 
a Saudi-supported salafism. These two waves of rebellion sometimes flowed in 
tandem, but occasionally crashed into each other.32 Yet the main driver of Islamist 
success was discontent with the status quo and existing alternatives, given the 
failed communist rebellions in the MENA region. As an amorphous framework 
that could equally glom onto Third International Marxism, Third Worldist nation-
alism, or High Street banking, political Islam gave the added benefit of providing a 
regional touchstone to the nativist promise of a region-wide renewal.33
These intellectual streams circulated while Arab states slowly peeled away lay-
ers of the public sector. Instead of applying shock therapy, Arab states shuffled off 
state sectors in piecemeal fashion. The result was a long decline in public invest-
ment with no concurrent uptick in private investment. Since 1985, the ratio of 
fixed investment/GDP in MENA states has remained between 20 percent and 25 
percent. East and South Asian investment rates matched and then surpassed the 
MENA region in the 1980s and 2000s, respectively.34
The OPEC “revolution” that washed Gulf states in capital did not produce a 
deluge of investment toward populous MENA countries. Under a different geo-
political order, perhaps, after the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars these incoming 
revenues could have been converted into a regional equivalent to the Marshall 
plan. The real sink of Gulf capital was, however, Euro-U.S. financial markets, part 
of which then flowed back to Third World countries in the form of Wall Street pri-
vate lending.35 The Gulf capital that did travel to MENA states was targeted toward 
activities that barely distinguished it from Western capital—namely, finance and 
real estate—thus evading state clutches and making it harder to repurpose for 
state-defined developmental goals. The form of business enterprise attached to 
Gulf capitalism, the diversified business conglomerate, was often portrayed as a 
traditional monarchical throwback. This trope hid the fact that family-held hold-
ing companies and state-linked conglomerates were the most common form of 
capital accumulation across the North and the South, globally thriving in neolib-
eral habitats.36
Amid the din, the hidden success story of Arab MENA states during the global 
neoliberal turn was a marked continuation in improvement of non-income wel-
fare levels at a pace commensurate with the postwar statist period. This occurred 
while, relative to wealthy Northern states, per capita income levels stagnated and 
then declined. Between 1985 and 2000, the World Bank reported, MENA “devel-
oping” countries outperformed other middle-income regions in the Global South 
in their improvement of schooling years, literacy levels, child mortality, and life 
expectancy. This occurred, the World Bank puzzled, “despite a considerably slower 
rate of output growth and a decline in levels of public spending.”37 In fact, compared 
to countries at similar income levels, MENA states performed far more poorly in 
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terms of income growth from 1980 to 2000, but their non-income welfare indica-
tors caught up with comparators (shown above in table 11.1 and figure 11.1).
It is indeed puzzling, and the development literature on the region itself con-
tains no consensus to account for the data. The convergence of MENA with other 
regions on non-income welfare indicators is observed even when controlling for 
levels of income and public spending.38 A provisional explanation is that the dif-
ferentia specifica of the region for its non-income basic welfare successes was the 
absence of full-throttled neoliberalism. An ossifying yet intact public sector was 
arguably better than one subject to neoliberal strictures. In a weak state system 
such as that of Lebanon, private spending on health and education was the norm 
even in the postwar years. Yet in those Arab states with a legacy of large public sec-
tors, private spending did not serve as a replacement for public services. Given the 
deepening underinvestment in the state, however, two glaring fissures appeared. 
The quality of service suffered, leading to increased private welfare spending on 
top of existing social provisions. Also, access to advanced health care, as in most 
countries, was limited to those with social insurance—mainly public-sector work-
ers and the wealthier elite. The welfare institutions of the previous era were never 
upgraded or expanded.39
For Iran and Turkey, a breakdown in postwar elite rule—by the 1979 revolu-
tion and the 1980 coup, respectively—resulted in a process of unstable intra-elite 
competition. For all the well-known differences between the two countries, one 
common fact stands out. This elite competition allowed for newly mobilized social 
groups to force demands onto the state. Turkey’s Justice and Development Party 
(AK Party) was the most successful actor of them all, wielding a long-curated pop-
ular mobilization to eventually transform the political structures of the Kemalist 
republic. In the process, the uneven corporatist pillars of the welfare system were 
remolded into a broader—though more fragile—social protection regime that 
mixed market, state, and non-state actors.40 In Iran, continual jockeying within 
a fractious postrevolutionary elite resulted in the proliferation of new welfare 
organizations and inclusionary social provisions. Yet the inability of the state to 
robustly enforce such regulations has produced a mixed welfare regime where 
casualization occurs alongside expanding social insurance protection.41 Neverthe-
less, in both cases, there has been a marked change in social protection systems 
over the past decade, as new segments of the population have been provided access 
to state welfare.
A TIME OF MONSTERS
Given the positive trends mentioned above, why did the Arab uprisings occur? 
Improvements in non-welfare indicators are not incommensurate with political 
unrest. Indeed, coupled with lack of income convergence with the wealthy North, 
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especially in light of the rapid economic growth in other Southern regions and 
growing inequality between MENA subregions, grievances were plenty. Given 
increases in health and education, as well as a concurrent demographic transition 
toward nuclear household sizes, exit and voice were prevalent strategies among 
those who felt blocked from pathways of upward mobility available to  previous 
MENA generations. A common option was, as always, migration. Yet North 
 African migration to southern Europe as well as the Gulf increasingly came under 
harsh constraints—“fortress Europe” in the former, a switch to South Asian labor 
under the latter. The classic political safety valve of migration was, for these coun-
tries, increasingly obstructed.
Some of the social grievances highlighted in the 2011 Arab uprisings, however, 
stem from problems that arose from earlier successes. Mass primary education 
and basic health care were pro-poor interventions by the state. From 1975 to 2010, 
Arab MENA states enjoyed the fastest rate of growth of average years of schooling 
of any region. Fertility rates declined and spending per child increased in house-
holds. As a result, the subsequent generation’s horizons toward education were 
starkly different than that of their parents. Yet on the tertiary level and in the labor 
market, class inequality was reproduced. Quantitative gains in educational attain-
ment masked the qualitative avenues of elite status distinction that reduced the 
returns on so-called human capital. Even more structural factors were at play. The 
baby boom of the 1970s–1980s meant that the number of youth entering the work-
ing age circa 2010 was four to six times that of people reaching retirement age. 
The ossification of public investment channeled the search for employment toward 
private forms, usually informal. Reservation wages tended to be higher than other 
Southern countries, with little incentive for foreign capital to hire skilled or techni-
cal labor.42 These particulars lay under the relatively high formal unemployment 
rates for youth in the region when compared to other Southern countries. As a 
result, many young individuals faced a “failure to launch.”
This social stratum is awkward to classify in theoretical terms. Carrie Wickham 
has labeled such individuals in Egypt as the lumpen intelligentsia, a “professional 
underclass” with “graduates unable to find permanent white-collar employment . . . 
not unemployed so much as forced to accept jobs they perceived as beneath the 
dignity of someone with a university degree.”43 While the 2011 uprisings had roots 
in earlier formal-labor protests, this new stratum was present throughout the ini-
tial protest wave across the region.44
Fortunately, on account of questions added to the 2011 Arab Barometer Survey 
in Tunisia and Egypt, survey data exists that details some of the contours of unrest 
in these two best-known cases. Protest participants in both countries tended to 
be mostly male, with above average income and education levels. Forty-six per-
cent of surveyed protestors in Egypt, for instance, had at least some university 
education, compared to 19 percent of the population as a whole. Unemployment 
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was not a predictor of protest, nor was youth, but protestors disproportionately 
possessed professional and skilled vocational backgrounds compared to the rest 
of the population. More unskilled workers protested in Tunisia than in Egypt, the 
surveys found, but in both cases, there was a disproportionately high rate of pro-
test participation by government employees. Women who did participate tended 
to be active in the labor market. The younger the age of the protestor, the more 
likely he or she was to identify economic grievances or corruption rather than civil 
and political freedoms as the key motivation for participation.45 Snapshot surveys 
cannot capture questions of timing and process in the two countries’ uprisings, 
but they do give some weight to the lumpen intellgentsia’s role as compared to the 
formalized proletariat or informal sub-proletariat.
As a sop to the poorest strata, MENA Arab states did not fully liberalize their 
subsidies on staple goods and fuel. The increasing trend, in line with other regions, 
has been to replace segments of the subsidy system with new “targeted” anti- 
poverty programs. Unlike in Latin America, these are relatively new, small-scale, 
and disconnected from party mobilization. Along with decreased spending on 
public housing and infrastructure, the erosion of the previously established social 
compact has contributed to the informalization and casualization of the domestic 
labor force, including disguised female labor.
If there is an overriding factor determining the trajectory of MENA states, 
however, it is not neoliberalism as much as militarism. While sporadic wars had 
taken place in the region after 1948, since the 1970s there has been a long cascad-
ing war with multiple sub-currents. At least three varieties can be distinguished. 
First are national-expansionist projects under U.S. protection—Israel in Palestine, 
Lebanon, Syria, the Sinai; Iraq into Iran; Saudis in Yemen; and Iranian soft expan-
sionism in Afghanistan and Iraq. Second are national-expansionist projects with-
out U.S. protection—Iraq into Kuwait. Third, and most widespread, are conflicts 
with a popular-war dynamic, where social discontent has combined with national 
anger—Palestinian intifadas, Yemeni oppositions, Hezbollah, the Kurdish Work-
ers’ Party, and Sunni militias in Iraq—which often become entangled with internal 
security struggles and temporary external alliances. This semipermanent state of 
war and increasingly direct intervention by U.S. military forces set the stage for a 
series of counter-revolutions after 2011 to contain the wave of mass uprisings.
The other outcome of this war cascade was to push the political and eco-
nomic leadership of MENA states toward the Gulf monarchies. The Gulf model 
attempted to create a costless, codified capitalism: social citizenship for elite kin-
ship minorities, imported professional and working classes, and territorial secu-
rity subcontracted to the American superpower. Celebrated by sycophants and 
held up as an obverse to state-led development, the model is under strain on all 
three fronts. Young Gulf Arabs are growing tired of being cloistered and pampered 
without career trajectories, leading the monarchies to pursue a half-hearted policy 
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of “nationalization” of the workforce, with increased costs in tow. The long-term 
circulation of South Asian and North African labor throughout the Gulf has built 
up local communities with their own resources of social solidarity. Hidden resis-
tance is still the norm, but costs of containing labor unrest are increasing. The U.S. 
protection umbrella, as the royals are now grumbling, is looking more like a pro-
tection racket. But if the Gulf monarchies had to protect themselves, they would 
also have to enter into a more ordinary balance of power in the region where Iran, 
Turkey, and other possible competitors could claim a veto irrespective of Ameri-
can or Israeli wishes. This has occurred to some extent anyway, making the Gulf 
model even more precarious.
Like the 1848 revolutions, the 2011 uprisings brought forth a reactionary wave 
of violent containment, as well as bargained co-optation. Yet if authoritarian 
retrenchment were again the main outcome, the situation would be less dire. In 
the decade and a half since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, segments of the postwar 
MENA political order shifted back toward the politics of notables, local social for-
mations, and transnational flows of pamphlets, laborers, and revolutionaries. In 
the previous iteration of this, in the early twentieth century, it took waves of anti-
elite, anticolonial mobilization, as well as radical political state-building projects, 
to produce order from the mayhem. For the time being, however, the chances of a 
repeat look rather slim.
Instead, as occurred in Afghanistan during the 1980s and 1990s, coherent and 
crafted political systems along the Maghreb and Levant are being pulverized into 
a set of rump chieftaincies. The labor reserves that had been accumulating during 
the shrinking of the state—unskilled proletarians and skilled professionals alike—
are now the uprooted migrants that sit in the shatter zones of the old geopolitical 
order. As reported in the London Review of Books, “The mobilisation techniques 
used in the Arab Spring, which brought thousands of demonstrators to a given 
place, were now being used to organise the new waves of migration.”46 Increases in 
health and educational attainment produced in postwar social compacts are being 
reversed for a generation. It remains to be seen if outstanding regional powers can 
prevent their own further entanglement or if additional conflagrations will arise.
If some form of cold peace comes to the region after further population resettle-
ment, new social questions for the MENA region might revolve around centers of 
state power and capital accumulation, their exploited peripheries of inclusion, and 
the excluded remainder. Competitive spheres of influence are not necessarily anti-
developmental, if order is established and new cadres are developed. Any stability 
might come in the region only when states build political and social compacts 
that not only incorporate wider segments of the population but also significantly 
reshape their life chances. It is unlikely, though, that emulating the developmental 
models of the present will create a solid compact for MENA states. Processes of 
urbanization and depeasantization that were corollaries of MENA state formation 
meant that rural reserves of semi-proletarian labor of the sort that fueled rapid 
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growth in East Asian markets and lured in Western capital are today nowhere to 
be found. The rural subsidization of social reproduction cannot be re-created. As 
Faruk Tabak insightfully pointed out, access to plantation labor attracted Western 
capital flows in the late nineteenth century, while access to rural networks of semi-
proletarian labor in East Asia supported the manufacturing activities in which 
global capital invested in the late twentieth century. The Ottoman Empire lacked 
the former, and today the Middle East lacks the latter.47
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The  Social Question in Central and Eastern Europe and 
the Making of the Illiberal Right
Don Kalb
Jan Breman and Marcel van der Linden have provocatively claimed that the Global 
South is coming to the North, rather than the other way around.1 Not “develop-
ment” toward Northern modernity, but the informalization and flexibilization of 
the North, as in the South. They see the global economic agenda as hijacked by 
capitalist interests that seek the precariatization and stepped-up exploitation of the 
world’s laboring populations. Global agencies duplicitously present this agenda as 
one of employment generation and poverty reduction—and therefore represent-
ing the “general interest.” “Rigidities” stemming from the old language of labor 
cannot be allowed to derail this. The language of labor is a particularist trick on 
behalf of “rent seekers,” “insiders,” and “oligopolies of labor.” The rhetoric of global 
institutions has perhaps been changing slightly since the financial crises of 2008–
2014. Global economic technocrats consider social inequality now evidently as a 
negative. But the demand for “structural adjustment” and all that it entails in terms 
of precariatization and the flexibility of labor remains pervasive, from the IMF 
to the OECD to the ECB. And then there are “the markets” with their imperious 
judgments and their rejection of inflation. There is no reason to believe that a new 
era has arrived.
But as they are making this claim, Breman and van der Linden are sharply aware 
of differences and differentiations worldwide. There is no implication of global 
homogenization around a zero point of social dumping. But the overall direction 
they picture is globally shared, and it is useful that they state it without further ado. 
Until the recent revolt of “angry white labor” in the provinces—a symbol and fig-
ure of speech, of course, not a simple reality—social democrats and center-liberals 
of the “varieties of capitalism” school would certainly have responded to such a 
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provocation with incredulity. Capitalism, in their vision, is an assortment of sig-
nificantly diverging national varieties, to be chosen by major actors, not a unifying 
global historical complex with various systematically nurtured articulations.2 They 
will point to ongoing investments in “complex manufacturing” in new spaces, 
such as Brazil, Mexico, China, and central and eastern Europe. Such new spaces 
of “high-end” accumulation tend to be associated with upward regulation rather 
than any downward trends. One could also point to the Bolsa Familia in Brazil, 
the recent income-support schemes in India, and the officially sanctioned upward 
pressure on labor and social standards in China as other examples of opposite ten-
dencies.3 There is space for a more dialectical vision in their overall approach, of 
which they are aware. But, once more, it is useful that they state their main thesis 
of capitalist precariatization and social dumping straightforwardly.
Central and eastern Europe (CEE) has been powerfully re-industrialized in the 
years after 1995, though unevenly. It now serves as the premier mass-manufacturing 
site for the European Union and hosts various branches in transnational services 
such as call centers, retailing, media, software, and finance. The “Visegrad coun-
tries” of north-central Europe, plus Slovenia, have been reintegrated into western 
European—above all, German—supply chains. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Hungary are now more open to trade and are more export-dependent than they 
ever were before and more so than most western countries. Until the mid-2000s 
they had also received broadly similar amounts of foreign direct investment per 
capita as China. With 70 percent of GDP generated through international trade, 
the smaller post-socialist countries close to the EU heartland now even beat his-
torical champions of economic openness in the West such as Belgium and the 
Netherlands. They are proportionally among the top exporters worldwide, includ-
ing in such branches as automotives and electronics. Since 2005, countries like 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia have also acquired more complex manufacturing 
industries. The employment structures of the “successful” CEE countries therefore 
tend to be more industrial than those of western or southern Europe, with around 
30 percent of the labor market in manufacturing. So, against this background, 
what about Breman and van der Linden’s universal precariatization thesis?
THE VIOLENCE OF A TR ANSITIONAL RECESSION 
WITH MERE SHALLOW POVERT Y
By 2000, the Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slo-
vakia) and the Baltics were slowly extricating themselves from what experts in 
“transition economics” (a deeply neoliberal field) had disingenuously called the 
“transitional recession.” That so-called transitional recession—the name suggests 
ephemeral qualities—was, in reality, the largest, most devastating and protracted 
social crisis that any part of the modern world had ever experienced. Greece after 
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2010 comes close in purely economic terms, but aggregate economics was only a 
part of the post-socialist crisis, and Greece did so at a much higher level of wealth. 
There had been an average reduction of real wages with around 30 percent, fol-
lowed by a long stagnation of median incomes; consistently high inflation of basic 
prices; a durable reduction of formal employment of some 20 percent across the 
board; and a slide of real GDP anywhere between 20 percent and 50 percent.
This economic devastation coincided with a fundamental restructuring of 
social relationships and social institutions; a swift dwindling of state power and 
authority; ongoing panic about “the law” and security; the threat of open, collec-
tive violence in many places, serious social and cultural tensions everywhere, and 
actual civil wars in the least fortunate spaces; dramatic reversals in male mortality, 
as males died from alcohol and the cold; and even, over time, declines in literacy. 
In the more “successful” post-socialist countries, those losses would be evened out 
sometime between 2000 and 2008; others had to wait a decade or more. Just when 
some modest optimism was emerging, the Wall Street and Euro crises caused seri-
ous hits.4 It was no wonder that the new governing elites in CEE in the early 1990s 
had been terrified that the liberal transition they were overseeing might be undone 
by popular rage.
In the early 1990s, two broad social policy designs resulted from those elite 
fears for popular havoc: (1) Relatively generous pension and disability benefits for 
people above fifty years old, meant to cushion mass redundancies; and (2) unem-
ployment and family benefits, much less generous, to help younger working fami-
lies stay out of absolute poverty.5
With some initial exceptions—the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania—
most countries settled on a dual policy path combining fast economic liberaliza-
tion and privatization with a flanking social policy to cushion the mass exit from 
the labor market and forestall destitution and mass revolts. By the late 1990s the 
upshot for labor had become clear. (1) A massive reduction in formal employment 
throughout the region from some 70 percent to 50 percent of the working pop-
ulation. (2) Consistent medium to high levels of unemployment (in Poland, for 
example, the level was 18 percent for roughly a fifteen-year period). (3) The stabili-
zation of median wages at a very low level that endangered family social reproduc-
tion (fertility declines everywhere). Prices rose quickly to western European levels. 
Apart from Slovenia and the Czech Republic, median wages were stuck anywhere 
between two hundred and five hundred euros per month even by 2015, despite 
two decades of economic growth. (4) There was a proliferation of informal forms 
of social reproduction, including migration (circular, seasonal, and definite), self-
provisioning, petty entrepreneurship, moonlighting, and double and triple jobs. 
(5) The spread of complex practices of income pooling within domestic groups, 
households, and kinship networks, including the income from public transfers 
such as pensions and social benefits. (6) The labor market had become radically 
deregulated in practice. (7) Politics was characterized more by “exit” and voting 
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with the feet than by “voice.”6 Electoral participation hovered generally around a 
low 50 percent.
Taken together, these downward spiraling processes were inevitably leading to 
the making of substantial relative and absolute surplus populations, in particu-
lar outside metropolitan spaces. The Roma were among the most identifiable of 
victimized groups. The sheer duration and extent of their poverty inevitably pro-
duced sharp segregation; illicit economies; violence; harsh competition for space, 
work, and benefits; ethnicization; and the predictable moral panics among local 
working and middle classes, including raw political attacks.
But it has always been deeply misleading to equate social expendability in CEE 
with visible ethnic markers—the liberal “transition lie” par excellence. Large pop-
ulations in the provinces all over CEE, even in the Czech Republic, were turned 
into semi-surplus populations and ostensibly written off. Many poorly educated 
people in CEE found themselves durably caught in a poverty and precarity trap, 
particularly those in regions that were locked into long-term spirals of decline. 
Many people felt squeezed between those with access to the few good jobs and a 
hold over local politics, on the hand, and the ethnicized absolute surplus popula-
tions on the other. In some areas in the 1990s, a majority of actually employed 
or self-imagined working people, the working poor, were coping with household 
income levels around two hundred to three hundred euros per month and were 
structurally dependent on benefits, remittances, and in natura support from kin. 
The household surveys done by a team of urban geographers led by Alison Sten-
ning in Nowa Huta, Poland, and Petrzalka, a suburb of Bratislava, show that this 
was true even for households in the boom cities of the mid-2000s, as well as when 
local unemployment was very low.7 In those relatively well-off urban neighbor-
hoods, if your education was poor or of the wrong type, and if you had young 
children, you were very likely to be in structural poverty. Existential insecurity was 
widespread. This was the case amid economic growth and ostentatious consump-
tion by the few and in a context where politicians were more interested in pointing 
at the latter than caring about the former. In the absence of a credible left, this 
would come to haunt the region in the form of a slowly building politics of anger 
and resentment.
POL ARIZING SO CIET Y,  FUELLING CULTURE TALK: 
THE CLO CKWORK OF HIER ARCHY
Why did labor fail to defend itself against the neoliberal onslaught? This has 
understandably been a key question in the literature. Most authors have resorted 
to a “labor weakness” explanation.8 But if labor was indeed so weak, where did its 
weakness lie or come from? Was it weak on the shop floor, in the national public 
sphere, in post-socialist ideology? Scholars have pointed to subdued labor unions 
under socialism, unions that were mere parts of the administrative apparatus, with 
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no experience of mobilization—but in Poland, the opposite was the case. Other 
authors have pointed to the negative ideological reputation of class politics and 
labor rhetoric after socialism. I have come to doubt the intuitive validity of these 
answers. My own answer has emphasized that labor was sometimes surprisingly 
strong on the shop floor, often decidedly stronger than in the West, but not so on 
the national level—either within the bargaining structure of “tripartism” or on 
the level of public ideas. While labor was not a unified national force, it was an 
important local factor in many places, in companies, and in local politics. Every 
weakness it had seems to have emerged from the disconnect between those levels.
More fundamentally, the weakness of post-socialist labor, I have claimed, was 
a “weakness within.”9 It sprang from the crumbling of socialist solidarity between 
those who stood to gain from capitalism and were—amid stagnation and serious 
economic threats—hoping to finally get a fair price for their labor, and those who 
were seen as going to fail the test of the new value regime. In other words, in antici-
pation of capitalism’s coming, labor fractured between the skilled, flexible, and effi-
cient workers who had often formed the labor aristocracies of socialist production 
and those perceived as the spoilers of the coming efficiency drive. Thus, capitalism 
magnified and pushed into the open the status conflicts that had been obscured 
under socialism. It set a competition in motion, desired as well as real and inevi-
table, among the self-ascribed deserving and those they deemed undeserving, and 
it cracked open the always smoldering but repressed hierarchies of labor under 
socialism. It was this internal conflict within labor—fueled to the utmost by an 
intellectual state class that had made its reputation in the fight against socialism 
and, therefore, in the context of the global slide toward capitalist restoration, was 
always already liable to smoothly embrace neoliberal imaginaries—that ultimately 
explained the “emptiness” of labor as a political category.
Ethnographies have often reported of labor activists being jubilant about the 
coming fairness of the market. Labor organizers were certainly ready to advo-
cate social protection for laid-off workers, and they were sometimes also ready 
to fight—hard—to defend local employment. But, avowedly, not for everyone. 
Annoyance about supposedly pervasive slacking often broke through. There was 
sometimes open satisfaction that those slackers were going to be punished. Ideo-
logically, many workers tended to see the market as their opportunity to finally 
overcome an overbearing socialist mediocrity. The market was seen as the fair 
and transparent “culturally arbitrating” institution that would finally set them free 
from the socialist slackers, as well as from the socialist bureaucrats.10
The labor-weakness account is thus both problematic and more culturally com-
plex than is usually assumed. A realistic relational approach should focus on those 
accelerating social cleavages and emergent hierarchies within labor itself. These 
served to disable collective action by workers as workers. A logic of de-solidar-
ization was rolling through the region and transforming the potential collectivist 
politics of class into the myriad identity politics of culture and hierarchy.
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Jan Breman, writing about the global context, has recently called this the 
return of social Darwinism. The return of such social Darwinism in post-socialist 
Europe—a desire for a natural and meritocratically justified hierarchy—was not 
entirely unlike that in the West itself. But in CEE, it came in a pressure-cooker 
version in a peripheral and dependent capitalism that was going down the road 
of de-industrialization in the 1990s much faster and much more pervasively so 
than anything seen in the West. Nor was there the compensation of fast growth 
in professional and consumer services characteristic of the metropolises of the 
core. The singular reality of CEE was the collapse of a full-scale urban industrial 
modernity—indeed, a labor-based and labor-driven modernity. After the collapse, 
only an uneven rebirth took place amid the culture-talk of deservingness and 
un-deservingness.
Such hierarchical desires emerging “from below” were magnified by a public 
sphere that was openly condescending toward common workers and peasants. The 
whole higher stratum of intellectuals and professionals in eastern Europe, includ-
ing trade union experts and labor representatives themselves, stood to gain sig-
nificantly from capitalist state making and market expansion, and they sensed it. 
Many of the leading intelligentsia and dissidents turned themselves from pro-labor 
advocates into aspiring state classes almost overnight, clamoring for the proliferat-
ing jobs and consultancies within the new central bureaucracies—administrations 
that, in fact, grew in numbers everywhere after socialism. The second echelon of 
apparatchiks and managers, meanwhile, were busy transforming themselves into 
the privatizers of assets that had belonged to the socialist commons or setting 
themselves up as political leaders.11
These social divisions became openly expressed in a new public vocabulary 
of cultural hierarchy from above. Intellectuals and professionals began to iden-
tify themselves boisterously as middle class and civil. Those just below desperately 
aspired to become part of that same enchanted circle. And all were impatiently 
awaiting the advent of a magical “Europe.” Occidentalism took such a flight that, 
inevitably, the “East” became now often openly associated with an unsophisti-
cated red-brown populist despotism of an imagined Asiatic type. While the new 
self-appointed middle classes were righteously claiming their place near or in the 
advanced West, their neighbors without such cultural elevation were expressly rel-
egated to the supposed wastelands of the Orient. Rude Asiatic despotisms were 
seen as rightly befitting uneducated workers and peasants “who could not take 
care of themselves and were used to following orders”—Homo sovieticus types of 
persons.12 Their politics was seen as reflecting precisely this: unruly peasant and 
worker demonstrations were rejected as a form of uncivil and irresponsible “claim-
ing behavior” that had to be rooted out. No respect for the subaltern here. Michal 
Buchowski has called this syndrome “internal orientalism.”13
In such discourses, productivity and efficiency were not seen as abstract prop-
erties of national economies or production processes. Rather, they were perceived 
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as deeply personal characteristics, key indexes of personal worth—thus organi-
cally anticipating and internalizing the tenets of the emergent neoliberalism.14 
Those who failed to live up to the capitalist value regime, those literally described 
as the “losers of transition,” were imagined to also dress, talk, and smell differ-
ently. And they were seen as only having themselves to blame. They were felt to 
be a dead weight on national productivity and dignity, a fifth column against the 
global success of newly sovereign and utterly deserving nations: traitors, embez-
zlers, slackers, hooligans, and drunkards. And it was felt that those who were now 
going to be surplus populations had always already been inappropriately shielded 
by “really existing socialism.” Socialist rulers, it was said, had sought, unforgivably 
in the eyes of many, the alliance with the unruly and the unskilled, thus consigning 
their nations to an embarrassing mediocrity.
In a nutshell: what may have been crucial for the “defeat of solidarity” was how 
the local labor aristocracies felt about the less skilled.15 Labor aristocracies were 
essential for the running of socialist economies.16 These were rather tightly knit 
local working-class groups that were sometimes, as in Poland and Yugoslavia, de 
facto running the factories, including the associated social funds and affiliated 
labor unions and sports associations. By 1989 in Poland, they were sometimes 
even nominating their own directors on the managing boards, as had been com-
monplace in Yugoslavia. Also in Hungary or Romania, directors used to be “men 
of the people,” since they could not rule without the people and, often, not so 
easily against them. But these core groups of workers were increasingly exposed 
to drastic economic pressure and the threat of total social failure. In this life or 
death economic context—a context of fear and ontological insecurity—they were 
not against turning the slackers and the unruly among the unskilled workers into 
a relative surplus population. My interviews with workers in Wroclaw in the late 
1990s were full of such thoughts, internal dialogues about the rightfulness of the 
impatiently awaited restoration of meritocratic hierarchy. Powerful capitalist pres-
sures thus helped to unravel the possibility of solidarity among working classes 
upon which socialism as a form of rule had tenuously rested. The emergent infor-
mal capitalism of the 1980s, and then the quickly accelerating formal capitalism of 
the 1990s, cracked open the can of worms of repressed but visceral cultural hier-
archy and inequality that state socialism had tried to compress and keep together 
against the odds.
The longer historical perspective is essential here. Socialism had installed itself 
in the first half of the twentieth century in a backward region. It was overwhelmed 
by this backwardness. In the absence of a “world revolution,” Soviet socialism was, 
after 1923, pushed into political isolation by a vengeful West. “Socialism in one 
country” was incapable of escaping the logic of uneven and combined develop-
ment in Russia, as well as later in central Europe. The low level of urbanization; 
the prevalence of large, undifferentiated, and underdeveloped agricultural spaces; 
the persistence of large post-feudal latifundia, semi-serfdom, debt peonage, and 
 illiteracy—these were ominous starting points for a socialist modernization by 
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and on behalf of workers and peasants. In the aftermath of Stalin’s counterrevolu-
tion of 1928, agricultural collectivization, planned industrialization, and industry-
driven urbanization were designed to overcome such backwardness. They were 
crucial for defeating Hitler. But the consequences of the prior underdevelopment, 
combined with the contradictions of socialist accumulation itself, put steady limits 
on what could be achieved.17
For one, socialism kept featuring a significant under-urbanization. Aggregate 
urbanization in the 1950s and 1960s was fast, but it brought semiskilled industrial 
jobs to people in new provincial towns rather than concentrating both people and 
jobs in metropolitan centers.18 Agriculture was at best only partly efficient. Scar-
city regularly reappeared, and agricultural prices remained high. Sharp uneven 
development within the region, mostly going from west to east, was also never 
redressed. But even in the more advanced socialist urban districts in western areas, 
such as around Wroclaw (Breslau) or Györ—successful cities in the German and 
Habsburg Empires—a majority of workers in the local light engineering indus-
tries, even in the 1980s, would only have a primary school education. Commut-
ing peasant workers were a large and economically essential category in socialist 
countries. Many urban households would share kitchens, toilets, and bathrooms. 
During the famous and funny Kitchen Debate between Nikita Khrushchev and 
Richard Nixon in 1959, Khrushchev had boasted that in ten years time Soviet work-
ers would enjoy the same comforts as their American counterparts. Instead, after 
one more round of urbanization and industrialization in the early 1960s, Eastern 
European socialism ran up against its limitations and would struggle for another 
twenty years—and ultimately, it would not undo those limitations but rather bury 
itself instead. It had produced an illiberal provincial industrialism of 1930s–1950s 
type. It was unable to switch, like the West, to an education- and consumption-
driven accumulation that would export its blue-collar jobs overseas and sweep up 
agricultural productivity.
So, in the context of the imposition of the capitalist value regime and the conse-
quent fears and uncertainties, there were discourses of personal value, deserving-
ness, and un-deservingness; cultural hierarchy; and “civilization” among common 
workers too, discourses that sought to separate the worthy from the unworthy. 
This was the powerful cocktail of forces (geostrategic, political, economic, social, 
cultural, and psychological) that served to silence, delegitimize, disorganize, dif-
ferentiate, and then divide the eastern European working classes—despite their 
strong position on the local shop floor, despite high union membership, and 
despite sometimes very capable union leaders.
NEOLIBER AL C ONSOLIDATIONS:  UNEVEN, 
C OMBINED,  C ONTR ADICTORY
From 1998 to 2008, the post-Soviet world bifurcated into a set of unevenly neo-
liberalized and differentially transnationalized and financialized spaces.19 The 
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question of labor and its relation with the illiberal Right is part of these territorial 
differentiations within one universalizing, capitalist space-making process. Rela-
tive distance to the operational core of capitalism in the West was a key differenti-
ating property, changing with time. The social policy outcomes ranged from very 
neoliberal in the urban republics of the Baltics to much less so in social democratic 
Slovenia, though, over time, differences were evening out as the financial crises 
and austerity hit.20 Subsequently, the rise to power of illiberal populist forces in 
Hungary and Poland, and then elsewhere in the region, produced new differentia-
tions in the direction of workfare and family benefits. Overall, integration into the 
European Union produced growth and reindustrialization as well as dispossession 
and disenfranchisement.
The average wealth outcomes, in fact, resemble pre–World War I positions vis-
à-vis western Europe: Slovenia and the Czech Republic, once the most industrial 
parts of the Habsburg Empire, are now close to the EU average in wealth and pro-
ductivity, on a par with Portugal and Greece (with some 50 percent to 60 percent 
of median incomes of “the West”); Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland remain below 
40 percent. The rest of the region sticks to some 20 percent to 30 percent. Out-
migration, the response to dispossession, was facilitated by the European Union 
and the Schengen agreements and has been substantial, significantly reducing 
unemployment in Poland, the Baltic republics, Romania, and Bulgaria, countries 
that now occupy top positions in the world out-migration and remittance rank-
ings.21 All CEE countries have some 20 percent to 30 percent of GDP in the infor-
mal economy, making some households less poor in pecuniary terms than they 
appear on paper.
In a highly financialized and globalized environment, hard-pressed post-
socialist states transformed into Schumpeterian “competition states.”22 In the 
competition to attract mobile capital, they began subsidizing foreign investments, 
reducing capital’s tax bill, and putting downward pressure on wages and legal pro-
tections, all on behalf of international competitiveness.
In this context, social and economic policy outcomes were intensely contradic-
tory. One tenacious path dependency from socialism seems to stand out: large 
constituencies never bought into the neoliberal idea that one is expected to simply 
take care of oneself. The notion that families with children, in particular, have a 
right to a minimal standard of social reproduction, including public health and 
education, is popular everywhere in CEE.23 What emerged, then, in the bargain 
between electorates and neoliberalizing states was the oxymoron of a quaint “neo-
liberal paternalism,” an unstable compromise erected upon a fragile fiscal base 
geared to subsidizing transnational capital from the taxation of poor domestic 
labor.
Labor codes, for example, became increasingly neoliberalized over time, with 
the Polish and Slovak codes of the early 2000s unleashing a wave of region-wide 
anti-labor regulations. Romania’s 2013 labor code went perhaps the furthest in 
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allowing unlimited hours, hardly any regulation of hiring and firing, hardly any 
legal redress—a code obscenely offered to lure foreign capital in the midst of the 
euro crisis. Global capital was consistently in favor of downward regulation of 
labor codes, domestic capital sometimes less so.
EU accession, thus, became a contradictory and confusing experience for 
labor. On the one hand, it appears that the acquis communautaire has helped to 
strengthen the de jure legitimacy of central bargaining and tripartism. But in real-
ity, that tripartism remained overly weak. CEE states such as Poland and Romania 
kept a whole array of repressive legal measures in place against labor, including 
severe legal punishment of labor leaders if a strike was not first approved by a 
judge. The EU environment does help in singling out such measures for some 
public opprobrium. But policy competition among states to attract foreign capital, 
the deeper driver of the process, is all but hard-wired in the European Union and 
is further magnified in the CEE context. It has also driven the liberalization of the 
labor market below what was common even in the mid-1990s.24
Policy competition also explains the dramatic slide toward an upwardly redis-
tributional flat rate all over the region. Latvia introduced its flat tax of 13 percent 
in 1993, pushed through by a government of Latvian-American return-migrant 
entrepreneurs and libertarian adventurers. It spread soon through the Baltics and 
was copied by Slovakia in 2003 under Dzurinda’s notoriously neoliberal catch-up 
government, which then caused a chain reaction. Almost overnight, Slovakia was 
turned into a world champion of export-driven car manufacturing—the introduc-
tion of the euro helped too, taking away foreign-exchange risk. By 2010 all CEE 
nations with the exception of Slovenia had introduced flat taxes. They are any-
where between 9 percent and 20 percent for both labor and capital, but rates for 
capital have been declining further. The actual taxation of capital has dwindled 
even below the nominal flat rates. There is little transparency on this, as every-
where else. The effective average taxation of capital in Hungary has been estimated 
at not more than 3 percent.25 Neoliberal paternalism is paid for by labor itself, 
including big subsidies for capital.
In spite of these downward pressures on the finances of CEE states, neolib-
eral governments have not succeeded in radically entrenching or privatizing the 
welfare systems that were introduced in the early 1990s, despite continuous advo-
cacy to that effect by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development. Without exception, post-socialist electorates refused to give up 
their public pension systems and family benefits; nor were they persuaded that 
privatized health would overall be good for them. Where such neoliberalizations 
were driven through, mostly by social democratic governments, large popular 
mobilizations emerged, often supportive of right-wing nationalist parties that con-
demned such policies. Populist right-wing governments in Poland and Hungary 
after 2010 have reversed earlier pension privatizations. In 2016 the Polish Law and 
Justice government drastically increased the benefits for families with children 
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and lowered the pension age—defying the neoliberal current. The rise of “illib-
eral” right-wing governments, such as Orban’s in Hungary and Law and Justice 
in Poland, is largely explained by the popular rejection of the dismantling of the 
post-socialist commons by neoliberal social democrats. Illiberal nationalist parties 
rhetorically and sometimes factually celebrate the protection and well-being of the 
working poor.
CL ASS STRUGGLE WITHOUT CL ASS
In the context of the defeat of Europe’s labor-based modernity, Göran Therborn 
has posed a pertinent question about possible “class compasses” for the global 
twenty-first century.26 What sort of ideological frameworks might class struggle 
without class generate in the twenty-first century? Karl Polanyi’s work perhaps 
suggests an answer.27 Polanyi wrote about “countermovements to protect society” 
against the planned imposition of transnational “free” markets (the “double move-
ment”). In contrast to class movements, these could be on either the Left or the 
Right. He was writing with the central European experience of the interwar period 
as backdrop: fascism and Nazism. The “protection of society” against planned 
marketization in a context of class struggle without class can well take the form 
of the re-articulation of endangered “traditional” hierarchies. The post-socialist 
experience offers a contemporary illustration. In a first phase, dominant until the 
financial crises, neoliberalization and marketization are imposed in a “planned” 
way. In a second, the countermovements that emerged in the first phase become 
dominant, later even regionally hegemonic.
On closer scrutiny, this scheme is too neat. The phases are far less ontologically 
opposed in reality than the Polanyian reading suggests. Both phases of the double 
movement are, in fact, about creating social hierarchies. But they do so differently 
and with a different ideology. The neoliberal marketization phase invited a strong 
undercurrent of consent from the upper segments of labor, as from the governing 
elites, who wanted to believe that their desires for a deserved meritocratic hier-
archy would be realized through fair markets. The second, illiberal phase, can be 
understood as emerging out of the realization among common people and work-
ers, as well as provincial bourgeoisies, that this supposed association of markets 
with meritocratic fairness is an illusion. Hence, in the 1990s, there was the tena-
cious public narrative in the region that real capitalism never arrived, that it was 
always already corrupted by former communists or the secret services now playing 
the democratic game. In the next phase, an authoritarian state was now brought in 
to reassert the interests of deserving working families and provincial bourgeoisies.
In fact, we have, then, two contemporary varieties of social Darwinism. Both 
are striving toward a justified natural hierarchy, the first through markets and 
efficiency, the second through protective nationalist states. The first is a neolib-
eral Darwinism; the second, a national-socialist (stricto sensu) Darwinism. These 
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varieties do not represent a hard bifurcation or opposition. Both seek a hierarchy 
and support the market, though the first trumpets the global market and cosmo-
politanism and employs a liberal state machine, and the second embraces nation-
alist regulation and illiberalism. They are, then, two observable strains within one 
broadly right-wing thread, one seeking economic inequality, the other cultural 
hierarchy, to coin a phrase.
Neoliberal Darwinism is primarily middle-class driven and cosmopolitan, in 
factual as well as imaginary ways, though it does gain substantial working-class 
consent for a while. It deploys notions of meritocratic hierarchy interwoven with 
a glorification of capitalist discipline and efficiency against poorer and weaker 
classes of citizens, and it is ready to turn such citizens into undeserving surplus 
populations.
The national-socialist variant may also be middle-class driven but is more pro-
vincial, rather lower-middle class, literally and stylistically. It rhetorically cherishes 
the deserving national working classes, which are strictly separated (symbolically, 
ritually, and in policy) from the undeserving segments. Indeed, it needs and sum-
mons deserving workers as a vital and mobilized electoral constituency. It projects 
a protection of deserving working members of majority ethno-nations against a 
greedy and disloyal cosmopolitan capitalism, on the one hand, and the “criminal” 
classes dangereuses, the surplus populations, on the other.28 Both strains, the neo-
liberal as well as the national-socialist, are driven by the politics of class struggle 
without class and articulate a vindictive politics of culture and hierarchy.
How did the rise of illiberalism unfold within CEE? Hungary has served as a 
laboratory for the national-socialist form: a right-wing super majority that allowed 
for a new constitution and the construction of an illiberal state with universal 
welfare rights definitively switched off. It was first driven by the rise of a radical 
faction organized around the Jobbik party. This radical right-wing party flirted 
openly with paramilitary exercises in Roma settlements, the harassment of NGOs, 
and a pro-Putin—even pro-Iran—foreign policy, all combined with a rhetorical 
attack on foreign finance, foreign capitalists, the European Union, and the “plebe-
ian” enemies: the ethno-nation, immigrants, and the Roma. The Polish Right does 
not march far behind. It features a stronger labor-contingent than the Hungar-
ian Right and has accordingly claimed stronger positions on child benefits, fam-
ily benefits, and pensions. With this program, it won the Polish presidential and 
parliamentary elections in 2015. Taking programmatic inspiration from Orban’s 
illiberal revolution in Hungary, it is similarly disposed against the Roma, migrants, 
Muslims, gays, Jews, transnational capitalists, and the European Union (though 
it is ready to arm itself against Putin’s Russia and is decidedly more misogynistic 
than Jobbik). Putin himself has mobilized the Russian workers of the provinces 
in an illiberal alliance against the big cities, the gays, the NGOs, and the West. He 
purposefully marshaled them against the “creative classes” of Moscow and other 
big cities who rallied against his usurpation of power in 2011–2012. In Slovakia, 
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Romania, and Ukraine, waves of public attention to issues of deservingness/un-
deservingness have focused on majority/minority relations, often mobilizing the 
nation against poor Roma (if and where they have been “available” for such pur-
poses) or finding others to take the place of the Roma—from Jews and gays to 
communists (the Polish and Ukrainian Right).29
In contrast, the Baltics have produced a strong vernacular neoliberal Darwin-
ism. These countries have again turned into city-states, singularly dominated by 
foreign finance, real estate, entrepreneurial “creative classes,” and associated inputs 
into higher education. Russian speakers, located in the mining provinces close to 
the Russian border, have been seen as the cultural fifth column.30 Russian-speak-
ing miners are the local substitute for the Roma.
The Bulgarian experience of 2013 shows how shifty the class bases and orien-
tations of these angry populisms can be. During a cold February, a nationalist-
protectionist uprising in the provinces, driven by “common Bulgarian people” 
protesting against poverty and the high cost of basic utilities—privatized to trans-
national capitalists—led to the immediate abdication of a neoliberal right-wing 
government. The post-socialist social democrats won the subsequent election but 
made (characteristic) errors with personnel choices. They were immediately con-
fronted with a months-long Sofia-based “Bulgarian middle-class” mobilization, 
kept up day after day over the summer, seeking to keep the nation out of the hands 
of the “red oligarchs and their alliance with the uneducated poor.” It claimed that 
Bulgaria had to be run on behalf of “the productive Bulgarian bourgeoisie” and not 
for “the parasites on welfare.” Protestors in Sofia literally demanded “quality versus 
quantity.”31 For a taste of context, it might be added that in Bulgaria—the Euro-
pean Union’s poorest nation—85 percent of income was spent on basic necessities, 
including utilities. A local journalist remarked dryly that the Bulgarian “productive 
middle classes” who were protesting in Sofia, and who were supposedly beyond 
such dire straights, earned, on average, not much more than four hundred euros 
a month, far below any poverty line in the West of the continent. The outcomes 
of elections in both Bulgaria and Romania in late 2016 suggest, further, that the 
national-socialist politics of class without class in southeastern Europe might, in 
contrast to Poland and Hungary, be carried forward by social democratic parties.
L AB OR ,  POL ANYIAN C OUNTERMOVEMENT S,  AND 
THE MAKING OF THE ILLIBER AL VISEGR AD BLO C
Most westerners first learned about the “Visegrad Bloc” in late 2015 as it loudly 
refused to share in the reallocation of Middle Eastern refugees over EU space. 
The bloc, driven by the avowed “illiberal democracies” of Hungary and Poland, 
was adamantly nationalist, celebrated its national cultures as European fines fleu-
res, and declared that it would defend these national cultures and, indeed, Europe 
itself against a multicultural, cosmopolitan European Union.
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The Visegrad Bloc, however, was not at all new. It had existed as a formal col-
laboration between Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic from 1993 
onward. But as CEE states turned into neoliberal competition states to lure global 
capital away from each other, there was little to discuss among them. Synchro-
nization worked on automatic pilot toward a low point of neoliberalization and 
social dumping. National-socialist (stricto sensu) mobilizations—first in Poland 
in the early 2000s, then in Hungary after 2006, and again around the elections in 
Poland in 2015 and in Slovakia in 2016—transformed this bloc into a boisterous 
illiberal affront against a cosmopolitan European Union.32 Neoliberal cosmopoli-
tanism was meeting its “other” in neo-nationalist electoral mobilizations driven 
by the politics of class without class, endorsed by the “white working classes” of 
the provinces.
As I have argued, we need to place the dynamics of the bloc’s making squarely 
within the relationships between capital, states, labor, and the politics of value. 
While this is not the place to work this out in detail,33 here is a basic outline, offered 
as a coda.
First, an elite campaign of public condescension of workers and peasants took 
place in the 1990s. The “illiberal revolution” should be understood as the popular 
and populist counterpunch. Now the symbolic East had found its voice and spoke 
back in a biting tone against civil society and other idols of the 1990s. The rise of 
illiberalism was the political outcome of the making of the “eastern scale.” I use 
this as a metaphor for the “orientalized” losers of the transition, as well as a refer-
ence to the geographic location where they assembled their critical mass—an elec-
toral bloc of the self-declared disenfranchised of the poor eastern provinces, just 
as the Visegrad Bloc itself assembles the “eastern scale” for the European Union as 
a whole. The illiberal transformations in CEE are driven by electoral mobilization 
processes in the east of the East, in eastern Hungary, eastern Poland and eastern 
Slovakia—in other words, in those territories where the social reproduction of 
labor has stagnated more lastingly than in the new industrial spaces in the western 
manufacturing corridors and around the capital cities. They express the uneven-
ness of capitalist dynamics—the stagnation, humiliation, and disempowerment of 
wide strata of labor—and the spread of relative and absolute surplus populations.
Second, the “eastern scale” came into its own as a veritable Polanyian counter-
movement. It reacted against transnational marketization and the social abandon-
ment associated with the “competition state” syndrome. It emerged as a classical 
Polanyian “protection of society,” substituting itself for the absent capacity of labor 
to confront capital and the state directly.
Third, this Polanyian countermovement came in three phases. The first phase 
played itself out in the late 1990s and early 2000s in Poland and was labor driven. 
Constituencies with a history of radical confrontation with the state—first in the 
context of Solidarnosc and later in the context of privatization, transnationalization, 
and consequent neoliberal dispossessions and disenfranchisements—developed 
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an organic angry politics of resentment against the liberal state classes who had 
driven the moral assault on workers and peasants. This ushered in the first Kac-
zynski government (2005–2007), which went under in chaotic symbolic politics 
and intense infighting. It would depend on the next Hungarian phase of illiberal 
mobilization for the Polish Right to develop a more coherent program.
The second phase played itself out in the northeastern Hungarian districts.34 
Instead of labor, it focused on social reproduction. It came into being as a reaction-
ary popular mobilization against what was perhaps the first genuine social demo-
cratic government in Hungary and CEE at large (2002–2006), which sought to 
extend universal social rights at the municipal level in Hungary, including a guar-
anteed social minimum through family and child benefits and the reintegration of 
Roma children into mainstream primary education. This was a program explic-
itly meant to reintegrate the surplus populations. In a context of media-driven 
moral panics around “gypsy crime,” local constituencies rebelled. In their eyes, 
the social democrats were elevating the undeserving and unemployed Roma to 
the standards of the Magyar “working poor,” from whose taxes the subsidies were 
paid. They refused to subsidize the social reproduction of large and unruly Roma 
families and the desegregation of municipal schools. Relative surplus populations 
were being mobilized against the absolute surplus population. This was nationalist 
hierarchy in action.
This second phase can be understood, however, only in the context of the weak-
ness of the Hungarian state in relation to global capital. This was the deeper cause 
behind the failure of the push toward more universalist welfare-statism and the 
subsequent self-destruction of Hungarian social democracy. Mutual competition 
meant that CEE states failed to tax capital. The social democratic government in 
Hungary financed its new politics of social redistribution largely by selling state debt 
to the financial markets, markets that were flush with liquidity in the early 2000s. 
The Hungarian national bank also allowed Swiss franc– and euro- denominated pri-
vate mortgages with low interest rates (compared to the local currency) to  substitute 
for lacking wage growth. A consumer bonanza was launched with the Hungarian 
private housing stock as collateral. The social democrats exploited, in other words, 
the opportunities of transnational finance to make up for the  weakness of domestic 
labor and the state vis-à-vis transnational industrial capital.
What happened next destroyed social democracy in Hungary and opened 
the gates for an assertive, hierarchy-seeking neo-nationalism. In 2006, with the 
financial crisis approaching, global investors told the social democrats that new 
loans would not be forthcoming. Ferenc Gyurcsáni, the prime minister who had 
just won the 2006 elections from Viktor Orban with his program of universally 
extended social redistribution, conceded in a leaked post-election speech before 
his own activists that he had “lied night and day” and that his promises had to be 
withdrawn immediately. The escalating right-wing rebellion of the working poor 
against universal welfare in northeastern Hungary now rolled into the streets of 
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Budapest. Months of huge and angry mass demonstrations followed, leading to 
the abdication of Gyurcsáni.
Worse came when the financial crisis broke in the fall of 2008. After 1989, Aus-
trian finance had gradually reoccupied the paramount position in southeastern 
Europe that it had lost in the crisis of the 1930s. But in late 2008, in the midst 
of the credit crunch, Viennese financiers panicked. Loans to Hungary and other 
states had been based on global securitization, not on limited Austrian savings. 
Austrian bankers feared that the credit crunch would prevent the rollover of those 
international loans. Outstanding credit to eastern Europe would have to be called 
in, bankrupting millions of households and states in CEE, or, alternatively, they 
would have to allow the bankruptcy of the Austrian banks. The rumor alone led to 
immediate and uncontrolled devaluations of the local currencies, further increas-
ing CEE indebtedness in real terms. Hungary was the largest Austrian liability. The 
Viennese treasury now intervened by calling in the IMF—an episode not widely 
reported in the western media—which decided to offer “preventative credits” to 
CEE states, meant to buffer the local currencies and make a pool of public credit 
available in case Austrian loans were not to be rolled over. Hungary was offered 
a twenty-five-billion-dollar credit line, on the order of magnitude of Argentina’s 
state debt (per head).
The then IMF president, the French socialist Dominique Strauss Kahn, 
explained that old-style IMF conditionality was not on anymore. That turned out 
not quite to be true. The recently introduced “thirteenth month,” which had been 
the ultimate symbol of “growth” for many workers, was cancelled; health was fur-
ther privatized; and serious cuts were made in pensions and public salaries. The 
social democrats were committing nothing less than collective suicide in front of 
the public. The radical Right Jobbik party and its affiliated Magyar Garda began 
exploiting small local conflicts in the East to destroy the social democratic base 
in the eastern provinces, pushing Orban’s Fidesz party further to the populist 
Right. The outcome, in 2010, was the arrival of the most popular radical right-
wing government in Europe. It set about using its two-thirds majority in par-
liament to transform Hungary’s rights-based constitution and welfare state into 
an “illiberal national workfare state.” In the process, it attacked the autonomy of 
the Hungarian National Bank and the Constitutional Court; it renationalized the 
privatized pension system; it attacked the transnational banking sector, as well as 
the transnational media and utilities, and forced them (via new taxes and man-
dated price discounts) to sell out to Hungarian corporations; it nationalized the 
Budapest stock exchange; and, above all, it created a punitive regime against the 
Roma and other surplus populations, institutionalizing the Jobbik-driven moral 
panics of the 2010s into a permanent zero-tolerance workfare regime. The nation 
re-created its “natural” ethno-hierarchy, both domestically in the governing of 
populations and transnationally in the relation to foreign capital. In 2014 it paid 
off its IMF debt.
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In the third phase, this “illiberal democratic” program was taken over by Law 
and Justice in Poland, which in October 2015 won the largest electoral victory 
of any party in Poland since 1989—once again significantly based in the mobi-
lization of its eastern constituencies. Now, with a national-socialist right (stricto 
sensu) actively creating new illiberal state forms in the two key states of CEE, the 
Visegrad Bloc began presenting itself as the “eastern scale” within the European 
Union. For the first time since 1989, it began to speak with a unified political voice, 
condemning “western-imposed multiculturalism” and confronting the European 
Union on civil society, human rights, democracy, and immigration, and doing so 
on behalf of nothing less than the protection of “deserving” domestic labor and 
for the support of the even more deserving national bourgeoisie and its domestic 
accumulation.
The contradictions of social reproduction, in particular of working families, 
until then violently obscured under the mantra of economic growth and “success-
ful transition,” returned to haunt the European Union with a vengeance. Cultural 
hierarchy on behalf of the deserving majority-nation had finally become the new 
good sense. Internally divided labor, state weakness, dispossession, and disenfran-
chisement explain why—the multi-scalar narrative presented here as a coda nar-
rates how.
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The Social Question in Russia
From De-Politicization to a Growing Sense of Exploitation
Karine Clément
Despite the dramatic social shock that has traumatized millions of Russians after 
the fall of the communist system, the social question is, strangely enough, almost 
absent from public discussions, intellectual debates, and even social movements.1 
Social problems are a topic in everyday conversations; there are not a political 
issue. It is striking that in a country where social and labor precariousness is so 
high and where attacks on social security are so harsh, the social question does 
not exist as articulated or explicit preoccupations or demands. In this paper, I will 
try to assess the roots of the depoliticization of the social question in post-Soviet 
Russia and to interrogate whether there are some changes taking place in the ways 
people experience their precarious social and labor conditions today, almost thirty 
years after the end of the communist regime.
In order to explore the problem, I will examine the trajectory of the social ques-
tion issue in post-Soviet Russia from three perspectives: social-economic transfor-
mations since the fall of the Soviet regime and the evolution of public discourses 
on social problems, the subjective and social experience of precariousness and 
informality, and the place of social grievances in claims addressed to the state. 
The analysis is based on primary data from field research on labor relations2 and 
social movements3 carried out by the author and colleagues in several regions and 
organizations from 1995 to 2012, and more recent data come from field research 
on everyday nationalism in contemporary Russia, conducted in 2016–2017.4 The 
paper will argue that concerns about social rights and social consciousness, after a 
long period of collapse, tend to develop among large parts of the society, and that 
they arise from a growing sense of exploitation. The politicization of this social 
consciousness, however, remains problematic.
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MARKET CAPITALISM AND THE “SOVIET-ST YLE 
NEOLIBER ALISM”
The most radical capitalist and neoliberal reforms were made just after the break-
down of the communist regime, leading to social disorientation, impoverishment, 
and precarization of a large majority of the population. However, that neoliberal 
course has not changed, even up to today. The only thing that has changed is the 
rhetorical packaging of the reforms. The ultraliberal tone of the 1990s, when Boris 
Yeltsin was in power, has been replaced by the populist and patriotic discourse of 
the Putin’s government.
Ultraliberal Policy of the 1990s and Weak Resistance to It
Ultraliberal reforms were launched in early 1992 with the price liberalization 
and continued with mass privatization of enterprises, the state withdrawal from 
economy, and the minimization of its social functions. As a result, the income 
of the majority of population plummeted. According to Russian government sta-
tistics, in 1992 real incomes fell by 43.7 percent compared to 1991, then grew a 
little, and after the 1998 default, fell again by 42.5 percent compared to 1991. They 
recovered their pre-reform level only in 2005. Throughout the 1990s, most people 
depending on wages and social payments were brutally impoverished. They faced 
the problem of wage and pension reduction, non-payments, or delays in pay-
ment. Savings vanished because of ultra-inflation and default. Most of the popula-
tion was living in poverty, whereas a small, notorious, and hated segment of the 
population—referred to as the “oligarchs”—was becoming richer and richer. Ben 
Judah describes it thus: “the ‘wild 1990s’ is a synonym in Russian for a decade that 
left practically every family with stories of deprivation, unpaid wages, economic 
humiliation and diminished status.”5
The Soviet welfare system guaranteed free medical care, free education, job 
security, and a stable salary, as well as a pension. Under the Soviet system, social 
services were mostly provided by enterprises, which took care of their “social 
sphere” (kindergartens, schools, sports equipment, health and housing services, or 
gas and water supply). These enterprises got rid of this “social burden” soon after 
the fall of the wall, leading to a deterioration of the social protection and utilities 
system. Another feature of the Soviet social welfare system continued to exist: the 
system of “categorical benefits,” whereby certain categories of the population (such 
as the disabled, war veterans, and large families) received in-kind benefits (lgoty), 
such as free or subsidized public transportation, discounts on residential utilities, 
and free medication. Although the system was highly criticized by international 
financial organizations as inefficient and contrary to market logic, it continued 
to be developed under Yeltsin’s presidency. Indeed, the system was a popular and 
cheap way for state authorities to offset hardships.
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Except for the system of in-kind benefits, the Soviet welfare system broke down 
after the 1991–1992 ultraliberal reforms. Most people found themselves deprived 
of social security and any certainty of what tomorrow would be like. Neither the 
federal state nor local authorities took on the responsibility of providing social 
protection. Instead, they delegated social care to each individual and his or her 
close relatives. As a well-known Russian folk saying goes, “the salvation of those 
who are drowning is the business of those who are drowning”—meaning that one 
is expected to save oneself. Meanwhile, most workers, in all types of  sectors and 
types of ownership, continued to rely on the enterprises’ social sphere, going to 
their workplace even without being paid in order to have at least some  protection—
or at least the illusion of protection. This explains the low level of unemployment.6 
The problem in post-Soviet Russia is not unemployment, rather unpaid wages, 
compulsory leaves, low-wage jobs.
Thus, the first stage in the formation of Russian capitalism (the 1990s) led to 
a sharp economic downturn, a health crisis, the rise of social inequality, and the 
impoverishment of the majority of the population. Between 1989 and 1994, life 
expectancy declined by more than 6.7 years in men (from 64.1 years to 57.4) and 
3.4 years in women (from 74.5 years to 71.1), such a gender gap being linked to the 
stronger stress experienced by men who had lost their role as breadwinners.7 After 
the 1992 economic reforms, official statistics show the poverty rate rising to 33.5 
percent and remaining at a high level all through the 1990s. A large percentage of 
the population lived with incomes not much higher than the official poverty line, 
while a minority monopolized national wealth. A key feature of Russian poverty—
which endures until now—is that it is not limited to specific groups (although 
the disabled, families with many children, single-parent families, and retirees are 
among the most vulnerable categories), but also affects a lot of workers, skilled 
and nonskilled.
However, instead of revolting and rising up against power holders and oli-
garchs, people rejected politics and activism and retreated into their private lives 
and households. There were a couple of reasons for this. First, most of them had to 
survive, and that meant holding multiple jobs, being involved in subsistence and 
petty commodity production, and experiencing despair and exhaustion. Second, 
the dominant neoliberal or consumerist ideology led to self-criticism. Impover-
ished and precarized people tended to blame themselves, painfully enduring pri-
vations and passively hoping for state protection or economic restoration. The 
“tsunami of third-wave marketization,” as Burawoy calls the Russian transition to 
the market,8 led to the prevalence of commodification, economic decline, impov-
erishment of the majority, and stigmatization of blue-collar workers, poor people, 
and others who did not succeed in “adapting” to the market. The market reform 
of the 1990s thus did not lead to mass mobilization and resistance. Social struggles 
mostly broke out in a spontaneous and disordered fashion and were not part of 
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an ongoing mass movement. Industrial disputes occurred, but they were scattered 
and limited, with a few exceptions, like the miners’ strikes and blockades of the 
Trans-Siberian Railway in May–June 1998, in which a broad range of people 
 participated—not only miners, but also machinists, teachers, and municipal- 
services workers.
The Economic Revival of the 2000s and the Development of Grassroots 
Social Movements
The socioeconomic situation started to improve in the 2000s after the 1998 default 
and devaluation of the ruble. Real wages and pensions recovered, and poverty 
fell by half.9 Many people no longer had suffered from the day-to-day struggle 
for survival, and they got a firmer foundation under their feet. However, a new 
stage in neoliberal reforms began in 2004, when the Putin administration aimed at 
restructuring the social welfare system. The neoliberal logic of these reforms is not 
as visible as it was during the 1990s, since the rhetoric changed and the “antisocial” 
reforms were complemented by other “social” ones.
At first, it seems that the government opted for a strict neoliberal course. A flat 
income taxation (13 percent) was introduced in 2001. The new labor code imple-
mented in 2002 strengthened employers’ positions while weakened the employees’ 
ones, especially concerning the possibility for organizing in independent trade 
unions and for striking. Later in the 2000s, legislation on housing, urban, and 
ecological issues was reformed, which increased the cost of utilities and housing 
maintenance due by residents while opening the path to the privatization of com-
munal and housing services and lands. The course chosen by the government, 
under the influence of the World Bank and World Trade Organization, focused on 
price deregulation and privatization.
However, people had recovered from the shock of the 1990s, and new antiso-
cial reforms launched by Putin’s government gave rise to protest. In 2004, Putin’s 
government attacked the social benefits system and faced the most massive protest 
movements post-Soviet Russia has known.10 The mass social movement of winter 
2005 was directed against a reform known as the monetization of in-kind benefits 
(lgoty) that threatened the social benefits of a number of specific professional cate-
gories, but which, in practice, affected most of the population, particularly retirees, 
but also school children, students, the disabled, Chernobyl survivors, Great North 
workers, victims of political repressions, and so on. Protest actions began on a 
small scale and focused on concrete issues: following altercations on buses and 
trolleys, retirees objected to having to pay for their tickets. From bus stop to bus 
stop, indignation spread, as retirees shared their anger in familiar public spaces. 
The news spread like a wildfire, fanned by feelings of indignation, injustice, and 
contempt.
The movement quickly gained traction: only a few days after the monetization 
law went into effect, on January 1, 2005, thousands of people, led by the retirees, 
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demonstrated in the street to demand the law’s repeal. During the month of 
 January, the movement mobilized more than half a million people in 97 towns and 
78 regions across the country. In February, national action days were organized to 
demand that the federal government and Vladimir Putin withdraw the law. The 
national campaign ultimately achieved a partial repeal of the reform—but that was 
a rare occurrence in contemporary Russia.
After this concession, the social policy course seems to have been corrected 
in order to demonstrate the state concern for social care. Federal programs in 
health, housing, and education were launched with great publicity. Special aid was 
granted to young families and mothers through the popular “maternity capital” 
program, which also aimed at demonstrating the state concern for the birthrate. 
These programs had a brief positive effect, improving access to affordable hous-
ing or increasing education and health care workers’ wages. However, the eco-
nomic crisis of 2008–2009 and the recession that began in 2014 have stopped the 
improvement of families’ social situation and living conditions. Currently, the 
problems of wages arrears, diminution of real wages, and impoverishment have 
made a dramatic comeback, while social inequality has been reinforced.
Since the 2005 movement against the monetization of social benefits, the most 
massive mobilization has been a grassroots movement that is scattered, local, and 
rooted in the daily lives of its participants, and that seeks to address particular 
but narrow social problems (school or hospital closures, increases in transport or 
communal charges, problems of urban construction and so forth). These social 
demands are usually not translated in terms of welfare state or social redistribution.
As a whole, social movements, because of their local and spread-out charac-
ter, tend to be largely ignored by the media, whatever their ideological orienta-
tion, and underestimated or delegitimized by the intellectuals for their egoism or 
narrow materialism. This is one explanation of why it has been so difficult for a 
nation-wide social justice movement to develop. Another explanation is the lack 
of mobilizing structures, the high degree of atomization, and the loss of the sense 
of social belonging.
One of the few nation-wide organizational structures is the trade unions, but 
they are not very powerful in mobilizing. In practice, relations between rank-and-
file workers and the management in factories are strongly unbalanced, because of 
the weakness of the trade union movement. The movement remains dominated 
by former official Soviet unions, renamed the Federation of Independent Trade 
Unions of Russia (FNPR), and this group collaborates with management in most 
cases. The alternative or free trade unions more frequently focus on the defense of 
labor rights and confrontations with employers, but they face difficulties gaining 
recognition and support among workers.11 This situation explains the high level of 
distrust toward trade unions in general.
Up to now, the labor movement remained one of the weakest social forces. 
There was a small wave of strikes in 2007–2008, especially in profitable and 
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foreign-owned enterprises, with workers confronting managers with demands for 
higher pay and better working conditions. Then the global economic downturn in 
2009–2010 led to a wave of spontaneous street protests that were focused on indi-
vidual crises (for example, fighting the threat of an enterprising closing entirely or 
conducting mass lay-offs). The crisis of the Russian economy, which began at the 
end of 2014, has generated a new wave of labor protests in manufacturing indus-
tries and in the public sector. However, these protests are scattered and poorly 
organized, and they have not led to any movement for the improvement of the 
workers’ condition as a whole.
Local protests usually do not address the social question as such. The national 
protest most widely covered in the media, the 2011–2012 movement “For Fair Elec-
tions,” did not raise the social question. As some commentators have pointed out,12 
the protest was over moral issues, as illustrated by the most popular slogan: “against 
the party of crooks and thieves.” Still there are some exceptions, mostly in move-
ments emerging from local grassroots initiatives located far from the wealthier 
centers, and especially in labor conflicts, such as the month-long strike at a Ford 
plant (Vsevolozhsk, in the St. Petersburg region) in 2007 or the wave of protests 
for the survival of industrial “monotowns” (towns that were built around a single 
local industry) all around the country in 2009. In some cases, timid voices can be 
heard that raise the issue of social justice; however, they do not demand expres-
sively a new social policy. In most cases, social inequalities, dispossession, and 
impoverishment are experienced as social ills that are beyond the reach of grass-
roots local activists. They fight against unpaid wages, the increase of the housing 
utilities’ prices, the closure of factories, or against the local government. They do 
not fight for social justice or welfare entitlements as such.
The Displaying of the Social Question in the Public Sphere
The evolution of social policy is reflected in the way influential political actors 
have displayed or silenced the social question over time during the post-Soviet 
period. In the dominant discourse of the 1990s, the social question was not a mat-
ter of concern. In the mass media, people who needed social protection were por-
trayed as old, reactionary, or incompetent people who failed in adapting to the 
market and deserved their miserable existence. The tone of “democratic” media 
was particularly disrespectful and ironic while reporting protest actions for the 
payment of wages: protesters were depicted as lazy or reactionary, fools or extrem-
ists. Older people and blue-collar workers were among the most stigmatized. The 
former for their nostalgia for the Soviet Union (“A new misfortune fell down on 
Russia: fools show the way”).13 The latter for their laziness (“They work only three 
days per week, but they are still discontent and participate in protest actions”).14 
Government officials and liberal intellectuals actively participated in the stigmati-
zation of those who needed or demanded social security from the state. They were 
“losers” by their own fault, because they lacked the personal qualities needed in 
the modern, democratic market era.15
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Thus, the market capitalism ideology predominated in the 1990s in the public 
discourse in the media, intellectual circles, and institutional politics. State inter-
vention in the economy was considered as bad for economic growth. Social wel-
fare was a sign of state paternalism and demands for social rights a sign of the 
infantilism of people unable to take care of themselves. Social inequality was good, 
and equality associated with the Soviet uravnilovka, “equalization.” Because of the 
rejection of state-imposed communist ideology, critic of capitalism was taboo and 
class language rejected, even by the workers themselves.
In Putin’s Russia, this rhetoric has radically changed, while the neoliberal 
politics has remained the same. Especially after the massive protests against the 
monetization of social benefits in 2005, the Putin administration accentuated the 
discourse of government concern for the people and the rejection of the neoliberal 
reforms of the 1990s. Thus, one can argue that under Putin a “Soviet-style neo-
liberalism” has developed16 that is a neoliberal politics coupled with populist and 
nationalist values and the ostensible opposition to the 1990s-era economic reforms 
that were so traumatizing to most of the population. The rhetoric is appealing, 
since it was accompanied by economic growth and concrete demonstrative mea-
sures, such as the war on oligarchs controlling Russia’s exporting companies in 
the sectors of oil, gas, and metals (the most famous case being the one that led to 
Michail Khodorkosvky’s imprisonment) and the strengthening of the state author-
ity. In his populist rhetoric, Vladimir Putin turns back to the “hard-working” and 
“conscientious” “ordinary folk,” and primarily speaks to “ordinary citizens” and 
“people who work” and “love Russia.”17
Thus, many impoverished and stigmatized people during the 1990s had their 
self-esteem restored thanks to the change in official public discourse. It is not sur-
prising, then, that many of them support Putin, at least passively. Indeed, the liberal 
and democratic opposition, for its part, continues to use the rhetoric of the 1990s. 
Moscow intelligentsia considers “mass post-Soviet people,” especially poor people 
from the regions, as “paternalistically minded,” authoritarian, and interested more 
in materialistic stuff than in democracy and cultural or ethical values.18 However, 
if welfare claims in post-Soviet society were long delegitimized as sign of the old-
fashioned Soviet “paternalism,” recent studies indicate the development of a social 
consciousness. More people, especially from the lower classes, are beginning to 
raise the issue of socioeconomic injustice and to claim for more social guarantees 
and redistribution. This change goes along with the change in public discourse, 
the growing level of socioeconomic inequality, and the return of socioeconomic 
hardships. As paradoxical as it may seem, the Kremlin’s nationalistic and populist 
discourse offers new clues to perceive social cleavages and to identify with the ones 
who are exploited and despoiled by the economic and political elites. To a cer-
tain extent, the rising popularity of the opposition leader Alexei Navalny and the 
mass participation in the all-Russian protest days against corruption that he initi-
ated in March and June 2017 provide evidence that concerns for social problems 
and inequality are developing. Interviews conducted by sociologists during these 
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mobilizations (including by myself and colleagues from the Laboratory of Public 
Sociology)19 demonstrate the strength of social and economic motives. Interviews 
and videos from demonstrations in regional towns show that people took to the 
streets not so much to protest corruption or support Navalny, but rather to voice 
their discontent with the state of public services, health care, public education, cul-
ture, or roads. They were pushed to protest by their dissatisfaction with wide social 
inequalities between the small group of the rich at the top and the poor major-
ity, between the prosperous central cities and the neglected and remote regional 
towns.
Capitalism Pervading Informal Coping Practices
The social question was difficult to embrace in Russia because of its informal char-
acter, which rendered invisible social insecurity, precariousness, uncertainty, and 
isolation, these being characteristic features of neoliberal capitalism.20 There were 
no available and trustable statistics on informal practices for the 1990s, because the 
Russian State Statistical Agency (Rosstat) did not gather information on it at that 
time. Informality was considered a side effect of the transition toward  capitalism—
and it was expected to soon disappear. The most representative sociological survey, 
the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey of the Higher School of  Economics 
(RLMS-HSE), started to measure informality in the early 2000s and relies on 
the respondents’ willingness to admit their participation in informal activities. 
Using different data sources (the Rosstat statistics as well as the RLMS-HSE data), 
Gimpelson and Kapelyushnikov estimate the informal-sector employment within 
the range of 20 percent to 30 percent in the 2000s.21 Vinogradova, Kozina, and 
Cook make similar estimation, but add non-standard work arrangements that 
encompass more than 40 percent of the enterprises.22 However, not all forms of 
non-standard work arrangements are informal and not all of them are experienced 
by the workers as precarious.
Formal and informal practices are intertwined,23 and this does not facilitate 
the evaluation of informality. Most frequently, informal activities develop inside 
formal economic organizations and in response to the formal order. The most 
widespread such practice was the second, informal job that workers, formally 
employed by registered enterprises, were performing during the 1990s because 
of the nonpayment or underpayment of their wages. Another illustration can be 
the informal work that most workers have to perform in order to do their work—
for instance many workers must repair the machines they work on before using 
them—because of the disorganization of the labor process in the 1990s, and, 
later, because of the increasingly high and practically unfulfillable formal targets 
required by the management in the 2000s.
The social question was difficult to grasp for ordinary people because of the 
overwhelming informality surrounding it. Precariousness, for instance, tended to 
be just coping practices of ingenious people who tried to take care of themselves by 
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themselves. Social public services were provided without clear rules and visibility. 
In-kind benefits, for example, were provided covertly and consisted of things like 
free access to public transport or minimal healthcare, the providers of which were 
not refunded by the state budget. Access to public services of better quality could 
be gained through the payment of small bribes or an informal social network. The 
state encouraged the development of these informal tactics of coping for providing 
social care.
This is changing now, with the new capitalistic logic that the government 
has been pushing in the social sphere and public sector since the second part of 
the 2000s. A new trend toward formalization tried to make the public sector— 
particularly healthcare, education, and housing—conform to the capitalistic logic. 
This worsened social, educational, and medical care available to the poor, disabled, 
seriously ill, or rural people. Neoliberal reforms of the 2000s led to the retrench-
ment of the state from social welfare, to the institutionalization (formalization) of 
a reduced state commitment to the provision of social care, and to the introduc-
tion of neo-managerial principles in the public services sector. In turn, this led to 
the exclusion of large categories of social services from state budget funding and to 
stronger control over workers in the fields of health, social services, and education. 
Being underdeveloped and under growing state control, nongovernmental vol-
untary or philanthropist organizations cannot effectively supplement state social 
welfare. Private profit-based services are not affordable for the majority. Thus, in 
interviews about everyday life, many people complain about the degradation of 
the health care, education, housing, and transport system.24 This is certainly one of 
the explanations for why more people are beginning to address the social question 
now, at least in terms of blaming socioeconomic inequality and the state’s inaction 
on promoting social equity and social welfare guarantees.
THE EXPERIENCE OF PRECARIOUSNESS:  FROM 
DESUBJECTIVATION TO THE GROWING SENSE OF 
EXPLOITATION
In this section, I shall trace the everyday experiences of precariousness and infor-
mality and show how desubjectivation dynamics (the loss of some sense of the self 
and agency) tend to be overcome in recent time.
Desubjectivation
Precariousness was maybe nowhere so widespread and all-pervading as it was 
in the 1990s in Russia. Blue-collar and industrial workers were among the first 
victims of the new labor regime, because of deindustrialization, the loss of the 
previous symbolic significance of the mythicized Soviet proletariat, and the weak 
mobilizing potential of their organizations. In the 1990s, they lost two-thirds of 
their average real wages; most of their social benefits and protections, including 
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guaranteed employment; as well as their social image as the leading class of Soviet 
society. However, workers stood by relatively passively in the face of such a loss. 
Quiescence resulted from their—successful or unsuccessful—adaptation to the 
social transformations that were taking place. Given the degree and scale of these 
transformations, adaptation often meant complete human flexibility, the ability to 
bend and distort oneself without breaking. Some people did break (the men’s life 
expectancy fell dramatically during the 1990s). Others did not break but lost their 
sense of self in the course of constantly adapting to changing conditions. Most of 
them lost points of reference and their orientation in life; they had trouble iden-
tifying themselves and the society they lived in. The field studies I conducted in 
the 1990s among industrial workers led me to describe their life’s precarization as 
a process of desubjectivation.25 Many talked about themselves in derogatory terms: 
“a small screw in the soulless machine,” “nothing,” “unneeded people,” “cattle,” or 
“slaves.” My conclusions are supported by the ethnographic study conducted by 
Sarah Ashwin who explained workers’ “endless patience” by alienation, atomiza-
tion, and workers’ reliance on individual survival strategies.26
Although more affected by it, industrial workers were not the only ones to be 
shaken by precarization, which pervaded all spheres of human living and took a 
thousand faces. The predominant feature of precariousness was and remains infor-
mality, that is to say, the bypassing of the law and the formal (established and col-
lectively recognized) rules.
Informality: From Destabilization to Inhabiting
Although some scholars at the time argued that informality was a legacy of the 
Soviet system that would disappear as soon as market capitalism developed, infor-
mality has not decreased over time. In fact, it has sharply increased in times of 
crisis. Thus, the socioeconomic crisis that began in 2014 because of inflation, the 
collapse of the ruble, decreasing oil prices, and Western sanctions has led to a 
decline in economic growth and income levels, a rise in unemployment, and an 
increase in poverty. The extent of informality and precariousness has increased, as 
testified by the rise of nonpayment or delayed payment of wages, flextime, “volun-
tary” dismissals, and so forth.
The 1990s were the triumph of informality, since all formally existing institu-
tions and laws fell apart or split in the face of the new conditions of life that they 
could no longer constrain or sustain in any way. The only rule was to survive, to 
cope, or to make it work, by any means necessary. Informal practices at the work-
place embraced all aspects of the labor regime.27 Payments varied according to the 
situation, as well as interpersonal relations. There were widespread wage arrears, 
nonpayment, or unofficial payments (so-called envelope wages). The amount 
and mode of calculation of wages were unclear and flexible, as the employers had 
the ability to increase or decrease wages by modifying the amount of workers’ 
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monthly bonus, which often constituted a large part of their wages. Hiring and fir-
ing were discretionary and depended on informal arrangements. Although legisla-
tion was and remains rather stringent concerning workers’ dismissals, it was (and 
continues not to be) not a problem to get rid of anyone—the only condition was to 
obtain the formal agreement of the worker himself or herself. The labor organiza-
tion was chaotic and changing, because of the deterioration of equipment, irregu-
lar provision of raw materials and tools, incoherence of the production policy, 
and arbitrary in human resources management. The tasks workers had to fulfill 
might change daily and went far beyond their formal labor requirements. Com-
pulsory overtime was widespread. Workstations and tasks were often distributed 
according to interpersonal relationships between the worker and the supervisor. 
Rights and obligations at work changed according to individuals’ interpretation 
of them—from relaxation of discipline (a supervisor might look the other way 
regarding small pilferages or smoking or drinking at the workplace in exchange 
for some services or because of a particular worker’s indispensableness) to the 
strengthening of discipline, in case of interpersonal hostility or disloyalty. Inter-
personal relationships also played a major role in the informalization of work. It 
could take the form of informal arrangements or bargaining, informal networks of 
coping inside and outside the enterprise, patron-client relations, or parallel busi-
ness networks within the enterprise. The work schedule could be ultra-flexible—
from absenteeism, tardiness, or leaving early to unpaid overtime or compulsory 
shortening of the workweek with wage cuts or even forced furloughs.
Sometimes these practices could provide self-confidence and reasons to be 
proud of oneself. Sometimes they attenuated social insecurity by giving workers 
ways of coping with material difficulties. In most cases, however, the personal and 
social cost of these practices was quite high. Negative consequences on the char-
acter and solidity of relationships included the uncertainty of what the next day 
would bring and the impossibility of long-term commitments, the implosion of 
the workers’ collective, the lack of trust and solidarity, the withdrawal into oneself, 
and the impossibility to rely on anything but one’s own ability, cleverness, and 
inventiveness. Informality as an everyday life experience meant destabilization 
and devaluation of labor.
A trend toward more formalization unfolded during the 2000s thanks to the 
economic and social improvements, but informal practices never disappeared, 
and they made a massive comeback with the 2014 crisis. However, changes have 
happened in the ways workers experience informality and precariousness. Instead 
of suffering or bending, some of them have begun to deal with precariousness and 
informality in other ways. Although it may look like resilience or the process of 
never-ending individual adaptation to hardships, it is rather a striving to get some 
satisfaction or enjoyment from life. Striving to make one’s life livable and even 
comfortable instead of binding oneself to the neoliberal demands of individual 
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adaptation or market achievement. This can be grasped as a process of “inhabit-
ing”—what Morris, studying working-class people in a Russian monotown, calls 
“the striving for mundane comfort and ordinariness.”28 Inhabiting means living 
one’s life despite insecurity and uncertainty; it means finding it normal, ordinary, 
even good. Inhabiting is “making habitable the inhospitable and insecure space of 
lived experience.”29 This is one of the new trends countering the dynamics of desub-
jectivation prevailing in the 1990s, since inhabiting one’s everyday life, including 
its precarious characters, provides some grounds for gaining self-confidence and 
opening to others and the larger world.
Informality Pervaded by Power Relations and Formal Control
The importance of informal networks (reflected by the Russian term blat) has 
been pointed out by many students of the Russian transition.30 Informal networks 
are the relatives, friends, and acquaintances one turns to (instead of formal insti-
tutions) in order to get help, borrow money, find a job, and so forth. However, 
informal networks have changed since the 1990s; they now form a more symbi-
otic relation with formal institutions and rules. Most people continue to rely to a 
significant degree on informal practices and relationships in everyday life, while 
dealing also with the state institutions and private agents.31 The strengthening of 
the state and market capitalism has led to a new imbalance between informal and 
formal relationships in favor of the latter. Horizontal relations based on kinship 
or friendship have weakened, to the advantage of hierarchical power relations. In 
other words, informal networks have been perverted by formal power relations 
and social inequality. It has become more difficult for poor or subordinate people 
to rely on informal help from relatives or friends.32 Because of the strengthening of 
the market logic and the orientation toward profits, unpaid social care and simply 
helping others tends to lose any attraction for people who must focus on building 
a successful career or who are struggling to comply with new and constraining 
formal requirements in their jobs (for example, teachers or health care personal). 
Russian gender studies gives some empirical evidence of marketization’s destruc-
tive influence on social care and social or kinship relationships.33
Since the 2000s, a new process of formalization has developed that has not led 
to the disappearance of the informality but is aimed at controlling it. The process 
of formalization has taken place because of four circumstances: the pressure of 
international financial institutions for new reforms, Putin’s stated policy of rees-
tablishing the “rule of law,” the policy of increasing state control, and the need to 
sustain predatory capitalism. Pressures toward formalization have strengthened 
since Russia entered a new economic crisis in 2014, aiming at redirecting money 
flows toward the state budget and economic and political elites. In a wide range 
of sectors (such as labor, taxes, housing, and the social sphere), legislation, codes, 
and regulations have been modified in order to better fit the reality of informal-
ity and to control the use people from below could make of it. Informal practices 
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and rules are still part of the labor experience, because they are often necessary in 
order to fulfill formal requirements and bureaucratic control procedures. How-
ever, they have become more risky. If needed (in cases of disloyalty, budget cuts, 
changes in leadership, political or administrative pressures), the set of formal rules 
and regulations can be implemented, and those workers who have resorted to 
informal practices can be punished. Informality has become a more precarious 
line of behavior, at least for the subordinates. Instead of being one of the means 
accessible to them for coping with precariousness, informality became one of the 
means available to the dominants for controlling, bending, and punishing, thus 
accentuating precarization. The formal order is indeed becoming so constraining 
that it is hard to comply with its requirements without informal arrangements, but 
that makes it easy to fall into the trap of the formal control. Thus, the oppressive 
side of informality becomes more graspable.
Gaining the Sense of Exploitation
An important point to add about informality is that it implies some kind of work—
unstable, precarious, or flexible—but still work. Most of the practices mentioned 
above include physical, social, emotional, or cognitive work. This means a life 
invaded by work that is not recognized as such and thus not paid, and work that is 
performed without any labor or social guarantees. Moreover, this work is often not 
recognized and not experienced as such even by the performers. They therefore 
engage in a kind of self-exploitation and cannot demand any formal recognition 
or retribution for that work.
However, this is changing. Surveys confirm a growing sense of social cleavage 
and inequality,34 findings also made in our ongoing research on everyday national-
ism in Russia.35 In-depth interviews with people about their everyday lives show 
a high proportion of them blaming the rising social inequality. One of the most 
widespread views from below on the Kremlin nationalist project is social critical. 
The critique is addressed to the patriotic state propaganda and to the unpatriotic 
behavior of the economic and political elites. The critique is social in its contents, 
people denouncing the antisocial aspects of the policy, especially compared with 
the official discourse of government concern for the people. In interviews, many 
people address claims on the state for welfare protection. They demand recogni-
tion for those who really work for the good of the country, and they blame the 
theft of the state by oligarchic elites who have stolen the wealth of the nation and 
continue to steal money from the people through taxes, low wages, and the rising 
cost of public services and utilities. Below are some typical quotations to provide 
some empirical evidence.
A pensioner, male, St. Petersburg, May 2016: “I cannot figure out how is it pos-
sible that people live so poor in such a rich country.”
A cook, female, St. Petersburg, April 2017: “What kind of patriotism is it to 
force people to work for peanuts?”
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A young high-skilled blue-collar worker, St. Petersburg, Jan. 2017: “I love my 
job—I really enjoy it. And I want to earn money from it. However, it turns out 
to be without any value. Human labor is not valuated anymore.  .  .  . Those fat 
 assholes—sorry—who sit in their chairs in the Duma don’t do anything and earn 
half a million, [and they] are considered far more useful. . . . And what about the 
pensioners? They have worked all their lives for the good of the country! And they 
still have to work in order to survive, instead of traveling and enjoying life, like 
foreign pensioners. It’s a shame! . . . And the regions, all these little towns where 
people live without jobs and money. Why did all factories close?”
A businesswoman, Astrakhan, June 2016: “What is the Crimea for? I don’t need 
it! Increase wages and give our children good education! No! They don’t give us 
anything, only take everything from us!”
A blue-collar worker repairing the roof of an apartment building, Astrakhan, 
June 2016: “Nothing will never change in Russia in our lives. What can change? 
Everything has been seized. It’s business; it is profitable for them—do you 
 understand?—it’s profitable to take everything from the workers, to pay them so 
little. . . . They say, ‘love the motherland and be hungry.’ ”
A collective interview in a courtyard in Astrakhan, June 2016 (all working-class 
women between the ages of thirty and sixty).
—“[Putin] lifts the country up? Not our country, maybe Syria or Crimea.”
—“You know, I don’t think he lifts our country up, nor Crimea and Syria.”
—“Yes, he lifts up the well-offs.”
—“All the money is offshore. . . . Nothing remains in Russia.”
—“Yes, he works for the rich.”
—“Banks also do well—our welfare funds go to the banks.”
—“What did Putin do for the pensioners? What? Nothing! Nothing! Only 
empty words.”
—“They live very well, and we struggle to survive.”
From the analysis of recent data on everyday life experience, I draw the conclu-
sion that a growing sense of exploitation is developing, through which people raise 
the social question, demanding social protection and decent wages for working 
people who work for the welfare of the nation far more than the exploiting oligar-
chic elites controlling the government. A clear social cleavage appears in conversa-
tions that separates those who work in earnest for the good of the country, who 
do something useful or productive (or have done, if speaking of pensioners), and 
those who only talk or live at the expense of the genuine workers.
C ONCLUSION
Striking social changes are unfolding now in Russia, in a direction opposite to 
the atomization, alienation, and desubjectivation dynamics that developed in 
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the 1990s among people impoverished and precaritized by the liberal capital-
ist restructuring. Thirty years after the breakdown of the communist regime, a 
social sense of exploitation is emerging through which the social question is being 
raised. This means that the social question is not so much claims on the state for 
social care as it is the social critique of the state belonging to the oligarchs and of 
the political and economic elites exploiting working people.
This trend is especially widespread among the lower classes, although it’s not 
restricted to them. The awakening of a sense of exploitation is linked to the sta-
bilization of life experience many people experienced in the 2000s, as well as to 
the process of inhabiting one’s social and material environment that gives some of 
them rootedness in their quotidian life experience and allows them to grasp the 
rising social inequality and exploitation. This process is fueled by the feelings of 
outrage that arise from the contradiction between the patriotic state propaganda 
and their everyday life experience. The main issue at stake is the assertion of the 
commonwealth, which has to belong to those who deserve it by their work or their 
real acts for the good of the country. This is a social critical version of nationalism. 
The problem is that this standpoint does not lead to mobilization, except maybe 
through the Navalny anti-corruption campaign. In most cases, social criticism 
and the sense of exploitation are accompanied by a strong sense of powerlessness: 
people do not have any confidence in their ability to change things and to force the 
economic and political elites to stop exploiting people.
In the end, I would interpret the changes occurring now in Russian society 
as a revival of a certain class-based perception of social inequality relying on an 
unexpressed, and maybe unconscious, Marxist frame for grasping the social real-
ity around them. I am encouraged to make such an assertion by my empirical find-
ings and by recent ethnographic studies that also stress “vernacular Marxism”36 as 
a strong framework for the understanding of everyday Russian world. Maybe it 
is time for scientists to come back to Marxism as a theory useful for grasping the 
deep structural constraining process of social changes, as well as the way people, 
more or less consciously or actively, arrange with them.
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Postscript 
The Social Question in Its Global  Incarnation
Jan Breman, Kevan Harris, Ching Kwan Lee, and Marcel van der Linden
The social question emerged during the first decades of the nineteenth-century in 
Europe, when the rise of capitalism led to low wages, long hours, miserable hous-
ing, unemployment, diseases, and social insecurity for the working classes. Trade 
union–led struggles and the well-understood self-interest of elites resulted in a 
comprehensive body of labor rights that gradually led to more inclusive and gener-
ous public support, culminating in the welfare state. Still, the social question never 
lost its initial meaning of aiming at the emancipation of the working class. The 
case studies collected in this volume bear witness to the diversity of the nature and 
handling of the social question in different eras and different regions of the world, 
due, first, to the variety in historical trajectories these regions passed through; sec-
ond, to the plurality in the character of the social forces and their dynamics; and 
third, to the differences in the shaping of politics and policies that either supported 
or ignored welfarism within the national context. Rather than highlighting the 
heterogeneity found across the first, second, and third worlds—terms that anyway 
have rapidly lost their relevance—we have in our introductory chapter focused on 
the commonality that exists in the way the social question is mutedly raised and 
why it remains in limbo in the era of globalized capitalism.
For a number of decades, especially after World War II, it seemed as if the 
social question had more or less been solved in the privileged part of the world. 
Advanced capitalist and so-called socialist countries apparently had defeated 
(or at least marginalized) insecurity and unemployment. Public housing, health 
care, and education facilitated upward mobility and were important markers of a 
trend toward more equity and equality. But this proved to have been a temporary 
and geographically localized success. With the globalized switch to the credo of 
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neoliberalism in the last quarter of the twentieth century, a turnabout that coin-
cided with the dissolution of alternatives to capitalism, the social question made 
a comeback with a vengeance. This has also happened in first world countries 
where universalized welfare policies were, for a couple of decades, successfully 
implemented. In these better-off parts of the planet, the state has retreated from 
securing welfare and protection against adversity to all who can claim citizenship 
rights. As discussed in the introductory chapter, the large majority of humankind 
remained deprived of public benefits aimed at the economically inactive (because 
of old age or disability) and least so in case of cyclical inactivity (because of unem-
ployment or underemployment among able-bodied workers). The emancipatory 
momentum failed to spread and slowly faded away where it existed. It meant that 
the already skewed balance between capital and labor further spiraled in subse-
quent decades.
The return of the social question worldwide is documented in our regional pro-
files as a labor issue first and foremost. The Global South, in particular, is expe-
riencing a crisis of exceptional proportions. Voices from civil society are fully 
justified in saying, “Living wages and decent work for the world’s workers are fun-
damental to ending today’s inequality crisis. All over the world, the economy of 
the 1% is built on the backs of low paid workers, often women, who earn poverty 
wages and are denied basic rights.”1 But the social question is not an issue only for 
the South. It is returning to those parts of the world that appeared to have largely 
solved the problem. The tempestuous economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s 
created the impression that capitalism had at last become “social.” The average 
income level grew with an unprecedented speed, and the level of consumption 
increased so fast that many social scientists began to believe that the old class soci-
ety had elevated itself to a higher level and that work had lost its central place in 
social development. When the southern European dictatorships collapsed in the 
1970s and eastern European “actually existing socialism” imploded around 1990, 
many believed that the victory of a liberal and social capitalism was final. The “end 
of history” seemed to have arrived.
Nothing could have been further from the truth. In the “old” capitalist coun-
tries, the average profit rates had—despite some interruptions—been declining 
since the 1960s. The shipbuilding and textile industries were the first to move 
many of their production sites to East Asia and other regions with low wages. The 
entry of the People’s Republic of China, the former Soviet Union, and a liberalizing 
Republic of India caused a true “labor supply shock,” doubling the total number 
of workers producing for the world market and thus globally reducing bargain-
ing power of the working class. Full employment disappeared as the standard to 
adhere to. In line with the prescribed recipe from the directorate of neoliberal 
capitalism, the IMF and World Bank, the economy became increasingly informal-
ized. The shift to labor-market flexibilization led to the phasing out of regular as 
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well as regulated employment. In the Global South, the much-awaited transition 
from informality to formality had only haltingly taken place when the switch back 
to informality emerged as a firm trend—in the Global North as well as the South. 
After the 1980s the trajectory leading to development, which had postulated that 
the Rest would follow the West—began to turn in the opposite direction.
Both in the advanced capitalist and the former “socialist” countries, attain-
ments such as the “standard employment relationship,” high wages, and social 
security arrangements came increasingly under attack. Already since the 1980s 
“nonstandard employment relationships” had become more common. Contin-
gent, precarious, and temporary jobs are becoming the norm. The outbreak of 
the global economic crisis since 2007 has accelerated this downward trend enor-
mously. It is now for all of us to see that “social capitalism” was only a temporary 
interlude before unrestrained market capitalism. The insecurity and poverty that 
have always been with the large majority of the world’s population are now becom-
ing endemic in the Global North. The demolition of social capitalism confirms an 
insight in a long-term trend that the philosopher István Mészáros expressed as 
follows: “The objective reality of different rates of exploitation—both within a given 
country and in the world system of capital—is as unquestionable as are the objec-
tive differences in the rates of profit at any particular time. .  .  . All the same, the 
reality of the different rates of exploitation and profit does not alter the fundamen-
tal law itself: i.e. the growing equalization of the differential rates of exploitation as 
the global trend of development of world capital.”2 The fierce competition between 
capitals has a clear downward effect on the quality of life and work in significant 
parts of globalized capitalism.
Unemployment and underemployment have remained a massive challenge 
for the developing world. In the 1990s, economic historian Paul Bairoch esti-
mated that in the Global South “total inactivity amounts to around 30 to 40 per-
cent of the potentially active time.”3 In subsequent years, the situation is unlikely 
to have improved and may even have become worse. According to the World 
Employment Social Outlook 2017, vulnerable forms of employment are expected 
to remain above 42 percent of total employment, accounting for 1.4 billion people 
the world all over. In developing countries, the proportion of workers employed 
in vulnerable forms of labor rose to four out of five workers. Living on less than 
$3.10 per day in purchasing power terms, which is the ILO’s yardstick for coping 
existence, nearly half of the laboring poor in South Asia and two-thirds of them 
in sub-Saharan Africa were stuck in moderate to extreme working poverty in 
2016.4 The countries of the South today differ from the advancing countries dur-
ing the nineteenth century in two fundamental ways. In the nineteenth century, 
average unemployment rates were far lower in the cities of the currently devel-
oped countries. Ranging from merely 4 percent to 6 percent, it indicated the 
labor-intensive character of the urban-industrial transformation process at that 
time. And most importantly, the unemployment was cyclical, that is, essentially 
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concentrated in the years of economic adversity, whereas in the Global South, 
unemployment is structural.
The crisis that has kept the world in its grip for the last decade has immensely 
intensified the struggle from above for lower wages and less social security. And 
since the attainments of the working classes have been based to a significant extent 
on the redistribution of income within the working classes, within and between 
countries, this also implies that huge sums of money are channeled away from 
the workers’ total wage fund (of which deferred wages in pension funds are also 
a major part) and are transferred to capital. The reversal indicates the return of 
the social question also on the agenda of the rich countries. To carve out a niche 
through self-employment, self-provision, and self-representation is endorsed and 
hailed, but it is the socioeconomic policy of the last resort for a globalized work-
force bereft of proper jobs and decent income. The multitudes that do not manage 
to find waged employment are not supposed to be out of work; they are listed as 
own-account workers, with the added warning that the state won’t help people 
who can’t help themselves. The predicament of the laboring poor in the catch-up 
economies is aggravated by the ongoing substitution of labor for capital, resulting 
in a rapidly growing reserve army unable to make a fair living. They fail to find 
steady engagement, are hired and fired in quick succession, and have no access 
to contributory social protection. Held captive in a regime of neoliberalism that 
has, over the years, acquired a punitive streak, their dire plight resembles the label 
attached to the erstwhile “non-deserving poor.” As victims of exclusionary politics, 
they are blamed for the progressive disuse made of their labor power. The prob-
lem as stated is not absence of gainful work per se but adamant unwillingness to 
scratch around and source it.
In the light of the extremely uneven development in the world at large, it 
comes as no surprise that more and more people from the Global South try to 
escape and settle in the better-off zones of the world. Between 2000 and 2017 the 
number of international migrants living in the North increased from 82.4 million 
to 146  million, while this fraction of the population from elsewhere residing in 
high-income countries rose in the same period from 9.6 percent to 14 percent.5 In 
 September 2016, a summit of the United Nations discussed the worldwide issue of 
refugees and migrants. The report observed, “Member States noted that poverty, 
including the lack of access to health care, education, labour markets and  essential 
services, were key drivers of voluntary migration. . . . The lack of economic oppor-
tunities for youth was identified as an important driver of migration.”6 The people 
who have become footloose beyond the borders of their country depart on what 
for many of them turns out to be a perilous journey. It is an ordeal difficult to 
survive, and of those that do, an unknown magnitude is detained somewhere 
along the route, sometimes traded as slaves to willing buyers. “Economic refu-
gees” who somehow manage to climb the walls erected around the “safe havens,” 
are often disallowed entry and sent back to where they “belong.” The exclusion of 
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alien intruders on the basis of their distinctive “otherness” is not restricted to the 
economically advanced quarters of the world but is not less ferociously practiced 
elsewhere. In our introductory chapter, we have commented on the wave of iden-
tity movements and parties sweeping through the political landscape that, though 
rightist in their appeal, are also joined by large segments of the working classes 
increasingly signaling their restiveness. The mainstream electorate wants to see 
citizenship restricted to those who are “our own,” hitting out against all those who 
cannot claim Blut und Boden heritage. People of different religious or ethnic stock 
are disparaged and discriminated against, marginalized or even totally excluded 
from occupying economic and societal space. It is a racialized mindset that not 
only is manifest at the level of the nation-state but also, having become normalized 
in the age of imperialism, aims to set the civilizations of the Global North apart 
from those of the Global South. The sloping divide separates a forward and privi-
leged segment of humanity from the disprivileged majority of the human species 
tainted with the stigma of backwardness.
The United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 asserts 
that social security is an inalienable human right. To implement this lofty dec-
laration requires political will in combination with administrative aptitude, and 
today, both are missing at the global level. National states have lost much (though 
certainly not all) of their sovereignty, a loss of power that has not been compen-
sated by supranational agencies. The ILO is the one organization vested with the 
mandate for a social compact; it has consistently failed to deliver what its conven-
tions promise. The IMF agrees that fiscal policy can be a powerful instrument for 
redistribution but fails to act on it. As a major protagonist of neoliberalism, the 
World Bank should be held co-responsible for the obscene inequality in wealth 
and income that has materialized, but this taskmaster of corporate finance has 
been erroneously conferred by the United Nations with counseling on how to 
combat poverty. A supranational authority capable of halting and reversing the 
trend of ever more accumulation versus immiserization is clearly lacking. We live 
in a transitional period in which many challenges can no longer be dealt with by 
national authorities, and not yet (if ever) by supranational or world authorities. In 
the contemporary global world, there is no equivalent of the nation-state at the 
world level that could implement fiscal and welfare policies, anti-trust controls, 
and labor and environmental laws aimed at regulating markets and at correcting 
market failures. Nor is there a world independent judiciary that can control and 
sanction illegal behavior. Nor is there a democratic polity at the world level.
Unable to raise, let alone solve, the social question at the global level, the prob-
lem is referred back to where it started, within the perimeters of the nation-states. 
They can at least mitigate the severity of the global social problem by “good gover-
nance,” which means limiting returns to shareholders; taxation to reduce extreme 
wealth; redistributing property and resources; restoring the public domain; and 
enhancing the bargaining power of people who lack representation, are prone to 
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disenfranchisement, and are excluded from social provisioning. Critique of exclu-
sionary policies seems to mainly address the state. In our opinion, rather than 
allow capital to remain shielded behind stare politics, it should be confronted 
head-on and held accountable for the well-being of both the laboring and the 
non-laboring poor in the world of today. The most likely consequence of what 
is in store may well be the collapse of what has become the hegemonic mode of 
production in today’s world, as a result of its own internal contradictions. But the 
downfall of capitalism could be precipitated by the demise of political democracy. 
That eventuality is already signaled loud and clear, as can be illustrated also by 
the surrender of equality as a civilizational ideal. Our prognosis is inspired by the 
failure to reconcile the ever-widening gap in well-being with the dictum of social 
justice and universal franchise. A reversal of the steep inequality merely at state 
level is bound to remain a piecemeal endeavor, at best, with an enormous diversity 
in disparate parts of the world.
While there is a global trend toward growing precarity and insecurity, we 
should keep in mind that the differences between and within the North and the 
South are still enormous. According to the IMF, in 2016 the GDP per capita, in 
international dollars, was in the United States, 57,436; in Germany, 48,111; in Brazil, 
15,242; in Nigeria, 5,942; and in Burundi, 814.7 Naturally, international solidarity is 
extremely difficult under such conditions. The governments of the more privileged 
countries, with the support of majorities of their populations, try to defend their 
living standards and what is left of their systems of social protection by violently 
excluding migrants from poorer parts of the world. Labor movements are at a low 
ebb and trade-union density the world all over is probably less than 7 percent.8 
Collective bargaining for a better deal is considered counterproductive to higher 
dividends. The World Employment Social Outlook 2017 reports that the ILO’s social 
unrest index shows that with the current socioeconomic situation, discontent in 
recent years has heightened across almost all regions.9 The misery and anger of 
the wretched of the earth cannot be wished away any longer. But will this looming 
threat persuade the powers that be to end the state of denial in which they want to 
keep the social question dormant?
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Want, disease, ignorance, squalor, and idleness: first recognized together in mid-nine-
teenth-century Europe, these are the focus of the Social Question. In 1942 William 
Beveridge called them the “giant evils” while diagnosing the crises produced by the 
emergence of industrial society. More recently, during the final quarter of the twentieth 
century, the global spread of neoliberal policies enlarged these crises so much that 
the Social Question has made a comeback. 
This carefully curated volume maps the linked crises across regions and countries and 
identifies the renewed and intensified Social Question as a labor issue. It includes 
discussions of American exceptionalism, Chinese repression, Indian exclusion, South 
African colonialism, democratic transitions in Eastern Europe, and other phenomena. 
Evaluated here are the effects of capitalism, the impact of the scarcity of waged work, 
and the degree to which the dispossessed poor bear the brunt of the crisis. Both thor-
ough and thoughtful, the book serves as collective effort to revive and reposition the 
Social Question, reconstructing its meaning and its politics in the world today.
“The global approach makes this book a highly innovative endeavor.” NICOLE MAYER-
AHUJA, Director, Sociological Research Institute at the University of Göttingen
“Approaches a familiar debate on the social implications of globalization using a lens 
that is at once unique, suggestive, and innovative.” EDWARD WEBSTER, Professor 
Emeritus and Founder of the Society, Work and Development Institute at the Univer-
sity of the Witwatersrand
JAN BREMAN is Emeritus Professor at the University of Amsterdam and author of On 
Pauperism in Present and Past. KEVAN HARRIS is Assistant Professor of Sociol-
ogy at the University of California, Los Angeles, and author of A Social Revolution: 
Politics and the Welfare State in Iran. CHING KWAN LEE is Professor of Sociology at 
the University of California, Los Angeles, and author of The Specter of Global China. 
MARCEL VAN DER LINDEN is Senior Fellow and former Director of Research at the 
International Institute of Social History and author of Workers of the World.
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
www.ucpress.edu | www.luminosoa.org 
A free ebook version of this title is available through Luminos, University of 
California Press’s Open Access publishing program for monographs.  
Visit www.luminosoa.org to learn more.
Cover illustration: © istockphotos.com. 
